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Abstract
In advanced industrial democracies, including Canada, elections act as important
mechanisms of democratic accountability. However, the migration of public decision-making
responsibility away from elected representatives and toward new governance models may
alter accountability relationships. As authority is dispersed horizontally to new governance
actors that exist beyond the reach of the ballot box, questions of public input and
accountability within the democratic governance process arise.
The objectives of the dissertation are: 1) to evaluate the extent to which Canadian provinces
have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to policy issues and
why; and 2) to evaluate the existence and relative strength of the accountability relationships
that emerge between new governance actors and both government and society once authority
has migrated. It is hypothesized that period in time, political ideology, and government fiscal
capacity are predictors of authority migration as a policy tool. Like wise, it is hypothesized
that period in time, political ideology, and the geographic scale of the new governance
jurisdictions, are predictors of the strength of both government and societal accountability
relationships.
To test the hypotheses, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are utilized. First, the
incidence of decision-making authority migration and strength of accountability relationships
are evaluated using regression analysis. This analysis considers these relationships using an
original dataset of cases of horizontal authority migration in the provinces of Alberta, British
Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario, between the years of 1946 and 2005. Second, case
studies and qualitative interviews are leveraged to gain greater contextual understanding of
the causes and implications of migration of decision-making authority to regional healthcare
bodies in the provinces selected.
While horizontal governance arrangements may raise questions over public input and
accountability, findings support the hypothesis that their use is not new having existed for the
entire post-war period. Furthermore, while the accountability relationship between
government and new governance actors has remained dominant, the accountability
relationship with society is strengthening as predicted. Perception of accountability
ii

relationships by interviewees, however, suggests that a lack of clarity in decision-making
responsibility has weakened the ability for citizens to hold decision-makers accountable.

Keywords
Accountability, Multilevel Governance, Type II Multilevel Governance, Authority
Migration, Democratic Accountability, Public Accountability, Democracy.
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Chapter 1
1

Introduction: The Migration of Authority

On December 27th 2009 Reilly Anzovino died as the ambulance carrying her reached the
Welland hospital. Anzovino was taken to the Welland hospital, approximately twenty
kilometers from the scene of the car accident that caused her injuries. The Fort Erie
Douglas Memorial hospital, which was only five kilometers from the accident scene, had
recently had its emergency room closed (Hamilton Spectator, 2010).
The decision to close the emergency room in Fort Erie was made by the Haldimand Brant
Local Health Integration Network (HNHM LHIN). The HNHB HLIN is one of fourteen
not-for-profit corporations in Ontario that work with local health providers and
community members to determine the health service priorities for their regions. The
Local Health Integration Networks were created in 2006 with the stated purpose of
planning, integrating, and funding local health services, including: Hospitals, Community
Care Access Centres, Community Support Services, Long-term Care, Mental Health and
Addictions Services and Community Health Centres (Ontario Local Health Integration
Network, 2006). At its January 27th 2009 meeting the HNHB LHIN passed a motion
requiring the Niagara Health System to make changes at its hospital site in Fort Erie.
Among the changes was the order to close the emergency room at the Fort Erie Douglas
Memorial hospital (Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant LHIN, 2009).
Like many public policy decisions, the decision to close the emergency room at the Fort
Erie Douglas Memorial hospital was made neither by an elected representative nor by a
member of the public service for whom our elective representatives are accountable.
Instead a not-for-profit corporation to which the Ontario government migrated decisionmaking authority over fundamental aspects of the Ontario public healthcare system made
the decision. Using the language of multilevel governance, decision-making
responsibility had shifted horizontally from a general-purpose jurisdiction, the province
of Ontario, to a task-specific jurisdiction, the HNHB LHIN. It is in this environment,
where actors from outside of traditional government are engaged in the act of public
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governance, that this research is focused. As public decision-making authority migrates
beyond the traditional confines of government, questions must be asked as to the
resulting implications for public input and democratic accountability. How are such
decision-makers held accountable for their actions?
In assessing the implication of authority migration for democratic accountability the
proceeding chapters focus on the following: 1) the extent to which Canadian provinces
have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to policy issues
and what factors explain the migration of authority; and 2) the existence and relative
strength of the accountability relationships that emerge once authority has been migrated,
especially the accountability relationship between the new governance actors and both
government and society. In other words, how often is decision-making authority migrated
and why? When authority is migrated, who are the new decision-makers accountable to?
And, how strong are the new accountability relationships? Expressed in terms of the
decision to close of the emergency room at the Fort Erie Douglas Memorial hospital, the
questions being asked would be: 1) What factors explain the migration of healthcare
decision-making authority? And 2) How can citizens hold LHINs accountable for the
decisions made that shape public healthcare within their community?

1.1 Authority Migration and the Changing Face of
Governance
As stated by David Adamany in his introduction to 1975 edition of Schattschneier’s The
Semisovereign People, the most legitimate question for political scientists in a democracy
is how can the people control government (Adamany, 1975: xiii). In the case of authority
migration, the question can be expanded to how can the people control the range of actors
engaged in the governance process. As the governance structure has changed, what is the
effect on the ability of citizens to hold decision-makers accountable?
While the word governance has become omnipresent, it remains a contested term with
people ascribing varied meanings to the concept of governance based upon their own
theories and values (Bevir, 2010: 1-2; Pierre and Peters, 2005: 1; Torfing, et al., 2012: 2).
The interest in governance reflects concerns over how to understand the changing role of
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public leadership and the changing institutional and social patterns in society (Torfing, et
al., 2012: 2). As a concept, governance is not constant, but shifts in step with changes in
the needs and values of society (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 49). At one time governance
simply referred to statecraft, or the exercise of governmental responsibility (Stivers,
2008: 5), however, as societal needs and values changed, the meaning of governance has
changed to include a broader range of actors in the governance process. The current use
of government and governance now convey different meanings and can no longer be used
interchangeably (Hughs, 2010: 89; Rhodes, 1997: 46). The modern conceptualization of
governance can be broadly defined as collective problem solving in the public realm
(Caporaso, 1996: 32). Another account suggests that governance is the pursuit of
collective interests and the steering and coordination of society (Peters and Pierre, 2006:
209). Bell and Hindmoor provide a more fleshed out definition, defining governance as
shaping, regulating, or attempting to control human behaviour in order to achieve
collective ends (2009: 2).
While for the majority of the past three centuries we have associated the act of
governance with the state and a dominant pattern of hierarchical governing in which
governments decide the laws and policies to be adopted, this traditional view of
governance is being challenged as networks and other social actors seek greater
autonomy (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209-210). Challenges to the traditional structure of
governance have also emerged in the form of high demand for governance. The demand
for governance has expanded beyond the capacity of the state to the point where
governance requirements cannot be fulfilled without widespread delegation (Flinders,
2006: 223). The result is an increased interest in partnerships between government and
societal actors and the dispersal of political authority across multiple layers (Peters and
Pierre, 2006: 209). The state is no longer seen to monopolize the governance process, and
governments are now subject to negotiations with a wide range of public, semi-public,
and private actors when engaged in policy formation (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007: 3-4).
This dispersal of authority has reshaped the governance landscape and brought about
questions of democratic input and accountability within the governance process (Peters
and Pierre, 2006: 209).
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At the heart of the question over public input and democratic accountability is the
movement of decision-making out of the hands of elected representatives. A central
premise of democracy is that decision-makers are legitimate and accountable. In the
democratic tradition the election process has fulfilled these roles at it provides a
mechanism by which to identify the legitimate representatives of the people and a means
through which to hold the same representatives accountable. As stated by James Fearon,
in elections have been seen as an important mechanism of accountability through which
the policy preferences of the citizens can induce government action (1999: 57). However,
the new forms of governance that have emerged as decision-making authority has been
migrated rarely call for the popular election of board members and decision-makers. In
the absence of elections, it is essential to examine whether mechanisms are being put in
place to ensure the continued legitimacy and accountability of decision-makers.
When authority migrates beyond the boundaries of elected government, the nature of the
ensuing accountability relationships must be considered. In the chapters that follow two
potential accountability relationships are investigated: 1) the relationship with
government through which government holds decision-makers directly accountable and
citizens hold decision-makers indirectly accountable through government; and 2) the
relationship with society in which citizens hold decision-makers directly accountable. In
addition to the two possible accountability relationships, a third outcome exists where
decision-makers are neither accountable to government nor citizens. Through the
evaluation of both potential accountability relationships a better understanding can be
gained of if and how decision-makers that exist outside of traditional government are
held accountable.
Up until now, the goal of this chapter has been to provide context and to instill a sense of
importance in studying the migration of decision-making authority away from elected our
elected representatives. In the next section the focus shifts to outlining each of the
following chapters and how each of the two accountability relationships discussed above
are evaluated using both qualitative and quantitative means.
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1.2 Assessing the Migration of Authority and Accountability:
A Chapter Outline
In investigating the changes in the governance environment and the implications for
democratic accountability, this research project assesses both the extent to which
governments have opted to migrate authority and the subsequent accountability relations
that emerge. To accomplish these ends instances of authority migration in the provinces
of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the years of 1946 and
2005 are considered. Provincial politics was selected as it provides a larger sample sizes
than using national level data alone. The specific provinces were selected based on
regional diversity and political ideology. The sixty-year timeframe was selected as it
provided an observation window that began with the emergence of Keynesianism after
World War II and continuing through the shift to neoliberalism.
The necessary theoretical constructs that underpin this research endeavour are put
forward in Chapter 2. Using the construct of multilevel governance, authority migration
and the potential accountability relationships are discussed. The concept of accountability
is then elaborated upon, followed by the challenges to accountability that authority
migration is seen to cause. Chapter 2 concludes with a preview of the hypotheses to be
discussed and evaluated in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the methodology and the data used
throughout the research project, including the rational for the timeframe, provinces, and
specific case studies selected for study. Moreover, as the project realizes upon datasets
compiled specifically for the purpose of this study, Chapter 3 provides a detailed account
of the compilation criteria and process. The methodology used to conduct both large-n
quantitative analysis and the ensuing case studies is also discussed in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4 the ‘newness’ of authority migration and the ensuing governance
arrangements are first evaluated. Taking a historical perspective, the rate at which the
provincial government of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario migrate
authority is evaluated across time. If authority migration is a recent trend, then the rate of
authority migration should increase over time. If authority migration is nothing new,
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however, and what is being witnessed is the accumulation of decisions to migrate
authority then the rate of authority migration should remain relatively stable, while the
number of decision-making bodies that exist beyond the confines of the traditional state
should increase.
Beyond the newness of authority migration, Chapter 4 explores two hypotheses regarding
the rate of authority migration. First, that as the capacity of government to respond to
policy demands decreases the rate at which authority is migrated increases. Second, that
governments further to the left on the political spectrum will be less likely to migrate
authority than governments on the right. In Chapter 4 a quantitative approach is
employed, which uses both descriptive statistics and regression analysis.
While Chapter 4 assesses the extent to which authority has migrated, Chapter 5 assesses
the strength of the subsequent accountability relationships. To do so a quantitative
approach is again used. A dataset containing all cases of authority migration in the
provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario between the years of
1946 and 2005 is again used. For all cases, the accountability relationship with both
government and society is coded based upon Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability,
which states that “accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which
the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (2007: 450).
In Chapter 5 the effect of time, political ideology and the geographic scale on the strength
of the accountability relationship between both Type II bodies and government and
society are tested. In evaluating the effect of political ideology it is expected that
governments further to the left will build stronger accountability relationships with
government than governments further to the right. When considering accountability
relationships over time, Chapter 5 assesses whether the accountability relationships, both
with government, and society, have been strengthening or weakening over time. Lastly,
Chapter 5 explorers the effect of geographic size as the strength of each accountability
relationships is compared across jurisdictions that are municipal, regional, provincial, or
interprovincial in size.
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Having looked at the universe of cases of authority migrating in the provinces of Alberta,
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the years of 1946-2005, attention in
Chapter 6 is turned to the migration of authority in a specific policy area – healthcare.
Building on the results of previous chapters, Chapter 6 explores the process by which
each of the four provinces legislated the migration of authority and the creation of health
authorities in their health care systems. To continue to develop an understanding of why
authority migrates, both the fiscal capacity and political ideology hypotheses put forward
in Chapter 4 are evaluated against the migration of authority in the four health care
systems. Moreover, additional factors that influenced the decision to migrate authority in
each of the four cases are sought, such as increased capacity for citizen participation,
through the exploration of how the changes in the healthcare system were framed.
Beyond examining the factors that led to the migration of authority, Chapter 6 looks at
the consistency of the framing of the policy problem and solution with the eventual
policy outcomes. In doing so both the initial migration of authority and the subsequent
changes to the governance structure are considered.
Chapter 7 investigates the existence and functioning of the accountability relationships
that emerged with creation of health authorities. An initial overview of the formal
accountability mechanisms put in place by government through legislation and regulation
as well as the accountability initiatives put in place by the health authorities are provided.
Moving from how the accountability relationships appear on paper to how they are
perceived in practice, interview responses from members of the health authorities,
provincial public service employees, elected representatives, and members of interest
groups active in the health care field are then assessed. In evaluating the accountability
relationship between the provincial health authorities and both government and society,
Chapter 7 considers the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 5. However, the main focus is
on how the accountability of the health authorities is perceived. Interviews are used to
gain greater understanding of whom regional health authorities are seen to be accountable
to and whether the existing accountability structures are believed to be effective.
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1.3 Implications
Through the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches this research responds to
concerns that the migration of authority outside of traditional government weakens the
accountability relationships between the people and those who make decisions on their
behalf. Significant academic literature exists on the vertical migration of authority to
different levels of elected government and the migration of authority upward to the
international sphere as a result of globalization. This project instead focuses on the
understudied horizontal migration of authority outward from government toward special
purpose bodies. The key contributions of this research are the illumination of the
accountability relationships that emerge once decision-making authority shifts beyond the
immediate responsibility of our elected representatives, and the relative effectiveness of
these relationships.
In Democratic theory, elections have been an important mechanism of accountability
through which the policy preferences of the citizens can induce government action
(Fearon, 1999: 57). The migration of decision-making responsibility outside the
boundaries of elected governments, however, necessitates a different conceptualization of
accountability relationships. When decision-making authority is granted to an unelected
body, what are the channels and processes available to citizens to hold decision-makers
accountable? Through the evaluation of the existence and strength of accountability
relationships between decision-makers, such as the HNHB LHIN, and both government
and society, an understanding of if and how these decision-makers are held accountable
can be gained.
Linked to concerns over accountability is the extent to which authority is migrated. The
greater the tendency of government to resolve public policy issues through authority
migration, the greater the implications for any associated loss of accountability. Through
studying both the propensity for governments to migrate authority and the viability of
resulting accountability relationships, both the validity of accountability concerns and
risk to democratic accountability presented by the volume of instances of authority
migration can be addressed.
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Overall, in assessing both the frequency and the effect on democratic accountability of
having decision-making authority migrated horizontally to special purpose bodies this
research fills significant gaps in the academic literature on two levels. First, by focusing
on the horizontal migration of authority at the provincial level, the research explores an
area of authority migration that while common in practice is understudied in the
academic literature. Second, backed by empirical findings, this research contributes to
our broader understanding of roles and abilities that both government and citizens play in
holding decision-makers accountable.
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Chapter 2
2

Theoretical Background: Migration of Authority,
Multilevel Governance, and Accountability

At its core, democracy can be described as self-governance though collective decision
and action (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 317; Warren, 2011: 687). The structure of
representative democracy has remained relatively constant during the last two centuries:
rulers are elected by citizens, citizens are free to discuss and demand at all times, but can
give no legally binding instructions, and rulers are subject to periodic reelection (Manin,
Przeworski and Stokes, 1999: 3). Within the structure of representative democracy, the
dominant pattern of governance has been hierarchical, where government decides the
laws and policies to be adopted (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209).
While the structure of representative democracy has remained relatively constant, the
traditional pattern of governance has been challenged (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209). An
increasing number of public and private actors now have an effect on how society is
governed (Sørensen, 2006: 98). Government has become just one of many actors,
resulting in policy areas becoming more crowded and contested and the boundary
between public and private less precise (Kennett, 2010: 20). New governance
arrangements have emerged that do not align with conventional government hierarchy
and new actors in public governance may operate autonomously from the dictates of
legislatures and public agencies (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 316). As stated in the
November 1999 report by the Auditor General of Canada, changes have occurred in how
we are governed with some policy initiatives moving beyond traditional forms of
governance as responsibility is shifted to entities outside of government (1999: 23-27).
The transformation in public governance has been met with both optimism and concern.
From a positive perspective, the migration of authority to special purpose bodies holds
the potential for more responsive governance than a single area-wide political monopoly
(Bollens, 1986: 119; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 633). The migration of authority to task
specific bodies may allow greater efforts and resources to be effectively concentrated on
specific problems than would otherwise be the case (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 107).
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Moreover, expanding the number of decision-making bodies in the public realm may also
increase the opportunity for public participation in the decision-making process
(Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 633; Sørensen, 2006: 104). Government may even find that
the use of nongovernmental actors in certain circumstances is better suited to achieving
the state’s goals than government itself (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 226; Bell and
Hindmoor, 2009: 99).
From a critical perspective, the transformation of the role of government in governance
has been seen to undermine representative democracy. The legitimacy of representative
democracy is threatened as elected governments struggle to direct the policy process
(Bevir, 2010: 2). The dispersal of authority away from government can limit the ability of
politicians to translate the public’s demands into effective political action (Andrew and
Goldsmith, 1998: 104; Peters, 2004: 132) as well as weaken legitimacy and create
disillusionment with the political process (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104). The
potential also exists that public accountability will be lost as decision-making is removed
from the political arena (Bollens, 1986: 118-119; Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209; Skelcher,
2007: 63). Even if the state maintains a preeminent position in the governance process,
the involvement of nongovernment actors runs the risk of separating elected politicians
from decisions (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 50). As the role of government in the
governance structure is transformed there is the possibility that policy processes and
decisions will become closed to public influence, while at the same time open to
corruption (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104; Peters, 2004: 133).
The changing role of government in governance and the increased inclusion of new
actors in the governance process have given rise to multiple concerns over democratic
input and accountability (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 5; Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209;
Flinders, 2011: 2; Gotham, 2012: 644). Taking into account both state-centric and
society-centric perspectives on modern governance arrangements, the remainder of this
chapter will provide a theoretical background for authority migration, state vs. society
control of the governance process, and the prognosis for accountability. The concept of
accountability will be explored as well as the possible accountability relationships that
may emerge as authority is migrated outside the boundaries of traditional government
11

institutions. The chapter will conclude with an overview of the hypotheses that will be
explored and tested in the following chapters.

2.1 Authority Migration and Multilevel Governance
One dimension along which governance can vary is centralization of authority. Authority
can be highly concentrated in a single hierarchical entity that claims exclusive
jurisdiction or dispersed among various nodes, each exercising only limited jurisdiction
(Kahler and Lake, 2004: 409). Furthermore, the dispersal of authority may result in broad
authority over a limited geographic jurisdiction, or concentrated authority in specific
policy areas (Richardson, 2011: 671). The migration of authority can then be thought of
as occurring along both a vertical and horizontal axis. Along the vertical axis authority
can be distributed to successively more local levels of government in which the more
limited jurisdictions are nested within larger jurisdictions. Along the horizontal axis the
authority can be dispersed to actors outside of government.
One conceptualization of authority migration has been captured in the term “multilevel
governance”. The term multilevel governance emerged out of Gary Marks’s attempt to
better characterize the governance structure of the European Union. Marks argued that
what was being witnessed in the European Union was the “emergence of multilevel
governance, a system of continuous negotiation among nested levels of governments at
several territorial tiers - supranational, national, regional and local - as the result of a
broad process of institutional creation and decision reallocation that has pulled some
previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down
to local/regional level” (1993: 392). The basis for Marks’s argument was that EU
Structural policy did not fit within either a national or supranational conception of
governance. Instead, what Marks witnessed was a two-sided process that involved the
decentralization of decision making to subnational governments while at the same time
powers were centralized at the supranational level. The result of this process was
decision-making power being spun away from the national state in both subnational and
supranational directions (Marks, 1993: 401-402). In addressing authority migration,
multilevel governance does not reject the importance of the state, but instead asserts that
the state no longer monopolizes policy-making authority. According to multilevel
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governance, decision-making authority is shared among actors at different levels, rather
than monopolized by state executives (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 346). As stated
by Bache and Flinders, the analytical focus of multilevel governance can be seen as the
increasingly contested jurisdictional and territorial boundaries both within and beyond the
state, the fundamental concern being how to explain the dispersal of central government
authority both vertically to actors at other territorial levels and horizontally to non-state
actors (2005: 4).
Building upon Marks’ work, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks developed two contrasting
visions of how to conceptualize multi-jurisdictional governance labeled Type I and Type
II multilevel governance. Marks and Hooghe’s Type I and Type II multilevel governance
typology provides an effective tool for identifying and conceptualizing different forms of
multi-jurisdictional governance. Type I multilevel governance has its intellectual
foundation in federalism, which is concerned with power sharing among governments
operating at different levels (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 17). Type I multilevel governance
is described as the dispersion of authority to a minimal number of jurisdictional levels
into which a wide array of policy areas are bundled, with smaller jurisdictions nested
within larger ones and only one relevant jurisdiction existing at each territorial scale. Like
federalism, Type I multilevel governance is characterized by general-purpose
jurisdictions, rather than task specific jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe, 2003: 236-237;
2005: 17-19). Unlike federalism; however, Type I multilevel governance is not confined
by the geographic boundaries of nation states (Marks and Hooghe 2005: 19). As such,
Type I jurisdictions include both federal states such as Canada as well as supranational
entities such as the European Union.
In contrast with Type I multilevel governance, Type II multilevel governance denotes
independent jurisdictions that fulfill specific functions as the unit of analysis. Type II
multilevel governance is defined as having intersecting memberships in the sense that
borders will be crossed and jurisdictions may overlap; as being organized across a large
number of levels in which authority is not neatly layered but diverse in scale; and being
flexible in design, allowing it to respond to changing citizen preferences and functional
requirements (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 20-21). According to Marks and Hooghe, Type
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II multilevel governance can be conceptualized as a system where citizens are not served
by ‘the’ government, but by several public service industries (2003: 237). The flexibility
and territorial diversity means that Type II jurisdictions are located across multiple levels
of government ranging from the transnational to the local level. At the international level,
Type II jurisdictions can be seen to include organizations such as the Basel Committee
for Banking Supervision, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision oversees the regulation of international
banking, while the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are charged with the
formation of codes of good practice for regulatory and macroeconomic matters (Baker,
Hudson and Woodward, 2005: 10). At the local level, Type II jurisdictions may be
created to deal with concerns regarding natural resources, fire protection, water supply,
housing, sewage, parks and recreation, or any other single function issue area (Marks and
Hooghe, 2005: 26).
The construction of both territorial and functional dispersions of power characterized by
Type I and Type II multilevel governance are not unlike the Althusian compound state.
Michael Burgess describes the Althusian compound state as an “amalgam of political
associations based upon consent and built up from below, in which power is distributed
both territorially and functionally” (2000: 8). Althusius conceptualized institutional
structure made up of a plurality of smaller and larger consociations, or self-governing
authorities (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 92) where the small consociations determine what
authority was delegated to larger consociations, meaning that decisions were apt to
remain at the lowest practical level (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 96).
In keeping decisions at the lowest practical level, Althusius foreshadowed the modern
principal of subsidiarity (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 96). The principal of subsidiarity is
the normative position that decision-making authority should be placed at the level of
government that is closest to the citizen and best positioned to carry out a particular task
(Leuprecht and Lazar, 2007: 5). From the perspective of fiscal federalism, which
primarily distributes authority along the vertical axis, the most appropriate level of
government is the lowest level of government that encompasses the relevant benefits and
costs (Oates 2004: 15). In cases where externalities are inter-jurisdictional, regional
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organizations may emerge which are capable of addressing the problem through
negotiations and coordinated decision making (Oates 2004: 23), thus pushing authority
upwards. While such approaches may result in optimal governance structures,
determining the appropriate level at which responsibility rests encompasses political as
well as economic factors. Political participation by both citizens and governments
interacts with economic efficiency in determining the governance system (Oates 2004:
30-31).
While fiscal federalism typically looks at the division of powers vertically at the
territorial level, multilevel governance, like the Althusian compound state, divides
powers along both territorial and functional lines. As the principal of subsidiarity is
premised upon regulatory tasks being undertaken as close as possible to those being
regulated (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 888), the principal is equally suited to both Type I and
Type II multilevel governance. The challenge is to build effective processes for collective
action that recognize the principle of subsidiarity, without weakening democracy
(Skelcher, 2005: 106-107).
While Althusius envisioned the smaller political groupings deciding which decisions
should be migrated upward to larger consociations (Hueglin and Fenna, 2006: 96), Marks
and Hooghe argue that in contemporary multilevel governance arrangements it is
common for Type II multilevel governance structures to be embedded in the legal
frameworks determined by Type I jurisdictions (2003: 238; 2005: 24). Accordingly, Type
I and Type II multilevel governance should not be viewed as competing approaches, but
as complementary approaches where the selected model is a function of the problem
which needs to be addressed (Marks and Hooghe 2005: 29). Type II multilevel
governance bodies can be employed as a tool of government through the delegation of
authority in response to a specific policy circumstance. Alternatively, Type II multilevel
governance may occur when private actors play a dominant role in the policy making
process, causing public actors to adopt the privately negotiated regimes (Marks and
Hooghe 2005: 25).
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While Type I jurisdictions may involve private actors, Type II jurisdictions have higher
rates of private involvement that may result in the opening up of public decision making
to private actors to various degrees (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 24). The potential for
either government or non-government actors to be dominant in the policy process
suggests that multiple paths with varied degrees of government control can be taken
when formulating Type II governance jurisdictions. In essence, the steering of regulatory
decision-making for Type II jurisdictions can be conceptualized along two axes, societycentric in which society steers or state-centric in which government steers, as presented in
Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Society and Government Steering in Regulatory Decision Making

As shown in Figure 2.1, multilevel governance, unlike traditional models of
intergovernmental relationships, includes both public and private actors in the
governance process of exchange and collaboration. At the same time, however, the
institutional dimension of multilevel governance remains important. Institutions define
the linkages between different levels of government as well as shape and constrain the
larger web of political actions (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 83). As the linkages, both
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vertically and horizontally, have become more complex the role of the traditional
political centre has become redefined (Torfing et al., 2012: 97-98).
While Marks and Hooghe’s typology is useful for distinguishing between a traditional
government approach to governance (Type I) and a special purpose governance
jurisdiction that can exist outside of government (Type II), there is no agreement on how
governance that spans multiple jurisdictions should be organized. Multiple concepts,
including multi-tiered governance and polycentric governance, deal with the same
questions of authority dispersal that multilevel governance attempts to answer (Bache and
Flinders, 2005: 4). As discussed below, alternative definitions can be found in the works
of Blatter, Rosenau, and Frey and Eichenberger.
Joachim Blatter states that common to debates over the institutional transformations that
are occurring within the traditional Westphalian state are de-territorialization and
unbundling of politics. While the Westphalian system bundles political responsibility on
a territorial basis and subordinates all other identities to national identity, it is possible
through the unbundling of politics for territorial communities to be supplemented by nonterritorial communities (Blatter 2003: 185-186). While the underlying themes may be
consistent, in looking at broader regions within both North America and Europe, Blatter
distinguishes between the emerging governance structures. The European case, which
features institutions with a clear-cut geographic basis and multi-sectoral goals and tasks,
is labeled by Blatter as a ‘multi-level system’ which is described as ‘multilevel
governance’ complemented by an additional layer of institutions of governance and
identity formation. The North American case, which features institutions with fluid
geographic bases, is described as a ‘multi-polity system’ where non-territorial polities
complement traditional governance structures along single policy dimensions (Blatter,
2003: 203-204). Blatter’s identification of ‘multi-level’ and ‘multi-polity’ as contrasting
systems of governance is not dissimilar to Marks and Hooghe’s multilevel governance
typology in which Type I is categorized as being multi-level with a minimal number of
clearly defined geographically jurisdictions, while Type II multilevel governance is
policy focuses and cuts across traditional geographic boundaries.
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Rosenau has used the term ‘fragmegration’ to describe the link between fragmentation
and integration as the location of jurisdictional authority is shaped simultaneously by
globalization, centralization and integration on one hand and localization,
decentralization, and fragmentation on the other (2000: 177-178; 2005: 35). To
conceptualize who has the right to exercise authority, Rosenau uses ‘spheres of authority’
that define the range and capacity of actors to generate compliance on the part of those to
whom the directives are issued (2005: 32; 2007: 89). Constructed by formal and informal
rules (Rosenau, 2005: 32), Rosenau argues that ‘spheres of authority’, in comparison to
multilevel governance, allow for the study of the full complexity observed in the political
world.
Frey and Eichenberger have developed the concept of Functional, Overlapping, and
Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ), which is similar to Marks and Hooghe’s
conceptualization of non-territorial communities under their label of Type II multilevel
governance. According to Frey and Eichenberger, FOCJ allow the emergence of political
bodies whose size corresponds with the tasks to be fulfilled. Instead of being based upon
1

historical territories, the geographic extension of a FOCUS is driven by the physical
extension of the problem (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999: 3). FOCJ are characterized by
four properties: FOCJ are determined by the function to be fulfilled and the jurisdictional
size must match accordingly; FOCJ are overlapping in their geographical extensions;
FOCJ are competitive and are forced to cater to the preferences of citizens due to the
threat of exit and political competition through democratic institutions; and FOCJ are
formal political units with powers to regulate and tax (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999: 4-7).
As such, FOCJ align with Type II multilevel governance in regard to the emphasis on
functionalism, overlapping non-territorial geographic extensions, and competition
between jurisdictions, however, the guarantee of political competition through
democratic institutions in Frey and Eichenberger’s FOCJ limits the number of potential
cases in comparison to Marks and Hooghe’s Type II multilevel governance.

1 FOCUS is the term Frey and Eichenberger use for the singular of FOCJ.
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While there is a lack of agreement on how governance that spans multiple jurisdictions
should be organized, Marks and Hooghe’s contrasting, yet complementary, forms of
multilevel governance are appropriate for understanding the migration of authority at the
federal and provincial level within Canada. Using multilevel governance to study politics
in Canada is not new. Multilevel governance has been used to study specific policy areas,
such Leo and August’s look at immigration (2009); the study of voting behaviour in the
case of Anderson’s exploration of economic voting (2006; 2008); and the creation of the
Canada Research Chair in Multilevel Governance in 2003 to promote research into
governance and public policies in Canada aimed at identifying the intergovernmental
relations and processes that produce the best public policies (Canada. Canada Research
Chairs, 2003).
Conceptually, multilevel governance aligns well with Canadian governance. The
traditional federal dynamics of Canadian governance is captured under Type I multilevel
governance, while the emergence of special purpose jurisdictions, which is the central
focus of this research, is incorporated under Type II. Furthermore, Marks and Hooghe’s
framing of Type I and Type II bodies as complementary, in which the selected
governance model is a function of the problem that needs to be addressed (Marks and
Hooghe 2005: 29) and that Type II multilevel governance structures can be embedded in
legal frameworks determined by Type I jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe 2003: 238;
Marks and Hooghe 2005: 24) aligns with the migration of authority by government actors
to external decision-making bodies that has given rise to concerns over public
accountability. Lastly, unlike Frey and Eichenberger’s FOJC, the definition of Type II
multilevel governance lacks the requirement for political competition through democratic
institutions. In omitting the need for political competition, Type II multilevel governance
more adequately captures the range of institutional arrangements that occur as a result of
authority migration in Canada. While there exists bodies, such as the Vancouver Board of
Parks and Recreation, that have elected commissioners (Vancouver. Board of Parks and
Recreation, 2012), there are many more that fail to incorporate political competition into
the institutional design.
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While multilevel governance may be useful in terms of both the act and the
understanding of governance arrangements, it is not without critique. Peters and Pierre
have described multilevel governance as a Faustian bargain (Peters and Pierre, 2005;
Pierre and Peters, 2005). In Christopher Marlowe’s play The Tragic History of Doctor
Faustus, Dr. Faustus gives his soul to Lucifer in exchange for Mephistopheles as his
servant. As the play draws to a close, however, Dr. Faustus realizes that for the vain
pleasure of twenty-four years he has lost eternal joy (Marlowe, 1604). Peters and Pierre
argue that multilevel governance may be a Faustian bargain as the capacity to govern has
been sold in an attempt to achieve a more inclusive bargaining process (2005, 94). While
multilevel governance has the potential for high problem solving capacity and to generate
efficient outcomes it also has features that call its democratic nature in to question (Pierre
and Peters, 2005: 99).

2.2 State-Centric Multilevel Governance: Government
Steering
Decision-making in the public sphere by non-government actors is not new. Voluntary, or
third sector, actors have involved in the provision of public services longer than that of
the state (Pestoff and Brandsen, 2010: 223). Today, however, the increasing inclusion of
new actors in public governance has changed how the role of government is perceived.
Two opposing views on the role of government have emerged in the literature: statecentric and society-centric. The society-centric position argues that changes in
governance structures represent a shift away from government dominance toward the
increasing reliance on non-state actors, while state-centric view claims that government
has remained the principal actor in governance (Robihau, 2011: 116-117). From the statecentric perspective, while actors external to government have long been involved in
governance, modern governance has been transformed by becoming increasingly
formally organized, legally bound and state controlled. When approached from the
society-centric perspective, governance is seen as a multidirectional process between
multiple actors within and between complex systems (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 887).
In attempting to understand the changing role of the state, Jon Pierre (2000) identifies
three aspects of state governance that can be seen as particularly relevant to multilevel
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governance discourse and the understanding of how to attribute responsibility. First,
Pierre points to a linkage between the relaxation of regulatory steering within the state
and the emergence of public-private exchange. This suggests the emergence of a model in
which the state seeks to increase its points of contact with its external environment as a
means of conveying its objectives to society. Secondly, Pierre suggests that state power
and institutional capacity are becoming increasingly contingent upon both public and
private resources and the ability to direct both toward a common set of objectives. Lastly,
Pierre states that the model of governance has, to a greater or lesser extent, emerged as a
steering model that can be witnessed in the growing interest in public-private partnerships
and the migration of functions that are not critical to the state (2000: 242-243). Overall,
what Pierre is suggesting is not the weakening of the state, but a shift in state function.
Likewise, Wallington, Lawrence, and Loechel claim that new governance arrangements
are not the hollowing out of the state, but the result of the state wanting to govern well
rather than govern less (2008: 3). In evaluating the role of government in the economy,
Crouch argues that while the role of the state changes in response to changes in the
governance environment, the state has not withdrawn from the scene, but has remained
an active form of governance. While networks and markets have grown in importance,
the need for close and constant adjustment of the regulatory regime leaves the question of
whether there is more or less state control open to debate (Crouch, 2004: 113). As stated
by Skelcher et al., the inclusion of new governance actors does not mean a relationship of
equals (2005: 578), the role of new actors may be more modest than society-centred
arguments presumes (Leuprecht and Lazar, 2007: 2).
In assessing the changing role of the state, Bob Jessop argues that we are seeing the
emergence of a metagoverning state. The state, in response to the re-articulation of
different levels of territorial organization of power within the global political system, has
enhanced its role in managing inter-scalar relations, thus seeking to control how and
where authority is migrated to minimize effects upon the overall power of the state. In
response to the shift from government to governance, the state has increased its role in
metagovernance, thus getting involved in redesigning markets, constitutional change,
jurisdictional reregulation, setting the conditions of self-organization and organizing the
overall process for collaboration. As such, the state can be seen as setting the overall
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ground rules for governance and regulatory order (Jessop, 2004: 19 and Jessop, 2005: 6465, Sørensen, 2006: 101). As argued by Chevallier, the government remains central to the
governance process, “mais à la manière d'un «stratège» et non plus d'un «pilote»” (2003:
212). It is important to acknowledge, however, that embedded within the idea of
metagovernace is the recognition that a number of organizations or processes have
attained sufficient autonomy to warrant some degree of control be imposed overtop of the
existing governance process (Peters, 2010a: 37).
Regardless of the level of autonomy, governance can be seen to occur in what Scharpf
identified as the “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf, 1994: 38-39). In the modern state, both
public and private actors operate under the shadow of hierarchy where public actors set
the legal rules of the game and intervene to correct distortions or outcomes that violate
public interests (Börzel, 2010: 196-197). So while the underlying assumption of
multilevel governance is that centralization has given way to new forms of governance,
resulting in decision-making authority being dispersed across multiple jurisdictions, it
can be argued that the state continues to play a fundamental role within the process. If
this is indeed the case, and as Jessop argues we are seeing the emergence of
metagovernance, we can expect Type II jurisdictions to be accountable to government
through its central role in shaping the structure of governance. Furthermore, we can
expect accountability mechanisms to be built into the institutional environment created
by government in the conception of Type II jurisdictions, as institutionalizing an
accountability relationship between government and Type II decision-makers will serve
to maintain government control of public policy. The absence of accountability
mechanisms within the institutional design does not necessarily mean the absence of state
steering as the state may engage in other informal mechanisms of control, however, it can
be expected that governments will utilize the institutional design process to preserve their
steering capacity.
From this state-centric perspective, while governance structures may have been altered as
governments adopted a wider range of governance strategies to address policy issues,
government has remained at the centre. According to Bell and Hindmoor regardless of
the governance approach put into place, the state has remained the preeminent actor in
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the governance process (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 10; 2009a: 153-154). Government
occupies a privileged position as it alone has the legislative capacity to set the rules of
governance (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 895; Rhodes, 2007: 1244; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009:
13). As argued by Bell and Hindmoor, only governments have the legitimate authority to
select, alter, and replace governance mechanisms. This power serves to keep other
governance actors in line and preserves government dominance in the policy process
(Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 13). According to Elke Löffler, the key question for
government is which governance approach to use to deal with a specific problem. There
are policy issues that lend themselves to delegation to community groups, those that lend
themselves to market mechanisms and those that are best addressed through hierarchy
(2009: 230). Consistent with Bell and Hindmoor, Löffler places government at the centre
of governance as the result of government’s power to select which governance approach
is paired with a policy problem.
While government may be the sole holder of legislative authority, this does not mean that
government action will result in the desired consequences. As stated by Rhodes, it is
important to distinguish between intervention and control. Governments can and often do
intervene in the governance process, but such interventions do not always have the
intended effects, raising questions of control (Rhodes, 2007: 1248). Matthews argues that
intra-governmental capacity shapes government response and a lack of intra-government
capacity can result in actions that while intended to shore up government capacity have
unintended consequences such as the emergence of new veto points (2012: 185). Through
the act of metagovernance, politicians may grant considerable autonomy to stakeholders
to govern themselves, while at the same time reducing government’s ability to direct and
control outcomes (Sørensen, 2006: 99).
The belief that the state has maintained its position at the centre of governance is not
universal. There are those who believe that the power of the state has been weakened by
the changes in governance. Michael Mann identifies two meanings of state power;
despotic power where actions can be taken without negotiations with civil society groups,
and infrastructural power which is the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society
groups. According to Mann, in Western democracies there has been loss of despotic
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power but growing infrastructural power within the state. The growth in infrastructural
power has allowed the state, through its powers of taxation and regulation, to penetrate
everyday life (Mann, 2003: 54-55). The shift in state function identified by Pierre is
taking place within the realm of infrastructural power. According to Giandomenica
Majone, two types of infrastructural power are evident: the power to tax and spend,
which are constrained by budgetary means and rule-making power where budget
constraints have little impact (1997: 148-149). Majone argues that the absence of
budgetary constraint for rule-making power has important consequences as neither
parliament nor government systematically determines the overall level of regulatory
activity in a given period, and that no office is responsible for establishing regulatory
priorities across the government (1997: 150). A stronger rejection of the continued
strength of the state is put forward by McBride and Shields who argue that the
advancement of a neo-liberal agenda aimed at reducing the state and increasing reliance
on market mechanisms provides the ideological venue for shifting decision-making
outside of politics and is eroding the power of the state (1997: 18). According to Janet
Newman, modernization, globalization and privatization all signal profound shifts in the
process of governance. Government power is retreating with state institutions being
slimmed down and hollowed out while at the same time decentralization and
marketization has expanded to reach more aspects of citizens’ lives (Newman, 2005: 1).
Falling in between government as the preeminent actor and the retreating of the state is
the idea of “interactive governance”. Torfing et al. define interactive governance as “the
complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging
interests interact in order to formulate, promote, and achieve common objectives by
means of mobilizing, exchanging and deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources”
(2012: 14). While interactive governance may still be conducted in the shadow of
hierarchy (Torfing et al., 2012: 4) and governments often play a crucial role in facilitating
and managing interaction, there is no privileged centre. From an interactive governance
standpoint, society does not constitute an external environment for the actions of
government, but instead societal actors are actively engaged in the formation and
achievement of common objectives (Torfing et al., 2012: 15). As Jan Kooiman states, in
the interactive governance model societies are governed by a combination of efforts from
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the different actors within society (2010: 73). Torfing, Peters, Pierre, Sørensen clarify,
however, that while interactive governance is an important form of governance, it may
not be appropriate for all policy areas (2012: 4).

2.3 Society-Centric Multilevel Governance: Societal SelfSteering
In contrast to the state-centric approach, which suggests the state continues to play a
dominant role in governance, the society-centric perspective places greater emphasis on
the actions of societal actors that exist outside of government. While state-centric
arguments, such as the government’s role in metagovernance, place government in a
position of steering (Jessop, 2005: 65; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009), society-centric
governance advances the idea that societal actors outside of government are engaged in
more self-steering and that government interacts with society to reach mutually
acceptable decisions (Peters, 2000: 36). The modern patterns of governance that are seen
to be emerging are not unilateral but bilateral or multilateral, as no single actor, public or
private, have sufficient knowledge or action potential to act unilaterally (Kooiman, 1993:
4). Furthermore, actors outside of government may take on the role of metagovernance
that state-centric theorists reserve for government. From a society-centric perspective,
any actor with sufficient resources, be they public or private, may act in a metagovernace
capacity (Sørensen, 2006: 102-104). While both government steering and societal selfsteering views of governance contain the assumption that society must be governed,
different assertions are made as to who the dominant actor is: government or society
(Peters, 2000: 36-37).
The governance change at the heart of society-centric governance is the shifting of
responsibility outside of government. In 1993, Kooiman observed that in many countries
the tendency has been a shift in the balance between government and society – a shift
away from the public sector and toward the private (1993: 1). Kooiman claimed that as
the capacities of political/administrative governing systems have reached or become close
to the point of diminishing returns, governments have reduced the need for governing by
deregulating or have shifted the need for governing through privatization (1993a: 35). In
responding to the changes in the governance environment, Matthew Flinders states that
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government now operates in highly heterogeneous networks of organizations where the
control and scrutiny of diverse organizations and partnerships has become a central
challenge of modern governance, especially when many actors operate with a significant
level of autonomy from elected politicians and legislatures (2006: 223). While still a
powerful and relevant participant in governance, government no longer governs in the
conventional command and control manner (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 3).
Within the patterns of modern governance, both a positive and negative version can be
witnessed. The negative version stresses the capacity of social forces to resist the
regulations and impositions of the state and contains the normative element that citizens
know better what they want than does the state and are therefore justified in finding ways
to avoid the incursions of authority into their lives (Peters, 2000: 40-41). Peters further
states that the negative version of modern governance has been embraced in deliberative
democracy (2000: 41). For deliberative democrats, strong emphasis is placed upon the
protection of the public sphere where actors can deliberate and formulate views and
opinions. The preferences of social actors are not fixed but instead are formulated and
reformulated through deliberation. It is through participation in deliberation in the public
sphere that the authentic will of the people may be discovered, which can then be
translated into a discernible common good (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007: 14-16).
While representative democracy’s legitimacy is tied to minimal but equal participation
through voting, the legitimacy of participatory democracy requires institutions that are
transparent and open to all, but participation need only be from a minority (Wainwright,
2004: 154). New governance arrangements including both government and nongovernment actors have blurred traditional roles, the result being that legitimacy can no
longer be solely understood in terms of the democratic accountability of elected
governments (Wallington, Lawrence and Loechel, 2008: 11). Grafting elements of
popular authority, like participatory democracy, onto representative democracy may be
necessary to ensure the input legitimacy in governance. It has been cautioned, however,
that the representational unevenness of direct citizen participation means that it is not a
substitute (Skogstad, 2003: 968; Fung, 2006: 66). Psychology research into
accountability has shown that individuals respond in a manner that indicates audience
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approval matters (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999: 270). If decisions are influenced by the
desire for audience approval the unevenness of direct citizen participation risks outcomes
that benefit a narrow slice of the population.
The positive version of modern governance is based upon the existence of sufficiently
powerful resources within society that are capable of shaping policy at both the input and
output stages. Networks, communities and other interest groups that are involved in a
policy area are assumed to be in position to shape policy, meaning the strength, or even
dominance, of society becomes an asset for governance within individual policy areas.
The normative element identified by Peters in the positive approach to modern
governance is that society should be capable of managing its own affairs without the
intervention of the state (Peters, 2000: 41-42). This is consistent with Paul Hirst’s
associated democracy model, in which as many functions as possible are devolved from
the state to civil society, followed by the democratization of the new civil society
organizations. In doing so, governance is shifted from top-down bureaucratic to
democratically self-governed associations (Hirst, 2000: 28) According to Sørensen,
government can play a role in the democratization of self-governance through the use of
metagovernance to ensure that new governance processes are regulated in accordance
with democratic criteria (2006: 105).
The traditional pattern of governance has been one of state dominance through a pattern
of hierarchical governing in which governments decide the laws and policies to be
adopted (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209-210). The emergence of new forms of governance,
however, has increased the number of private and public actors involved in the
governance process (Sørensen, 2006: 98). From the society-centric perspective, societal
actors have become more engaged in the governance process, with government working
with society to bring about mutually agreed upon solutions (Peters, 2000: 36). If societal
actors are taking a more prominent role and asserting greater influence in the governance
process, we should expect Type II jurisdictions to be increasingly accountable directly to
society.
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New forms of participation may, however, privilege certain types of actors (Peters, 2010:
217). Peters suggests that, somewhat paradoxically, in an era in which participation has
become an increasingly important value to the public, the level of participation in many
aspects of political life is declining (2010, 213). With a decline in political participation
there is the possibility that organized societal interests may secure a formal accountability
relationship that does not exist for the broader population. Peters claims that as
organizations are removed from ministerial lines of responsibility influence is not
achieved by average citizens acting autonomously, but instead through organized groups
(2010: 215). Moreover, goals will not be uniform across members or groups of members
within society (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 13). The potential of uneven participation is akin
to violating the democratic norm of proportional inclusion as described by the all-affected
principle. According to the all-affected principle, individuals have a normative claim to
influence collective decisions to the extent that they are affected by those decisions
(Warren, 2011: 687). Conversely, as new governance channels tend to grant more
influence to stakeholders than to citizens, there also exists the possibility that in
accordance with the all-affected principle, each citizen will obtain greater influence over
the decisions that affect them most (Sørensen, 2006: 104). It is possible that democratic
accountability can be enhanced through a governance process in which those who are
most affected have considerable influence in shaping policy solutions (Skelcher, Mathur
and Smith, 2005: 580).
While increased participation should be good for democratic accountability, there is still
the question of whether increased participation by societal actors affects the decisionmaking of Type II jurisdictions. As amusingly stated by Sherry Arnstein in 1969, “the
idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle
because it is good for you” (1969: 216). However, as Arnstein further states, there is a
critical difference between going through an empty ritual of citizen participation and
citizens having the real power needed to affect outcome and process (1969: 216). Today,
the question remains as to whether societal actors are capable of securing accountability
mechanisms that promote accountability relationships directly between Type II
jurisdictions and society within the institutional environment of Type II jurisdictions.
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2.4 Multilevel Governance and Accountability Relationships
Good governance can be thought of as a function of the extent to which citizens can hold
political officials accountable for their actions (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003: 447). In a
representative democracy, accountability is the principal mechanism through which mass
publics exert control over their elected officials and is a central tenet of democratic theory
(Rudolph, 2006: 99). While constituents are not required to act to be represented, they
must be conceived of as being able to (Disch, 2012: 602). Accordingly, the institutional
structure must be such that citizen preferences are made known and citizens are able to
act to hold decision-makers accountable.
Fritz Scharpf describes the democratic process as an exercise in collective selfdetermination that operates on two dimensions – inputs and outputs. On the input
dimension political choices should be derived directly or indirectly from the preferences
of the citizen with government held accountable by those they govern, while the output
dimension denotes the effectiveness of policy to achieve goals (Scharpf, 1997: 19). The
empowerment of actors outside government to make decisions, however, means that not
only must government be held accountable, but all involved in the governance process
must also be held accountable. As Bell and Hindmoor state in elaborating on Scharpf’s
work, for governance arrangements to be considered legitimate, not only must the policy
be effective in producing the desired outcomes, the governance process must be
democratic and accountable (2009: 29). It is this combination of both input and output
legitimacy that compels us to obey collectively binding decisions, even when they do not
align with our own personal preferences (Skogstad, 2003: 956). To this end, the act of
governance must aim to improve the state of society and maintain and extend democratic
values (Skelcher, Mathur and Smith, 2005: 577).
Within the governance process, accountability serves three purposes: to control for the
abuse and misuse of public authority; to provide assurance in respect to the use of public
resources and adherence to the law; and to promote the continuous improvement in
governance and public management (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000: 45; Auditor General
of Canada, 2002: 4). Furthermore, Aucoin and Heintzman argue that due to the integral
role accountability plays in the governance process, it is essential that it not be affected
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by the extent to which governance processes are undergoing change (2000: 45).
However, as stated in the December 2002 Report of the Auditor General to the House of
Commons, what accountability means and how it is supposed to work are often disputed,
making its application difficult (Auditor General of Canada, 2002: 3).
Defining the concept of accountability is not in itself problematic. Person A is
accountable to person B if two conditions are met; there is an understanding that A is
obliged to act in some way on behalf of B; and B is empowered by some mechanism to
sanction or reward A. Stated in the form of an agency relationship person A can be
understood to be an agent, who makes choices on behalf of person B as the principal
(Fearon, 1999: 55). While the concept of accountability may not in itself be problematic,
assessing accountability is decidedly more so. Assessing accountability can be elusive as
accountability means different things to different people, thus becoming a general term
for any mechanism that makes institutions responsive to their particular publics (Bovens,
2007: 448-449).
Jonathan Koppell attempts to provide conceptual clarity through the identification of five
dimensions of accountability. According to Koppell, accountability can viewed as
transparency - whether the organization revealed the facts of its performance; liability whether the organization faces consequences for its performance; controllability –
whether the organization does what the principal desires; responsibility – whether the
organization follows the rules; and responsiveness – whether the organization fulfills its
substantive expectation (2005: 96). Bovens argues, however, that broad conceptions of
accountability make it empirically difficult to operationalize. Dimensions, such as
transparency, are instrumental, but alone do not establish accountability. For other
dimensions such as responsiveness, there is no general standard to measure against.
Accordingly, Bovens provides a narrower definition stating, “Accountability is a
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain
and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and
the actor may face consequences” (2007: 450). Bovens’s definition is consistent with the
position of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada that states accountability in
practice is how those responsible are held to account. Accountability is not working when
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there is no or inadequate reporting, there is no serious informed review of the information
reported, and there are no consequences for those responsible (Auditor General of
Canada, 2002: 10).
Consistent across the above definitions of accountability is the ability to sanction as a
necessary element in the accountability relationship, however, as stated by Richard
Mulgan, placing sanctions in the core of accountability is contestable (2000: 556). On
one extreme, Richard Fraser has gone so far as to state that you cannot have
accountability without liability and that accountability without fear of consequences is
not likely to be accountability at all (1996: 36). Harlow and Rawlings argue, however,
that it is not clear whether the possibility of sanction is an essential element of an
accountability relationship (2007: 545). In determining what can be considered a
sanctioning act, Hawlow and Rawlings argue that recommendations for improvement are
sufficient to satisfy accountability requirements (2007: 546). This weaker
conceptualization of sanctions and accountability aligns with what Bovens labels
informal accountability in which consequences of accountability are tied to the public
rendering of negative reports by an Ombudsmen or other agencies, which may damage
the public image of agencies or individuals (2007: 452).
In the tradition of democratic theory, elections are viewed as an important mechanism of
accountability through which the policy preferences of citizens can induce government
action (Fearon, 1999: 57). Adserà, Boix, and Payne argue that the existence of political
control of public officials depends upon the occurrence of regular elections where the
electorate holds the relevant information required to appropriately sanction politicians
(2003: 478). According to Jane Mansbridge, electoral control can be conceptualized as
either promissory or anticipatory. From the promissory perspective, constituent control is
based upon the representative’s campaign promises. While from the anticipatory
perspective representatives anticipate the preferences of future voters in the next election
(Mansbridge, 2011: 627). Mansbridge further states that in representative democracies,
members of the public most often hold the promissory understanding of representation,
while accountability often works through the anticipatory mechanism (2011: 627).
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Regular elections form the basis of an accountability relationship between the electorate
and their elected representative. The elected representative is accountable to the
electorate as the elected representative is expected to act in a way that promotes the
preferences of the electorate and if the electorate is not happy with the actions of their
elected representative, they can vote them out at the next election. Moreover, in a
Westminster-style parliamentary system such as Canada, the use of the power of the state
is governed by the principle of responsible government, which means that those who
exercise power are held to account. Rooted in the democratic institution of parliament,
the exercise of state power is done in accordance with the requirements of ministerial
responsibility and parliamentary accountability. In this system ministers are answerable
to parliament for the actions of government and parliament has the means to hold to
account those who exercise the power of the state, be they elected or non-elected officials
(D’Ombrian, 2007: 198-199). The result is a chain of accountability relationships
connecting those who exercise state power to the electorate. The Auditor General of
Canada states, however, that accountability relationships have become more complex.
Public objectives are increasingly achieved through non-hierarchic relationships
involving government and the private and voluntary sectors (Auditor General of Canada,
2002: 4-5). The result is the need for an understanding of accountability that includes
both traditional accountability relationships and the new relationships that have emerged
as new actors become part of the governance process.
When applying the concept of accountability and agency relationships to Type II
multilevel governance, with its potential for both government steering and society selfsteering, it is evident that multiple principal-agent relationship paths may exist. As
illustrated in Figure 2.2, three different accountability arrangements are possible: first,
2

society as principals of Type II bodies where Type II bodies are directly accountable to
society; second, citizens as principals of democratic governments who in turn are
principals of Type II bodies meaning that Type II jurisdictions would be indirectly

2 Society is referring to both individual citizens and groups outside of government who are affected by the
decisions made by Type II bodies operating in the public realm.
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accountable to the citizens; third, both the first and second accountability arrangements
exist. Not shown in Figure 2.2, but understood, is that an additional possibility is the
absence of any accountability relationship.
Figure 2.2: Type II Multilevel Governance: Possible Principal-Agent Relationships
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2.5 Multilevel Governance and Problems of Accountability
As authority migrates vertically up or down to different levels of elected government free
and fair elections provide the central mechanism for accountability. However, when
decision-making authority migrates horizontally to potentially unelected bodies, how
decision-makers are held accountable requires consideration. Schattschneider
hypothesized that the result of political contests is determined by the scope of public
involvement in conflicts (1975: 5). With decision-making authority migrating beyond the
reach of the ballot box, questions over the scope of public involvement arise. It must be
considered whether the decisions made by government empowered external bodies are as
public as those that occur within elected legislatures (Schattschneider, 1975: 65).
Schattschneider argues that the origin of politics is strife and that political strategy deals
with the exploitation, use of, and suppression of conflict (1975: 65). With the migration
of authority, decisions are moved outside the standard arena of political contest –
elections. In doing so, conflict is displaced and questions of public participation,
accountability and legitimacy of decision-making arise.
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While multiple accountability relationships may exist to hold Type II bodies accountable,
the introduction of new forms of governance bring with it concern over the ability to hold
new forms of public decision-making actors accountable. Responding to such concerns,
scholars have explored a wide range of potential challenges to democratic accountability
(for example, Anderson, 2006, 2008; Bache and Flinders, 2005a; Benz, 2007; Geber and
Kollman, 2004; Kahler and Lake, 2004; Olsson, 2003; Peters and Pierre, 1998, 2005;
Sørensen, 2006). The concern for accountability is most strict when considering
autonomous actors (Busuioc, Curtin and Groenleer, 2011: 853). The emergence of new
forms of governance, including the introduction of third-party decision-makers and
arm’s-length public corporations, however, all cause the lines of accountability to be less
clear (Skelcher, 2007: 63). Clarity is lost as a single organization becomes the agent of
several principals, while at the same time the policy-making process is clouded by a
mixture of representative, ‘delegative’, and direct democracy (Skelcher, 2007: 63). As
Rhodes argues, “sheer institutional complexity obscures who is accountable to whom and
for what” (1997: 101). To understand contemporary accountability and legitimacy one
must depart from accountability as characterized by liberal democracy as it is not wholly
satisfactory to hold solely elected officials to account (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 118-119).
Concern over the growth and accountability of non-departmental forms of government in
Canada is not new. In 1973, in his chapter titled “Structural heretics: the nondepartmental forms,” J. E. Hodgetts positioned the expansion of non-departmental
entities as the result of the workload of conventional departments expanding to the point
where tasks are unmanageable, as well as the taking on of new functions by government
for which the traditional department structure no longer seemed appropriate (1973: 139).
In adopting the new forms of organization, Hodgetts raises concern over the relationship
with the Minister and the formal structure of ministerial command and responsibility,
citing the obscuring of conventional channels of ministerial responsibility and
diminishment of parliamentary supervision (1973: 143). The problem is not isolated to
Canada. The challenges facing the hierarchical model of responsibility can be seen in
what Dennis Thompson calls the ‘problem of many hands.’ According to Thompson,
many political outcomes are the product of actions from multiple contributors who may
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not be individually identifiable or whose individual contributions may not be
distinguishable (Thompson, 1980: 907).
In parliamentary systems a contributing factor to the diminishment of parliamentary
supervision is the increasing variety of accountability chains brought about by the formal
dispersion of authority associated outside the traditional department structure. Chains of
delegation are not new; parliamentary democracies exhibit multiple steps in the
accountability chain between citizens and those who govern (Laver and Shepsle, 1999:
279; Strøm, 2007: 267). For parliamentary democracies, Strøm identifies four distinct
steps in the accountability chain: from voters to their elected representatives; from
legislators to the executive branch; from the head of government (prime minister) to
ministerial or departmental heads; from the heads of executive departments to the civil
servants (2000: 267). Yannis Papadopoulos argues, however, that accountability
problems increase with the length of the chain of delegation. As the chain of delegation
increases, the policy process becomes visible only to those who are closely involved in
the decision-making process, the risk being a loss of direct accountability with delegated
decision-makers subject to administrative rather than democratic accountability
(Papadopoulos, 2007: 479). Papadopoulos concludes that delegation of authority weakens
the direct accountability of policy makers as lines of responsibility become dispersed and
do not form a coherent accountability system. While many mechanisms of accountability
are believed to exist, they fail to operate in an effective manner (Papadopoulos, 2007:
483). Similarly, Andrew and Goldsmith point to increased complexity brought about by a
multi actor system in comparison to that of a single agency. A plurality of actors makes it
more difficult for citizens to navigate the political system and more difficult to coordinate
between the large number of special purpose bodies (Andrews and Goldsmith, 1998:
107). As the number of bodies outside the hierarchy of traditional government
departments increase so do the variations in accountability chains that link citizens to
decision-makers.
While the organizational structures that troubled Hodgetts were not beyond the pale of
ministerial responsibility and therefore may not have warranted the name ‘structural
heretics’ (Aucoin, 2003: 7), experimentation in governance structures in Canada have
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continued to raise concerns. In Canada, the 1979 Royal Commission on Financial
Management and Accountability (Lambert Commission) stated that a group of
corporations, labeled as quasi-public, sat at the edge of the public sector. The
commonalities among the corporations included a government role in creation by way of
legislation, government funding of the corporation, government appointment of some
board members, and the absence of formal accountability linkages (Aucoin, 2003: 8). The
Office of the Auditor General of Canada raised similar concerns in 1999, stating that new
governance arrangements involving external partners in planning, design and
achievement of government objectives created situations where the partners were not
accountable to ministers and Parliament (Auditor General of Canada, 1999: 23-5). The
Auditor General’s report stated that of the new governance arrangements examined,
“accountability to Parliament was often weak and good governance not always assured”
(Auditor General of Canada, 1999: 23-31). Peter Aucoin also raised specific concerns
over the use of independent foundations to distribute public funds in 2003. According to
Aucoin, the independent foundations retained the characteristics identified as “quasipublic corporations” by the Royal Commission on Financial Management and
Accounting (2003: 8). Moreover, one-time endowments transferred to the independent
foundations effectively turned public funds into private funds, making decisions in
relation to the funds beyond the reach of government and the legislature (Aucoin, 2003:
10). In such cases, it is not a case of an overly complex accountability chain, but the lack
of an accountability linkage altogether between government and decision making bodies.
As stated by Timothy Heinmiller, one of the greater virtues of ministerial responsibility is
the establishment of clear lines of accountability, however, if ministers no longer have
meaningful oversight and control, then ministerial responsibility is little more than a
constitutional fiction (2011: 125-128).
A second, but related concern is the information costs of multilevel governance. John
Dunn has argued that in the modern state most citizens are unable to form a broad
understanding of most of what is going on politically (1999: 335). According to Dunn,
without sufficient knowledge and understanding, interaction between citizens and
decision-makers in which the behavior of the decision maker is rationally sanctioned is
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unlikely (1999: 335). While Dunn’s analysis focuses upon the relationship between
citizens and their elected representatives, the same argument can be applied to the
relationship between citizens and Type II jurisdictions.
The existence of a multilevel system of governance creates further difficulties for citizens
in attributing policy decisions to policy actors. As argued by Soroka and Wlezien,
effective public responsiveness depends upon an accurate signal of what government is
doing, while a vertical division of powers increases the number of different governments
making policy in a given policy area thus making it less clear which government is doing
what (2004: 552; 2011: 33). Identified by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 70,
the information challenges faced by citizens are further exacerbated by the actions of
governments who engage in blame shifting and credit taking for policy outcomes
(Anderson, 2006: 450; Cutler, 2004: 19; Hamilton, 1788). Cameron Anderson argues that
a multilevel environment can create incentives for governments within the multilevel
system to camouflage their responsibility for decisions and outcomes (2006: 450). This
practice of credit taking can be witnessed in Kathryn Harrison’s work on government
involvement in Canadian environmental policy. Harrison observed that when
environmental policy issues were salient in public opinion, both federal and provincial
levels of government sought credit for environmental regulation, however, when public
interest subsided the federal government was inclined to leave environmental policy to
the provinces (2003: 340-341). Such actions demonstrate the willingness of government
actors to attempt to take credit when it appears to be politically advantageous, and to
shirk responsibility when it is not.
Anderson argues that as political decentralization increases, the ability of citizens to hold
a government accountable for political outcomes decreases (2006: 459). Furthermore, as
governance becomes more decentralized and multilayered, the ability of citizens to cope
with increased challenges to democratic accountability becomes more pressing

3 There is a large literature in political behavior on the role of information. For greater insight see Delli
Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters (1996) or Althaus, Collective
Preferences in Democratic Politics (2003).
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(Anderson, 2006: 459). While both Anderson and Soroka and Wlezien focus upon Type I
jurisdictions, many of the same challenges can be applied to Type II jurisdictions.
Concerns already exist over the ability of citizens to accurately recognize which powers
belong to which level of government (Anderson, 2006; Brzinski, Lancaster, and
Tuschloff, 1999; Schneider, Jacoby and Lewis, 2011), as authority migrates horizontally
to a myriad of Type II bodies the likely result is the further clouding of citizens’
perceptions of who is responsible for which policy decisions. It is possible that the
increasing complexity of governance arrangements, including the use of autonomous and
quasi-autonomous organizations, may bring the governance process closer to the citizen,
while at the same time leading to citizen confusion when confronting problems (Peters,
2010: 211). In exploring the use of the private sector in delivering public services, Lorna
Stefanick draws attention to the 1995 and 1998 reports from Alberta’s Ombudsman,
which found that a major impediment to accountability in Alberta is the increasingly
complex governance environment in which it is difficult to determine who is responsible.
The report highlighted that members of the Office of the Ombudsman often have
difficulty determining responsibility, and raised the question of how the average citizen is
to know how to address problems (Stefanick, 2011: 248-249).
In addition to concerns that authority migration has weakened democratic accountability,
concerns that authority migration results in the absence of accountability relationships,
either directly to society, or indirectly through government, have been put forward.
According to Hirst, in many cases the use of the term governance signals a threat to
conventional forms of democracy or potentially an attempt to sidestep democracy
altogether. Instead of being accountable either directly to the citizens or indirectly to the
citizens through government, governance mechanisms are seen to be tools of commercial
interests or unaccountable bureaucracies (Hirst, 2000: 13). Adam Harmes provides an
example of accountability loss in his look at neoliberalism and multilevel governance.
Harmes suggests that multilevel governance is characterized by the dispersal of power
away from central government and can be viewed as part of a deliberate neoliberal
political project with the goal of separating economic and political power. The effects of
this separation of powers can be witnessed in the growing use of legal-juridical
mechanisms to lock in neoliberal policies and insulate them from democratic influence
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(Harmes, 2006: 726-727). Hirst furthers the argument that accountability is being lost,
stating that governance through partnerships and networks is intensely local and difficult
for outsiders to penetrate, thus conferring benefits only on existing members (2000: 19).
As such, it is conceivable that no formal relationship exist, either indirectly through
government or directly with the citizens, by which Type II jurisdictions are held
accountable.
While numerous concerns have been raised over the weakening of democratic input and
accountability, the possibility has also been put forward that accountability fears have
been overblown. Bartle and Vass argue that problems of accountability are overcome
when self-regulatory schemes are embedded within the systems of transparency and
accountability of the modern regulatory society (2007: 897). The act of metagovernance
by the state amounts to the supervision of nonelected bodies. The legitimacy and
accountability of nonelected actors then become tied to the ability and willingness of
government to exercise a credible response if the delegation of authority fails to engender
compliance with the metagoverance arrangements (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 897). The rise
of the modern state has brought about institutions, processes, and mechanisms of
regulatory governance that reinforce accountability, these processes and mechanisms can
be extended beyond traditional government to preserve accountability (Bartle and Vass,
2007: 898).
As Mark Bovens suggested in 1990, however, we are dealing with complex
organizations, not rational person-like servants waiting quietly on the edges of society to
be called upon (1990: 91). When attempting to ‘steer’ such organizations a minister is
often confronted with the need to establish a second complex organization (agency) that
has the technical expertise to hold the first in check. The second can then be subsequently
steered by the department (Bovens, 1990: 93). So while the possibility for state steering
exists, it may not be as easily implemented as it first appears.
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2.6 Hypotheses: Migration of Authority and Creation of
Type II Bodies
As previously stated, there is the perception that changes have occurred in how we are
governed. In some instances this includes decision-making responsibility shifting beyond
the boundaries of elected government. In response to the idea that there has been a
dispersal of decision-making authority, the extent to which authority has migrated beyond
the boundaries of elected government at the provincial level in Canada is explored. The
creation of Type II bodies forms the focus of Chapters 4 and 6. Chapter 4 explores both
the rate at which Type II bodies are being created and the possible factors that may
promote the migration of authority to Type II bodies in the provinces of Alberta, British
Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario. Chapter 6 looks specifically at creation of Type II
bodies in the area of healthcare provision. In the rest of the chapter, the hypotheses and a
brief overview of the rationales put forward in Chapter 4 are provided.
In assessing the extent to which concern over potential negative consequences associated
with authority migration is warranted, the extent to which governments have utilized the
migration of authority in response to policy issues is first explored. In response to
concerns over the increasing use of authority migration the first two hypotheses are put
forward as follows:
H4.1 – The absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over time.
H4.2 – The annual creation rate of Type II bodies is increasing over time.
Beyond the rate of creation is the question of what factors promote the creation of Type II
bodies by government. Two potential explanations are put forward: 1) the capacity of
government to meet governance demands plays a role in shaping the location of
governance responsibility; and, 2) the ideological persuasion of the governing parties is a
factor in the creation of Type II bodies.
The level of government capacity as an explanatory factor is based upon the notion that
the demand placed on the modern state outstrips the capacity of government to act. When
demand increases and capacity fails to keep pace, the capacity gap can only be filled by
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delegation, which allows the state to address a wide range of policy issues while not
needing to be involved with the day-to-day socio-political interactions (Flinders, 2006:
223-224). In Canada, the existence of government debts and deficits had a pervasive
influence on government operations and reform (Kernagan, Marson and Borins, 2005: 6).
While the state is unlikely to be able to fulfill all requests, the capacity argument suggests
that the lower the fiscal capacity of the state to fulfill its responsibilities (both new and
existing) the greater the rate of creation of Type II bodies is likely to be. Accordingly, the
third hypothesis tested in Chapter 4 is as follows:
H4.3 - The lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher
the rate of creation of Type II bodies.
The argument for ideology influencing the extent to which authority has migrated outside
of government is anchored in the idea that parties on the left tend to resort to more
government intervention and parties on the right are more likely to rely upon the market.
It has been suggested that multilevel governance is characterized by the dispersal of
power away from the national level of government and can be viewed as part of a
deliberate neoliberal political project with the goal of separating economic and political
power (Harmes, 2006: 726). While neoliberalism is a recent phenomenon, there are longstanding debates over size of government. Neoclassical liberals argued that government
should be as small as possible, while welfare liberals promote a larger role for
government (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 77-79). In comparison to both forms of liberalism,
social democracy calls for a larger state and promote the expansion of public ownership
(Ball and Dagger, 1995: 44). Taking both the recent and historic trends into account, it
can be argued that political ideology may influence the rate at which Type II bodies are
created due to the differing views of the role of the state. Specifically, governments
aligned further to the left are expected to create fewer Type II bodies than governments
aligned further to the right. This leads to the fourth and final hypothesis evaluated in
Chapter 4:
H4.4 – The further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits the
lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies.
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2.7 Hypotheses: Migration of Authority and Accountability of
Type II Bodies
While Chapters 4 and 6 explore the creation of Type II bodies, Chapters 5 and 7 delve
into the accountability relationships between the new decision-makers and both
government and society that emerge once authority has been migrated. Chapter 5 looks at
the strength of both accountability relationships over time and which possible factors may
promote the strengthening of accountability relationships. Type II bodies are again
selected from the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario.
Chapter 7 deals directly with the accountability relationships that have emerged from the
creation of special purpose bodies charged with the provision of healthcare. Below the
hypotheses and a synopsis of the rationales put forward for each in Chapter 5 are
provided.
While an underlying assumption of multilevel governance is that centralization has given
way to new forms of governance that result in decision-making authority being dispersed
across multiple jurisdictions, it can be argued that the state continues to play a
fundamental role in the governance process. Through setting rules and maintaining the
ability to intervene when policy outcomes do not appear to be in the public interest
government can be seen to dominate the policy process. If government has continued to
dominate the public policy process, then we can expect formal accountability
relationships between government and Type II bodies to be present and to have either
remained stable or increased in strength. The question of government’s continued
governance capacity leads to the first hypothesis of Chapter 5, which is as follows:
H5.1 – The accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies has
either remained stable or increased in strength over time.
An alternative view is that the new governance arrangements have weakened the state.
McBride and Shields argue that the advancement of a neo-liberal agenda aimed at
reducing the state and increasing reliance on market mechanisms provides the ideological
venue for shifting decision-making outside of politics and is eroding the power of the
state (1997: 18). While neoliberalism is a modern construct, there are long-standing
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debates over the role and size of government. Liberalism in both its neoclassical and
welfare forms promote a smaller version of the state than social democracy. Taking into
account both recent ideological trends and the historical debate over the appropriate size
and role of the state, it can be argued that the ideology of the governing party influences
the structure of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government.
Specifically, governing parties aligned further to the right are expected to produce weaker
accountability relationships when migrating authority as there is stronger belief in
minimal state interference. Accordingly the second hypothesis of Chapter 5 is presented
as follows:
H5.2 – Governing parties further to the left on the political spectrum will produce
stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than
governing parties further to the right.
In addition to the accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies
there is the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and societal actors. Peters
provides two opposing views of governance, a traditional approach where the state steers,
and a modern approach where societal actors are involved in more self-steering rather
than depending upon the guidance of government (Peters, 2000: 36-37). If social forces
are taking a stronger role in the governance process, it follows that Type II bodies should
be increasingly accountable directly to society as societal actors assert greater influence
over policy inputs and outputs. The idea of increasing societal governance capacity leads
to the third hypothesis of Chapter 5:
H5.3 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased
in strength over time.
An additional area of interest is the influence of geographic scale on the accountability
relationships between Type II bodies and both government and society. When
considering elected government, a trade-off is seen to exist between the efficiency and
coordination gains brought about by centralization and the accountability gains brought
about by decentralization of accountability. The idea that accountability is strengthened
by decentralization is based on the idea that as government becomes more centralized, the
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ability of any one region to select a government based upon the government’s perceived
performance in that region is diminished (Seabright, 1996: 65).
Given the relative lack of elections for Type II bodies and the dearth of information on
the effect of geographic scale on the accountability of Type II bodies, two exploratory
questions are asked: First, do Type II bodies succumb to the same trade off as traditional
elected government? And second, is there a corresponding weakening of accountability to
government that occurs with decentralization?
While Type II bodies for the most part lack elections as an accountability mechanism, it
is still possible that centralization results in a similar tradeoff between economies of scale
and accountability. When a Type II body moves along the continuum from decentralized
to centralized, the number of citizens whose preferences must be taken into account
increases. As the number of citizens increases, the ability of any one citizen to hold the
Type II body accountable based upon their perceived performance of the Type II body
decreases. If this is in fact the case, it is expected that the greater the level of
decentralization, the greater the capacity of members of society to hold Type II bodies
directly accountable.
While it is expected that decentralization of Type II bodies have accountability benefits
for citizens, the second question considers whether decentralization has an effect on the
accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government. The premise put
forward for testing is that as decision-making is decentralized there may be a willingness
on the part of government to shift responsibility for holding decision-makers accountable
closer to the citizen. If this is the case, it is expected that the greater the degree of
decentralization, the weaker the capacity of government to hold Type II bodies directly
accountable. Accordingly, the last two hypotheses of Chapter 5 are presented as follows:
H5.4 – The accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will
decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.
H5.5 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as
the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.

44

2.8 Healthcare Governance and Canadian Healthcare
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, the evaluation of the above hypotheses can be
divided into groups. In Chapters 4 and 5 the hypotheses are evaluated against an original
dataset of cases of Type II bodies operating between the years of 1946 and 2005 in the
provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario. In Chapters 6 and 7
case studies and qualitative interviews are leveraged to gain greater contextual
understanding of the causes and implications that surround the migration of decisionmaking authority to regional healthcare bodies. Here, a background on Canadian
healthcare systems, regional health authorities, and healthcare reform is provided.
Canada’s healthcare systems are publically financed with approximately 70% of
expenditures financed by the general tax revenues of the federal, provincial and territorial
governments. Within this funding structure the governance, organization, and
organization of delivery of services has remained highly decentralized (Marchildon,
2013:19). Marchildon attributes this continued path of decentralization to at least three
reasons: 1) provincial responsibility for the funding and delivery of the majority of
healthcare services; 2) the continued status of physicians as independent contractors; and
3) the existence of organizations, from regional health organizations to privately run
hospitals, that operate at arm’s length from government (2013:19).
In a federal state, such as Canada, the division of powers is defined in the constitution.
The challenge with the healthcare field, however, is that through time the field steadily
changes while the Canadian Constitution has not. Neither the British North American Act
nor the Constitution Act, 1982 gave explicit jurisdiction over health care, only the
jurisdiction over hospitals to the provinces (Fierlbeck, 2013: 5). In addition to holding
jurisdiction over hospitals, Subsection 92(16) of the Constitution has been used
historically to grant provinces jurisdiction over healthcare as it has been argued that
health is a personal and local matter (Braën, 2004: 32; Fierlbeck, 2013: 5). Personal
health at the time of British North American Act was considered a purely private mater
by society and by extension politicians (Braën, 2004: 28). From a constitutional
perspective, André Braën states that the federal governments powers regarding health are
limited to three areas: 1) criminal law (by way of its ability to control the manufacturing
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and labeling of potentially hazardous products; 2) spending power; and 3) the authority to
ensure peace order and good government (Braën, 2004: 34). While constitutionally
limited to three areas, Fierlbeck argues that when considered in light of the extent of the
spending power and the regulation over pharmaceuticals and other noteworthy goods
their impact is quite extensive (Fierlbeck, 2013: 5).
With responsibility for healthcare being divided along provincial and territorial
boundaries, health system planning is done at the provincial/territorial level. In some
provinces regional health authorities are responsible for more detailed planning at the
regional level. Some provinces have also created health councils and health technology
assessment agencies to aid both provincial governments and regional health authorities in
their planning process (Marchildon, 2013: 20). Provincial governments, however,
maintain primary jurisdiction over both the administration and delivery of pubic health
services. This means that healthcare entities ranging from regional health authorities to
private hospitals are regulated by the provincial government (Marchildon, 2013: 46). It
should also be emphasized that with responsibility for healthcare being at the
provincial/territorial level and not the federal there is no one healthcare system. Services
are covered in one province that may be subject to fees in another. Some provinces
require residents to pay healthcare premiums, while others do not. Private hospitals are
legal in some provinces but not in others (Boessenkool, 2013: 160).
As stated above, provincial/territorial healthcare systems differ. One way in which health
systems may vary is the degree to which decision-making responsibility is decentralized.
In the late 1980s the provincial and territorial public finances were poor shape and being
made worse by a recession. Beginning in 1991/92 a series of decisions signaled a
retrenchment in healthcare. Over the next five years, provinces either tightened health
care expenditures or succumbed to the growth in health service demand and by the end of
the 1990s there was a growing sense of stress on the healthcare system including
increased wait times (Lazar, 2013: 2). Consistent with hypothesis H4.3, Boessenkool
attributes the provincial struggle with financial deficits to producing healthcare reforms,
as most provinces opting to restructure their healthcare system regionally (2013: 161).
Regionalization resulted in the simultaneous centralization and decentralization of
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decision-making. Decisions that were previously made by the province were
decentralized and pushed to the regional level, while decisions that were once made at the
local level were centralized to the newly created regional authorities (Tomblin, 2004:
300). The current trend, however, has been the elimination of regional health authorities
(Marchildon, 2013: 20) According to Stephen Duckett, the shift to a single health
authority in Alberta is in line with the growing recognition of the failures associated with
regionalization (Duckett, 2011: 23). In Alberta, the shift to a single health authority was
brought about by the need to correct the negative effects of inequality and unhealthy
competition that resulted from the regional system (Duckett, 2009: 156).
Beyond the shift from regionalization and back, the majority of the primary health
services in Canada are private and therefore decentralized (Marchildon, 2013: 39). The
vast majority of physicians remain profit-making independent contractors who are neither
employed by regional health authorities or provincial/territorial governments. Hospitals
are owned by a number of sources, some are owned by regional health authorities while
others are private, mostly not-for-profit, corporations. Services supporting primary and
acute care, including ambulance, laboratory services and many ancillary hospital services
are private. Moreover, dental, vision, psychology and rehabilitation services are privately
funded and delivered by profit-making independent professionals (Marchildon, 2013:
39).
In regards to reforming one of Canada’s 13 healthcare systems, it has been found that for
the most part governments focus on improvements within the existing health system
model instead of moving toward a new model (Lazar, et al., 2013: 175). As mentioned
above, Boessenkool attributes the fiscal challenges of the 1990s with producing a rush of
healthcare reforms in which most provinces opting to restructure their healthcare system
regionally (2013: 161). According to John Lavis, Canada’s lack of veto points suggests
that political elites (including government officials) representatives from dominant
healthcare providers, representatives from the bio-medical industry and other healthbased groups are the reason for the lack of reform (2004: 257-258) Similarly, Lazar et al.
observe that the most engaged political actors in the healthcare field were much more
effective at preventing reform than creating it (Lazar et al., 2013: 216). The citizens’ or
47

publics’ role in health care reform is exogenous. The public exercises influence by
electing government, but they remain outsiders to the policy process (Lazar, 2013, 10).
Researching trust, Abelson et al. found that individuals tend to portray themselves as
outsiders of the health system, either entirely alone or in collaboration with their provider
against government and private interests (2009: 68).

2.9 Conclusion
As evident from the discussion above there is the sense that the traditional form of statecentred governance has given way, at least to some degree, to new governance structures.
While new governance structures bring with them the potential for positive outcomes,
this shift has also brought about questions of democratic accountability as decisionmaking is spun away from the centre, both vertically to different levels of government,
and horizontally to actors outside of traditional government. When authority is migrated
outside of government and away from elected officials, concerns are raised over public
input into the decision-making process, and how the decision-makers are held
accountable for their actions.
Wrapped in the language of multilevel governance, the ensuing chapters explore the rate
and causes of authority migration, as well as the structure of the accountability
relationships that emerge once authority migration has occurred. While this chapter has
developed the theoretical background, the subsequent chapter describes the
methodological approach and the data that is drawn on throughout the remainder of this
undertaking.
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Chapter 3
3

Methodology and Data

The central objectives of the research are two-fold: 1) to assess the extent to which
Canadian provinces have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in
response to policy issues and what factors explain the use of migration of authority as a
policy tool; and 2) to establish the existence, nature, and relative strength of the emergent
accountability relationships. To achieve these objectives both quantitative and qualitative
research methods are employed. Quantitative techniques are used with a custom dataset
containing cases of authority migration in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia,
Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the years of 1946 and 2005 to assess the extent of
authority migration over time as well as the existence and strength of accountability
relations. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods are then utilized to
provide a richer account of how specific non-government bodies are held accountable.
This chapter provides a description and rationale of the research methods and types of
data used to assess the accountability of non-governmental actors in multilevel
governance in subsequent chapters. To begin, a rationale will be provided for the
selection of provinces and timeframe used in the study. Next a description of how cases
of authority migration are identified is provided. Lastly, both the quantitative and
qualitative research designs are presented.

3.1 Province Selection and Case Identification
This research project explores the migration of authority to Type II bodies and the
resulting accountability relationships at the provincial level in Canada. A provincial
approach was adopted for three reasons: provincial politics is relatively under-studied in
comparison to the federal politics; it allows for comparisons across provinces; and it
provides a larger sample sizes than using national level data alone. As time constraints
prohibited the inclusion of all provinces, the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia,
Nova Scotia, and Ontario were selected based on region and political ideology. While
region was selected based on the potential for variation across Canada, political ideology
was selected based on the data requirements of H4.4 and H5.2.
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Regionalism is viewed as an accepted fact of political life in Canada (Simeon and Elkins,
1974: 397; Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams, 1980: 227; Henderson, 2004: 595). The
effects of regionalism are reflected in federal cabinet building (Simeon and Elkins, 1974:
397), the shape of national election campaigns – both under the brokerage party model
and regionally based party politics (Cross, 2002: 117), and the birth of Canada through
regional self-interest (Savoie, 2006: 14). Given its current and historical significance,
regionalism was used to select a subset of provinces from across the whole of Canada. In
drawing regional boundaries, however, it must be acknowledged that the lines between
provincial boundaries, or groups thereof, are somewhat arbitrary and fail to take into
account the cultural and political variations that may occur within the boundaries
(Jackson and Jackson, 2001: 99). For the purpose of this research, the standard
geographical regions of Canada were adopted, based on Statistics Canada’s definition:
the Atlantic provinces; Quebec; Ontario; Prairie Provinces; British Columbia; and the
Territories (Canada. Statistics Canada, 2011). Just as Simeon and Elkins eliminated
Prince Edward Island due to its relatively small population size in their exploration of the
regional political cultures in Canada (1974: 401), Prince Edward Island and the
Territories were eliminated from this study. In 2013 the populations of the Yukon,
Northwest Territories and Nunavut were 36.7, 43.5 and 35.6 thousand respectively, while
Prince Edward Island’s population was 145.2 thousand (Canada. Statistics Canada:
2013). The province of Quebec was also excluded from the study. The decision not to
include Quebec is based on the province’s unique nationalism and cultural differences.
Quebec has a unique cultural history within Canada stemming from its historical
connection to New France in contrast to other province’s historical connection to British
North America (McRoberts, 1997: 2 Wiseman, 2008: 43).
In addition to region, political ideology was used in the province selection process. To
satisfy the political ideology requirement, both left- and right-of-centre parties must have
formed the government to test the effect of political ideology on the rate of authority
migration and the resulting accountability relationships. As a proxy for political ideology,
party systems were used. Politically, the provinces were divided into three groups based
upon party system: single-party systems; two-party Liberal-PC systems; and two- or
three-party systems with competitive left-right politics. The only province to fall into the
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single-party category for the duration of the study is Alberta (Dunn, 2001: 457; Stewart
and Carty, 206: 105). The Atlantic provinces historically fall under with in the category
of two-party liberal-conservative systems (Dunn, 2001: 457), however, more recently
Nova Scotia has witnessed competitive three-party politics (Stewart and Carty, 206: 106)
The remainder of the provinces fall within the category of having either a competitive
three-party system, or a two-party system with a right-left political polarization (Dunn,
2001: 457; Stewart and Carty, 206: 106).
While also a prairie province, Alberta’s inclusion in the study is foremost based on
Alberta being the only province in Canada with a single-party system. Alberta’s Social
Credit Party was at the far right of the Canadian political spectrum, believing in a limited
role for the state in the economy, and resisting calls for government regulation of the oil
and gas industry, marketing boards, and subsidies for new industries (Finkel, 1989: 138139). When the Social Credit Party was eventually defeated in 1971 it was by the
Progressive Conservatives, another right-of-centre party. This party governed
consistently from the right of the Canadian political spectrum, the inclusion of Alberta
serves an ideological control throughout the study.
The remaining three provinces were selected from the remaining geographic regions,
with competitive left-right party politics being the criteria for selection between
provinces within a region. Historically the Liberal and Conservative governments that
emerged throughout Canada’s Atlantic region did not differ ideologically. As a whole,
the region was elite-oriented, conservative and traditional (Wiseman, 2008: 24). For its
early history, this holds true for the province of Nova Scotia, however, the March 24th
1998 election saw the New Democrats and Liberals finish with 19 seats each and 35% of
the vote. The Progressive Conservatives finished third with 14 seats and 30% of the vote.
The results marked the emergence of the NDP as a major political player in Nova Scotia
(Bickerton, 2001: 63). In the 2009 election the NDP took another step, winning the
general election and Darrell Dexter becoming the first New Democratic Premier in the
Atlantic region (Nova Scotia. Nova Scotia Legislature, 2014). The recent growth in
competitive left-right party politics in Nova Scotia formed the basis for its selection
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among the Atlantic Provinces. Ontario and British Columbia were included as both were
classified as regions unto themselves and have competitive left-right party politics.
Within each of the four provinces, the identification of cases of authority migration to
Type II bodies is based upon the definition of Type II multilevel governance and
authority migration. Type II bodies are defined as independent jurisdictions that fulfill
specific functions. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Type II bodies are characterized
by: intersecting memberships in the sense that borders will be crossed and jurisdictions
may overlap; being organized across a large number of levels in which authority is not
neatly layered but diverse in scale; and being flexible in design (Marks and Hooghe,
2005: 20-21). In terms of authority migration to Type II bodies three conditions must be
satisfied: authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to a new or
existing body through an act of provincial legislation; the majority of decision-makers
within the body must be comprised of individuals who are from outside of the
government, legislature, and the public service; and the legislated decision-makers must
have decision-making autonomy. Based on these criteria, bodies that act in an advisory
rather than a decision-making capacity would be excluded, as would those where fiftyper cent or more of the board is made up of elected representatives or public employees.
For Example, the District Health Councils in Ontario, while charged with identifying
areas of need, assessing health care alternatives, and establishing priorities at the local
level, had no decision-making authority (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987:
14-15). As such, the District Health Councils where excluded from the study. In contrast,
Alberta’s Regional Airport Authorities were included as the provincial government
granted decision-making authority and the boards were not comprised of elected
representatives or member of the public service. The range of policy areas where
authority has migrated to Type II bodies includes: financial regulation, food and
agriculture, education, healthcare, natural resources, public safety, social services, sports
and entertainment, transportation, and other public goods.
To summarize, instances of authority migration to Type II bodies in the province of
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario between the years of 1946 and 2005
form the universe of cases. In addition, Type II bodies must: be granted authority over
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some part of the public realm through an act of provincial legislation; have a majority of
decision makers comprised of individuals who are from outside of the government,
legislature or public service; and have decision-making autonomy.

3.2 Quantitative Methods – Chapters 4 and 5
In assessing the extent to which provinces have utilized the horizontal migration of
authority in public governance and the nature and strength of the ensuing accountability
relationships a quantitative approach was first employed. The universe of cases for the
quantitative analysis is comprised of all instances of authority migration to Type II bodies
in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario where the Type II
body was in existence at some point between the years of 1946 to 2005. The 1946 to
2005 timeframe was selected as it provides a sixty-year observation window beginning
with the emergence of Keynesianism and followed by the shift to neoliberalism as the
dominant policy paradigm during the post-WWII time period. In Canada Keynesianism
lasted as the dominant paradigm through the 1970s to some point in the early 1980s
(Bradford, 2000: 63-64). Keynesianism was characterized as a period of state
involvement in both society and economy and the building of a comprehensive welfare
state, while the neoliberal period that followed has been characterized by pressures to
create a lean state through shrinking social welfare expenditures and the reduction of
state regulation (Burke, Mooers and Shields, 2000: 11- 13). The Keynesian paradigm was
influenced by the work of John Maynard Keynes. Keynes principal assumption was the
existence of a national economy that could intervene to influence levels of investment
and domestic income. In doing so, the state could regulate the effects of unemployment
through national policies (Teeple, 2000: 17). In contrast to Keynesianism is the neoliberal
philosophy of reducing the state and increasing reliance on market mechanisms.
Neoliberalism is seen to provide an ideological venue for shifting decision-making
outside the public realm and erode the power of the state (McBride and Shields, 1997:
18). As will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4, the shift in the perceived role of
state suggests that a higher rate of authority migration may be occurring under the
neoliberal paradigm than did under Keynesianism.
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To test the hypotheses put forward in Chapters 4 and 5 a master dataset was created
containing the universe of cases as defined above. The master dataset was then used in
combination with provincial fiscal statistics retrieved from Statistics Canada and
provincial election results to build topic specific datasets for each chapter. The creation of
the master dataset, the creation of the annual authority migration rate dataset, the analysis
of the authority migration rate dataset, the creation of the accountability relationship
dataset, and the analysis of the accountability relationship dataset will be discussed in
turn.

3.2.1

Building the Master Dataset

To build the master dataset instances of authority migration to Type II bodies were
identified using the revised statutes for each province (Alberta: 1955, 1970, 1980, 2000;
British Columbia: 1948, 1960, 1970, 1996; Nova Scotia: 1954, 1976, 1989; and Ontario:
1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990) and the online publication of statutes from provincial
government websites. Annual statute volumes were used to provide details on
incremental changes to the legislation that altered the accountability relationship when
multiple amendments made it impossible to obtain the information from the revised
statutes. Working in chronological order, each piece of legislation in the revised statutes
and on government websites was evaluated based upon the criteria for authority
migration outlined above. Dataset records were created for: each Type II body in
existence in 1946 but created prior to 1946; each new Type II body created between 1946
to 2005; each termination of a Type II body between 1946 to 2005; and each modified
accountability relationship for a Type II body that occurred between 1946 to 2005. A
record type based upon the four scenarios described was coded for each new record to
allow for differentiation when working with the data. For example, the record type would
enable the distinction between records of authority migration that occurred between the
years 1946 to 2005 and records of authority migration that occurred prior to 1946. In
cases where a single piece of legislation creates multiple Type II bodies with the identical
governance structure only one record is created. For example, the Alberta Public
Libraries Act allows for the creation of both municipal and regional library boards. While
multiple municipal and regional boards exist as a result of this legislation only two
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records have been created in the dataset, one record for municipal libraries and one
record for regional libraries. In taking this approach, instances of decision-making
authority being migrated are captured and not the resulting number of Type II bodies.
When collecting the data a unique id was assigned for each instance of authority
migration to a Type II body. Subsequent records for termination or modification of the
accountability relationships for that Type II body were coded with the same id – linking
all records associated with a specific Type II body together. Not captured in the dataset
are instances where the legislation has been amended, but the accountability relationships
remained unchanged. Moreover, in cases when the Type II body remains in place, but the
legislation that created it is repealed and replaced, the Type II body is not coded as
terminated and recreated. Instead, only changes to the accountability relationships (if
occurring) are captured. In cases when an amendment resulted in one or more of the
criteria for authority migration to be no longer satisfied, the Type II body was treated the
same as if the Type II body had been terminated and a termination record was entered.
In addition to the type of record, the data collected from the provincial statutes include:
the year, chapter, and title of the statute; the year, and chapter of the revised statute; the
name or description (i.e. municipal libraries) of the Type II body; the policy area in
which authority was migrated; the geographic scale of Type II body; whether the Type II
body is a Professional Self-Regulatory body; and the existence of specified accountability
mechanisms. The geographic scale of each Type II body was coded based on whether the
Type II body’s geographic jurisdiction matched: that of a single municipality as in the
case of municipal library boards; spanned municipalities as in the case of regional library
boards; covered an entire province as does Alberta Health Services; or spanned multiple
provinces as does the Atlantic Provinces Special Education Authority. A Type II body
was coded as a Professional Self-Regulatory body when government granted
responsibility for regulation over a specified profession to a body whose membership and
majority of its board is composed of practitioners of that profession.
In coding accountability relationships, a total of fifty-four specific accountability
mechanisms, as detailed in Appendix A, were identified. The list of accountability
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mechanisms was developed in accordance with Bovens’s definition of accountability as
discussed in Chapter 2. To be included, the mechanism must either oblige the Type II
body to explain and to justify its conduct, enable the public or government to ask
questions and pass judgement, or enable the public or government to sanction the Type II
body. A preliminary list of accountability mechanisms was initially created and tested
against the cases of authority migration for the province of Alberta. New accountability
mechanisms were appended to the list as they were identified in the Alberta statutes. Any
previously coded statutes were then reexamined to ensure that the newly added
accountability mechanisms had not been missed. Following the completion of Alberta,
the provinces of British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario were processed. Each
accountability mechanism was coded as a 1 when the mechanism was present within the
legislation and a 0 when it was not. In cases where a new authority mechanism was
identified in the remaining three provinces, it was added to the list, however, previously
coded statutes were not revisited. The decision not to review previous coded statutes was
based upon the experience gained reexamining statues in Alberta. When the Alberta
statutes were reexamined no additional occurrences of the new accountability mechanism
were found.
Once all statutes had been coded, the accountability mechanism variables were used to
create six additional variables for each record: three for the accountability relationship
between the Type II body and government; and three for the accountability relationship
between the Type II body and society. For each relationship, the three variables
correspond with the three components of Bovens’s definition of accountability: the
obligation to justify and explain; the capacity to question and pass judgment; and the
ability to sanction. When determining the nature of an accountability relationship, all
members of the public must be able to utilize the accountability mechanism for the
accountability relationship to be with society. Accountability mechanisms that can only
be utilized by narrowly defined subgroups of the population were deemed as supporting
accountability to special interest groups. For example, only members of the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario are able to hold members of their board accountable
through their capacity to elect board members. All six variables are coded as either
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present (1) or absent (0), based on the existence of an accountability mechanism that
meets the particular criteria for the variable.
In addition to the six variables used to denote the existence or absence of each element of
Bovens’s accountability definition, four overall accountability scores were created. For
each of the three relationships listed above the scores for the three individual variables
4

were added together to capture the overall strength of the relationship. For example, the
existence of all three elements of Bovens’s definition of accountability would result in an
accountability score of three, while the existence of any two would result in an
accountability score of two, and so on, for each of the four accountability scores.

3.2.2

Chapter 4: Dataset Creation

Using the data compiled in the master dataset in conjunction with provincial election
results and provincial fiscal data obtained from Statistics Canada a secondary dataset was
created. The second dataset was used to evaluate the rate of authority migration to Type
II bodies and the extent to which provincial finances and governing party ideology
influence the authority migration rate. The secondary dataset contains a record for each
province and year between 1946 and 2005. For each record two annual Type II body
creation rates are created: one for all Type II bodies; and a second excluding Professional
Self-Regulatory bodies. As discussed later in the chapter, the decision to evaluate the rate
of authority migration with and without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in the
dataset is based upon the possibility that the inclusion of Professional Self-Regulatory
bodies skew results. The decision to evaluate the rate of authority migration with and
without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies was taken as a robustness check of the
central findings for this chapter’s analyses. The rate of authority migration is calculated
as the number of instances of authority migration in a calendar year minus the number of
terminated instances of authority migration. A cumulative variable is also calculated for

4 Assigning equal value to each of the three components of accountability gives the obligation of a Type II
body to justify its actions the same weighting as the ability to sanction, when it could be argued that the
ability to sanction is of greater value. When changes were made to the model, for example scoring
sanctioning as a 2 or a 0 instead of a 1 or a 0, the results remained consistent with those reported in Chapter
5.
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each record and is equal to the cumulative value for the previous year plus the annual rate
of authority migration for the current year.
For each row in the secondary dataset the political composition of the legislature is also
compiled. Dummy variables were created to denote if a left-of-centre party formed a
majority government, a minority government, or the loyal opposition. In distinguishing
between political ideologies, the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) were labeled left-of-centre as content analysis of
federal political party manifestos between 1945 and 2000 demonstrated consistent
ideological disagreement between parties at the federal level with the NDP to the left of
both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties (Cochrane, 2010: 590-591). When
populating the dummy variables, if a left-of-centre party had both formed the government
and been the loyal opposition during the same calendar year the variables were coded
based upon which of the two options occurred for the longest duration in that calendar
year. For example, if a left-of-centre party was in power for seven months and formed the
loyal opposition for the remaining five months, the dummy variables would be coded as 1
(yes) for having a left-of-centre government in power and 0 (no) for having a left-ofcentre party as the loyal opposition.
In addition to capturing the political environment in a binary manner, the seat and vote
percentage for the left-of-centre parties and the party in power were compiled for each
calendar year. In cases where there was an election in the middle of the calendar year the
seat and voter percentages were calculated base on the proportional value for that year.
For example, if a left-of-centre party held 25% of the seats for 75% of the year and 40%
of the seats for 25% of the year, the percentage of seats held would be calculated as (25 *
.75) + (40 * .25) for a result of 28.75% of seats.
To populate the political data for Alberta, election results were obtained from the
Elections Alberta website (http://www.elections.ab.ca/Public%20Website/746.htm)
which provides the votes and seats received by party for each election from 1905 to 2012.
British Columbia election results were obtained from two Elections British Columbia
publications, Electoral History of British Columbia 1871-1986 and Electoral History of
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British Columbia Supplement, 1987-2001, as well as recent election results from the
Elections British Columbia website. Nova Scotia election results were obtained from
Election Nova Scotia’s Election Statistics website (http://electionsnovascotia.ca/electiondata/statistics). Ontario elections results, as Elections Ontario does not provide vote level
data, were obtained from the results complied by Alan Siaroff in Christopher Dunn’s
Provinces: Canadian Provincial Politics 2nd edition.
In addition to political data, variables were included in each record for disposable
income, provincial debt, and provincial deficit. Disposable income is used as an indicator
of provincial economic performance as it is the longest running macroeconomic timeseries available for Canada (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2010: 171), and the only
macroeconomic indicator that provides consistent time-series data from 1946-2005.
Disposable income data was obtained from Statistics Canada’s Historical Statistics of
Canada for the years prior to 1980 and from table 384-0012 of Statistics Canada’s
CANSIM socioeconomic database for the years after 1986. For the five years of
overlapping data from 1981 through to 1985 the average of the historical statistics and
CANSIM data was used to smooth out the small differences between the two sets of
statistics. Disposable income data was recorded on a per capita basis and in 2005 dollars
to allow for consistency across provinces and across time. In addition, the percentage
change in disposable income per capital over the previous four, five, and six years were
calculated. Change over periods of four, five and six years were calculated based on the
rationale that a government is more likely to respond to a fiscal trend than smaller shifts
in the fiscal environment, while longer periods of time run the risk of smoothing out
trends in the fiscal data that the government may have responded to.
Provincial debt was captured as it is considered to be a key measure of the overall
financial strength of government (Baker and Rennie, 2011: 359). Unfortunately, no
continuous data source was available for government debt, and changes in how debt was
calculated over time presented challenges in building a continuous time-series. To
produce a single provincial debt variable multiple sets of provincial debt data were
obtained from Statistics Canada. Table H404-415 from the Historical Statistics of
Canada dataset was used to obtain the data for direct and indirect provincial debt for the
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years 1933 through to 1975. Net fiscal debt collected from CANSIM table 385-0014 plus
the debt guaranteed by the provincial government from CANSIM table 386-0026 were
used to calculate public debt for the years 1971 through to 2005. Changes in the method
of debt calculation resulted in different debt values being reported for the same year. As a
result, for each of the five years in which the two datasets overlapped the average of the
two scores was used to calculate the provincial debt value in order to smooth the
transition from one dataset to another. Provincial debts were recorded on a per capita
basis in 2005 dollars and as a percentage change per capita over four, five, and six year
periods.
The third fiscal component, budgetary surplus or deficit, also presented challenges when
collecting the data, as an eight-year gap exists in the data available through Statistics
Canada. Historical tables H197-208 (Total Net General Expenditures) and H124-135
(Total Net Revenue) were used to calculate the annual deficit for all years up until 1969.
Data for 1970 through to 1980 was obtained from CANSIM table 384-0023, while data
for 1989 through to 2005 was obtained from CANSIM table 385-0001. Provincial deficits
were recorded on a per capita basis in 2005 dollars. As a result of the eight-year gap only
a short-term variable, annual per cent change per capita, could be created to present
changes in deficit across time.
When appending each piece of fiscal data to the yearly provincial record annual fiscal
data is applied to the subsequent calendar year. For example, the fiscal results for 1995 in
British Columbia are appended to the record of authority migration in British Columbia
for 1996. The rationale for this approach is that government can only respond to what has
already occurred or the existing trends in the province’s finances.
Also included within the dataset were dummy variables for each of the four provinces,
election year, and neoliberalism. All six dummy variables are used as control variables in
the regression models discussed below. The province variables are populated with a 1
when the record contains data for that province and 0 if not. The election year variable
contains a 1 if there was an election held in that calendar year and 0 if not. Lastly the
neoliberalism variable is coded as either a 1 or a 0 to denote the shift from Keynesianism
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to neoliberalism, with 1980 onward being coded with a 1. While Keynesianism entered
into crisis during the 1970s, 1980 was selected as the breaking point between the two
paradigms as it was not until the 1980s that neoliberalism became embedded (Bradford,
2000: 63-64).

3.2.3

Chapter 4: Data Analysis

A full list of Type II bodies can be found in Appendix B. In assessing the migration of
authority, both descriptive statistics and regression techniques are employed. First,
descriptive statistics are used to evaluate the hypotheses that the rate of authority
migration is increasing over time and the absolute number of instances of authority
migration is increasing over time. Line charts are used to plot both the annual rate of
authority Migration of Type II bodies and the cumulative number of Type II bodies
across time for each of the four provinces.
Next, ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to test the effect of fiscal capacity
and political ideology on the annual rate of authority migration. A sequential modeling
approach is used to test the independent variables, with a regression model run for each
independent variable and a final regression model containing all independent variables. In
all models the control variables are included. A sequential approach was adopted so that
the R-square, which provides an estimate of the effect of an independent variable on the
dependent variable (Pollock, 2009: 180), could be observed for each independent variable
and to ensure that results remained robust when all other independent variables were
controlled for. Statistical significance is report for 90, 95, and 99 per cent confidence
levels. Furthermore, independent variables are evaluated for each province separately and
against combined provincial data to allow for comparisons across provinces and to assess
overall trends in authority migration.
In addition to looking at both provincial and aggregate data, both the descriptive and
regression techniques are used to evaluate the rate of authority migration and the effect of
provincial fiscal capacity and political ideology with and without the inclusion of
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies. The decision to evaluate the annual rate of authority
migration with and without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in the dataset was based
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upon the possibility that the inclusion of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies would skew
results.
In three of the four provinces the increase in the rate of creation of Professional SelfRegulatory bodies was most prevalent in the area of healthcare. In Alberta, the Dental
Discipline Act resulted in the addition of two Type II bodies in 1990, while the Alberta
Healthcare Professionals Act saw an additional seven Type II bodies added between 1999
and 2005. Together the two acts accounted for nine of the eleven Professional SelfRegulatory bodies created in Alberta between the years of 1990 and 2005. In British
Columbia the enactment of the Healthcare Professions Act resulted in the creation of nine
new Type II bodies since 1994, accounting for eighty-two per cent of new Professional
Self-regulatory Bodies created since 1990 in British Columbia. The Regulated Health
Professions Act in Ontario resulted in an additional nine Type II bodies since 1991,
account for seventy per cent of the new professional self-regulatory bodies created since
1990 in Ontario. The only province that did not experience a sharp increase in the number
of healthcare related Type II bodies in the 1990s and early 2000s was Nova Scotia, which
only had an increase of three. However, the total number of new Professional SelfRegulatory bodies in Nova Scotia during this fifteen-year period was ten.
When collecting the data it was observed that the frequency at which authority had
migrated to Professional Self-Regulatory bodies was higher during the last fifteen years
included in the study. Overall, the increase in the number of Professional Self-Regulatory
bodies created in the four provinces during the last fifteen years being studied appear to
be the result of one of two trends: 1) the increasing degree of specialization within an
existing area of healthcare expertise, and 2) the legal recognition and assignment of
regulatory responsibilities to existing fields of professional practice. An example of the
increasing degree of specialization is the change from one regulatory body governing
both physiotherapists and massage therapists in British Columbia to two regulatory
bodies, one to govern physiotherapists and a second to govern message therapists, in
1994. Similarly, in Alberta a regulatory body for practical nurses was created through
legislation in 2003; this act brought the number of professional nursing bodies in Alberta
from two to three. Increased specialization within the healthcare field in general can be
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seen in the emergence of Type II bodies charged with regulating professions such as
medical laboratory technologists in Alberta, occupational therapists in British Columbia,
respiratory therapists in Nova Scotia, and speech and language pathologists in Ontario.
Special cases have also occurred, such as the legalization of midwifery that necessitated
the need to regulate the new legalized professional body.
To guard against changes in the rate of creation of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies
unknowingly biasing the results, the decision was made to assess the data with and
without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in the dataset.

3.2.4

Chapter 5: Accountability Relationships

As with assessing the migration of authority, a secondary dataset was created to assess
the accountability relationships that emerge once authority had been migrated. The new
dataset uses data collected in the master dataset in conjunction with provincial election
results. All records of authority migration between the years of 1946 and 2005 as well as
all records for changes in the accountability mechanisms of existing Type II bodies are
included in the dataset, while instances of termination of authority migration and records
for the creation of Type II bodies prior to 1946 are excluded. Data elements included
from the master dataset are: the unique id assigned to each instance of authority migration
to a Type II body; the year, chapter, and title of the statute; the name of the Type II body;
the record type code (new or modified), policy area, whether the Type II body is a
Professional Self-Regulatory body; and the accountability scores for the relationship
between the Type II body both government and society.
Using the same data sources used to create the dataset for Chapter 4, the political
composition of the legislature was again included. For each record, dummy variables
were created to denote if a left-of-centre party formed a majority government, a minority
government, or the loyal opposition. Seat and vote percentage variables for the left-ofcentre parties and the party in power were also created. The date of the legislation was
used to determine which party was currently in power and which election results to use to
calculate voter and seat percentages.
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Also included within the dataset were dummy variables for each of the four provinces,
geographic scale of the Type II body, whether the Type II body is Professional SelfRegulatory, and time period. The province variables are populated with a 1 when the
record contains data for that province and 0 if not. Four geographic scale variables were
created: single municipality; spans municipalities; single province; and spans provinces.
The geographic scale dummy variables were populated with a 1 if the geographic scale of
the Type II variable fell into that category, and 0 when it did not. To create time period
variables the overall timeframe being studied is divided into six ten-year periods and a
dummy variable is created for each. All instances of creation or modification of Type II
bodies were coded according to which time period it occurred in, with 1 indicating that it
occurred in that time period and 0 indicating it did not.

3.2.5

Chapter 5: Data Analysis

To test the effect of time period, political ideology and geographic scale on the strength
of the accountability relationships ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used. As with
the analysis of the annual rate of authority migration a sequential modeling approach is
used. Each independent variable was separately modeled. To ensure that results remain
robust, an additional model with all independent variables is run. Statistical Significance
is again reported at 90, 95, and 99 per cent confidence levels. Also consistent with the
approach taken for Chapter 4, the independent variables are evaluated against the records
for each individual province separately, as well as for all provincial records. This is again
done to allow for cross province comparison in addition to the assessing the overall trend
in accountability relationships.
Differing from the approach used in Chapter 4 is the treatment of Professional SelfRegulatory Type II bodies. While, Chapter 4 required a separate analysis of the annual
rate of authority migration for all Type II bodies and non Professional Self-Regulatory
Type II bodies, Chapter 5 uses a Professional Self-Regulatory dummy variable in the
regression model. Furthermore, the decision to control for Professional Self-Regulatory
bodies is not the result of an increase in number of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies,
but instead the fact that Professional Self-Regulatory bodies represent a unique category
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of Type II body. As these bodies are self-regulatory, there is the potential for a weaker
accountability framework in comparison to other forms of Type II body.

3.3 Quantitative and Qualitative Methods – Chapters 6
and 7
In chapters 6 and 7, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches is used to
gain additional understanding. While all incidents of legislated authority migration to
Type II bodies between the years of 1946 and 2005 in the provinces of Alberta, British
Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario formed the universe of cases for Chapters 4 and 5,
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on specific case studies from each of the four provinces. The
cases include: Alberta Health Services, British Columbia’s Health Authorities, Nova
Scotia’s District Health Authorities, and Ontario’s Local Health Integration Networks.
Discussed in great depth in Chapter 6, the decision to select the creation of Health
Authorities for case study is multifaceted. The criteria for case selection included the
migration of authority in the policy area being consistent across all four provinces, while
still providing sufficient provincial difference to allow for cross case comparisons.
Provincial differences could include but is not limited to the timing of authority
migration, or the institutional design of the Type II body to which authority was
migrated. With the creation of Local Health Integration Networks in Ontario in 2006 the
Type II health authorities met the “all province” criteria, while the institutional
differences between the four provinces met the “provincial difference” criteria. The
specific institutional difference of interest is the difference in geographic scale, with
Alberta having one province wide health authority, while each the other three provinces
have regional health authorities, and the unique decision in Ontario to maintain local
hospital boards where in the other three provinces local hospital boards were completely
replaced by regional or, in the case of Alberta, provincial boards.
The decision to explore the migration of decision-making authority in healthcare was also
influenced by the level of importance Canadian citizens place on healthcare. When asked,
“Which of these five issues is the most important issue to you PERSONALLY in this
election,” the results found that 48.8 per cent of respondents selected healthcare as the
65

most important issue in 2004 and 40.8 per cent selected healthcare in 2006 (Blais et al.,
2007). In addition, the decision took into account the relative lack of academic literature
on migration of authority to health authorities since the initial wave of authority
migration in the 1990s (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 507). Since the initial wave of
authority migration the provinces of Alberta and Ontario have moved in directions that
have substantially different institutional designs than those that were introduced in the
1990s. Lastly, while the focus of analysis is on the creation of Type II bodies and the
resulting accountability mechanism in the Canadian provinces, the migration of decisionmaking authority in healthcare is widespread, meaning the study of authority migration in
Canada has the potential to provide value beyond the Canadian border.
In investigate the migration of authority to Health Authorities and how they are
subsequently held accountable, both primary document sources and interviews were used.
The remainder of this section describes the collection of documents, the interview
process and how the data was analysed for Chapters 6 and 7.

3.3.1

Government Healthcare Document Collection Process

To provide context to the results of the quantitative analysis of the enabling legislation
both government publications and contracts or accountability agreements between
governments and regional health authorities were utilized. Government publications came
from two categories: documents produced by or at the request of the ministry responsible
for healthcare; and documents produced by external agencies or offices. Examples of
documents produced by or on behalf of the ministry include task force or royal
commission reports, government responses to task force and royal commission reports,
and government white papers and policy papers. Examples of publications produced by
external government agencies or offices include ombudsman reports, provincial auditor
reports, or reports by other autonomous or semi-autonomous entities such as the Health
Quality Council of Alberta.
To obtain recent government publications a search of government websites was initiated.
To find older publications the library catalogues of the University of Western Ontario and
the University of Guelph were searched. Each document collected was then searched for
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references to other government documents. Referenced documents were checked against
those that had already been identified, with new documents then being retrieved. The
search criteria for websites and library catalogues included: accountability, citizen
engagement, citizen participation, and governance. Contracts or accountability
agreements between governments and regional health authorities were searched for on
both ministry and health authority websites. A full list of documents is provided in
Appendix C.

3.3.2

Interview Questions

Interviews were semi-structured in design, with a set of predefined questions forming the
general structure of the interview. The interviewer was free, however, to ask probing
questions in response to the participant’s answers. The predefined interview questions are
provided in Appendix D. The interview questions are divided into three sections: Section
1 approaches accountability as defined by the participant; Section 2 approaches
accountability as defined by Bovens; and Section 3 is specific to Alberta and asks about
the shift from regional health authorities to one province-wide health authority.
In Section 1, the first question asks the participant to define accountability. This is done
to provide perspective to subsequent answers. Questions 1.2 and 1.3 are intended to
determine whom the participant believes the Type II body is most accountable to and
whose interests the Type II body most represents. Both questions are based on questions
asked by Lomas Woods and Veenstra in their study of the motivations, attitudes and
approaches of regional health authority board members published in 1997 (1997a: 673).
Questions 1.4 ask the participant to describe the accountability relationship between the
Type II body and government if not previously discussed, while question 1.5 does the
same for relationship between the Type II body and society. Following each question,
additional probes regarding the specific accountability mechanisms, the perceived
effectiveness of the accountability mechanism or the need for change or strengthening of
the accountability mechanism could be employed to further flesh out the participant’s
position.
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The questions in Section 2 are based upon Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability
and mirrors the data collected for quantitative analysis. In modelling the questions after
the variables used for the quantitative analysis the results can be directly compared and
contrasted to the quantitative findings. As a result the case study objective of providing
additional context to the quantitative results can be achieved. As previously stated,
Bovens identifies three parts to an accountability relationship including the obligation of
the actor to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the ability for the forum to pose
questions and pass judgement, and that actor may face consequences (Bovens, 2007:
450). For both the relationship between government and the Type II body and society and
the Type II body the participant is asked to what extent there is an obligation on the part
of the Type II body to explain and justify their actions; to what extent the ability exists to
pose questions to the Type II body regarding their actions; and to what extent there is the
ability to sanction the Type II body if their actions do not meet expectations. After each
question follow-up questions are used to determine not only the formal existence of each
of the three aspects of the accountability relationships, but perceived success or failure in
enacting each component.
The third section was only asked to participants from the province of Alberta. In Alberta
nine regional health authorities were migrated into a single province wide health
authority in 2008. Participants are asked what impact the shift from regional authorities
the single province health board have had on the ability of both government and society
to hold decision-makers accountable. The question is included to gain greater insight on
influence of geographic scale on accountability relationship. Participants from Alberta
are asked this question, as Alberta is the only province to move to a single provincial
entity from regional boards.

3.3.3

Interview Participants

All names, e-mail address and phone numbers used to contact perspective participants
were obtained from organizational websites or publically available reports, such as yearend reports. Interview participants were selected across four categories: elected
representatives, ministry employees, interest groups members, and members of the
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organization being studied. The purpose of including participants from a diverse set of
stakeholders is to obtain a wide range of viewpoints for inclusion in the analysis.
The elected representatives category includes members of both governing and opposition
parties. Within a parliamentary system, the exercise of state power is done in accordance
with parliamentary accountability where the government answerable to Parliament and
Parliament has the means to hold to account those who exercise the power of the state, be
they elected or non-elected officials (D’Ombrian, 2007: 198-199). For this reason, the
views of the party forming the government and those who are charged with holding
government to account were sought. Interviews were sought from the Minister as well as
the health critics from the opposition parties. Introductory e-mails were sent directly to
each potential participant and followed up with additional e-mail requests, and finally a
phone call if no response was received. A copy of the standard text used in the
introductory e-mail is included in Appendix E.
Interviews were also sought from public service employees. The size, complexity, and
number of functions undertaken by the state make it impossible for elected officials to be
involved in all aspects of how we are governed. Consequently, members of the public
service perform large portions of government activities (Flynn, 2011: 43). As public
employees perform much of the activities of government, they are attuned with the
operational reality of accountability mechanisms. To recruit participants an introductory
e-mail was sent to the appropriate branch of the public service requesting an interview
with a representative of the department. In Ontario the introductory e-mail was sent to the
Health System Accountability and Performance branch of the Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care. In Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia the appropriate area
within the ministry was not clearly identified on publically available organizational
charts. As a result, introductory e-mails were sent to the deputy minister’s office. If no
response was received a follow-up e-mail was sent. In all cases, responses to the followup e-mail were received.
The views of interest group representatives where sought to gain insight into how the
accountability of the Type II bodies were perceived from outside of government and the
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Type II body. In each province the provincial associate of the Canadian Health Coalition
and the province’s medical association were contacted for interviews. The health
coalitions were selected due to their position as coalitions of organizations and
individuals who are active or interested in healthcare policy at the provincial level.
Medical associations were selected as they represent an important constituency group in
the delivery of health services. For both the health coalitions and the medical associations
introductory e-mails were sent in accordance with the contact information provided on
the website to request an interview with a representative of the organization. In cases of
non-response follow-up e-mails were sent and finally if needed a phone call was placed
to the organization.
Similar to the need to interview both elected politicians and public service employees,
both board members and upper management were recruited from the health authorities. In
each province, members of both the board and management were recruited from the
health authority responsible for the capital region. Participants from a second health
authority – with the exception of Alberta, which has only one health authority – were
recruited to allow for additional perspectives to be put forward. In selecting a second
regional authority, regions that include rural areas were selected to offset the largely
urban characteristics of the capital region. In recruiting participants from the capital
region prior members of the board and management were recruited when existing
members declined to be interviewed. In selecting a second regional health authority,
when members declined to participate an alternative region was identified and
approached. When contact information was available, board chairs and CEOs were
contacted directly. When such contact information was not available, the introductory email was sent either to organizational e-mail accounts, or to specified individuals
identified on the organizations website, with the request that it be passed along to the
desired recipient.
While ideally participants from each category and groups within each category would
have been interviewed, this was not the case as not all possible interviewees consented to
being interviewed. The number of participants per category by province is shown in
Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Interview Participants by Category
Alberta

British
Columbia

Nova
Scotia

Ontario

Total

Elected Representatives

1

1

1

2

5

Ministry Employees

1

1

1

1

4

Interest Groups

2

1

1

1

5

Type II Board

0

2

1

2

4

Type II Management

1

2

2

2

7

Total

5

7

6

8

26

Lastly, all participants were also required to read and sign a research consent form. The
research consent form outlines the purpose of the research, the interview procedure and
questions, possible risks and benefits, details pertaining to withdrawing from the study,
and protection of participant confidentiality. In signing the consent form the participants
state that they have read the research consent form, have had the nature of the study
explained to them, and agree to participate. A copy of the research consent form is
included in as Appendix F.

3.3.4

Interview Procedure

All interviews were conducted over the phone or over the Internet through Skype. While
it is acknowledged that there are inherit disadvantages in using phone interviews, it was
felt that the advantages far outweighed them. The disadvantages of conducting phone
interviews include: evidence that suggests that open ended questions, such as those asked
in this study, yield shorter answers in comparison to face to face interviews (Singleton
and Straits, 2005: 241); there is increased difficulty in establishing trust and rapport with
the respondents (Singleton and Straits, 2005: 241); and there is an inability on the part of
both respondents and the interviewer to make use of visual in addition to verbal
communication channels (Berg, 2007: 110). The largest advantage to conducting the
interview by phone is the substantial savings in both time and money. There are
additional advantages in terms of flexibility as interviews could be scheduled on very
short notice with participants on both the East and West coast of the country.
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When contacting the participant the option was given for the respondent to provide a
contact number, or initiate the phone call. This option was provided as not all phone
numbers were publically available. At the start of each phone interview participants are
asked to consent to having a digital recording made of the interview. A set of predefined
questions then formed the overall framework for interview. The order, however, in which
the questions were asked, was not standardized across all participants. Instead, leeway
was given to the interviewer to adjust the order based upon the responses to initial
questions. For all participants the questions in Section 1 were asked in the predetermined
order, with the participant defining accountability and then specifying whom they believe
the health authorities are most accountable to. This is done to ensure that participant’s
answers are not biased by the definition of accountability as set out in the quantitative
analysis. Depending upon how the participant defines accountability and their response to
the question, whom do you believe the health authority is most accountable to? Questions
from Section 2 may be asked as part of the discussion. For example, if the participant
defines accountability along the lines of Bovens’s definition and states that health
authorities are most accountable to government, then questions from Section 2 regarding
government can be asked as part of this discussion. In instances where the participant’s
and Bovens’s definition of accountability do not align, the questions from Section 2 are
asked upon the completion of Section 1. The same approach is taken with Section 3; if
the topic emerges as part of a different discussion the questions regarding the shift from
regional to one single provincial body in Alberta may be asked out of order.
This semi-structured approach was taken as it provided sufficient structure to ensure that
key questions were asked, while providing enough flexibility to the interviewer to discuss
topics as the emerged within the conversation and to pursue topics that may or may not
have been included within the predefined interview questions. For example, while the
predetermined questions do not touch on the ideal number of health authorities in
Ontario, such a line of inquiry can be pursued if a participant engages in this topic in
relation to accountability to either citizens or government.
The interviews were on average 46 minutes in length. For all interviews notes are taken
throughout the duration of the interview. In addition, each participant was asked if they
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would consent to having an audio recording of the interview made. In total eighty-five
per cent of the participants agreed to the audio recording. Upon completion of the
interview the interviewers notes, as well as the digital recording were transcribed. In
instances where the participant’s answer is unclear a follow-up email is sent to the
participant to ensure that the participants intent is captured correctly. All participants are
asked at the end of the interview process if they desire a copy of the complete work.

3.3.5

Data Analysis: Chapter 6

Chapter 6 examines the factors leading to the migration of authority to Type II bodies in
provincial health care. In each of the four provinces the initial migration of authority to
Type II bodies as well as subsequent changes to the governance model is explored.
Consistent with Chapter 4, Chapter 6 assesses the effect of fiscal capacity and political
ideology, but also seeks to identify additional factors that have contributed to the
migration of authority in each province. In investigating which factors played a role in
the decision to migrate authority to Type II bodies, the provincial governments’ framing
of the challenges facing the health care system were explored. To determine how the
challenges facing health were defined, government policy documents, commission or task
force reports, provincial legislation, and provincial regulations are used. Both the
description of the existing structure and the recommendations or proposals for change
were examined to build an understanding of how policy challenges in health care were
framed leading up to the migration of authority.
In addition to exploring how the policy problem was framed, the eventual policy
outcomes are also considered. Specifically, the initial policy framing and the resulting
policy implementation are assessed for inconsistencies.

3.3.6

Data Analysis: Chapter 7

Chapter 7 uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches to explore the accountability
relationships between the regional health bodies and both government and society. The
chapter evaluates the effect of time, political ideology, and geographic scale on the
accountability relationships. This is done through the evaluation of government
documentation, contracts or accountability agreements between governments and
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regional health authorities, and the use of descriptive statistics as well as individual
interviewee responses from participant data. In evaluating accountability relationships
both the existence and effectiveness of accountability mechanisms are considered.
The existence and strength of the accountability relationships between health authorities
and both government and society is first assessed based upon the existence of
documented accountability mechanisms. In doing so, government-mandated mechanisms
as set forth in the legislation, regulations, and accountability or operating are taken into
account. Accountability mechanisms are identified based upon Bovens’s definition of
accountability. The strength of the accountability relationship is assessed based upon the
extent to which all three aspects of each accountability relationship exist.
Moving beyond the formal prescribed accountability mechanisms, the ability of both
society and government to hold health authorities accountable is evaluated. To do so the
interview transcripts are used. To code the data, the widely accepted three-step procedure
consisting of: 1) open coding or theming; 2) axial coding or tagging; and 3) selective
coding (Archer and Berdahl, 2011: 350-351) is employed. In employing this approach,
the data will be first explored for general patterns or themes, then searched for specific
instances of each theme, and finally reviewed for both additional supporting and
discrepant evidence (Archer and Berdahl, 2011: 350-352).

3.4 Ethical Considerations
The risks posed by this research are minimal. Interviewees may feel some psychological
or emotional discomfort answering questions about the organization’s level of
accountability if they have concerns over how the organization or those working for or
with the organization will be perceived. Participants may feel some stress over being
identified if they believe their comments to be unfavourable to the organization they are
associated with. There is also the risk that the participant may be identifiable due to the
small number of overall participants and the public nature of the organizations being
studied.
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In response to the potential risks, no information that discloses the identity of the
participant will be released or published without the participant’s consent. Furthermore,
at the recommendation of the Research Ethics Board, findings will be presented in a
summarized manner to minimize the risk that participants will be identified as a result of
the small number of potential participants linked with each organization.
To further protect the privacy of participants all audio recordings and transcripts will be
stored electronically and encrypted. Four copies of each file will be maintained: One on a
personal laptop, one on an external backup drive, one on DVD and one on the H: (home)
drive on the social science network to provide offsite backup. Audio recordings will be
kept for 5 years after the thesis defence. Transcripts will be maintained indefinitely.

3.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this research is to assess the extent to which provinces have utilized Type
II multilevel governance bodies in public governance and to gain a greater understanding
of the nature and strength of the accountability relationships that emerge when authority
is migrated. To achieve these objectives both quantitative and qualitative research
methods are employed. A quantitative approach was first employed to make use of the
large number of cases available across the four provinces. Qualitative analysis was then
employed to investigate specific cases in considerably more depth. The strength of
existing theories regarding the migration of authority and the resulting accountability
relationships were tested using OLS regression, while qualitative coding of documents
and interview responses allowed new areas of inquiry to emerge and provide context to
the quantitative findings.
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Chapter 4
4

Creation Myths: The Migration of Authority

My little girl Miller can take the fridge magnets with the letters on them, put any three letters on
the fridge in any order she wants to and she’ll get some government agency that you’ve never
heard of but you’re paying millions and millions a year to sustain.”
-Tim Hudak, 2011 Ontario Leader’s Debate

For the majority of the past three centuries governance in the public realm has been
associated with the state and a dominant pattern of hierarchical governing in which
government decides the laws and policies to be adopted (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209).
This traditional approach to governance, however, has been challenged as societal actors
seek greater autonomy (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 209-210) and the governance demands
on the state expand to the point where capacity requirements cannot be fulfilled without
widespread delegation (Finders, 2006: 223). Caught between increased demands on one
hand and limited fiscal budgets on the other, governments have engaged a range of
private and public actors in the governance process (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011: 5).
The demands placed upon government as the provider of public goods and services have
pushed government toward the use of external actors to meet public demand, while at the
same time growing societal complexity has made governance more difficult in terms of
both managing demand and managing the growing number of interconnections (Pierre
and Peters, 2005: 121-122). The attitude and actions of citizen have also played a role in
challenging the traditional patterns of governance. There has been a decline in citizen
confidence in the public sector, a reduction in citizen participation in politics, and a
pattern of voting for governments who pledge to reduce the role of the state (Peters,
2004: 130). The resulting change in governance model has been described as the
‘marketization’ of the public sector, where an increasing number of special purpose
bodies and private actors are enlisted to deal with specific policy problems (Andrew and
Goldsmith, 1998: 104).
In response to the idea that the traditional model of public governance is undergoing a
change that is resulting in the dispersal of decision-making authority, this chapter
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explores the extent to which authority has migrated beyond the boundaries of elected
government at the provincial level in Canada. To do so, legislated instances of authority
migration in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario
between the years of 1946 and 2005 form the universe of cases. Two areas of inquiry are
explored: the extent to which the aforementioned provinces have migrated decisionmaking authority; and the degree to which period in time, political ideology and
government fiscal capacity are able to explain variation in the likelihood of government
migrating authority.

4.1 Migration of Authority and Governance
One dimension along which governance can vary is centralization of authority. Authority
can be highly concentrated in a single hierarchical entity that claims exclusive
jurisdiction or dispersed among various nodes, each exercising only limited jurisdiction
(Kahler and Lake, 2004: 409). The dispersion of authority can then be thought of as
occurring along both a vertical and horizontal axis. Along the vertical axis authority can
be distributed to successively more local levels of government in which the more limited
jurisdictions are nested within larger jurisdictions. Along the horizontal axis the authority
can be dispersed to actors outside of government.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the dispersion of authority, both vertically and horizontally, is
captured by Marks and Hooghe’s Type I and Type II models of multilevel governance.
The analytical focus of multilevel governance is the increasingly contested jurisdictional
and territorial boundaries both within and beyond the state, with the fundamental
question being how to explain the dispersal of central government authority both
vertically to actors at other territorial levels and horizontally to non-state actors (Bache
and Flinders, 2005: 4). Marks and Hooghe provide two contrasting models for the
dispersion of authority outward from the centre: Type I multilevel governance, which is
concerned with power sharing among governments operating at different levels; and
Type II multilevel governance, which denotes independent jurisdictions that fulfill
specific functions. Focused on the vertical dispersion of authority, Type II bodies are
defined as having intersecting memberships in the sense that borders will be crossed and
jurisdictions may overlap; as being organized across a large number of levels in which
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authority is not neatly layered but diverse in scale; and being flexible in design, allowing
it to respond to changing citizen preferences and functional requirements (Hooghe and
Marks, 2005: 20-21).
While contrasting in structure, the applications of Type I and Type II multilevel
governance are complementary with the selected model of multilevel governance being a
function of the problem to be addressed (Marks and Hooghe 2005: 29). Furthermore,
Type II multilevel governance structures can be embedded in legal frameworks
determined by Type I jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe, 2003: 238, 2005: 24). The use of
Type II multilevel governance as a tool of government where government delegates
authority in response to a specific policy circumstance can be witnessed at the provincial
level. While Type II multilevel governance may occur when private actors play a
dominant role in the policy making process, causing public actors to adopt privately
negotiated regimes (Marks and Hooghe, 2005: 25), it is a government’s use of Type II
bodies to delegate authority outside the confines of elected government that is the focus
of this chapter.
The first objective is to place recent trends in the creation and termination of Type II
bodies within a historical context. It has been argued that policy areas are becoming
increasingly crowded, with government becoming just one of many actors involved in the
governance process (Kennett, 2010: 20). If, as suggested, there has been an increased
interest in governance partnerships between government and societal actors and an
increase in the dispersal of political authority across multiple governance actors
(Kooiman, 1993: 1, 35; Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104; Peters, 2004: 130; Flinders,
2006: 224) an increase in both the rate and absolute number of Type II bodies should be
witnessed across time. This leads to the chapter’s first two hypotheses, which are as
follows:
H4.1 – The absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over time.
H4.2 – The annual creation rate of Type II bodies is increasing over time.
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Beyond the rate of creation, there is also the question of what factors promote the
creation of Type II bodies by government. Two potential explanations are put forward in
this chapter: first, the capacity of government to meet governance demands shapes the
location of governance responsibilities; and, secondly, the ideological persuasion of the
governing parties is a causal factor in the creation of Type II bodies. Both of these
potential explanations are considered in greater detail.
The argument that increased demands placed on government leads to increased migration
of authority to Type II bodies is based upon the premise that the demands on the modern
state outstrip the capacity of government. The growth in responsibilities demand a
structural capacity that can only be filled with the widespread delegation that allows the
state to address a wide range of policy issues, while not needing to be involved with the
day-to-day socio-political interactions and in doing so simultaneously blurring the
public/private distinction (Flinders, 2006: 223-224). The influence of capacity as a
rationale for including new governance actors in the public realm can be seen in the
argument put forward for the use of public-private partnerships that emerged in Canada
in the mid-1990s. Changes to the governance structure were made with the intent of
minimizing on-budget government expenditures and not increasing current levels of
government debt (Vining and Boardman, 2008: 12). Kernagan, Marson, and Borins
identified the pervasive influence of debt and deficit on public-service reform and
government reform, which included privatization and the contracting out of public
services (2005: 6). When the state is unable to fulfill the governance demands placed
upon it, the capacity argument suggests that the lower the fiscal capacity of the state to
fulfill its responsibilities (both new and existing) the greater the rate of creation of Type
II bodies is likely to be. Accordingly the chapter’s third hypothesis accesses the effect of
fiscal capacity on the rate of Type II body creation and is presented as follows:
H4.3 - The lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher
the rate of creation of Type II bodies.
The argument for ideology influencing the extent to which authority is migrated outside
of government is anchored in the idea that parties on the left tend to resort to more
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government intervention and parties on the right are more likely to rely upon the market.
Adam Harmes suggests that multilevel governance is characterized by the dispersal of
power away from central government and can be viewed as part of a deliberate neoliberal
political project with the goal of separating economic and political power. The effect of
this separation of powers can be witnessed in the growing use of legal-juridical
mechanisms to lock in neoliberal policies and insulate them from democratic influence
(Harmes, 2006: 726-727). Similarly, the emergence of new public management in the
1980s, with its promotion of the private sector and the delegation of authority as a
remedy for the high taxes and deficits associated with the welfare state, has been
characterized as a neoliberal approach (Hoehn, 2011: 77). As argued by McBride and
Shields, the advancement of a neoliberal agenda, aimed at reducing the state and
increasing reliance on market mechanisms, provides the ideological venue for shifting
decision-making outside of politics and is eroding the power of the state (1997: 18). This
suggests that the more closely aligned the government in power is with a neoliberal
ideology the greater the rate of creation of Type II bodies, while governments on the left
would be expected to resort less frequently to the use of Type II bodies in the governance
process.
While neoliberalism is a recent phenomenon, there are long-standing debates over size of
government. Neoclassical liberals have long argued that government should be as small
as possible and act as a night watchman whose only role is to protect the person and
property of individuals, while welfare liberals have promoted a larger role for
government, including the existence of state run institutions (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 7779). In comparison to both forms of liberalism, social democracy calls for a larger state
and promotes the expansion of public ownership (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 44). Drawing
upon both the recent and historic trends, it can be argued that differences in political
ideology, specifically how the role of the state is viewed, may influence the rate at which
Type II bodies are created. Specifically, governments aligned further to the left are
expected to create fewer Type II bodies than governments aligned further to the right due
to their belief in an expanded role for the state. Accordingly this leads to the chapter’s
final hypothesis:
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H4.4 – The further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits the
lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies.

4.2 Data and Methodology
To test each hypothesis the custom dataset described in full in Chapter 3 is used. The
dataset includes the incidents of creation, termination, and modification of Type II bodies
in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario between the
years of 1946 and 2005. The reasons to use provincial data are threefold: provincial
politics is relatively under-studied in comparison to the federal level, it allows for
comparisons across provinces, and it allows for the creation of a larger sample size than
the use of national level data alone would provide.
The dataset includes records for Type II bodies created prior to 1946 and still in effect in
1946, new Type II bodies created after 1946, and cases of Type II body termination since
1946. For a Type II body to be included in the dataset three conditions must be satisfied:
authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to the body through an act
of legislation; the majority of decision-makers within the body must be comprised of
individuals who are from outside of the government, legislature, or public service; and
Type II body must have decision-making autonomy. For example, the Alberta’s Child
and Family Services Authorities created under the Child and Family Services Authorities
Act of 1996 are included within the dataset as they are created by legislation, the boards
are comprised of non-government members, and they have the autonomy to make
decisions for their region including: the planning and managing the provision of child and
family services; the determining of priorities in the provision of child and family services
and allocating resources accordingly; and working with other Authorities, the
Government and other public and private bodies to co-ordinate the provision of child and
family services.
To test the effect of political ideology and government fiscal capacity on the creation of
Type II bodies the annual creation rate of Type II bodies is used as the dependent
variable. The annual creation rate is calculated by subtracting the number of terminated
Type II bodies from the number of newly created Type II bodies in each calendar year.
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The independent variables used as a proxy for government fiscal capacity are disposable
income as an indicator of overall provincial economic health, and provincial debt as an
indicator of government fiscal capacity. Both the provincial economic health and the
government finances are included as they measure different financial aspects within the
province. It is possible that provincial finances are structured in a way that limits capacity
even during a booming economy. In assessing government finances, provincial debt is
utilized as it is considered to be a key measure of the overall financial strength of
government (Baker and Rennie, 2011: 359). Disposable income is used as an indicator of
provincial economic performance. As the longest running macroeconomic time-series
available for Canadian data (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2010: 171), disposable income is the
only macroeconomic indicator that provides consistent time-series data from 1946 to
2005.
Both disposable income and provincial debt are measured using the percentage change
per capita over the previous five years. A five-year period is used based on the rationale
that a government is more likely to respond to a fiscal trend than smaller blips in the
fiscal environment and that too long a time period runs the risk of smoothing out trends in
the fiscal data that the government may have responded to. As discussed in Chapter 3, no
continuous data source was available for government debt, and changes in how debt was
calculated over time presented challenges in building a continuous time-series. To
produce a single provincial debt variable two datasets from Statistics Canada were used,
one containing records of public debt from 1933 to 1975 and a second containing records
of public debt from 1971 to 2005. The changes in the method of debt calculation resulted
in different debt values being reported for the same year. For each of the five years in
which the two datasets overlapped the average of the two scores was used for the
provincial debt value in order to smooth the transition from one dataset to the other. For
both disposable income and provincial debt, the previous year’s fiscal data is used as
governments can only react to what has previously happened.
To test the effect of political ideology the percentage of seats held by a left-of-centre
party is used as an independent variable. While a brokerage model has been traditionally
applied to Canadian party politics, Cross and Young’s examination of party attitudes
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suggest clear patterns of ideological differentiation between parties (2002: 859). Cross
and Young conclude the Canadian party system manifests some characteristics of an
ideological model (2002: 878). Content analysis of federal political party manifestos
between 1945 and 2000 has demonstrated an ideological disagreement between parties at
the federal level. The analysis places the NDP consistently to the left of both the Liberal
and Progressive Conservative parties that alternate holding the position on the far right
(Cochrane, 2010: 590-591). While organizational independence exists between the
federal Liberal and Conservative parties and their provincial counterparts, the NDP
remains a fully integrated organization with membership at the provincial level resulting
in automatic membership in the federal party (Esselment, 2010: 871-872). Given the
connection between the provincial and federal NDP parties, and the NDP’s consistent
position to the left at the federal level, the percentage of seats held by the NDP or CCF
party forms the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties.
An alternative independent variable, a left-of-centre party forming the government, was
considered, however, the absence of left-of-centre governments in Alberta and Nova
Scotia facilitated the decision to use the number of seats held by left-of-centre parties as
it allows for a consistent regression model across all datasets. Furthermore, it is expected
that the greater the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties, the stronger the
voice of the left will have in parliament and the greater the influence the left-of-centre
will have on how the province is governed.
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to test the effect of each independent
variable on the rate of creation of Type II bodies. A Sequential modeling approach is
used in which each independent variable is tested separately and then as part of a larger
model. Sequential modeling was adopted so that the effect of each independent variable
on the dependent variable, as expressed by the adjusted R2, could be observed
independently. For each hypothesis the models are run for the entire dataset to identify
overall trends and then for each province individually to identify differences between the
provinces. Due to the skewing effect caused by Professional Self-Regulatory bodies
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5

discussed in Chapter 3 , when working with the aggregated provincial dataset the models
will be run first for all Type II bodies, then for all Type II bodies excluding Professional
Self-Regulatory bodies. When working at the individual province level, Professional
Self-Regulatory bodies are omitted from the dataset.
The regression models also contain a number of control variables. An election year
dummy variable is included within all models to control for any effect an election may
have on the rate of creation of Type II bodies. The election year dummy variable is coded
with a 1 for years in which an election is held and 0 for all other years. Dummy variables
are also created for each province to control for provincial differences. The provincial
dummy variables are included in the model when the aggregate provincial dataset is
evaluated. The Ontario dummy variable is omitted from the regression models, making
Ontario the provincial variable against which all other provincial variables are compared.
An additional control variable for neoliberalism is also included in the regression models.
The neoliberalism dummy variable is used to denote the shift in policy paradigm from the
Keynesian welfare state to a neoliberal political agenda. While as discussed above, there
has been and remains an ideological difference between the left and right in regard to the
role of the state, the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism is reflected in the policy
platforms of parties on both sides of the political spectrum (Larner, 2000: 8-9). The
neoliberalism dummy variable allows for the across party shift toward neoliberalism to be
controlled for by denoting the years in which neoliberalism has been the more dominant
policy paradigm. Neoliberalism existed prior to 1980; however, it was not until the 1980s
that it became embedded (Bradford, 2000: 63-64). While the exact timing of the shift
between paradigms, especially for each political party can be contested, the neoliberalism
dummy variable is coded as a 1 for the years of 1980 through 2005 and 0 for the years
1946 through 1979.

5 Between 1990 and 2005 the number of Professional Self-Regulatory bodies increased rapidly as existing
professional bodies, largely in healthcare, splintered into multiple new Type II bodies. The occurrences of
such events cause spikes in the creation rate of Type II bodies, skewing the data. Testing the hypotheses
with and without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies is done to control for such spikes.
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While OLS regression is utilized in testing the effect of political ideology and
government fiscal capacity, descriptive statistics are used to test the hypotheses that the
rate and absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over time. As with the
regression analysis, the data is presented first for all forms of Type II bodies and then
excluding Professional Self-Regulatory bodies. The cumulative number of Type II bodies
is calculated by adding the annual creation rate to the previous years cumulative value.
The baseline for the cumulative number of Type II bodies is the number of Type II bodies
operating in and not terminated during the 1946 calendar year.

4.3 Results: Annual Rate of Creation and Absolute Number
of Type II Bodies
The first of the four hypotheses to be evaluated is H4.1 – the absolute number of Type II
bodies is increasing over time. Results are presented in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d, which
containing all forms of Type II bodies, and Figure 4.2a through 4.2d in which
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are excluded.
As depicted in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d the trend across provinces has been the gradual
increase in the cumulative number of Type II bodies over the past sixty years. In Alberta,
this trend began to reverse in the late 1980s, with the cumulative number of Type II
bodies decreasing between 1990 and 2005. However, a corresponding shift, from an
increasing to decreasing cumulative number of Type II bodies, is not evident in any of the
other provinces. While the other provinces have sudden decreases in the cumulative
number of Type II bodies during specific years – 2003 in British Columbia, 1999 in
Ontario, and 2001 in Nova Scotia – all three provinces have since continued to add to the
number of Type II bodies.
Also evident in Figure 4.1a through 4.4d is a decline in the rate of accumulation of Type
II bodies during the time period immediately prior to 2005. In Alberta, Nova Scotia and
Ontario the leveling of the cumulative number of Type II bodies begins in approximately
1988, while in British Columbia the trend begins a decade earlier in 1978. While the
cumulative results show a decrease in the creation rate across all four provinces, the
annual results indicate that in each of the four provinces new Type II bodies have
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continued to be created throughout the entire duration of the period being studied.
Overall, the results suggest a continuing increase in the number of Type II bodies
supporting the hypothesis that the absolute number of Type II bodies is increasing over
time.
Figure 4.1: Type II Body Annual and Cumulative Creation Rate by Province
Figure 4.1a

Figure 4.1b

Figure 4.1c

Figure 4.1d

When Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are omitted from the dataset the decline in the
rate of accumulation of new Type II bodies becomes more prevalent. As shown in Figure
4.2a through 4.2d, a more pronounced decrease in the slope of the line representing the
cumulative number of Type II bodies is apparent when Professional Self-Regulatory
bodies are removed from the dataset. In three of the four provinces the cumulative

86

number of Type II bodies ceases to increase after 1988 and then either decreases or
remains at approximately the same level for the remainder of the period being studied.
The exception is British Columbia, where the cumulative number of Type II bodies
ceases to increase in 1978 and then remains relatively stable for the remaining 27 years
included in the study.
Figure 4.2: Type II Body (Excluding Professional Self-Regulatory) Annual and
Cumulative Creation Rate by Province
Figure 4.2a

Figure 4.2b

Figure 4.2c

Figure 4.2d

Consistent with the results for all forms of Type II bodies, Figure 4.2a through 4.2d show
the continuous use of Type II body creation as a solution to policy requirements. Unlike
when all forms of Type II bodies are analyzed, however, Figure 4.2a through 4.2d show
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that when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are removed from the dataset a decrease in
the rate of creation, as shown by the stabilization of the cumulative number of Type II
bodies, exists. While some fluctuation is observed between years, in all four provinces,
after an initial period of growth, the cumulative number of Type II bodies either
decreases or stabilizes. When Professional Self-Regulatory Type II bodies are removed
from the data set the results do not support the hypothesis that the absolute number of
Type II bodies is increasing over time.
The second hypothesis to be evaluated is H4.2 – the annual creation rate of Type II bodies
is increasing over time. As depicted in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d, the annual rate of
creation remains fairly consistent across the 60-year period. While both dips and spikes
appear in the charts for each of the four provinces, there is no evidence of a trend toward
an increasing rate of Type II body creation over time. This is consistent with the results
for the absolute number of Type II bodies, which shows a gradual flattening of the slope,
suggesting if anything a decrease in the annual rate of Type II body creation. As
presented in Figure 4.2a through 4.2d, the results remain consistent when Professional
Self-Regulatory bodies are removed from the data set. This suggests that no support
exists for the hypothesis that the annual rate of creation of Type II bodies in increasing
over time.
What the above charts do show is that the use of Type II bodies is not new, in contrast
there has been a history of Type II body use in public governance. Looking at the 60-year
period between 1946 and 2005 the overall trend is toward a continuous increase in the
cumulative number of all Type II bodies. The exception to this trend is the province of
Alberta in which the cumulative number of Type II bodies decreases starting in the late
1980s. When Professional Type II bodies are removed a decline is witnessed in both
Alberta and Nova Scotia while the cumulative number of Type II bodies in British
Columbia and Ontario become stable. Overall, when all forms of Type II bodies are
included, the results support the hypotheses that the absolute number of Type II bodies is
increasing with time, however, the results also show that the number of Professional SelfRegulatory bodies has been increasing at a rate that compensates for the stabilization or
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decrease in the number of other forms of Type II body. Moreover, the uniqueness of
Alberta’s results means that caution must be taken when forming generalizations.

4.4 Results: Aggregated Datasets - Creation Rate of Type II
Bodies
Two hypotheses are put forward regarding changes to the creation rate of Type II bodies:
H4.3 - the lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher
the rate of creation of Type II bodies; and H4.4 – the further to the left-of-centre on the
political spectrum a government sits the lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies.
Each hypothesis will be examined in turn starting with the aggregate dataset containing
all provinces and all forms of Type II bodies, then with the aggregated provincial dataset
without Professional Self-Regulatory bodies, and lastly with each of the four provincial
datasets.
The results of the regression analysis for each hypothesis against the dataset containing
all provinces and all forms of Type II bodies are presented in Table 4.1. When looking at
the effect of fiscal capacity on the annual rate of Type II body creation, two independent
variables are tested. Provincial debt is used as it is considered to be a key measure of the
overall financial strength of government (Baker and Rennie, 2011: 359). Disposable
income, which captures funds available for individual and household consumption
(OECD, 2003), is used as a macroeconomic indicator of provincial economic
performance (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2010: 171). Based on the results in Table 4.1, Model
1, an increase of one per cent in disposable income per capita over the previous five years
produces an increase of 2.707 in the rate of Type II body creation, and is significant at the
95% confidence level. The results, however, are not in the predicted direction, with the
strengthening of the provincial economic health suggesting a higher level in the rate of
creation of Type II bodies. When both disposable income and provincial debt are
included in the regression model, as shown in Table 4.1, Model 3, the results for
disposable income remain positive and are significant at the 99% confidence level. When
all independent variables are included within the regression model (Model 5) the results
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for disposable income again remain significant at the 99% level and in the positive
direction.
As shown in Table 4.1, Model 2, the provincial debt coefficient is positive as predicted,
but does not produce significant results. When disposable income is included in the
regression model as presented in Model 3, provincial debt remains positive but not
significant. When all independent variables are included in the model the provincial debt
coefficient again remains positive but not significant at the 90% confidence level.
Taking into consideration the results for provincial debt and disposable income there is
no support for the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal capacity of government the higher
the rate of creation of Type II bodies. Instead, the results across all three models for
disposable income are statistically significant in the opposite direction, suggesting that
increased fiscal capacity is associated with a higher level of Type II body creation as
opposed to the lower level that is predicted.
When looking at the effect of political ideology on the annual rate of Type II body
creation, the results for percentage of seats won by left-of-centre parties are not in the
expected direction. As shown in Table 4.1, Model 4, when all provinces and forms of
Type II bodies are included in the dataset the changes in the number of left-of-centre
seats produces significant results. As displayed in Model 4, a one per cent increase in the
number of seats held by a left-of-centre party produces an increase of 0.024 in the rate of
type II body creation, with the results significant at the 95% confidence level. When all
independent variables are included in the regression model (Model 5) the results indicate
that an increase of one per cent in the number of seats held by a left-of-centre party
produces a 0.025 increase in the annual rate of creation, with the results remaining
significant at the 95% confidence level. While a lower level in the annual rate of creation
of Type II bodies was expected the results indicate a higher level, suggesting that the
hypothesis be rejected.
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Table 4.1: Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Dataset includes AB, BC, NS and ON)
Model 16
Disposable
Income

Model 2

2.707(1.057)**

Provincial
Debt

0.222(0.211)

Model 37

Model 4

Model 5

2.925(1.066)***

2.966(1.056)***

0.303(0.209)

0.298(0.208)

Left Seats

0.024(0.0102)**

0.025(0.011)**

Neoliberalism -0.626(0.260)**

-0.853(0.244)***

-0.552(0.264)**

-1.087(0.254)***

-0.746(0.275)***

Election Year -0.466(0.267)*

-0.521(0.269)*

-0.472(0.266)*

-0.528(0.267)**

-0.485(0.264)*

Alberta

-0.532(0.336)

-0.481(0.341)

-0.605(0.339)*

-0.120(0.363)

-0.288(0.363)

British
Columbia

-0.465(0.334)

-0.493(0.339)

-0.489(0.334)

-0.885(0.381)**

-0.904(0.376)**

Nova Scotia

-0.522(0.338)

-0.397(0.338)

-0.552(0.338)

-0.154(0.350)

-0.321(0.350)

Adjusted R2

0.102

0.0815

0.110

0.0968

0.101

Number of
Cases

240

240

240

240

240

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
Ontario is the category for comparison for province variables.

As shown in Table 4.1, Model 5, neoliberalism, election year, and British Columbia also
produce significant results. The results indicate that the time period in which
neoliberalism is the dominant paradigm (1980-2005) is associated with a decrease of
0.746 in the annual rate of creation. The results for neoliberalism are consistent across all
models at the 95% confidence level or higher. The results indicate that election years are
associated with a decrease of 0.488 in the annual creation rate and are consistent across
all models at the 90% confidence level or higher. The results for British Columbia
suggests a decrease of 0.929 in the annual rate of Type II body creation in comparison to
Ontario, however, the results are only significant when the percentage of seats held by
left-of-centre governments is included in the model.

6 Change in provincial disposable income was also tested at 4 [3.864(1.285) ***] and 6 [2.882(0.883) ***]
years to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous.
7 Provincial Annual Surplus and Debt was included in previous models. The variable was removed as it
was found to not be a significant predictor of the rate of creation of Type II bodies and due to a gap in the
available data resulted in the dropping of 15% of the available cases.
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Overall, the results suggest that both hypotheses be rejected. The results presented in
Table 4.1 provide no support for the hypothesis suggesting that governing parties on the
ideological left creates fewer Type II bodies. There is also no support for the hypothesis
that government would turn to the creation of Type II bodies to meet new of governance
demands when confronted with diminished fiscal capacity. Moreover, the results for
disposable income, which was significant at the 99% confidence level when all
independent variables were included in the regression model, suggests a strengthening of
overall provincial economic performance is associated with a higher level in the creation
rate of Type II bodies.
The results of the regression analysis for each hypothesis against the dataset containing
all provinces when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are excluded are presented in
Table 4.2. When testing the effect of fiscal capacity on the creation rate of Type II bodies
both disposable income and provincial debt are again evaluated. When evaluating the
effect of disposable income, as shown in Table 4.2, Model 1, a one per cent increase in
disposable income per capita over the previous five years produces an increase of 2.906
in the annual rate of Type II body creation and is significant at the 95% confidence level.
As shown in Model 3, when provincial debt is added to the regression model the results
for disposable income remain in the positive direction and are significant at the 99%
level. When all independent variables are included in the regression model the results
again remain unchanged. As presented in Model 5, a one per cent increase in disposable
income per capita over the previous five years produces a higher level in the annual rate
of Type II body creation, with a positive coefficient of 3.18. The results are significant at
the 99% confidence level.
When testing the effect of provincial debt, as shown in Table 4.2, Model 2, the results
failed to produce significant results, however, when disposable income was added to the
regression model a one per cent increase in provincial debt was associated with an
increase of 0.365 in the annual rate of Type II body creation. The results are significant at
the 95% confidence level and are in the expected direction. As shown in Model 5, when
all independent variables are included in the regression model, the coefficient for
provincial debt remains positive and significant at the 95% confidence level. Taking the
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results for both disposable income and provincial debt into account there is mixed
support for the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal capacity of government the higher the
rate of creation of Type II bodies. An increase in provincial debt indicates weakened
fiscal capacity, and is associated with a higher level of annual creation rate of Type II
bodies, however an increase in disposable income indicates a strengthening of the
provincial fiscal environment, but is also associated with a higher level in the annual
Type II body creation rate.
Table 4.2: Annual Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Data Includes AB, BC, NS and
ON – Excluding Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies)
Model 18
Disposable
Income

Model 2

2.906(0.926)***

Provincial
Debt

0.276(0.185)

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

3.168(0.929)***

3.180(0.930)***

0.365(0.183)**

0.363(0.183)**

Left Seats

0.007(0.010)

0.007(0.009)

Neoliberalism -0.799(0.228)***

-1.037(0.215)***

-0.710(0.231)***

-1.140(0.226)***

-0.767(0.242)***

Election Year -0.283(0.233)

-0.343(0.237)

-0.290(0.232)

-0.338(0.237)

-0.294(0.232)

Alberta

-0.573(0.294)*

-0.526(0.300)*

-0.660(0.296)**

-0.379(0.323)

-0.568(0.320)*

British
Columbia

-0.450(0.293)

-0.484(0.298)

-0.480(0.291)

-0.577(0.312)*

-0.600(0.331)*

-0.516(0.296)*

-0.383(0.287)

-0.551(0.295)*

-0.302(0.312)

-0.484(0.308)

0.131

0.103

0.142

0.096

0.141

240

240

240

240

240

Nova Scotia
Adjusted R
Number of
Cases

2

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance.
Ontario is the category for comparison for province variables.

In evaluating the effect of political ideology on the annual rate of Type II body creation,
no significant results are produced when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are
removed from the dataset. As shown in Models 4 and 5, the results remain consistent
when all independent variables are included in the regression model.

8 As with Model 4.1 the results for change in provincial disposable income was tested at 4 [4.138(1.122)
***] and 6 [2.955(0.772) ***] years to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous.
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While not related to specific hypotheses, the results for neoliberalism and British
Columbia again produce significant results. As shown in Table 4.2, Model 5, the results
for neoliberalism suggest a decrease of 0.767 in the annual creation for years in which
neoliberalism was the dominant paradigm. When all variables are included in the
regression model, the results for British Columbia suggests a decrease of 0.6 in the
annual rate of Type II body creation in comparison to Ontario. For British Columbia, the
results are again only significant when the percentage of seats held by a left-of-centre
party is included in the regression model. Unlike the results presented in Table 4.1,
election year produced no significant results.
In addition, two new variables produced significant results when Professional SelfRegulatory bodies were excluded from the dataset. When evaluating provincial fiscal
capacity, Nova Scotia produced significant results when disposable income was included
in the dataset, suggesting a lower level in the number of Type II bodies created annually
in comparison to Ontario. However, the results failed to remain significant when all
independent variables were included in the model. As shown in Model 5, the results for
Alberta suggest a decrease 0.568 in the annual rate of creation in comparison to Ontario
and the results are significant at the 90% confidence level. The results for Alberta are
significant across models 1 through 3, however, are not significant in Model 4, which
evaluates the effect of political ideology.
Overall, when Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies are removed from the dataset the
results remain largely consistent with those of the entire dataset. No support is found for
the hypothesis that governments further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum
create fewer Type II bodies. There is mixed support, however, for the hypothesis that the
more limited the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demands the higher
the annual rate of Type II body creation. As expected the results suggest that an increase
in provincial debt, which indicates a decrease in government fiscal capacity, is associated
with a higher level in the annual rate of Type II bodies created. Unexpectedly, however,
an increase in disposable income, which indicates an overall strengthening of the
provincial economic health, is also associated with a higher level in the annual rate of
creation of Type II bodies.
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4.5 Results: Provincial Datasets - Creation Rate of Type II
Bodies
Having tested the hypotheses against the aggregate dataset the next step is to test at the
individual province level. For all provincial datasets, Professional Self-Regulatory bodies
have been removed so that results are not skewed by the sudden increase in the number of
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies as discussed in Chapter 3. The results for each
hypothesis by province are presented in Tables 4.3 through 4.7.
When looking at the effect of government fiscal capacity on the annual creation rate of
Type II bodies at the individual province level, the results are varied. For Alberta, as
shown in Table 4.3, Model 1 disposable income fails to produce significant results,
however, as shown in Model 2, provincial debt produce statistically significant results in
the positive direction as predicted. When both disposable income and provincial debt are
included in the regression equation as, shown in Model 3, the results for disposable
income and provincial debt remained consistent. When all independent variables are
included in the regression model the results again remained unchanged. The results in
Model 5 suggest a 0.438 increase in the annual creation rate for each one per cent
increase in provincial debt per capita over the past five years and are significant at the
95% confidence interval.
In the case of British Columbia (Table 4.4), neither disposable income nor provincial
debt produced statistically significant results. In the case of Nova Scotia (Table 4.5) and
Ontario (Table 4.6) disposable income produces significant results in the positive
direction, while the results for provincial debt were not significant. When all independent
variables are included in the regression model, a one per cent increase in disposable
income over the past five years was associated with a 3.624 increase in the annual
creation rate in Nova Scotia and an increase of 6.754 in Ontario. The results for both
Nova Scotia and Ontario are significant at the 95% confidence level, but not in the
expected direction. Neither the results for Nova Scotia nor Ontario provide support for
the hypothesis that weaker government fiscal capacity increases the annual rate of Type
II body creation.
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Table 4.3: Alberta – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional SelfRegulatory)
Model 1
Disposable
Income

Model 29

Model 3

1.224(1.463)

Provincial
Debt

0.375(0.204)*

Model 4

Model 5

1.648(1.441)

2.073(1.443)

0.409(0.205)*

0.438(0.203)**

Left Seats

0.052(0.041)

0.067(0.040)

Neoliberalism

-0.955(0.454)**

-0.910(0.424)**

-0.700(0.461)

-1.358(0.466)***

-0.971(0.483)**

Election Year

-0.252(0.471)

-0.313(0.461)

-0.299(0.460)

-0.284(0.468)

-0.320(0.454)

0.076

0.118

0.123

0.090

0.149

60

60

60

60

Adjusted R

2

Number of
Cases

60

10

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).

Table 4.4: BC – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional SelfRegulatory)
Model 1
Disposable
Income

Model 2

Model 3

3.683(2.438)

Provincial
Debt

-0.435(0.577)

Model 4

Model 5

3.764(2.914)

3.229(2.785)

0.035(0.679)

-0.110(0.650)

Left Seats

0.033(0.127)**

0.033(0.013)**

Neoliberalism

-0.857(0.526)

-1.331(0.436)***

-0.846(0.573)

-0.902(0.455)***

-1.254(0.570)**

Election Year

-0.755(0.479)

-0.872(0.480)*

-0.753(0.485)

-0.902(0.455)*

-0.793(0.463)*

0.158

0.133

0.1143

0.218

0.222

60

60

60

60

60

Adjusted R
Number of
Cases

2

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).

9 Consistent with evaluating the robustness of disposable income in the aggregated dataset, the per cent
change in provincial debt per capita over the past 4 [0.429(0.249) *] and 6 [0.163(0.178)] years were tested.
Unlike the disposable income results, which were robust over both longer and shorter timeframes, results
for Alberta’s provincial debt were consistent only for the 4-year timeframe, suggesting less robust results.
10 The number of cases (60) is consistent across all provinces, as the dataset contains one record per year
per province. See Chapter 3 for details.
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Table 4.5: Nova Scotia – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional
Self-Regulatory)
Model 111
Disposable
Income

Model 2

Model 3

3.624(1.472)**

Provincial
Debt

0.744(0.740)

Model 4

Model 5

3.513(1.484)**

3.398(0.420)**

0.591(0.714)

0.361(0.716)

Left Seats

-0.054(0.029)*

-0.047(0.028)*

Neoliberalism

-0.504(0.379)

-0.599(0.395)

-0.453(0.385)

-0.229(0.445)

-0.097(0.434)

Election Year

0.847(0.422)**

0.701(0.436)

0.841(0.423)*

0.808(0.430)*

0.929(0.420)**

0.133

0.056

0.128

0.098

0.156

60

60

60

60

60

Adjusted R

2

Number of
Cases

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).

Table 4.6: Ontario – Creation Rate of Type II Bodies (Excluding Professional SelfRegulatory)
Model 112
Disposable
Income

Model 2

Model 3

6.754(3.016)**

Provincial
Debt

-0.164(1.094)

Model 4

Model 5

6.829(3.075)**

7.230(3.021)**

0.179(1.068)

0.430(1.056)

Left Seats

-0.028(0.017)

-0.031(0.017)*

Neoliberalism

-0.584(0.539)

-1.320(0.457)***

-0.563(0.558)

-1.062(0.467)**

-0.229(0.577)

Election Year

-0.974(0.485)**

-0.900(0.505)*

-0.977(0.489)*

-0.913(0.494)*

-0.995(0.479)**

0.200

0.123

0.186

0.166

0.218

60

60

60

60

60

Adjusted R
Number of
Cases

2

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).

11 Change in disposable income in Nova Scotia was tested at 4 [4.849(1.777) ***] and 6 [3.444(1.205)
***] years to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous.
12 Change in disposable income in Ontario was tested at 4 [7.609(3.599) **] and 6 [6.754(3.016) **] years
to ensure that the 5-year results were not anomalous.
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Overall, the results for the individual provinces provide mixed support for H4.3.
Supporting the hypothesis, the results for Alberta indicate that an increase in provincial
debt is associated with a higher level in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies. When
looking at the results for the other three provinces, none provide support for the
hypothesis. In all three cases, provincial debt does not produce significant results, and the
results for disposable income are in the opposite direction than predicted. In the cases of
Nova Scotia and Ontario, the results for disposable income are significant at the 95%
confidence level, and suggest that an increase in government fiscal capacity is associated
with a higher level in the annual rate of Type II body creation.
When the effect of political ideology is explored at the individual province level, the
percentage of seats held by left-of-centre government produces significant but conflicting
results. For British Columbia (Table 4, Model 4) a one per cent increase in the number of
seats held by left-of-centre parties indicates a 0.033 increase in the annual rate of Type II
body creation and is significant at the 95% confidence level. When all independent
variables are included in the regression model, the results remain consistent..
In contrast, the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario indicate a negative relationship
between the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties and the annual creation rate
of Type II bodies. When all independent variables are included in the regression model
the results for Nova Scotia (Table 4.5, Model 5) suggest that a one per cent increase in
the amount of seats held by a left-of-centre party suggested a decrease of 0.097 in the
annual Type II body creation rate. The results for Ontario (Table 4.6, Model 5) suggested
a decrease of 0.031 in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies for each one per cent
increase in the seats held by left-of-centre parties. For both relationships the results were
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
In Alberta (Table 4.3) the number of seats held by a left-of-centre party does not produce
significant results. When considering the results for all four provinces, support for the
hypothesis that the greater the number of seats held by left-of-centre parties the lower the
annual creation rate of Type II bodies is inconsistent. The results for British Columbia are
in the opposite direction than expected, suggesting a higher level in the annual rate of
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Type II body creation when there are greater numbers of elected representatives from
left-of-centre parties. In contrast, the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario are in the
expected direction and support hypothesis H4.4.
The neoliberalism and election year variables also produce statistically significant results,
but not consistently across all four provinces. When all independent variables are
included in the regression model (Model 5) neoliberalism produces statistically
significant results at the 95% confidence level for the provinces of Alberta and British
Columbia. For both Alberta and British Columbia the results are in the negative direction
suggesting a lower level in the annual rate of Type II body creation for years in which
neoliberalism is the dominant paradigm. The result for election year is significant in all
provinces with the exception of Alberta. In British Columbia and Ontario the results
suggest a negative relationship with fewer Type II bodies being created during an
election year. However, the results for Nova Scotia are in the opposite direction,
suggesting a higher level in the annual number of Type II bodies created during an
election year.

4.6 Results Summary
A summary of whether support was found for either hypothesis is presented by dataset in
Table 4.7. When the results for each of the provincial datasets and the aggregate dataset
are taken into account, as shown in Table 4.7, partial support exists for H4.3 - the lower
the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher the rate of
creation of Type II bodies. Support for H4.3 is found in the results for provincial debt in
Alberta and the aggregate dataset when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are
excluded. However, the results for disposable income suggest that the hypothesis be
rejected. The results for disposable income are consistently in the opposite direction than
expected, with an increase in disposable income suggesting a higher level in the annual
rate of Type II bodies created. The results for H4.4 – the further to the left-of-centre on
the political spectrum a government sits the lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies,
are again contradictory. Support for H4.4 is again centered in the provinces of Ontario
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and Nova Scotia, however, results for the province of British Columbia are significant
and in the opposite direction.
Table 4.7: Annual Creation Rate - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset
H4.3 – Fiscal Capacity

H4.4 – Ideology

Disposable Income

Provincial Debt

% Left Seats

All Provinces

No Support

No Support

No Support

All Provinces –
Excluding SelfRegulatory

No Support

Support

No Support

Alberta

No Support

Support

No Support

British Columbia

No Support

No Support

No Support

Nova Scotia

No Support

No Support

Support

Ontario

No Support

No Support

Support

4.7 The Creation of Type II bodies: Time and Governing
Paradigm
While the results reject the hypotheses that the annual creation rate of Type II bodies is
increasing over time, the pattern of Type II body creation over the 60 year period
warrants discussion. In looking at the annual rate of creation of Type II bodies, as shown
in Figure 4.1a to 4.1d, the trend that emerges is three decades of increase followed by a
shift toward stabilization or decline. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4.2a to 4.2d, the
trend becomes more pronounced when Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are removed.
As supported by the regression results for neoliberalism, this pattern is not dissimilar to
the time periods associated with the rise of the Keynesian welfare state and the following
period of neoliberalism. The time period directly following World War II, 1946 to the
early 1970s, has been characterized as a period of steady economic growth and
Keynesianism. During this time the state was involved in both society and economy with
the aim of building a comprehensive welfare state (Burke, Mooers and Shields, 2000: 1113). In contrast, the neoliberal period that followed was characterized by the aim to create
a lean state and policy goals became those of shrinking social welfare expenditures and
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reducing state regulation (Burke, Mooers and Shields, 2000: 11- 13). Neil Bradford
identifies three distinct time periods and two governing paradigms in Canada after World
War II: first a period of technocratic Keynesianism as the governing paradigm which
lasted from the 1940s through to the end of the 1960s; second, a period of interlude
between governing paradigms which lasted through the 1970s; and third the arrival of
neoliberalism as the governing paradigm in the 1980s and 1990s (2000). Bradford
describes technocratic Keynesianism as bureaucratic with its influence dependent upon
administrative leadership in renovating the bureaucracy’s analytic capacity. The result
was the recruitment of new technical and statistical expertise that produced a statist
advisory setting that provided ‘neutral’ experts with the opportunities to perform a range
of public policy functions. Neoliberalism, in contrast to being bureaucratic, was formed
on the idea of substituting the market for the state. Under the neoliberal paradigm, not
only bureaucrats, but politicians and other organized interests must all be disciplined by
the market and market rules replaced policy discretion (Bradford, 2000: 57-65).
The parallels between the timing of Bradford’s shifts in governing paradigm and the time
of the changes in annual rate of creation are intriguing. It may be that the changes in the
rate of creation of Type II bodies witnessed over time is a shift in the balance between
state as regulator and market as regulator or as labelled by Bradford, the shift in paradigm
from technocratic Keynesianism to neoliberalism. While the state will continue to be
active in a regulatory function, changes to the dominant governing paradigm can alter the
balance between the desired levels of state and market as regulators. The economic
turmoil of the 1970s facilitated the emergence of a new governing paradigm in Canada in
the 1980s, a paradigm that placed market rules at the forefront (Bradford, 2000: 63-65).
The neoliberal paradigm sought to downsize the state and liberate market forces from the
state’s regulatory constraints (McBride and Shields, 1997: 101). With the new governing
paradigm focused on the minimization of state involvement during the 1980s and 1990s,
it could be argued that the results above demonstrate a weakening of the willingness of
the state to take on new responsibility, whether as part of the machinery of government or
through delegation. The result may be a decrease in the legal delegation of authority to
existing or newly created Type II bodies as market mechanisms are looked towards to
produce regulatory constraints.
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4.8 Creation of Type II Bodies: The Role of Ideology
Beyond the possible effect of governing paradigm, the question remains as to what the
impact of political ideology is on the annual creation rate of Type II bodies. When using
the percentage of left-of-centre elected representatives to evaluate the effect of ideology,
the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario support hypothesis H4.4, however, results of the
aggregated and the Alberta and British Columbia datasets do not. Given the conflicting
results, one possibility is that a change in the percentage of seats held by parties to the
left-of-centre may not make a significant difference to the policies of government unless
the percentage change makes the difference between whether a left-of-centre party forms
the government or not.
Instead of testing the percentage of seats held by left-of-centre parties, it may be more
appropriate to test the effect of electing a left-of-centre government on annual Type II
body creation rates. The cases evaluated will be limited to British Columbia and Ontario
as they were the only provinces to elect left-of-centre governments during the period
being studied. Using regression analysis, the results for the effect of a left-of-centre
government being in power on the annual rate of Type II body creation for both Ontario
and British Columbia are presented in Table 4.8. As Table 4.8 shows, the results for a
left-of-centre government is different than the results for the percentage of elected
members from left-of-centre parties. As shown in Table 4.8 a left-of-centre government
in British Columbia suggests an increase of 1.026 in the annual rate of Type II body
creation. The results are significant at the 90% confidence level and are in the positive
direction. While the results for British Columbia are in the opposite direction than
expected, the results for Ontario are not significant.

13

13 In addition to evaluating the effect of a left-of-centre party forming the government both percentage of
votes for a party and the effect of a left-of-centre party forming the loyal opposition in both a majority and
minority government were tested. None provided support for the hypothesis.
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Table 4.8: Effect of Political Ideology on Annual Creation Rate – Percentage of Leftof-centre Seats vs. Left-of-centre Government
British Columbia

Ontario

Left Government

Left Seats

Left Government

Left Seats

Disposable Income

3.760(2.852)

3.229(2.785)

6.356(3.078)**

7.230(3.021)**

Provincial Debt

-0.055(0.666)

-0.110(0.650)

0.217(1.062)

0.430(1.056)

Ideology

1.026(0.557)*

0.033(0.013)**

-1.188(0.924)

-0.031(0.017)*

Neoliberalism

-1.106(0.579)*

-1.254(0.570)**

-0.428(0.564)

-0.229(0.577)

Election Year

-0.663(0.478)

-0.793(0.463)*

-1.081(0.493)**

-0.995(0.479)**

Adjusted R2

0.188

0.222

0.195

0.218

Number of Cases

60

60

60

60

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).

Overall, the results for the effect of ideology on the rate of Type II body creation provide
little support H4.4. The results for the number of seats held by a party to the left-of-centre
are inconsistent, while the results for the presence of a left-of-centre government suggest
the hypothesis by rejected. Moreover, in both British Columbia (Figure 4.1b) and Ontario
(Figure 4.1d), NDP governments were responsible for the highest annual rates of
increase.
Adding to the debate over the role of ideology in Type II body creation is Neil Bradford’s
account of governance paradigm shift in Ontario during the 1990s. Bradford argues that
both the NDP and Progressive Conservatives embraced public-private partnerships in the
face of policy challenges; however, they did so in different ways (Bradford, 2003: 1006).
According to Bradford, the NDP introduced a social partnership approach which saw
substantial policy discretion devolved to new multipartite bodies which operated at arm’s
length of government (Bradford, 2003: 1010). Given the observed readiness of the NDP
government in Ontario to shift governance outside of the traditional realm of government,
having the regression results for the percentage of seats held by a left-of-centre party
show a lower level in the annual rate of Type II body creation is surprising. Together the
results indicate that in the face of fiscal challenges, the Ontario NDP acknowledged the
benefits of public-private partnerships. However, the NPD’s usage of Type II bodies as a
policy tool remained lower in comparison to other governments. This shows that
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regardless of the ideology of the governing party, they are still subject to the climate in
which they govern. However, within that climate, ideological differences between parties
can still result in differences in policy outcomes..

4.9 The Creation of Type II Bodies: Government Fiscal
Capacity
As with political ideology, the effect of fiscal capacity on the annual creation rate of Type
II bodies is inconsistent. The regression results for Alberta and the aggregated dataset
excluding Professional Self-Regulatory Type II bodies suggests an increase in provincial
debt is associated with a higher level in the annual rate of Type II body creation. The
results for Nova Scotia, Ontario and the aggregate provincial datasets, however, show
that an increase in disposable income is associated with a higher level in the annual
creation rate of Type II bodies, which is in the opposite direction to the hypothesized
relationship. The conflicting results bring the exact nature of the relationship into
question.
The results for Alberta indicate that changes in the amount of provincial debt per capita
have a significant effect on the number of Type II bodies created annually, with an
increase in debt predicting a higher level in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies.
This relationship is in the expected direction, as increasing provincial debt represents a
weakening of government fiscal capacity. No support is evident, however, when
evaluating the other three provincial datasets. The difference in the results may be
attributed to Alberta being the only province in the dataset to have undergone a sustained
period of debt reduction. Figure 4.3a through 4.3d presents provincial debt and
disposable income per capita in 2005 dollars for the years of 1946 through 2005 for each
of the four provinces. As depicted in Figure 4.3a through 4.3d, while each province
experienced periods of debt reduction, Alberta is the only province of the four to have
undergone sustained reduction in provincial debt. Beginning in 1990 Alberta experienced
a sustained decreased in provincial debt per capita, which continued throughout the
duration of the study. With Alberta being the only province to undergo a sustained period
of debt reduction the results indicate that a reduction in provincial debt leads to a lower
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level in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies in Alberta, however, they are not
generalizable.
Figure 4.3: Per Capita Disposable Income and Provincial Debt by Province
Figure 4.3a

Figure 4.3b

Figure 4.3c

Figure 4.3d

While the decrease in provincial debt was unique to Alberta, the evaluation of disposable
income produced more consistent results. The results from both aggregate datasets
suggest that an increase in the level of disposable income produce a higher level in the
annual creation rate of Type II bodies. Further support, while not as strong, for the
existence of a positive relationship between disposable income and annual creation rate is
evident at the province level, with the results for Nova Scotia and Ontario producing
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statistically significant results. The relationship between disposable income and annual
creation rate, however, is not in the expected direction. While the regression analysis
suggests an increase in disposable income results in a higher level in the annual creation
of Type II bodies, it was expected that an increased level of disposable income would
result in a lower level of Type II bodies. One possible explanation for the unexpected
result is that changes in personal disposable income, as the amount left over after
payment of personal direct taxes, is capturing both changes in provincial economic
conditions and changes in taxation strategies of government. What we may be observing
is reductions in taxation levels that contribute to an increase in disposable income and a
decrease in government capacity.
If change in personal disposable income is capturing both changes in provincial economic
conditions and changes in taxation strategies of government in which government is
reducing taxation, a negative relationship can be predicted between disposable income
and government revenue. What would be expected is an increase in disposable income
resulting in a decrease in government revenue. The effect of disposable income on
government revenue can be tested using ordinary least squares regression, with
disposable income per capita and government revenue as the independent and dependent
variables. With the exception of an eight-year gap in government revenue across all
provinces, data for disposable income and provincial government revenue are available
from Statistics Canada for the years 1946 to 2005. The results for the effect of personal
disposable income on government revenue per capita are presented in Table 4.9.
According to the results in Table 4.9, when looking at the relationship between
disposable income and government revenue across all four provinces, disposable income
is significant at the 99% level and indicates that a one-dollar increase in disposable
income per capita results in a 40-cent increase in government revenue per capital. When
province is controlled for, as shown in Model 2, the results remain consistent.
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Table 4.9: Disposable Income as a Predictor of Change in Government Revenue
(1946-2005)

Disposable Income

Model 1

Model 2

0.395(0.013)***

0.406(0.0128)***

AB

1079.517(233.935)***

BC

623.462(233.750)**

NC

1330.575(236.147)***

Adjusted R2

0.8006

0.8286

Number of Cases

208

208

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
Ontario is omitted from the regression model.

With an increase in disposable income resulting in a higher level in government revenue,
the scenario where an increase in disposable income is weakening the government’s
fiscal capacity is unfounded. Based on the findings above, an increase in disposable
income results in a higher level of annual creation rate of Type II bodies as well as a
higher level of government revenue. This would confirm that the relationship between
disposable income and the annual creation rate of Type II bodies is in the opposite
direction to that expected in H4.3. An increase in the fiscal capacity of government, as
indicated by the correlation between disposable income and government revenue, results
in an increase in the annual rate of Type II body creation.
A plausible explanation for government capacity being positively associated with the
annual rate of Type II body creation is the role of government in funding both public and
private actors engaged in welfare provision and regulatory responsibility. Gregg Olseen
points out that while public and private forms of welfare provision can be distinguished,
states continue to play an important role in private provision. Private actors may be
funded through tax revenues by the state or be the beneficiaries of tax incentives and
disincentives aimed either at encouraging the contributions of others to the organization
or lessening the financial costs to the organization (Olseen, 2002: 25-26). Furthermore,
Olseen identifies a quasi-market form of welfare provision where governments provide
the funding and private actors deliver the service, which is evident in the Canadian health
insurance system where medical practitioners are private providers, but their services are
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paid for by the state (Olseen, 2002: 26). As governments contribute either partially or
fully to the financial operation of Type II bodies operating in the public realm it is
reasonable that decreases in fiscal capacity reduce the rate at which government creates
or enlists new actors in the act of public governance. During periods of economic
downturn it may be more efficient for government to add new responsibilities to the
portfolio of existing actors already operating in the governance field.
The regression results for neoliberalism support the idea that government, when faced
with fiscal challenges, is unlikely to create or enlist new actors in the act of public
governance. While the neoliberal approach to public management has been characterized
as the promotion of the private sector and the delegation of authority as a remedy for the
high taxes and deficits associated with the welfare state (Hoehn, 2011: 77), the results
suggest that neoliberalism is associated with a decrease in the legislative delegation of
decision-making authority to Type II bodies. When the overall number of new Type II
bodies is considered, the results in Figure 4.1a through 4.1d show a flattening of the slope
and in the case of Alberta a decrease in the number of Type II bodies beginning during
what Bradford describes as the period of interlude between Keynesianism and
neoliberalism that lasted through the 1970s (Bradford, 2000: 63). As shown in Table 4.1,
the results for the neoliberal time period are negative and significant when compared with
the Keynesian time period.
Taking into account the descriptive statistics and the regression analysis, the results
suggest that a reduction in the number of Type II bodies created began in the 1970s, with
reductions in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia beginning earlier than in
Alberta or Nova Scotia. With the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant policy
paradigm in the 1980s, a statistically significant decrease in the rate of authority
migration to Type II bodies is observed in comparison to 1946 to 1979 period of
Keynesianism. While the enlisting of the private sector may have been promoted as a
remedy of public debt, the results indicate that the neoliberal period was not one of
increased migration of decision-making authority by the state. Instead, what we may be
witnessing in the face of increasing governance demands is the entrenchment of state
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authority where the state feels it is most necessary, and the willingness of government to
leave to market mechanisms that which the state feels the market can best regulate.

4.10 Election Year and Type II Body Creation
In addition to the variables used to test the specified hypotheses, the election year dummy
variable produced statistically significant results when all independent variables were
included in the regression model for four of the six datasets. The results at the aggregate
level produced statistically significant results in the negative direction when all Type II
bodies were included in the dataset. At the provincial level, the British Columbia and
Ontario cases also produced statistically significant results in the negative direction,
while Nova Scotia produced statistically significant results in the positive direction.
The results for election year in the case of Nova Scotia are not unexpected, as Francesco
Lagona and Fabio Padovano have argued that legislators attempt to maximize their
probability of being re-elected by concentrating the passing of laws directly before the
elections and engaging in other activities the remainder of the time (Lagona and
Padovano, 2008:202). It was unexpected, however, to find statistically significant results
in the negative direction. An explanation for these finding may be the existence of a
period of time both before and after an election when no legislation is passed. In this
scenario, even if there is a spike in the volume of passed legislation in the last months
before the closing of a legislature (Lagona and Padovano, 2008: 214), the ensuing
campaign period and time required to get the new legislature up and working results in an
extended period of time during which no legislation is passed. For example, during
British Columbia’s 37th general election in 2001 the legislature was dissolved in on the
18th of April 2001 and the new legislature opened on the 19th of June 2001 – meaning that
no legislative work was done for the two-month period beginning April 18th (Government
of British Columbia, 2002: 37). Furthermore, with the change in party in power from
NDP to the Liberal Party (British Columbia. Legislative Assembly, 2002: 21, 37) the
volume of legislation passed in the following six months would likely be low.
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4.11 Decreasing Creation Rates: Why the Disconnect
between Expectations and Results?
While an increase in the annual creation rate of Type II bodies was expected over the
period included in the study, the results have not born this out. It was expected that the
growth in government responsibilities had placed a level of demand upon government
that exceeded the structural capacity and could therefore not be fulfilled without
widespread delegation across a wide range of policy issues (Flinders, 2006: 223-224).
Instead, the results indicate a pattern of increasing and decreasing annual rates of Type II
body creation that move in lock step with the post World War II rise of the Keynesian
welfare state and the subsequent supplanting of Keynesianism by the neoliberal
paradigm. This raises the question of how we account for the difference in expectations
and results.
Two possible reasons are offered. First, the use of Type II bodies may in fact be
increasing, however, the function of the majority of such bodies may not be decisionmaking or regulatory responsibility per se, but instead augmenting the delivery of
government services. In this scenario, the government remains the dominant actor in the
governance structure, maintaining decision-making authority, but delegating delivery. As
argued by Bell and Hindmoor, the existence of governance relationships between the
state and society does not mean the relationships are equal (2009: 11). While still a
concern in terms of efficiency and accountability, the use of external actors as solely
service delivery mechanisms without decision-making authority sits outside the scope of
this project. Second, the disconnect between expectations and results may not be due to
numbers of Type II bodies but the policy areas in which Type II bodies are being used.
New Type II bodies are being created in policy areas that have high public profiles and
have a long history of being perceived as the responsibility of government. In this
scenario it is not an increase in the number of Type II bodies, but their emergence in key
policy areas that has led to an expectation of increased delegation of government
authority.
While the role of external actors in service delivery is of importance, it falls outside the
scope of this research project. However, the possibility that the disconnect between
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expectations and results is a function of the use of Type II bodies in higher profile policy
areas warrants consideration. Support for this hypothesis is found in the public opinion
literature which indicates an overall low level of political knowledge among citizens but
also that while citizens cannot focus on every issue, they do have a higher level of
knowledge about the issues that they care deeply about (Hayes and Bishin, 2012: 133;
Hutchings, 2001: 848). This suggests that citizens would be more informed of instances
of authority migration in areas of higher interest than instances of authority migration in
general.
In considering the possibility that the migration of authority in key policy areas has led to
the perception of increased involvement of new governance actors in the public realm the
creation of Type II bodies in the policy area of healthcare is be explored. Healthcare has
been chosen due to its level of importance to Canadians. As reported by Stuart Soroka in
a report to the Health Council of Canada in 2005, 85% of Canadians believed that
eliminating public healthcare represented a fundamental change to the nature of Canada.
Additionally, more respondents viewed eliminating healthcare as a fundamental change
than any of the other policies listed in the survey, including abandoning English and
French as Canada’s official languages, and ending peacekeeping missions (Soroka, 2007:
5). A 1994 Ekos Research Association Inc. poll found that Canadians rank health 3rd in a
list of 22 values, behind freedom and a clean environment (Fortier, 1996: 21).
Furthermore, when asked what policy issues they are most concerned about, respondents
have overwhelmingly expressed concerned for healthcare since 1997 and have not shifted
from this position (Soroka, 2007: 5).
14

When we look at the number of Type II bodies created in the area of healthcare ,
including the regulation of healthcare professionals, as depicted in Table 4.7, we see that
in the case of each province the largest percentage of Type II bodies created in the
healthcare field over the 60 year period being studied is during the 1991 to 2005 time
period. Furthermore, in the case of British Columbia and Ontario, 50% of the Type II

14 A list of all Type II bodies is provided in Appendix B.
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bodies created since 1946 in the healthcare policy area were created between 1991 and
2005.
Table 4.10: Number of Type II Bodies in the Healthcare Policy Area
Alberta

British
Columbia

Nova Scotia

Ontario

All
Provinces

1946-1960

5 (17%)

3 (17%)

2 (15%)

6 (21%)

16(18%)

1961-1975

7 (24%)

4 (22%)

3 (23%)

7 (25%)

21(24%)

1976-1990

8 (27%)

2 (11%)

3 (23%)

1 (4%)

14(16%)

1991-2005

9 (31%)

9 (50%)

5 (38%)

14(50%)

37(42%)

29 (100%)

18 (100%)

13 (100%)

28 (100%)

88 (100%)

Total

When looking at the results for the creation of Type II bodies for healthcare, what
appears is a reversal of the overall trend. While the annual rate of Type II body creation
overall has been decreasing since the late 1980s, what we can see when looking at Table
4.10 is that in the healthcare policy area the rate of creation has increased since the late
1980s, with two cases having 50% of the bodies created since 1946 being created during
the last 15 years being studied. This suggests that it is possible, at least to an extent, that
the perceived increase in the rate of Type II bodies is derived from the increase of Type II
bodies in policy areas that are of high importance to citizens and not the overall rate of
authority migration.

4.12 Conclusion
The creation of Type II bodies is a tale of consistency and difference. There is a
consistent pattern across the four provinces in which the annual creation rate is initially
sufficiently high to push the cumulative number of Type II bodies higher on a year over
year basis. However, over time the creation rate decreases to the point of stability or
decline in the cumulative number of Type II bodies. Beyond the consistency in the
pattern of Type II body creation, there are also differences across the provinces in what
factors are shown to contribute to changes in the annual creation rate. Such differences
showcase the economic and political uniqueness of each province, but also serve to
produce conflicting results and limit the ability to make generalizations.
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Overall, the results produce two principal findings and one curious question. The first
principal finding is that over the sixty-year period being reviewed the annual rate of
creation and the cumulative number of Type II bodies have fluctuated over time. The
existing data for Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario demonstrate that
the use of Type II bodies in public governance is not a recent phenomenon, as Type II
bodies have been used as a tool of government for over sixty years and the prevalence of
the use of this tool is subject to periods of both increase and decline.
The second principal finding is that the pattern of increase, stability, then decrease in the
annual creation rate of Type II bodies mirrors that of the shift from the technocratic
Keynesian approach that was the governing paradigm from the post-war period until the
early 1970s through to the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant governing
paradigm in the 1980s. The emergence of this pattern is unexpected, as neoliberal
thinking tends to be associated with the shrinking of the state and the increased
involvement of external actors in the business of the state. Two factors, however, provide
insight into the unexpected results: 1) the neoliberalism paradigm places the market in the
position of preferred regulator, and 2) government is a funding source for both public and
private actors engaged in the provision of state delegated regulatory responsibility. As the
goal of neoliberalism is the shrinking of fiscal commitments and the regulatory reach of
the state, a weakening of the willingness of government to take on new regulatory
responsibility, whether as part of the machinery of government or through existing or
newly created Type II bodies, can be observed.
As for the disconnect between expectations and reality, as the number of Type II bodies
have not been increasing in recent years as expected, the question emerges as to why. The
answer put forward to this question is that the perceived increase in the rate of Type II
bodies is not derived from the overall rate of authority migration, but from the increase of
Type II bodies in policy areas that are of high importance to citizens and traditionally
viewed as the sole jurisdiction of the state.
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Chapter 5
“Another cause for the increase in alienation and cynicism is a feeling that too many policy
decisions that affect individuals have been taken out of any system that has accountability or that
they can influence.”
-Robert Teeter

5

Accountable to Whom: Migration of Authority and
Accountability

Elections, in the tradition of democratic theory, have been seen as an important
mechanism of accountability through which the policy preferences of citizens can induce
government action (Fearon, 1999: 57). However, new forms of governance introduce new
challenges for the theory and practice of public accountability (Skelcher, 2007: 63). The
migration of regulatory responsibility outside the boundaries of elected governments
necessitates a different conceptualization of accountability relationships between citizens
and public policy decision makers. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, while the annual rate
of Type II body creation has not increased over the past sixty years, the absolute number
of Type II bodies engaged in public decision making has. As stated by Peters and Pierre,
the growing number of new governance actors and the dispersal of political authority led
to questions of democratic input and accountability within the governance process (2006:
209). The shift from a single agency system to a plurality of bodies increases complexity
and opens the system to increased problems of accountability which in turn lead to
problems of coordination and strategic direction as different agencies compete for limited
resources (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 107).
In responding to concerns of accountability brought about by the dispersal of governance
authority, this chapter explores the accountability environment that has emerged when
government has delegated decision-making authority. To do so, legislated instances of
authority migration in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and
Ontario between the years of 1946 and 2005 form the universe of cases. Two areas of
inquiry are explored: the existence and relative strength of accountability relationships
between new governance actors and both government and society as stipulated in the
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legislation; and the extent to which political ideology, geographic scale, and the timing of
the legislation are able to explain the strength of accountability relationships.

5.1 Accountability and Public Governance
Without accountability, there is no popular control. In a democracy, accountability is the
principal mechanism through which mass publics exert control over their elected officials
and is a central tenet of democratic theory (Rudolph, 2006: 99). As discussed in Chapter
2, the concept of accountability is not in itself problematic: person A is accountable to
person B if two conditions are met; there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in
some way on behalf of B; and B is empowered by some mechanism to sanction or reward
A. Stated in the form of an agency relationship person A can be understood to be an
agent, who makes choices on behalf of person B as the principal (Fearon, 1999: 55). The
assignment of a principal-agent relationship to elected representatives is straightforward;
the elected representative is accountable to the electorate and is expected to act in such a
way that promotes the preferences of the electorate. If the electorate is not happy with the
actions of their elected representative, they can vote them out at the next election.
Defining accountability relationships associated with Type II multilevel governance,
however, is more complex as there is the potential for multiple principal-agent
relationship variations. Society may be the principals and Type II bodies the agents,
meaning that Type II bodies are understood to be directly accountable to society. Society
as principals of democratic governments may hold Type II bodies indirectly accountable
through the principal-agent relationship between government and Type II bodes. A third
possibility is that each of the before mentioned accountability arrangements exist.
Alternatively, there is the potential for the absence of any accountability relationship.
While governments have migrated authority to address specific policy needs, it has been
argued that Type II bodies remain accountable to the government and as such indirectly
to the citizen. Jessop has argued that the governments, in responding to the
institutionalization of political decision making upwards, downwards and sideways from
the state, have enhanced the state’s role in managing inter-scalar relations, thus seeking to
control how and where authority is migrated to minimize effects upon the overall power
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of the state (2005: 64). Through what Jessop labeled ‘metagovernance’, the state provides
the rules for governance and in doing so sets the conditions for self-organization and the
overall process of collaboration. In doing so the state sets the overall ground rules for
governance and regulatory order (2005: 64-65). Similarly, Tanja Börzel argues that in the
modern state both public and private actors operate under the shadow of hierarchy where
public actors set the legal rules of the game and intervene to correct distortions or
outcomes that violate public interests (2010: 196-197).
The underlying assumption of multilevel governance is that centralization has given way
to new forms of governance that result in decision-making authority being dispersed
across multiple jurisdictions. According to Bell and Hindmoor, however, regardless of
the governance approach put into place, the state remains the preeminent actor in the
governance process (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 10; 2009a: 153-154). In setting the rules
and being positioned to intervene on outcomes that violate public interests, government
can be seen to dominate the policy process. If government has continued to dominate the
public policy process, then we should expect formal accountability relationships between
government and Type II bodies to be present and to have either remained stable or
increased in strength. This leads to the chapter’s first hypothesis, which assesses the
ongoing strength of the accountability relationship with government, and is presented
below as follows:
H5.1 - The accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies has either
remained stable or increased in strength over time.
As stated in Chapter 2, the belief that shifts in state function and new forms of
governance have not weakened the state is not universal. McBride and Shields argue that
the advancement of a neo-liberal agenda aimed at reducing the state and increasing
reliance on market mechanisms provides the ideological venue for shifting decisionmaking outside of politics and is eroding the power of the state (1997: 18). Furthermore,
the term governance can signal a threat to conventional forms of democracy or
potentially an attempt to sidestep democracy altogether. Instead of being accountable
either directly to the citizens or indirectly to the citizens through government, governance
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mechanisms are seen to have become the tools of commercial interests or unaccountable
bureaucracies (Hirst, 2000: 13). According to Harmes, the dispersion of power away
from the centre can be viewed as a deliberate neoliberal political project with the goal of
separating economic and political power (2006: 726-727).
While neoliberalism is a modern construct, there are long-standing debates over the role
and size of government. Since the second half of the 19th century neoclassical liberals
have consistently argued that government should be as small as possible and act as a
night watchman whose only role is to protect the person and property of individuals. In
contrast, welfare liberals have promoted a larger role for government arguing that the
powers of the state can be a positive force for promoting liberty and equal opportunity
through the creation of regulations and state run institutions (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 7779). The desired role of the state is further expanded within the framework of social
democracy. Being linked to socialism, social democracy calls for government to play a
larger role in the lives of the people, promotes public ownership, and promotes the
redistribution of wealth (Ball and Dagger, 1995: 44).
Taking into account both recent ideological trends and the historical debate over the
appropriate size and role of the state, it can be argued that the ideology of the governing
party may influence the structure of the accountability relationship between Type II
bodies and government. Specifically, governing parties aligned further to the right are
expected to produce weaker accountability relationships when migrating authority as
there is stronger belief in minimal state interference in the lives of individuals, while
governing parties on the left are expected to develop stronger accountability relationships
due to their stronger belief in government intervention. Accordingly, this leads to the
second hypothesis:
H5.2 – Governing parties further to the left on the political spectrum will produce
stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than
governing parties further to the right.
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The second relationship under consideration is the accountability relationship between
Type II jurisdictions and society. Peters outlines two opposing views of governance, a
traditional approach where the state steers, and a modern approach where societal actors
are involved in more self-steering rather than depending upon the guidance of
government. While both government steering and self-steering views of governance
contain the assumption that society must be governed, different assertions are made as to
who the dominant actor is – government or society (2000: 36-37). Hirst’s ‘associated
democratic’ model goes as far as stating that as many functions as possible should be
devolved from the state to civil society, followed by the democratization of civil society
organizations, thus shifting governance from top-down bureaucratic to democratically
self-governed associations (2000: 28).
As argued by Neil Nevitte, there has been a trend toward a decline in deference to
authority by Canadians (1996: 38). Canadians have become increasingly dissatisfied, not
necessarily at specific office holders, but with the office itself as they demand more
meaningful participation in the political process (Nevitte, 1996: 55). Nevitte further states
that while voting provides one avenue for participation, there is no consensus that voting
is the most effective way for citizens to state the preference and make demands of
government and that citizens are increasingly interested in utilizing other forms of
participation (1996: 76). What has been witnessed is a culture shift where citizen access
and participation in the policy making process have become more closely tied to
legitimacy (Skogstad, 2003: 963). If social forces are seeking more meaningful
participation and taking a stronger role in the governance process, it follows that Type II
bodies should be increasingly accountable directly to society as societal actors assert
greater influence over policy inputs and outputs. As such, the third hypothesis accesses
the strength of the relationship with society and is presented as follows:
H5.3 - The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased
in strength over time.
An additional factor to be explored is the effect the geographic scale of a Type II body
has on the existence and relative strength of accountability relationships. With elected
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government, a trade-off exists where centralization produces efficiency and coordination
gains, however, diminishes accountability. This loss of accountability is based on the idea
that as government becomes more centralized, the ability of any one region to select a
government based upon the government’s perceived performance in that region is
diminished (Seabright, 1996: 65). Similarly it has been found that while larger
municipalities benefit from economies of scale, the gains come at a democratic cost as
the increase in size is associated with a decrease in citizens’ perceived political efficacy
(Dreyer and Serritzlew, 2011: 255).
Like traditional elected governments, Type II bodies exist at different geographic scales.
However, unlike elected government few Type II bodies have citizen-elected boards,
consequently minimizing the electoral accountability benefit associated with traditional
government. Taking into consideration the lack, or limited, accountability benefits of
elections, and a dearth of information on the effect of geographic scale on the
accountability of Type II bodies, this chapter puts forward two exploratory questions.
First, do Type II bodies succumb to the same trade off as traditional elected government?
While lacking the accountability function of elections, it is still possible that
centralization results in a similar tradeoff between economies of scale and accountability
of Type II bodies. When a Type II body moves along the continuum from decentralized
to centralized, the number of citizens whose preferences must be taken into account
increases. As the number of citizens increases, the ability of any one citizen to hold the
Type II body accountable based upon their perceived performance of the Type II body
decreases. If this is in fact the case, it is expected that the greater the level of
decentralization, the greater the capacity of members of society to hold Type II bodies
directly accountable.
While it is expected that decentralization of Type II bodies provide accountability
benefits for citizens, the second question posed is whether there is a corresponding
weakening of accountability to government that occurs with decentralization. When
decision-making bodies are decentralized there may be a willingness on the part of
government to shift both decision-making and responsibility for holding decision-makers
accountable closer to the citizen. If this is the case, it is expected that the greater the
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degree of decentralization, the weaker the capacity of government to hold Type II bodies
directly accountable. Accordingly the final two hypotheses address the effect of
geographic scale and are presented as follows:
H5.4 – The accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will
decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.
H5.5 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as
the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.

5.2 Data and Methodology
To test each hypothesis the custom dataset described in full in Chapter 3 is utilized. To be
included in the dataset the Type II body must satisfy each of the following conditions:
decision-making authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to the body
through an act of provincial legislation; the majority of decision makers within the body
must be comprised of individuals who are from outside of the government, legislature or
public service; decision-making autonomy must exist; and the Type II body must have
been operating in either the province of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia or
Ontario at some point between 1946 and 2005. Type II bodies included in the dataset
come from a wide range of policy areas including: financial regulation, food and
agriculture, education, healthcare, natural resources, public safety, social services, sports
and entertainment, transportation, and other public goods. The dataset contains incidents
of Type II body creation, termination, and modification. Captured at the point of creation
for each Type II body and for each subsequent amendment are the accountability
mechanisms included within the legislation. The dataset does not capture cases where the
legislation was amended but the accountability relationship was unchanged. In cases
when the Type II body remains in place, but the legislation that created it is repealed and
replaced, the Type II body is not coded as being terminated and recreated, but instead
only changes to the accountability relationships (if occurring) are captured.
Accountability is coded based upon the accountability mechanisms that are established
directly in the legislation. The coding of the accountability relationships uses Mark
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Bovens’s definition of accountability that states: “Accountability is a relationship
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor
may face consequences” (2007: 450). Through the elimination of constructs which are
instrumental but not essential, Bovens’s definition identifies three elements of an
accountability relationship that are identifiable and can be easily coded: processes which
force agents to explain and justify actions to their principals, processes which allow
principals to question agents and pass judgment upon their actions, and processes which
enable principals to sanction their agents. The decision to use Bovens’s definition is
based upon its ability to capture the concept of accountability as discussed in the
accountability section above and to allow for the standard coding of data along three
easily identifiable elements. For each record six pieces of data are captured, three for the
accountability relationship between the Type II body and government and three between
the Type II body and society. Each element is coded as either present (1) or absent (0),
allowing for an accountability score to be calculated for each of the relationships as the
15

dependent variable.

Again using Alberta’s Child and Family Services Authorities as an example, in this case,
the accountability relationship with government would score a 2 in 1996 as the Child and
Family Services Authorities must justify their actions to government through the
submission of reports to government and the provincial government is able to sanction
members of the board through mechanisms of appointment and the ability to transfer the
Authority’s powers to an alternate entity. Missing is a mechanism that legislates the
ability of the Provincial Government to pose questions to the Authorities. The
accountability score between the Authorities and society would be a 1 as the only

15 The complex nature of accountability poses challenges for operationalization. This chapter captures the
formal accountability rules that can be used by government or society; however, it fails to capture whether
the formal rules are utilized, or whether an alternate form of accountability, be it informal or market
mechanisms, exists. Furthermore, assigning equal value to each of the three components of accountability
gives the obligation of a Type II body to justify its actions the same weighting as the ability to sanction,
when it could be argued that the ability to sanction is of greater value. When changes were made to the
model, however, scoring sanctioning as a 2 or a 0 instead of a 1 or a 0 produced results consistent with the
reported findings.
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accountability mechanism built into the legislation is the requirement for board records to
be open to the public. A subsequent amendment that mandated board meetings being
open to the public changed the accountability score to 2, as now society members would
also be able to question members of the Authority’s board. Missing is a mechanism that
legislates the ability of society members to sanction board members in response to the
actions (or inactions) of the Authority.
Consistent with Chapter 4, one of the hypotheses explores the effect of political ideology
on accountability. As discussed in Chapter 4, content analysis of Canadian party
manifestos between 1946 and 2000 demonstrates an ideological disagreement between
parties at the federal level. This analysis demonstrates that at the federal level the NDP is
consistently to the left and the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties taking turns
holding the position on the far right (Cochrane, 2010: 590-591). While it is
acknowledged that organizational independence exists between federal parties and their
provincial counterparts, the NDP remains a fully integrated organization with
membership at the provincial level resulting in automatic membership in the federal party
(Esselment, 2010: 871-872). Given the connection between the provincial and federal
NDP parties, and NDP’s consistent position to the left at the federal level, the percentage
of seats held at the provincial level by the NDP or CCF party is used to test the effect of
political ideology. The formation of government by a left-of-centre party was considered
as an independent variable; however, no left-of-centre party formed the government in
either Alberta or Nova Scotia during the 1945 to 2005 time period.
To assess the influence of time period on the strength of accountability relationships, the
overall timeframe being studied is divided into six ten-year periods and a dummy
16

variable is created for each.

All instances of creation or modification of Type II bodies

were coded according to which time period it occurred in, with 1 indicating that it
occurred in that time period and 0 indicating it did not. In the regression model, the 19461950 dummy variable was omitted, making it the reference category for all other time

16 The division of time by Keynesianism and neoliberalism as dominant policy paradigms as was done in
Chapter 4 was also considered. The results remained consistent with that of results based upon decade.
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periods. The 1946 to 1955 time period was selected as the reference category because it
represents the starting point and therefore forms a baseline against which accountability
scores from each subsequent time period can be assessed.
To assess the influence of geographic scale the Type II bodies are coded according to
four categories: Type II bodies that are geographically confined to one municipality;
Type II bodies that span municipalities but are smaller in geographic scale than an entire
province; Type II bodies that encompass the entire province; and Type II bodies that span
provincial boundaries. For each category a dummy variable is created with a score of 1
indicating that the Type II body operates at that geographic scale and a score of 0
indicating that it does not. In the regression model the dummy variable for Type II bodies
that operate within the boundaries of a single municipality is omitted, making it the
reference category against which all other categories of geographic scale are compared.
The geographic scale of single municipality was selected as the reference category as it is
easier for comparison purposes to have the reference category at one end of the
continuum and not all provinces have created Type II bodies that span provinces, which
occupies the other end of the continuum.
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to test the effect of the independent
variables on the dependent. As in Chapter 4, sequential modeling is used in which each
independent variable is tested separately and then as part of a larger model. A sequential
approach was again adopted so that the effect of the independent variables on the
dependent variable, as expressed by the adjusted R2, could be observed separately for
each independent variable. For each hypothesis the models will be run for the entire
dataset to identify overall trends and then for each province individually to identify
differences between the provinces. Due to the unique characteristics of Professional SelfRegulatory Type II bodies outlined in Chapter 3 a self–regulatory control variable is
included in all regression models with Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies coded as a 1
and all other forms of Type II body coded as zero. Provincial control variables are also
included in the regression models when evaluating the aggregate provincial dataset.
Dummy variables are created for each province with a score of 1 indicating the Type II
body’s province of origin. The Ontario dummy variable is omitted from the regression
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models, making Ontario the provincial variable against which all other provincial
variables are compared.
The total number of cases evaluated, broken down by province and decade are presented
in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: New and Modified Type II bodies by Province by Decade
British
Columbia

Alberta

Nova Scotia

Ontario

Total

1946-1955

31

10

10

23

82

1956-1965

31

14

21

41

107

1966-1975

43

43

32

65

183

1976-1985

43

27

26

24
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1986-1995

39

32

43

42

147

1996-2005

43

31

34

64

172

230

165

157

259

811

Total

5.3 Results: Accountability Relationship with Government
Three hypotheses are tested in relation to the strength of the accountability relationship
between government and Type II bodies. The first (H5.1) considers the extent to which the
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies has either remained
stable or increased in strength over time. The second (H5.2) proposes that governing
parties on the left of the political spectrum will produce stronger accountability
relationships between Type II bodies and government than governments further to the
center and right. The third (H5.4) hypothesizes that the accountability relationship
between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the geographic scale of the Type
II body decreases. The results for each hypothesis when using the aggregated dataset are
presented in Table 5.2. In testing each hypothesis, two regression models are used, one
containing only the pertinent independent variables for the specific hypothesis and an
overarching model including the combined set of independent variables from all three
hypotheses.
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Table 5.2: Government Accountability Index (Dataset includes AB, BC, NS and ON)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1956-1965

0.229(0.129)*

0.225(0.129)*

1966-1975

0.331(0.117)***

0.324(0.118)***

1976-1985

0.487(0.125)***

0.478(0.126)***

1986-1995

0.434(0.121)***

0.416(0.130)***

1996-2005

0.647(0.118)***

0.642(0.118)***

Left Government

0.002(0.002)

0.001(0.003)

Spans Municipalities

-0.040(0.168)

-0.038(0.166)

Single Province

-0.136(0.144)

-0.127(0.142)

Spans Provinces

-0.012(0.427)

0.007(0.420)

Alberta

-0.009(0.080)

0.003(0.086)

-0.024(0.081)

0.003(0.087)

British Columbia

0.093(0.087)

0.042(0.101)

0.098(0.089)

0.085(0.102)

Nova Scotia

-0.291(0.089)***

-0.257(0.091)***

-0.270(0.091)***

-0.279(0.093)***

Self-Regulatory

-0.814(0.069)***

-0.762(0.069)***

-0.727(0.071)***

-0.794(0.073)***

0.176

0.1439

0.142

0.174

811

811

811

811

Adjusted R

2

Number of Cases

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
Ontario, 1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

Evaluating the effect of time period on the strength of the accountability relationship
between government and Type II bodies produces significant results in the expected
direction. As presented in Table 5.2, Model 1, each subsequent time period after 19461955 is associated with a higher level in the government accountability index score and is
significant at the 90% confidence level or higher. The results trend in the direction of
higher levels in the government accountability index scores in comparison to 1946-1955
as the time period becomes closer to present day. Type II bodies that were enacted or
updated between 1996 and 2005 suggest an increase of 0.647 in the government
accountability index score which ranges from 0 to 3. The exception to the upwards trend
is the 1986-1995 time period, which produced a smaller coefficient than the immediately
preceding time period (1976-1985), but still larger than the next most recent time period
(1966-1975). As shown in Model 4, when all independent variables are included in the
regression model, the results remain consistent. The results presented in both Model 1
and Model 4 provide support for the hypothesis that the accountability relationships
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between government and Type II bodies have either remained stable or increased in
strength over time.
When assessing the effect of a left-of-centre governing party on the strength of the
accountability relationship between government and all Type II bodies, the results shown
in Table 5.2, Model 2 are not significant. As displayed in Model 4, the results remain
consistent when all independent variables are included in the regression model. The
results from both models suggest that H5.2, governing parties further to the left on the
political spectrum will produce stronger accountability relationships between Type II
bodies and government than governing parties further to the right, be rejected.
As shown in Table 5.2, Model 3, the results for differences in geographic scale produced
no statistically significant results. As presented in Model 4, the results again remain
consistent when all independent variables are included in the regression model,
suggesting that hypothesis H5.4 be rejected.
Although not related to the hypotheses, the dummy variable for Nova Scotia produces
significant results across all models in Table 5.2. The results for Nova Scotia consistently
suggest a negative relationship and are significant at the 99% confidence level. As shown
in Model 4, when all independent variables are included in the regression model the
result is a 0.279 decrease in the government accountability index in comparison to
Ontario. Neither Alberta nor British Columbia produces statistically significant results.
As Nova Scotia is the sole province to produce significant results, it suggests that the
formal accountability relationship between special purpose Type II bodies and
government, as measured by this study, are weaker in Nova Scotia than the other
provinces.
The dummy variable for Professional Self-Regulatory bodies also produced statistically
significant results at the 99% confidence level across all models in Table 5.2. The results
in Model 4 suggest that within a possible range of 0 to 3 there is an average decrease of
0.794 in the government accountability index score when comparing Professional SelfRegulatory bodies to other forms of Type II bodies. This result indicates that Professional
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Self-Regulatory bodies tend to be held less accountable by government than other forms
of Type II bodies.
Discussion now turns to the province specific outcomes. The results for each hypothesis
by province are presented in Tables 5.3 through Table 5.6. In testing the hypothesis that
the accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies has either
remained stable or increased in strength over time, all provinces but Nova Scotia produce
statistically significant results in the expected direction. All three provinces produce
statistically significant results for the 1996-2005 period when compared to 1946-1955. Of
the four provinces, the results for Alberta (Table 5.3) produced the largest coefficient for
government accountability index score. As shown in Table 5.3, Model 4, when all
variables are included in the regression model a Type II body enacted or updated between
1996 and 2005 indicates an increase of 1.051 in the government accountability index.
The results are significant at the 99% confidence level.
To evaluate H5.1, the results for the province of Alberta are presented in Table 5.3, Model
1. The results indicate a higher level in the accountability index score for each time
period variable in comparison to the 1946-1955 time period. With the exception of the
1956-1965 period, all are significant at the 99% confidence level. The overall trend is an
increase in the government accountability index score over time, however, the results
show that change is not linear but varies from one time period to another. As shown in
Table 5.3, Model 4, when all independent variables are included in the regression model
the results remain consistent.
To evaluate the effect of time the results for British Columbia are presented in Table 5.4,
Model 1. While the three decades preceding 1946-1955 produced no significant results,
both 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 produced significant results in the predicted direction.
When all independent variables are included in the regression model, as shown in Model
4, only the 1996-2005 time period remains significant.
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Table 5.3: Government Accountability Index - Alberta
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1956-1965

0.293(0.213)

0.268(0.215)

1966-1975

0.630(0.198)***

0.605(0.204)***

1976-1985

0.898(0.198)***

0.811(0.202)***

1986-1995

0.540(0.198)***

0.628(0.255)**

1996-2005

1.042(0.200)***

1.051(0.200)***

Left Seats

-.009(0.010)

0.008(0.015)

Spans Municipalities

-0.700(0.325)**

-0.628(0.320)**

Single Province

-0.531(0.293)*

-0.434(0.287)

Spans Provinces
Self-Regulatory
Adjusted R

2

Number of Cases

Omitted

17

Omitted

-0.921(0.123)***

-0.819(0.127)***

-0.822(0.133)***

-0.933(0.130)***

0.226

0.151

0.161

0.260

230

230

230

230

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

Table 5.4: Government Accountability Index – British Columbia
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1956-1965

-0.041(0.315)

-0.089(0.307)

1966-1975

0.134(0.252)

-0.241(0.264)

1976-1985

0.124(0.269)

-0.049(0.265)

1986-1995

0.600(0.259)**

0.123(0.282)

1996-2005

0.766(0.258)***

0.803(0.249)***

Left Government

0.009(0.003)***

0.014(0.004)***

Spans Municipalities

0.262(0.433)

0.171(0.401)

Single Province

0.012(0.278)

0.040(0.262)

Spans Provinces

Omitted

Omitted

Self-Regulatory
Adjusted R

2

Number of Cases

-0.605(0.162)***

-0.453(0.155)***

-0.467(0.163)***

-0.653(0.160)***

0.123

0.087

0.039

0.181

165

165

165

165

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

17 Spans Provinces is omitted when no Type II bodies that span provinces exist within the dataset.
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Table 5.5: Government Accountability Index – Nova Scotia
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1956-1965

0.183(0.303)

0.175(0.315)

1966-1975

0.002(0.286)

-0.004(0.294)

1976-1985

0.467(0.293)

0.469(0.297)

1986-1995

0.128(0.283)

0.142(0.289)

1996-2005

0.278(0.286)

0.374(0.413)

Left Seats

0.004(0.007)

-0.004(0.116)

Spans Municipalities

0.305(0.453)

0.203(0.467)

Single Province

0.263(0.404)

0.248(0.410)

Spans Provinces

0.162(0.535)

0.205(0.538)

Self-Regulatory
Adjusted R

2

Number of Cases

-1.373(0.142)***

-1.375(0.142)***

-1.350(0.141)***

-0.382(0.151)***

0.394

0.387

0.379

0.380

157

157

157

157

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

Table 5.6: Government Accountability Index Ontario
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1956-1965

0.301(0.232)

0.261(0.231)

1966-1975

0.324(0.216)

0.369(0.217)*

1976-1985

0.113(0.259)

0.230(0.270)

1986-1995

0.187(0.234)

0.568(0.310)**

1996-2005

0.426(0.217)**

0.446.(0.215)**

Left Seats

-0.008(0.004)*

-0.012(0.006)*

Spans Municipalities

0.093(0.267)

0.096(0.268)

Single Province

-0.242(0.234)

-0.219(0.236)

Spans Provinces

Omitted

Omitted

Self-Regulatory
Adjusted R

2

Number of Cases

-0.467(0.131)***

-0.370(0.131)***

-0.381(0.128)***

-0.319(0.140)**

0.051

0.060

0.060

0.071

259

259

259

259

Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

The results for Ontario are presented in Table 5.6, Model 1. When evaluating the effect of
time, the only time period to produce statistically significant results in comparison to
1946-1955 was 1996-2005. When all variables are added into the regression model, as
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presented in Model 4, the 1966-1975, 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 time periods produce
significant results at the 90% confidence level or higher. The results for the 1996-2005
time period suggests an increase of 0.446 in the government accountability index score
(which ranges from 0 to 3) in comparison to the 1946-1955 period.
Overall, the results for all four provinces support H5.1 – that the accountability
relationships between government and Type II bodies have either remained stable or
increased in strength over time. While occasional reductions in the government
accountability score from one period to another are evident in all provinces, these results
were not statistically significant. As predicted, the trend has been toward either higher
levels of accountability as time progresses as seen in Alberta, British Columbia, and
Ontario, or stability as witnessed in Nova Scotia.
When testing the hypothesis that governing parties further to the left on the political
spectrum will produce stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and
government than governing parties on the right, the results for the individual provincial
datasets produce conflicting results. Of the four provinces only British Columbia and
Ontario produce significant results, however, the results are in opposite directions.
When evaluating H5.2 the results for the province of British Columbia are presented in
Table 5.4, Model 2. The results suggest that a 1% increase in the number of seats held by
a left-of-centre party are associated with an increase of 0.009 in the government
accountability index score which ranges from 0 to 3. The results are significant at the
99% confidence level. When all variables are included in the regression model, as shown
in Model 4, the results remain consistent. The results for Ontario are presented in Table
5.6, Model 2. The results for Ontario indicate that a 1% increase in the number of seats
held by a left-of-centre party is associated with a decrease of 0.008 in the government
accountability index score and is significant at the 95% confidence level. When all
independent variables are included, as shown in Model 4, the results remain consistent.
Based on the individual provincial results, there is conflicting support for hypothesis H5.2
– governments further to the left on the political spectrum will produce stronger
accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than governments
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further to the right. The existing support is contingent upon the province in question, with
each province producing statistically significant results, but in the opposite direction.
Depending upon the province, it could be argued that the presence of a left-of-centre
government suggests either a decrease (Ontario) or increase (British Columbia) in the
strength of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government.
When evaluating the hypothesis that the accountability relationship between government
and Type II bodies will decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases
only the province of Alberta returns significant results, and the results are not in the
expected direction. When evaluating H5.4 the results for the province of Alberta are
presented in Table 5.3, Model 3. The results suggest a decrease of 0.700 in the
government accountability index for Type II bodies that span municipalities and a
decrease of 0.531 for Type II bodes that are the same geographic scale as the province
when compared to Type II bodies whose jurisdiction is at the geographic scale of a single
municipality. When all variables are included within the regression model the results
remain in the opposite direction than what was predicted, however, only the dummy
variable for Spans Municipalities remains statistically significant. In assessing the results
of each of the four provincial datasets there is no indication of support for H5.4 – the
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.
Also of interest are the results for the Professional Self-Regulatory dummy variable. For
all models in Tables 5.3 through 5.6 the results indicate statistically significant results at
the 95% confidence level or higher, and all in the negative direction. Consistent with the
aggregate dataset, the results suggest that Professional Self-Regulatory bodies are held
less accountable by government than other forms of Type II bodies.
A summary of whether support was found for each of the three hypotheses by dataset is
provided in Table 5.7. As highlighted in Table 5.7 there is support across each of the
provincial datasets and the aggregate dataset for H5.1 – the accountability relationships
between government and Type II bodies have either remained stable or increased in
strength over time. The Nova Scotia case is an outlier, however, as the accountability
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relationship between government and Type II bodies remained stable in Nova Scotia, but
strengthened in the other four datasets.
In contrast to H5.1, Table 5.7 shows that no support was found for H5.4 – the
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.
Table 5.7: Government Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset
H5.1 – Time

H5.2 – Ideology

H5.4 – Geographic

All Provinces

Support

No Support

No Support

Alberta

Support

No Support

No Support

British Columbia

Support

Support

No Support

Nova Scotia

Support

No Support

No Support

Ontario

Support

No Support

No Support

Moreover, Table 5.7 shows mixed support for hypothesis H5.2 – governing parties further
to the left on the political spectrum produce stronger accountability relationships between
Type II bodies and government than governing parties further to the right. In testing the
effect of a left-of-centre government, Ontario and British Columbia produced significant
results, however, the results were in opposite directions, with British Columbia indicating
a strengthening of the relationship as predicted, while Ontario predicted a weakening of
the accountability relationship.
To test the robustness, the effect of a left-of-centre government on the accountability
relationship with government and Type II bodes was evaluated using regression analysis.
The results for H5.2 substituting left-of-centre government for percentage of seats held by
a left-of-centre party is presented in Table 5.8. The results in Table 5.8 shows that the
effect of a left-of-centre government is consistent with the findings for seat percentage. A
left-of-centre government in British Columbia indicates an increase of 0.549 in the
government accountability index, while a left-of-centre government in Ontario suggests a
decrease of 0.673.
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Table 5.8: Effect of Left-of-centre Governments on Accountability to Government
British Columbia

Ontario

1956-1965

-0.059(0.310)

0.317(0.229)

1966-1975

-0.191(0.267)

0.308(0.213)

1976-1985

0.110(0.264)

0.091(0.256)

1986-1995

0.210(0.283)

0.597(0.291)**

1996-2005

0.568(0.259)**

0.414(0.214)*

Left Government

0.549(0.173)***

-0.673(293)**

Spans Municipalities

0.104(0.406)

0.090(0.266)

Single Province

0.036(0.265)

-0.233(2.34)

Self-Regulatory

0.655(0.162)***

-0.309(0.139) **

Adjusted R2

165

259

Number of Cases

0.161

0.078

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively(two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

5.4 Results: Accountability Relationship with Society
In looking at the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies two
hypotheses are tested: H5.3 – the accountability relationship between society and Type II
bodies has increased in strength over time; and H5.5 – the accountability relationship
between society and Type II bodies will increase as the geographic scale of the Type II
body decreases. When testing each hypothesis, two regression models are again used, the
first model containing only the pertinent independent variables for the specific hypothesis
and the second model including the combined set of independent variables for both
hypotheses. Each hypothesis is examined in turn using the aggregated provincial dataset
and then again using the individual provincial level datasets. The results for each
hypothesis when using the aggregated data set are presented in Table 5.9.
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Table 5.9: Society Accountability Index (Dataset includes AB, BC, NS and ON)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

1956-1965

0.232(0.115)**

0.217(0.113)*

1966-1975

0.270(0.105)***

0.276(0.102)***

1976-1985

0.190(0.112)*

0.177(0.110)

1986-1995

0.500(0.108)***

0.489(0.106)***

1996-2005

0.506(0.106)***

0.499(0.103)***

Spans Municipalities

0.121(0.147)

0.099(0.145)

Single Province

-0.402(0.126)***

-0.412(0.124)***

Spans Provinces

-0.676(0.373)*

-0.732(0.367)**

Alberta

-0.117(0.071)

-0.142(0.071)**

-0.108(0.070)

British Columbia

-0.161(0.078)**

-0.129(0.078)*

-0.117(0.077)

Nova Scotia

-0.249(0.079)***

-0.200(0.080)**

-0.203(0.079)***

Self-Regulatory

0.401(0.062)***

0.568(0.062)***

0.506(0.063)***

Adjusted R2
Number of Cases

0.116
811

0.113
811

0.146
811

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
Ontario, 1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

When looking at the effect of time period on the strength of the accountability
relationship between society and Type II bodies, the results displayed in Table 5.9, Model
1, indicate that all time periods yield statistically significant results at the 90% confidence
level or higher. For all time periods the relationship is positive; suggesting a higher level
in the society accountability index score, which ranges from 0 to 3, for each subsequent
time period when compared to 1946-1955. When all independent variables are included
in the regression model, as shown in Model 3, the results remain consistent with the
exception of the 1976 to 1985 time period, which is no longer statistically significant.
The results for both Model 1 and Model 3 indicate that the most recent time period
(1996-2005) produces the largest coefficient. The results in Model 3 suggest an increase
of 0.499 in the society accountability index score for Type II bodies created or modified
between the years of 1996 to 2005 in comparison to Type II bodies created or modified
between the years of 1946 to 1955. Overall the observed trend is toward the
strengthening of the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies over
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time, lending support to the hypothesis that the accountability relationship between
society and Type II bodies has increased in strength over time.
When considering the effect of geographic scale on the strength of the accountability
relationship between society and Type II bodies. The results in Table 5.9, Model 2
indicate that Type II bodies that operate at the provincial geographic scale or higher
produce statistically significant results in the negative direction at the 90% confidence
level or higher. Based on the results in Model 2, a Type II body operating at the
provincial geographic level suggests a decrease of 0.40, while a Type II body that spans
provinces indicates a decrease of 0.676 in society accountability index score in
comparison to a Type II body operating at the municipal geographic scale. When all
variables are included within the regression model, as shown in Model 3, the results
remain consistent, providing support for the hypothesis that the accountability
relationship between society and Type II bodies increases as the geographic scale of the
Type II body decreases.
It should also be noted, as presented in Table 5.9, that the each of the provincial dummy
variables produced statistically significant results in at least one of the three models.
However, when all independent variables were included in the regression model, as
shown in Model 4, only Nova Scotia remained significant. In Model 3, the results for
Nova Scotia indicate a decrease of 0.203 in the society accountability index score in
comparison to the province of Ontario. Overall the results suggest a weaker
accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies in Nova Scotia than that
which exist in the other provinces being studied. To a lesser extent, however, the results
in Models 1 and 2 suggest a stronger accountability relationship between society and
Type II bodies in Ontario than in either Alberta or British Columbia.
As with the evaluation of the accountability relationship between government and Type II
bodies, the dummy variable for Professional Self-Regulatory bodies produced statistically
significant results at the 99% confidence level across all models in Table 5.9. In
evaluating the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies, however,
the relationship is in the opposite direction with a Professional Self-Regulatory body
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producing an increase in the society accountability index score in comparison to other
forms of Type II bodies. This result suggests that Professional Self-Regulatory bodies
have more accountable mechanisms to society than other forms of Type II bodies.
Proceeding to the evaluation of each hypothesis at the individual province level, the
results for Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia will now be explored.
The results for each hypothesis by province are presented in Tables 5.10 through Table
5.13.
Table 5.10: Society Accountability Index - Alberta
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

1956-1965

-0.047(0.179)

-0.020(0.170)

1966-1975

0.394(0.167)**

0.452(0.159)***

1976-1985

0.155(0.166)

0.249(0.160)

1986-1995

0.494(0.170)***

0.477(0.161)***

1996-2005

0.982(0.168)***

0.940(0.234)***

Spans Municipalities

1.133(0.268)***

0.940(0.253)***

Single Province

0.358(0.242)

0.235(0.229)

Spans Provinces

Omitted

18

Omitted

Self-Regulatory

0.546(0.104)***

0.806(1.109)***

0.682(0.104)***

Adjusted R2

0.294

0.237

0.369

Number of Cases

230

230

230

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively(two-tailed test of significance).

1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

18 Spans Provinces is omitted when no Type II bodies that span provinces exist within the dataset.
.
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Table 5.11: Society Accountability Index – British Columbia
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

1956-1965

0.609(0.285)**

0.497(0.277)*

1966-1975

0.433(0.228)*

0.351(0.221)

1976-1985

0.260(0.244)

0.252(0.235)

1986-1995

0.656(0.234)***

0.546(0.229)**

1996-2005

0.735(0.233)***

0.731(0.225)***

Spans Municipalities

-0.643(0.370)*

-0.720(0.362)**

Single Province

-0.926(0.237)***

-0.893(0.236)***

Spans Provinces

Omitted

Omitted

Self-Regulatory

0.239(0.146)

0.359(0.139)**

0.317(0.143)**

Adjusted R2

0.065

0.089

0.133

Number of Cases

165

165

165

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

Table 5.12: Society Accountability Index – Nova Scotia
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

1956-1965

0.141(0.275)

0.006(0.256)

1966-1975

0.022(0.260)

0.138(0.241)

1976-1985

0.043(0.267)

0.005(0.246)

1986-1995

0.144(0.258)

0.181(0.238)

1996-2005

0.180(0.260)

-0.151(0.241)

Spans Municipalities

0.280(0.371)

0.383(0.385)

Single Province

-0.666.(0.331)**

-0.614(0.339)*

Spans Provinces

-0.948(0.439)**

-0.917(0.446)**

0.253(0.129)*

-0.406(0.115)***

0.401(0.124)***

0.005

0.175

0.157

157

157

157

Self-Regulatory
Adjusted R

2

Number of Cases

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.
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Table 5.13: Society Accountability Index – Ontario
Model 1

Model 2`

Model 3

1956-1965

0.208(0.219)

0.201(0.218)

1966-1975

0.082(0.203)

0.059(0.203)

1976-1985

0.200(0.244)

0.163(0.244)

1986-1995

0.509(0.221)**

0.504(0.219)**

1996-2005

0.114(0.204)

0.118(0.203)

Spans Municipalities

-0.211(0.253)

-0.164(0.252)

Single Province

-0.411(0.222)*

-0.393(0.222)*

Spans Provinces

Omitted

Omitted

Self-Regulatory

0.427(0.124)***

0.579(0.121)***

0.499(0.128)***

Adjusted R2

0.078

0.075

0.087

Number of Cases

259

259

259

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively (two-tailed test of significance).
1946-1955, and Single Municipality are used as the categories of comparison for dummy variables.

When evaluating the effect of time period on the accountability relationship between
society and Type II bodies at the individual provincial level the results vary across
provinces. The results for Alberta are presented in Table 5.10, Model 1. For Alberta
1966-1975, 1986-1995, and 1996-2005 produce statistically significant results – each in
the positive direction. For Alberta the most recent time period, 1996-2005, produces the
largest coefficient of 0.982, while the 1986-1995 period generated the second largest.
Both the 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 results are significant at the 99% confidence level
and the results are consistent when all independent variables are included in the
regression model as shown in Table 5.10, Model 3.
When evaluating H5.3 for British Columbia the results are presented in Table 5.11, Model
1. All time periods produce results in the positive direction and are statistically significant
at the 90% confidence level or higher with the exception of the 1976-1985. Like Alberta
the most recent period, 1996 to 2005, produces the largest suggested increase in the
society accountability index score, indicating an increase of 0.735 in comparison to 19461955, while the 1986-1995 time period produced the second largest coefficient. The
results for both the 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 time periods are significant at the 99%
confidence level. When all independent variables are included in the regression model, as
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shown in Table 5.11, Model 3, the results for 1966 to 1975 are no longer statistically
significant.
The results for the effect of time on the strength of the accountability relationship
between society and Type II bodies for Nova Scotia are presented in Table 5.12, Model 1.
No statistically significant results are produced and the results remain consistent when all
independent variables are included in the regression model as show in Model 3.
When evaluating H5.3 for Ontario the results are shown in Table 5.13, Model 1. For
Ontario the only time period to produce statistically significant results is 1986-1995,
which indicates an increase of 0.509 in the society accountability index score in
comparison to 1946-1955 and is significant at the 95 % confidence level. When all
independent variables are included in the regression model the results remain consistent.
Of the four provinces, the results for both Alberta and British Columbia provide support
for the hypothesis that the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies
has increased in strength over time. Conversely neither the Nova Scotia nor Ontario case
provides support for the hypothesis.
Testing the effect of geographic scale on the accountability relationship between society
and Type II bodies produce conflicting results. When evaluating H5.5 for Alberta the
results are presented in Table 5.10 Model 2. In the case of Alberta, spans municipality is
the only variable to produces statistically significant results. While spans municipality is
expected to produce a negative coefficient, the results are in the positive direction. The
results suggest an increase of 1.333 in the society accountability index in comparison to
Type II bodies that operate within the jurisdictional boundaries of a single municipality
and are significant at the 99% confidence level. As shown in Model 3, the results remain
consistent when all independent variables are included in the regression model.
When evaluating hypothesis H5.5 for British Columbia the results are presented in Table
5.11, Model 2. The results are in the expected direction, with increases in the geographic
scale of Type II bodies suggesting a decrease in the society accountability index score.
As shown in Table 5.11, Model 2, spanning municipalities indicates a decrease of 0.643
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and operating at the same geographic scale as the province indicates a decrease of 0.926
in comparison to Type II bodies that operate within the boundaries of a single
municipality. The results are significant at the 90% and 99% confidence level and remain
consistent when all variables are added to the regression model as shown in Table 5.11,
Model 3.
When evaluating the effect of the geographic scale on Type II bodies in Nova Scotia the
results are presented in Table 5.12, Model 2. In the case of Nova Scotia the results for
Single Province and Spans Provinces produce statistically significant results in the
expected direction at the 90% confidence level. As shown in Model 2, Type II bodies that
operate on the same geographic scale as the province suggest a decrease of 0.666 and
Type II bodies that span provinces suggest a decrease of 0.948 when compared to Type II
bodies that operate within the boundaries of a single municipality. When all independent
variables are included in the regression model the results remain significant at the 90%
confidence level or higher as shown in Table 5.11, Model 3.
When evaluating H5.5 for the province of Ontario the results are presented in Table 5.13,
Model 2. For Ontario, single province is the only variable to produce statistically
significant results. As shown in Model 2, the results of Single Province are statistically
significant at the 90% confidence level and suggest a decrease of 0.411 in the society
accountability index in comparison to Type II bodies that operate within the boundaries
of a single municipality. As presented in Table 13, Model 3, the results remain consistent
when all independent variables are included within the regression model.
Overall, at the individual provincial level, the results for Albert refute the hypothesis that
the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as the
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases, while the results for British Columbia,
Nova Scotia, and Ontario provide support for the hypothesis.
In addition to the results for the independent variables being tested, the results for the
Professional Self-Regulatory dummy variable are again noteworthy. As shown in Model
3 in Tables 5.10 through 5.13 the results for the Self-Regulatory variable indicates a
higher level in the society accountability index across all provinces. This suggests that
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Professional Self-Regulatory bodies have a stronger accountability relationship with
society than other forms of Type II bodies.
When the regression models are run for each of the provincial datasets the results are
inconsistent. A summary of whether support was found for each of the hypotheses by
dataset is provided in Table 5.14. As shown in Table 5.14 there is mixed support for H5.3
– the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased in
strength over time. When evaluating the effect of time, the Alberta and British Columbia
datasets produce significant results in the positive direction for both the 1986-1995 and
1996-2005 time periods. The results suggest an increase in strength of the accountability
relationship between society and Type II bodies in comparison to 1946-1955. The
provincial dataset for Ontario produced significant results for 1986-1995; however, the
results for 1995-2005 are not significant in comparison to 1946-1955. The results for
Ontario suggest that any gains in accountability have since been lost. The Nova Scotia
dataset produced no significant results, suggesting that the strength of the accountability
relationship has remained consistent across the sixty years being studied.
Table 5.14: Society Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset
H5.3 – Time

H5.5 – Geographic

All Provinces

Support

Support

Alberta

Support

No Support

British Columbia

Support

Support

Nova Scotia

No Support

Support

Ontario

No Support

Support

As shown in Table 5.14 mixed support also exists for H5.5 – the accountability
relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as the geographic scale of
the Type II body decreases. When testing geography, the results for all datasets with the
exception of Alberta are significant in the expected direction. In British Columbia, Nova
Scotia, and Ontario the results suggest a decrease in the society accountability index
score when the Type II body is operating at the same geographic scale as the province in
comparison to a Type II body that is operating on the same geographic scale as a
municipality. The results for British Columbia further indicate a lower level in the society
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accountability index score for Type II bodies that span municipalities, while the results
for Nova Scotia further suggest a lower level for Type II bodies that span provinces. The
results for Alberta, however, are significant in the opposite direction, suggesting an
increase in the society accountability index for the Type II bodies that span municipalities
in comparison to Type II bodies that operate within the jurisdictional boundaries of a
single municipality.

5.5 Comparing the Strength of Accountability Relationships
In responding to concerns of accountability brought about by the dispersal of authority
outside of government, this chapter has sought to gain an understanding of the
accountability environment that has emerged when government has delegated decisionmaking authority. In doing so, the effect of political ideology, time, and geographic scale
on the accountability relationships between Type II bodies and both government and
society have been explored.
In looking at the accountability environment that emerges when authority migrates, two
of the principal findings are that the accountability relationships between both Type II
bodies and government and Type II bodies and society have been strengthened over time.
This indicates that the ability for both government and society to hold Type II bodies
accountable for decisions made and actions taken is greater today than it has been in the
past, lessening concerns over democratic accountability. However, while the
accountability relationships between both Type II bodies and government and Type II
bodies in society have become stronger, it is important to note that the accountability
relationship between Type II bodies and society remains weak when compared to the
relationship between Type II bodies and government.
As shown in Tables 5.15, the mean government accountability index scores, which are
used to assess the relationship between government and Type II bodies, are consistently
higher than society accountability index scores, which are used to assess the relationship
between Type II bodies and society. Across all four provinces the mean government
accountability index score for the entire time frame is above 1, while the society
accountability score is below 1 and for no time period is the society accountability index
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score higher than that of the government accountability index score. This is consistent
with Tanja Börzel’s argument that in the modern state both public and private actors
operate under the shadow of hierarchy where public actors set the legal rules of the game
and intervene to correct distortions or outcomes that violate public interests (Börzel,
2010: 196-197). So while an underlying assumption of multilevel governance is that
centralization has given way to new forms of governance, resulting in decision-making
authority being dispersed across multiple jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe, 2005 15-6),
the state continues to play a dominant role within the governance process.
Table 5.15: Mean Accountability Index Scores Across Time by Province
Alberta

British Columbia

Nova Scotia

Ontario

Gov Acc
Index

Soc Acc
Index

Gov Acc
Index

Soc Acc
Index

Gov Acc
Index

Soc Acc
Index

Gov Acc
Index

Soc Acc
Index

1946-1955

1.32

0.42

1.61

0.33

1.50

0.60

1.70

0.74

1956-1965

1.64

0.35

1.79

0.86

1.57

0.76

2.07

0.88

1966-1975

2.06

0.74

1.98

0.67

1.66

0.59

2.08

0.78

1976-1985

2.20

0.58

1.93

0.52

2.12

0.62

1.83

0.92

1986-1995

1.85

0.92

2.34

0.94

1.68

0.74

1.74

1.38

1996-2005

2.14

1.53

2.39

1.06

1.38

0.85

2.05

0.92

All Years

1.91

0.79

2.06

0.75

1.66

0.71

1.96

0.93

The results in Table 5.15 also bring to the forefront questions over the continued
strengthening of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government
and Type II bodies and society. While the results for Alberta and British Columbia
indicated a reasonably continuous strengthening of accountability relationships, the
sudden decrease in the mean government accountability index score for Nova Scotia
during the most recent two 10-year periods raises concerns over democratic input and
accountability within the governance process. Presented above in Table 5.2, the Nova
Scotia case was unique among the provinces studied. Nova Scotia is the only province in
which the government accountability index is consistently decreasing across regression
models in comparison to Ontario. In Table 5.15, the Nova Scotia case shows that
accountability gains can be lost. Small increases in the strength of the accountability
relationship between Type II bodies and society are more than offset by decreases in the
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies.
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Furthermore, the highest mean accountability for the 1996 to 2005 time period presented
in Table 5.15 is 2.39, which is far from the maximum accountability score of 3. This
suggests that while the strength of both accountability relationships may be improving, a
full accountability relationship with either government or the public does not exist for a
large number Type II bodies. The limited nature of accountability relationships for a
portion of Type II bodies bolsters concerns over a loss of public input and democratic
accountability when decision-making processes are delegated to Type II multilevel
governance bodies.
While time period had a positive effect on the accountability relationships between Type
II bodies and government and Type II bodies and society, the geographic scale of a Type
II body had an effect only on the relationship between Type II bodies and society.
Specifically, Type II bodies that exist on a smaller geographic scale have stronger
accountability relationships with society than Type II bodies that have boundaries that
align with the province. In contrast, the accountability relationship between Type II
bodies and government remains constant across geographic levels. As government is in
control of the legislation used to create Type II bodies, the results indicate that
governments are willing to, and in fact do, incorporate mechanisms that provide for a
stronger accountability relationship between Type II bodies and society when the Type II
body is operating and making decisions at a geographic scale that is less than the area of
the province. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results also indicate that there is no
willingness on the part of government to give up any control they may gain over the
actions of the Type II body through their accountability relationship, as the strength of
the accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government remain constant
across geographic scales.
Just as the strength of the accountability relationship between government and Type II
bodies remains constant regardless of geographic scale, so too does the relative strength
of the two accountability relationships. The mean government and society accountability
index scores for Type II bodies smaller in scale than the provincial boundaries are
presented by decade in Table 5.16. Consistent with the overall results, the results in Table
5.16 shows than the mean government accountability index score remains consistently
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higher than the mean society accountability index scores when looking at Type II bodies
that are smaller in geographic scale than provincial boundaries. This indicates that the
stronger of the two accountability relationships remains the relationship between
government and Type II bodies. While the ability for societal actors to hold Type II
multilevel governance bodies accountable increases as the geographic scale of the Type II
body deceases, the state continues to hold the dominant position.
Table 5.16: Mean Accountability Index Scores for Type II bodies at the Single
Municipality or Spans Municipalities Geographic scale
Government
Accountability
Index

Society
Accountability
Index

1946-1955

1.82

1.18

1956-1965

2.00

1.05

1966-1975

2.29

1.03

1976-1985

2.27

0.63

1986-1995

2.27

1.14

1996-2005

2.46

1.50

All Years

2.22

1.07

One area in which the strength of the accountability relationships between Type II bodies
and government and Type II bodies and society approaches parity is for Professional
Self-Regulatory bodies. The results for Professional Self-Regulatory bodies show the
strength of the accountability relationships to be moving in opposite directions, producing
a statistically significant increase in the accountability relationship between Type II
bodies and society and a statistically significant decrease in the accountability
relationship between Type II bodies and government when compared to other forms of
Type II bodies. The mean government and society accountability index scores for
Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies as compared to other forms of Type II bodies are
presented in Table 5.17. As the results in Table 5.17 show, the decrease in government
accountability index scores and the increase in society accountability index scores for
Professional Self-Regulatory bodies in comparison to all other forms of regulatory body
are consistent across time periods.
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Table 5.17: Mean Accountability Index Scores for Professional Self-Regulatory
Bodies
Government Accountability Index
Non SelfRegulatory Bodies

Society Accountability Index

Professional SelfRegulatory Bodies

Non SelfRegulatory Bodies

Professional SelfRegulatory Bodies

1946-1955

1.83

0.85

0.40

0.53

1956-1965

2.16

0.45

0.66

0.86

1966-1975

2.13

1.07

0.68

0.89

1976-1985

2.22

1.50

0.53

1.00

1986-1995

2.17

1.39

0.78

1.40

1996-2005

2.17

1.82

0.90

1.28

All Years

2.13

1.37

0.68

1.14

While being a Professional Self-Regulatory body has opposite effects on the two
accountability relationships, the relationships only approach but do not reach parity. The
results in Table 5.16 show that although the government accountability index scores
decrease and the society accountability index scores increase, the accountability
relationship between society and Type II bodies remains the weaker of the two
relationships. Furthermore, when the difference between the means of the two
accountability index scores is tested using a t-test the results indicate the difference
between means to be significant at the 99% confidence level.

19

This indicates that while

the two accountability scores may be converging, a significant difference in strength of
the two accountability relationships remains, meaning the state retains its position as the
dominant actor.

5.6 Discussion: What makes Nova Scotia Different?
The results for Nova Scotia also indicate significantly weaker accountability to both
government and society. One possible explanation for the difference is Nova Scotia’s
smaller population size. To test the effect of population the provincial dummy variables
were replaced with the provincial population size in the regression models. When testing

19 Satterthwaite’s approximation formula for the degrees of freedom is used to when conducting the t-test
(StataCorp, 2013: 2242), as variances between samples were not assumed to be equal.
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the effect of population on the accountability relationship with government the results are
not significant, however, when testing the effect of population on the relationship with
society the results are significant and suggest an increase of 0.000186 in the society
accountability index score for every additional 10000 people. These findings suggest that
while population size does not help to explain the weak accountability relationship with
government, it has some explanatory power for the weaker relationship between Type II
bodies and society.
A second possible explanation for the different results is the effect of political culture.
The effects of cultural differences on the political processes, government institutions, and
policy choices have long been recognized. Cultural differences influence both the policy
problems that confront government, and the types of policies elected officials are likely to
pursue (Lieske, 2012: 108). While in the recent past all provinces have been subject to
the pressures to balance budgets and shrink the role of the provincial state (Dyck, 2006:
57), historical differences exist that have shaped unique political cultures. Historically,
the political culture of Nova Scotia has been firmly based on a clientist model (Black and
Fierlbeck, 2006: 522). Nova Scotia’s political culture has been characterized as
hierarchical, elite oriented, conservative and traditional (Wiseman, 2006: 24, 31).
Furthermore, the Conservative and Liberal parties, which governed the province during
the duration of timeframe being studied, lacked substantive ideological difference and
both maintained the dominance of traditional conservative politics (Wiseman, 2006: 24;
Bickerton, 2001: 53). What developed between the late eighteenth and mid-twentieth
centuries was a pervasive system of patronage and deference to authority that became
cemented in the Maritimes Provinces (Wiseman, 2006: 38). While the 1990s brought
change to the political landscape in Nova Scotia, with the Buchanan government, who
practiced traditional elitist politics, replaced by a government with a more reformist
agenda (Bickerton, 2001: 60), the traditional hierarchical elitist nature of Nova Scotia
politics may still play a role in the development of accountability relationships between
Type II bodies and government. With the provincial elites dominating politics and
political rewards doled out through a patronage system, they may have been little need
for politicians to build formal mechanisms into the legislation that enforce the
accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government. The elites have a
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vested interest in maintaining the status quo, while those rewarded patronage positions
have a vested interested in acting according to preferences of those handing out the
rewards. The threat of being replaced, coupled with the deference to authority associated
with hierarchy may be sufficient to keep Type II bodies in check.

5.7 Conclusion
In looking at the accountability environment that emerges when authority migrates, two
overarching trends emerge: 1) the strength of accountability relationships between Type
II bodies and government and Type II bodies and society have increased over time, and
2) that regardless of increases in the strength of the accountability relationship between
Type II bodies and society, the relationship between Type II bodies and government
remains the stronger of the two relationships.
As the cumulative number of Type II bodies involved in the governance process continue
to expand, as the results from Chapter 4 show, the increase in both the strength of the
accountability relationship between Type II bodies and government and Type II bodies
and society can be seen as positive for public input and democratic accountability. As
laid out at the start of the chapter, three different accountability arrangements may exist
to hold Type II bodies accountable to citizens. First, society may act as principals with
Type II bodies as agents where Type II bodies are directly accountable to society.
Second, citizens may act as principals with democratically elected government as agents,
who are in turn acting as principals with Type II bodies again as agents where Type II
bodies are indirectly accountable to the citizens. Finally both accountability arrangements
may exist. The results indicate the existence of both accountability arrangements, with
citizens increasingly able to hold Type II bodies directly accountable and able to hold
Type II bodies accountable indirectly through the chain of accountability from citizens
through government to Type II bodies.
While the overall increase in the strength of accountability relationships is an
encouraging sign of democratic accountability, there is still some reason for concern. As
shown in Table 5.15, decreases in the mean government accountability index score for
Nova Scotia during the two most recent ten-year periods presents a situation where past
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gains in accountability are lost. While the results for Nova Scotia are unique among the
provinces studied, it does raise concerns over democratic accountability when Type II
bodies are brought into the governance process. Moreover, in the Nova Scotia case, small
increases in the strength of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and
society were more than offset by decreases in the accountability relationship between
government and Type II bodies during the most recent time period. In the case of
Ontario, the increase in society accountability index for the 1986 to 1995 time period is
statistically significant compared to 1946-1955, while the 1996 to 2005 time period is
not. Both the Nova Scotia and the Ontario case raise concern over the ability to maintain
accountability gains and secure public input and democratic accountability once decisionmaking authority has migrated.
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Chapter 6
“There will come a time when the Ministry of Health is the only Ministry we can afford to have
and we still won't be able to afford the Ministry of Health”
- Dalton McGuinty, Premier of Ontario

6

Migration of Authority and Healthcare Reform

Chapters 4 and 5 explored the rate at which the provincial governments of Alberta,
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario migrated decision-making authority to actors
outside of elected government and the accountability relationships that emerged once
authority migrated. Having evaluated the migration of authority using the universe of
cases from 1946 to 2005, Chapters 6 and 7 now focus on a specific policy area –
healthcare. In doing so, a more nuanced account of the factors and reasoning that led to
the migration of decision-making authority away from elected officials is provided.
In Canada, the trend toward migrating healthcare authority away from the centre of
government emerged in the 1970s with the creation of District Health Councils in
Ontario. While having no decision-making authority, the councils identified areas of
need, assessed healthcare alternatives, and established priorities at the local level
(Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987: 14-15). New instances of authority
migration emerged in the 1990s, as Alberta, British Columbia, New Brunswick,
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan all
devolved authority to regional bodies between the years of 1991 and 1994, with Manitoba
following suit in 1996 (Lomas, Woods and Veenstra, 1997: 371). While implementing
District Health Councils as advisory boards in the 70s, Ontario was the last province to
devolve decision-making authority with the creation of Local Health Integration
Networks in 2006.
Building on the results of previous chapters, this chapter explores the process by which
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario legislated the migration of authority
and the creation of new Type II bodies in each provincial healthcare system. In doing so
specific attention will be paid to determining what factors may have precipitated the
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migration of decision-making authority in each case. To continue to develop an
understanding of why authority migrates, both the fiscal capacity and political ideology
hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4 will be evaluated against the migration of authority
in the four healthcare systems. To reiterate, the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4 are:
H4.3 - The lower the fiscal capacity of government to meet governance demand the higher
the rate of creation of Type II bodies.
H4.4 – The further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits the
lower the rate of creation of Type II bodies.
A summary of the support found for each hypothesis in Chapter 4 is provided in Table
6.1. As shown in Table 6.1, the analysis in Chapter 4 produced inconsistent results, with
support evident in some datasets, but not in others.
Table 6.1: Type II Body Annual Creation Rate – Support for Hypothesis by Dataset
H4.3 Fiscal Capacity

H4.4 – Ideology

Disposable Income

Provincial Debt

% Left Seats

All Provinces

No Support

No Support

No Support

All Provinces –
Excluding SelfRegulatory Bodies

No Support

Support

No Support

Alberta

No Support

Support

No Support

British Columbia

No Support

No Support

No Support

Nova Scotia

No Support

No Support

Support

Ontario

No Support

No Support

Support

While Chapter 4 evaluated the effect of fiscal capacity and political ideology on the
migration of authority to Type II bodies, this chapter further seeks to explore the
existence of other factors that may have contributed to the migration of authority in
provincial healthcare. The unique context surrounding the creation of Type II healthcare
bodies in each province offers the potential to further identify additional factors that
promote the migration of authority. One factor that may either promote or suppress the
creation of Type II bodies is how problems are defined or framed. Due to the inconsistent
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results in Chapter 4, the impact of how policy problems in the healthcare system are
framed by government for public consumption is also considered. To do so, government
policy documents, commission reports, provincial legislation, and provincial regulations
will be used to gain an understanding of how policy challenges in healthcare were framed
during the authority migration process. Consistency in policy framing in relation to
policy solutions and eventual policy outcomes are considered in the evaluation of factors
that contributed to authority migration. For each of the four provinces the initial
migration of authority as well as subsequent changes to the governance model will be
explored.

6.1 Problem Definition, Issue Framing and Policy Images
To gain insight into what factors played a role in the migration of authority from central
provincial governments to multilevel governance Type II bodies, how each province
defined the challenges facing the healthcare system will be explored. There is universal
agreement that a key factor in policy response is how the problem, or the situation that is
considered to be problematic, is defined (Pal, 2006: 97). How a problem is structured acts
as a steering mechanism that shapes of all subsequent phases of policy development
(Dunn, 2004: 72; Pal, 2006: 97). Simply stated, as policies are responses to problems,
how the problem is defined shapes the nature of the policy response (Pal, 2006: 97).
Linked to the idea of problem definition is the concept of issue framing. On a basic level,
issue framing can be characterized as something akin to an optimal rhetorical strategy
through which policy actors emphasize the aspects of an issue that gives their preferred
solution a rhetorical edge (Jerit, 2008: 1-2). When expanded upon, framing can be
defined as “a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex
reality so as to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting” (Rein
and Schon, 1991: 263). As argued by Rein and Schon, it is through framing that vague
issues can be made sense of and eventually acted upon (1991: 263). However, frames do
not simply reduce the issue to an argument on one side or another. Frames are broader;
they suggest how an issue should be thought of and recommend what, if anything should
be done (Nelson and Kinder, 1996: 1057). In essence, frames shape how citizens think
about political issues (Sniderman and Theriault, 2004: 136).
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Rein and Schon suggest that frames are never self-interpreted. Instead the interpretation
of policy issues, in its various frames, is usually undertaken by a group of individuals or
by informal or formal organizations. Sponsors of the frame, such as government officials,
seek to develop the frame, make explicit its implications for action and establish grounds
for arguments surrounding it (Rein and Schon, 1991: 274-275). As all people cannot be
equally interested in or knowledgeable on all policy issues facing society, specialists in
any particular area have an advantage over others. When communicating with the broader
public and political elites specialists explain issues and justify policy approaches in a
simplified manner. The result is a set of policy images that are a combination of empirical
information and emotional appeals, leaving the problem understood in simplified and
symbolic terms (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 25-26).
At the centre of the process of transforming issues into policy problems are causal ideas.
As stated by Deborah Stone, “Problem definition is a process of image making, where
images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility”
(1989: 282). As such, difficulties or issues do not have inherent properties that make
them more or less likely to be seen as problems, but instead, political actors deliberately
portray them in ways calculated to give support for their position (Stone, 1989: 282).
Stone further contends that, in the world of public policy, there is always choice about
which factors to address. Focusing on different storylines will locate the responsibility
and burden of reform differently (Stone, 1989: 296). When considering the migration of
authority to Type II bodies in provincial healthcare, what are the causal factors that
promote the adoption of Type II healthcare bodies as a corrective action? Reflecting back
on the original hypotheses, will the policy problem be defined in terms of fiscal capacity,
political ideology, or something yet to be defined?
A challenge posed by issue framing is that it is possible for multiple, potentially
conflicting, frames to be built using the same underlying facts or evidence. At play is the
reality that divergent worldviews produce differences in how the underlying facts are
interpreted. As a result there is the potential for variation in how issues are framed and
what if any action should be taken in response to the issue (Rein and Schon, 1991: 264265; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 26). No one individual has the power to define the
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policy image or to guarantee that a specific solution will be adopted; both are the result of
political conflict (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 29). In basing the analysis of the
migration of authority in the healthcare system on government documents, the frame that
is being assessed is the policy image that emerged as successful from the political
battlefield. On the political battlefield, the differing conceptions of both the policy
problem and policy solutions would have been contested.

6.2 Why Healthcare?
The decision to explore the migration of decision-making authority in healthcare
provision is rooted in high level of importance placed on healthcare by Canadian citizens
and the declining presence of academic literature on healthcare decentralization since the
early days of authority migration as a vehicle for healthcare reform. The importance of
healthcare to Canadians is evident in Canadian Election Study results. Results for both
the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Study identify healthcare as the most frequently
selected issue, chosen over taxes, social welfare programs, the environment and
corruption in government when asked, “Which of these five issues is the most important
issue to you PERSONALLY in this election.” The results found that 48.8 of respondents
selected healthcare as the most important issue in 2004 and 40.8 per cent selected
healthcare in 2006 (Blais et al., 2007). Also, as discussed in Chapter 4, in 2005 85% of
Canadians stated that they believed that eliminating public healthcare represented a
fundamental change to the nature of Canada, with more respondents viewing eliminating
healthcare as a fundamental change than any other policy in the survey, including
abandoning English and French as Canada’s official languages, and ending peacekeeping
missions (Soroka, 2007:5). However, while healthcare is identified as an important issue
to Canadians, the literature on the decentralization of the healthcare system has
diminished. Paradoxically, as authority migration has become common-place across
provincial healthcare systems, Black and Fierlbeck lament that there is less literature now
than when the policies were first being implemented (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 507).
In addition to political salience and the decline in academic focus stated above, the
selection of healthcare is also guided by practical considerations. With the creation of
LHINs in Ontario a degree of decision-making authority was migrated outside of the
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central provincial governments in all 10 Canadian provinces, which allows for the
continued use of cross provincial comparisons between Alberta, British Columbia, Nova
Scotia and Ontario. Furthermore, how decentralization works within each province is
affected by contextual differences such as: variation in size, economies, political cultures
and other local features (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 523). This perception of
decentralization is consistent with outcomes in provincial healthcare, as they are not
uniform, but differ in governance models, degree of authority migration, and, in the case
of Ontario, timing of events. Taken together, the common use of horizontal migration of
authority as a healthcare reform policy solution coupled with differences in its
implementation provide a venue for investigating how contextual differences influence
the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 4 as well as factors specific to each provincial
context.
Lastly, while the focus of analysis is on the creation of Type II bodies and the resulting
accountability mechanism in the Canadian provinces, the migration of decision-making
authority in healthcare is not unique to Canada. For example, in New Zealand the district
offices of the Department of Health were merged with local hospital boards to create
Area Health Boards during the 1980s (Anderson, 1996: 78). Subsequent reforms saw
New Zealand’s Area Health Boards broken up and their functions divided among a
number of public and private actors (Anderson, 1996: 82). In the United Kingdom the
management of the National Health Service was decentralized to regional and district
levels through the creation of Health Authorities (Dekker, 1994: 283), while the
Netherlands has traditionally been a mix of public and private, with regulation of services
falling to government and quasi-autonomous non-government organizations (Dekker,
1994: 284). Given the widespread adoption of devolved decision-making authority in
healthcare, the analysis of authority migration in healthcare reform has the potential to
provide value beyond Canada.

6.3 Healthcare Reform and Authority Migration
While an important issue, the migration of decision-making authority in healthcare
reform has proven to be complex (Vaughan, 1990: 139). Mills argues that patterns of
institutionalized local behaviour, even those that are peripheral to healthcare, can
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influence which healthcare governance structure is ultimately adopted (1990:38). The
unique historical experiences of each jurisdiction have made generalizations over the
reason for authority migration in healthcare difficult. Countries with their own unique
historical context and with governments differing in political beliefs and policies have
felt the need to reform healthcare by way of shifting authority to some degree away from
central government (Vaughan, 1990: 139).
In assessing what decentralization in healthcare looks like, Mills states that while
decentralization can be defined in terms of transferring authority from higher levels to
lower levels of government, decentralization in the health system takes on many forms,
making decentralization not only an important theme in healthcare, but a confused one
(1990, 11). Four paths through which aspects of the healthcare system can be shifted
outside of central government are identified: deconcentration, devolution, delegation and
privatization (Mills, 1990: 16). Deconcentration is the movement of administrative
authority to locally based offices of central government (Mills, 1990, 16). Devolution is
the creation or strengthening of subnational levels of government that are substantively
independent from central government (Mills, 1990, 19). Delegation is the transfer of
managerial responsibility for defined functions to organizations that are outside the
government and are only indirectly controlled by central government (Mills, 1990, 21).
Lastly, Privatization involves the transfer of government functions to voluntary
organizations, private profit-making organizations, or non-profit enterprises (Mills, 1990,
22).
Lomas views the four paths put forward by Mills as a continuum along which the central
branch of government has decreasing a level of direct control over the decisions being
made (1996: 28). An alternative conceptualization is a continuum between state-centric
and society-centric steering along which decision-making control shifts between the
central state and societal actors. To determine where authority migration to Type II
healthcare bodies would be placed on that continuum, the three conditions laid out in
Chapter 3 must be considered. Authority migration to Type II bodies must satisfy three
conditions: authority over some part of the public realm must be granted to a new or
existing body through an act of provincial legislation; the majority of decision-makers
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within the body must be comprised of individuals who are from outside of government,
the legislature, and the public service; and the legislated decision-makers must have
decision-making autonomy. As such, the operationalization of migration of authority to
Type II bodies is consistent with delegation and privatization but not deconcentration and
devolution.
Where on the continuum each instance of healthcare decentralization occurs, however, is
a negotiation process as pressures on the state combined with local attitudes shape the
decentralization process (Lomas, 1996: 28). In combination, three sources grant power
during the authority migration process. The government grants the newly formed
healthcare body formal powers. Health professionals and institutions recognize and
conform to the decisions made by the new healthcare body. Citizens provide credibility to
the new healthcare body and a mandate to represent their needs, wants, and preferences.
As each source of power has its own agenda, the new healthcare authorities are situated at
the intersection of government’s expectations, providers’ interests and citizens’
preferences (Lomas, Woods and Veenstra, 1997: 734). The successful policy image that
ultimately triumphs within the negotiation process will be a product of the unique
historical experiences of the specific jurisdiction. While the state must work within the
confines of the internal and external pressures placed upon the healthcare system, it
maintains the capacity to set the overall ground rules and regulatory order. Despite the
participation of government, health professionals, and citizens in the negotiation process,
government continues to occupy a privileged position as the lone entity with the
legislative capacity to set the rules of governance (Bartle and Vass, 2007: 895; Rhodes,
2007: 1244; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 13).
Informing the negotiation process and ultimately the devolved structure that emerges are
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of devolved authority that have been
developed by issue framers in promoting their preferred solution. Consistent with the
assertion that multiple frames be built using the same underlying facts or evidence, Mills
argues that attributing advantages and disadvantages to devolution is complex, as
alongside each advantage exists a corresponding disadvantage. For example, increased
citizen participation is promoted as an advantage, while increased difficulty in developing
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national policies, priorities and standards can be seen as a disadvantage (Mills, 1990: 38).
This is not unique to healthcare; authority migration is cast in both positive and negative
light more broadly. As discussed in Chapter 2, from the positive perspective, authority
migration holds the potential for more responsive governance than a single political
monopoly (Bollens, 1986: 119; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 633). From the critical
perspective, however, authority migration has the potential to weaken legitimacy and
create disillusionment with the political process (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104). In
healthcare, experts have continued to debate over the success of decentralization. Some
experts claim that the promise of greater accountability and increased citizen
participation in decision-making has been realized, while others argue that such claims
have remained unfulfilled (Collier, 2010: 331).
In the Canadian context, there is no one national system of healthcare, but instead a set of
provincial systems (Deber, 2003: 20). While each province has its own unique story,
there is a degree of commonality across the provincial healthcare systems due to their
shared history. When Canada was formed, healthcare was the concern of religious
groups, charitable organizations or individuals (Braën, 2004: 25). Though coming under
provincial jurisdiction, the healthcare systems remained largely a matter of local public
initiative, with the delivery of health services remaining in the hands of municipal
hospitals, or religious and charitable institutions (Dorland and Davis, 1996: 4). Personal
health was seen as purely a private matter (Braën, 2004: 28) and a direct financial
relationship, with the recipients of local healthcare services paying the healthcare
providers directly (Lomas, 1996:29).
The expansion of the social welfare system following the end of World War II altered the
provincial healthcare systems as both provincial and federal governments became more
involved in healthcare policy (Braën, 2004: 25). This movement toward centralization
was spurred on by the increasing complexity of medical care and corresponding rising
costs (Dorland and Davis, 1996: 4; Johnson, 2004: 208) as well as a shift in perception
from individual to social importance of healthcare (Braën, 2004: 28; Dorland and Davis,
1996: 4) As mindsets changed, the financial relationship between patients and service
providers became increasingly indirect with the provinces reimbursing healthcare
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professionals for services (Lomas, 1996: 29). By 1971, all provinces and territories were
participating in the medical and hospital services programs in which funding was shared
by the provincial and federal governments (Deber, 2003: 21; Naylor, 1999: 11). The
resulting healthcare environment was one in which funding decisions and setting of
healthcare standards was centralized while hospital boards continued to operate at the
local level.
Just as increased costs facilitated the shift from a largely local healthcare system to one
that was increasingly centralized, growing financial pressures in healthcare helped again
to bring healthcare reform onto the public agenda. Inflationary pressures in the 1970s led
to increasingly harder lines being taken by governments in collective bargaining with
organized medicine, leading some practitioners to levy extra charges, which prompted
concerns over the erosion of Medicare’s principle of accessibility. The federal
government responded with the Canada Health Act in 1984. The Canada Health Act
consolidated previous insurance legislation and reduced federal funding to provinces that
allowed hospitals and doctors to impose extra fees. Over the next two years all provinces
passed legislation that abolished such fees (Naylor, 1999: 11-12). While the Canada
Health Act reaffirmed a commitment to the principles of Medicare (Johnson, 2004: 205),
the federal proportion of health expenditures fell (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 491;
Naylor, 1999: 12). The combination of ever-growing expenditures and reduced revenue
streams pushed provincial governments to reevaluate their healthcare systems and initiate
major healthcare reforms (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 491).
One of the possible factors contributing to the migration of authority discussed at the
beginning of the chapter is the weakening of a government’s ability to meet the fiscal
obligations of a growing governance demand. Hurley, Lomas, and Bhatia described such
a scenario in Canadian provincial healthcare where ever-growing demands and reductions
in revenue sources pushed provincial governments to consider healthcare reforms (1994:
491). However, internal fiscal pressures alone did not drive the widespread enactment of
provincial healthcare reforms. In conjunction with the changing fiscal circumstances
came changes in public confidence in the functioning of their healthcare system. While
citizens remained generally satisfied and supportive of provincial healthcare in the early
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1990s, a shift from support to concern emerged throughout the 90s (Tomblin, 2004: 291;
Lavis 2004: 257). The public continued to support the principles of a publicly funded
universal system, however, there were growing concerns over the system’s sustainability
(Tomblin, 2004: 291). As concerns rose, the Canadian public began to call for large-scale
change in the healthcare system (Lavis, 2004: 257). The growing public worry added to
the existing government concerns over the fiscal sustainability of the existing healthcare
systems. During a health policy conference focused on regionalization and
decentralization, then Ontario Premier David Peterson remarked, “you can introduce
change at two times – when all is quiet and successful or when there is a sense of crisis. I
believe that, right now, we are close enough to a sense of crisis that the time is ripe for a
change in the health-care system” (Peterson, 1996: 14).
One hypothesis evaluated in Chapter 4 is that when the fiscal capacity of government
fails to keep pace with the demand placed on government to deliver a good, government
is more likely to migrate authority. Flinders argues that through the delegation of
authority the state retains the ability to address a wide range of policy issues, while
removing itself from the day-to-day socio-political interactions (2006: 223-224). With
fiscal and public pressure mounting in the late 80s and early 90s the majority of Canada’s
provincial and territorial governments created royal commissions or task forces charged
with producing a strategy for change in the healthcare system. The issues and solutions
brought forward through this exercise were consistent, with solutions all involving
devolving some degree of authority away from central government (Lomas, Woods and
Veenstra, 1997: 371-172). While fiscal pressures led the provinces and territories to
examine health system alternatives, cost containment was one of many reasons given to
devolve authority. The reasons cited for devolving authority away from provincial
governments included cost containment, improving health outcomes, increasing
flexibility and responsiveness of delivery, and the better coordination of services (Lomas,
Woods, and Veenstra, 1997: 372; Lomas, 1996: 25). Following the blueprints developed
by the commissions and task forces, all provinces but Ontario proceeded to devolve
authority away from central government during the 1990s. Through the provincial
creation of new healthcare bodies, there was the devolution of some degree of provincial
administrative and budgetary authority as well as a shift of administrative control
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previously held by local institutions and agencies (Naylor, 1999 13-14; Lomas, Veerstra,
and Woods, 1997: 514).
Having explored the broader issue of authority migration in health, attention is now
turned to the migration of authority in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova
Scotia, and Ontario. Given their shared history and the common fiscal constraints faced
by the provinces, it is not surprising that the proposed solutions, and reasons given for the
solutions, share commonalities. Not all provinces, however, initially adopted the
migration of authority as the preferred policy alternative. Ontario waited a decade after
the other nine provinces had already moved forward. Moreover, not all ten provinces
adopted the same governance arrangements, nor have all ten provinces kept their initial
devolved structure. Instead, provincial differences have emerged from the unique
contexts of each jurisdiction. For Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario the
initial migration of authority as well as subsequent changes to the governance model in
healthcare will be explored. In doing so, a greater understanding of how the healthcare
system policy challenges were framed during the authority migration process will be
gained. Beyond evaluating solely fiscal capacity and political ideology, as was done in
Chapter 4, exploring the unique contextual realities of each province offers the potential
to further identify additional factors that promote the migration of authority.

6.3.1

Healthcare Authority Migration in Alberta

In Alberta, an order-in-council established the Premier’s Commission on future
healthcare for Albertans in 1987. The purpose of the Commission was to examine
changes in future health requirements for Albertans. The Commission was instructed to
take into account such issues as population and illness trends, technological advances,
organizational funding, and public needs and wants. In addition, the Commission was
instructed to examine the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of individual Albertans,
volunteers, community agencies, medical professionals, private sector interests and
governments in planning, delivering, and funding healthcare (Alberta. Premier's
Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 11-12).
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After two years of consultations, the Commission released the Rainbow Report: Our
Vision for Health. While the Commission’s report identified Alberta’s healthcare system
as one of the best in the world, concerns were raised over the fragmentation and
availability of resources (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for
Albertans, 1989a: 13). The Commission identified five principles: people, choice,
change, decisions, and opportunity, stressing that people are the core of the healthcare
system and that “people must have meaningful control” (Alberta. Premier's Commission
on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 17-18). Continuing on the theme of
people, the Commission recommended greater personal responsibility and accountability
for managing health and health resources and the need to return the power to make
choices closer to Albertans (Alberta. Premiers's Commission on Future Health Care for
Albertans, 1989b: 116). As such, the Commission report framed the challenges facing the
healthcare system in terms of both fiscal capacity and citizens’ attitude toward healthcare.
In response to the fiscal and attitudinal challenges, and consistent with the stated belief
that people need meaningful control of their healthcare system, the Commission
recommended that the province be divided into nine autonomous administrative areas
with an appropriately named health authority being responsible for the provision of
healthcare services (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for
Albertans, 1989a: 40-41). It was recommended that healthcare funding would be made
available directly to health authorities, which would then be responsible for the provision
of services and appropriate compensation methods within their administrative areas
(Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 41).
Moreover, it was recommended that each health authority board be comprised of locally
elected trustees plus a representative from the department of health (Alberta. Premier's
Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989a: 40). The Commission report
stated that the creation of regional health authorities would allow for responses to
changes at the local level, resulting in a better mix of services and treatments that
matched local needs (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for
Albertans, 1989b: 117).
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While the Alberta government initially rejected the idea of autonomous regional bodies
(Church and Smith, 2008: 221), the Alberta government eventually followed the direction
of the Commission’s report with the enactment of the Regional Health Authorities Act,
1994. The Act established regional health authorities with the power to determine
priorities in the provision of health services and allocate resources accordingly within
their region (Alberta. Legislative Assembly, 2000: 3-4). The Act replaced nearly 200
existing local health and public health boards with initially seventeen, then eventually
nine regional authorities (Church and Smith, 2008: 234). As recommended in the
Commission’s report, the health authorities were created with provisions for elected
board members (Alberta. Legislative Assembly, 2000: 4). A subsequent taskforce,
however, recommended that the elections option not be implemented and instead board
positions be filed by appointment (Church and Smith, 2008, 232).
The shift from rejecting to implementing the autonomous health authorities can be
viewed as political in nature. Initially, political resistance to change made the
introduction of regional governance models too risky. However, with a shift in focus
toward a government wide issue of deficit and debt reduction, the creation of autonomous
regional authorities was able to be embedded within a broader fiscal agenda (Church and
Smith, 2008, 218). In 1992, the Alberta government began work on a plan to reduce
spending, balance the budget, and pay down provincial debt. As part of this goal, each
department, including health, was required to produce a three-year business plan
including spending targets (Philippon and Wasylyshyn, 1996: 74). The timing of the
change in governance model coinciding with the government wide focus on debt
reduction supports the fiscal capacity hypothesis. The government’s focus on debt
reduction would limit the fiscal capacity of the department to fulfill its governance
obligations in healthcare and promote the migration of authority to Type II bodies.
Beyond the direct focus on the broader fiscal pressures facing government, Church and
Smith identify the influence of two policy paradigms in the government’s decision to
implement autonomous health authorities. First, is the idea of personal responsibility and
self-reliance, or that individuals are responsible for their own wellbeing (Church and
Smith, 2008, 224), which is consistent with the message that Albertans need to take
greater responsibility for their own health. The second is the new public management
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message emphasizing smaller government (Church and Smith, 2008, 224), which is
consistent with the migration of authority away from central government. The new public
management component lends a political ideology component to the creation of Type II
healthcare bodies in Alberta. New public management is associated with the promotion
of the private sector and delegation of authority as a remedy for high taxes and deficits,
which are characteristic of a neoliberal approach (Hoehn, 2011: 77).
In addition to altering the governance structure, the reform process also involved a shift
in emphasis on who should be making decisions regarding public healthcare. The
Rainbow Report called for residents of Alberta to have more meaningful control of their
healthcare system (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for
Albertans, 1989a: 18) and the movement of healthcare decisions closer to the people,
stating the need to delegate certain responsibilities to a more appropriate level of
authority (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans, 1989b:
117). The shift towards citizen participation in the healthcare process is also evident in
the recommendation for and the initial legislating of elected regional boards. The
subsequent shift away from an elected model in favour of appointed board members,
however, may have been an indication of changes to come.
During the decade that followed the creation of regional health bodies, reports on the
direction of healthcare in Alberta recommended increases in the scope and authority of
the regional Health Authorities (Alberta. Premier's Advisory Council on Health, 2001;
Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness, 2004). In May of 2008, however, it was announced
that Alberta would move from the existing governance model to a single fully integrated
province wide health system. The creation of Alberta Health Services brought together
the regional health authorities as well as the Alberta Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Commission, Alberta Mental Health Board, Alberta Cancer Board and ground ambulance
service (Alberta Health Services, 2012). The reasons given for the amalgamation to a
single health authority were financial. According to government reports, there was
concern over the ability to provide accessible high quality care in a sustainable manner to
Albertans (Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness, 2008: 3).
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While regionalization had been identified as healthcare’s solution in the Rainbow Report,
the Provincial Service Optimization Review: Final Report emphasized the need for better
healthcare coordination. The report cited challenges in coordinating health services in
Alberta, including a lack of coordination across regions, sites of care, and providers. As
well, the report critiqued the lack of standardization of care within facilities and
organizations. The report stated that the “regional health authority-based organizational
and funding structure did not optimally facilitate coordination of care delivery among the
regions. Incentives and structure drove a regional focus rather than a focus on care across
the province” (Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness, 2008: 38). The report further stated
that Alberta could “use its new found scale as a single ‘system’ to ensure greater
performance transparency and continuous improvement (Alberta. Alberta Health and
Wellness, 2008: 2).
Today, with the creation of Alberta Health Services, decision-making remains outside of
central government, but the governance structure moved from nine regional Type II
bodies to one provincial wide Type II body. With the formation of Alberta Health
Services, the preferred policy solution remained an autonomous body outside of
government, but went from regional to provincial in geographic scale. The initial change
in governance model was consistent with the fiscal capacity hypothesis, as the fiscal
challenges facing the healthcare system in Alberta played a pivotal role in kicking off the
exploration process. Moreover the shift toward new public management appears to have
given the final push required to move the changes from recommendations to reforms.
Beyond fiscal capacity, the migration of authority was also framed in terms of increased
public participation and the moving of decision-making closer to the citizen. By moving
decision-making closer to the citizen, the specific needs of each region could be better
met. With the move from regionalization back to centralization, the framing shifted from
the need for each region to better meet local needs to the need for increased coordination
and standardization across the province.

6.3.2

Healthcare Authority Migration in British Columbia

In 1991, the British Columbia Royal Commission on Healthcare and Costs released its
final report entitled Closer to Home. The Commission was tasked with examining the
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structure, organization, management and mandate of the current healthcare system in BC
(British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: iii). In its report,
the Commission stated that in regard to healthcare, “there has never been an overall plan,
and, quite naturally, the structure that has evolved lacks coherence and, sometimes, logic.
It also lacks the ability to assess itself, to objectively judge how just, efficient and
effective it is in providing healthcare,” and called for the creation of an independent
advisory body that, reporting directly to parliament, would be independent of the
government, the Ministry of Health and the healthcare profession (British Columbia.
Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: A-15).
In addition to an independent province-wide body to provide guidance and advise the
government on healthcare issues, the Commission recommended the distribution of
healthcare decision-making to the regional and local levels. The Commission’s final
report recommended the Ministry of Health retain responsibility for province wide goals
including priorities, strategic plans, standards and guidelines. The Commission did not
recommend the migration of decision-making authority outside the Ministry of Health,
but instead the adoption of regionally placed general managers who would report to an
assistant deputy minister responsible for all regions within the Ministry of Health (British
Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: B-38). Included within
the Commission’s recommendations was the need for decisions to be made with
community involvement and that improvements to the healthcare system must be made
with current levels of spending. In regard to community involvement, the Commission
argued that government should be prepared to fund coordinators, to encourage the
creation of advisory boards and to not force citizens to participate in schemes designed by
the Ministry of Health (British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs,
1991: A-6).
The recommendations in Alberta called for the delegation of authority, where managerial
responsibility for specified functions are outside of government and only indirectly
controlled by central government (Mills, 1990, 21). In contrast, the recommendations in
British Columbia called for the deconcentration of authority, with the movement of
administrative authority to locally based offices of central government (Mills, 1990, 16).
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Responding to the recommendations of the British Columbia Royal Commission on
Healthcare and Costs’, the Ministry of Health published New Directions for a Healthy
British Columbia in February of 1993. Acknowledging the Commission’s
recommendations for increased local management of the healthcare system, the
government announced two pertinent reforms. In contrast to the recommendation of
advisory boards, however, the NDP government announced the establishment of
community health councils at the local level with individual board members being both
elected and appointed. The community health councils would be primarily responsible for
the planning and coordinating of health services and identifying local health priorities.
The councils would absorb existing hospital boards and have a goal of providing greater
accountability and reducing duplication within the system. The second reform was the
creation of Regional Health Boards. Members of the Regional Health Boards would
include representatives from the community health councils and individuals appointed by
the Minister. While the initial role would be regional health planning and service
coordination, the long-term goal was to have the regional boards allocate budget
resources amongst the local councils (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 1415). The proposed reforms fundamentally altered the decision-making structure for
healthcare in British Columbia; shifting a broad set of planning, management, and
funding decisions to regional and local bodies (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 496).
The framing of the challenges facing the healthcare system in British Columbia centred
on fiscal concerns (consistent with the hypothesis that the weaker a government’s fiscal
capacity to meet governance demands the higher the rate of Type II body creation). The
Commission’s report highlighted the belief that “in these times of rapidly expanding
population, changing technologies and rising costs, innovative solutions are a necessity,
and creative alternatives a must” (British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care
and Costs, 1991: A-10). Likewise, the government’s policy position called for fiscal
responsibility, stating that funds are limited and there are many demands for funding
within the healthcare system (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 11). One
proposed solution to the fiscal woes facing British Columbia’s healthcare system was
decentralization. The Commission’s report stated that the decentralization of control
would encourage public accountability for the management of healthcare resources and
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cost control through greater efficiency, coordination and integration of services that serve
local needs (British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, 1991: B36). The government claimed that a decentralized partnership approach was imperative to
building and maintaining the healthcare system (British Columbia. Ministry of Health,
1993: 17).
Beyond fiscal framing, the government’s policy statement argued that increased public
participation and responsibility was an important part of a responsive and flexible health
system (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 13). In addition to the creation of
community health councils the government announced an increase in public participation
on professional boards, with lay representation constituting at least one-third of members
(British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 13). The intent of the government’s policy
to shift power over health services to the community level can be viewed as an attempt to
both counter the power of health professional elites, and foster a community orientation
toward wellness. It was hoped that a combination of democratic community
development, an active citizenry, and collaboration among institutional actors would
bring about the emergence of a health community. The health community in turn would
create the social and economic conditions required for healthy individuals and encourage
the mindset of parsimony with regard to healthcare utilization (Davidson, 1999: S35).
In December of 2001, the Liberal government announced the streamlining of the 11
Regional Health Boards, 34 Community Health councils and 7 Community Health
Services Societies then existing in the province. Replacing the existing structure were 15
health service delivery areas organized under five new geographic Health Authorities. A
sixth governing body responsible for the governing and administering provincial
programs and highly specialized services was also included within the new governance
design (British Columbia. Ministry of Health Planning, 2001: 1-2). The restructuring
again centred on issues of cost, with the existing structure described as “one of the most
complicated and expensive governance and management systems in the country” (British
Columbia. Ministry of Health Planning, 2001: 1). In simplifying the governance
structure, the British Columbia government promised the highest possible levels of
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efficiency, service, coordination and accountability (British Columbia. Ministry of Health
Planning, 2001: 1).
Moving from a highly localized model to one that encompassed fewer but larger regions,
the government documents assured citizens that there would be an elimination of
duplication, and with an increase in jurisdictional size, the ability to realize economies of
scale (British Columbia. Ministry of Health Planning, 2001: 5). Like Alberta, British
Columbia’s initial governance changes were set into motion by fiscal concerns. Similarly,
further restructuring continued to place decision-making authority outside the boundaries
of central government, but in the hands of a small number of individuals. Unlike in
Alberta, where the initial governance changes came about while the right-of-centre
Progressive Conservatives were in power, the creation of Regional Health Boards in
British Columbia were undertaken by a left-of-centre NDP government.

6.3.3

Healthcare Authority Migration in Nova Scotia

In November of 1990, the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Healthcare released Health
Strategies for the Nineties: Managing Better Health. In contrast to the British Columbia
Royal Commission, which claimed their healthcare system was one of the best in the
world (British Columbia. Ministry of Health, 1993: 1), the Nova Scotia Royal
Commission expressed great concern over Nova Scotia’s healthcare system. The Nova
Scotia Royal Commission stated that the level of expenditures on healthcare was not
reflected in health outcomes for the people of Nova Scotia. When compared to other
Canadian provinces the health of Nova Scotia’s residents was poor with its overall
mortality and disability rate being the highest in the country (Nova Scotia. Royal
Commission on Healthcare, 1990: ix).
While the perception of the quality within British Columbia and Nova Scotia healthcare
systems were divergent, both provinces still identified fiscal capacity as their central
challenge. The framing of their fiscal challenges, however, differed across provinces. The
challenge in British Columbia was positioned as the need to maintain the existing high
level of quality while also maintaining the current level of funding. In contrast, the
challenge in Nova Scotia was framed in terms of the existing level of expenditure not
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resulting in positive health outcomes (Nova Scotia. Royal Commission on Healthcare,
1990: ix). The Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Healthcare report suggested that the
health system in Nova Scotia was a legacy of insurance programs for hospital and
physician services that had resulted in 80% of the Department of Health and Fitness
budget being allocated to hospitals and physicians, while the occupancy rate of hospital
beds sat below the national average (1990: vii). Accordingly a combination of healthcare
expenditures and health outcomes were the focus of the Commission in Nova Scotia, with
a goal of optimal health outcomes and more efficient management (Nova Scotia. Royal
Commission on Healthcare, 1990: xi). In the Commission’s report, the reduction of the
rate of growth for healthcare expenditures is stated as one of the guiding precepts (Nova
Scotia. Royal Commission on Healthcare, 1990: xii). In suggesting how to control
healthcare costs the Commission recommended more attention be paid to disease
prevention and health promotion, moving from institutional to community based care,
and greater user participation in the planning of health services (Nova Scotia. Royal
Commission on Healthcare, 1990: 29).
As was the case in Alberta and British Columbia, the decentralization of healthcare
authority in Nova Scotia was framed as a way to increase citizen participation and
alleviate fiscal challenges. Consistent with Alberta, Nova Scotia’s Royal Commission on
Healthcare recommended the delegation of authority over health services through the
creation of autonomous Regional Health Authorities that would be responsible for the
planning and management of health services and program delivery (1990: 5). The
Commission argued that creating autonomous regional bodies would increase
responsiveness and flexibility to meet regional needs, increase the coordination and
integration of health services, increase efficiency, and allow for greater participation of
citizens in health planning (Nova Scotia. Royal Commission on Healthcare, 1990: 6).
Taking the Commission’s recommendations into account, the Nova Scotia government
announced its reform program in 1993. The original plan for healthcare reform in Nova
Scotia was to unfold opposite to healthcare reform in British Columbia. While the
Commission called for planning and managerial responsibility to be devolved away from
the provincial government, the health authorities announced by the Progressive
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Conservative government were to be merely advisory bodies with all members appointed
by the Ministry of Health (Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia, 1994: 500). Contrary to the
political ideology hypothesis, the left-of-centre government in British Columbia
delegated authority to Type II healthcare bodies, while the right-of-centre government in
Nova-Scotia planned hold onto the existing healthcare governance model and maintain
central decision-making authority. Upon the Liberals assuming office, however, the
government announced a far more decentralized governance structure (Hurley, Lomas
and Bhatia, 1994: 500). In 1996, the Liberal government in Nova Scotia implemented its
decentralization strategy through the creation of four Regional Health Boards. In doing
so, the existing 36 local hospital boards were amalgamated into the new Regional Health
Boards (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 507).
In 1999, the Minister’s Task Force on Regionalized Healthcare released its Final Report
and Recommendations. The mandate of the task force was not to study the validity of
regionalization, but the strengths and weaknesses of the existing governance structure and
present recommendations for improvement (Nova Scotia. Minister’s Task Force on
Regionalized Healthcare in Nova Scotia, 1999: 4). The Task Force reported that both
providers and consumers were critical of the existing system of healthcare, believing that
the main goal was to cut costs and that they has less input into the healthcare system
since the inception of the Regional Health Boards. Moreover, the Task Force believed
that the existing levels of dissatisfaction were the result of an incomplete transition to the
new governance structure as key components of the healthcare systems remained outside
of the control of the Regional Health Boards. The Task Force argued that for the existing
governance structure to work it must be strengthened and completed and that reversing
the regionalization process would disrupt the system, increase costs and lead to a
fragmented healthcare system. To strengthen and complete the system, the Task Force
recommended defining in law the status of the already established Community Health
Boards, ensuring that two-thirds of the members of Regional Health Boards are selected
by Community Health Boards, and funding for health services be administered by the
Regional Health Boards (Nova Scotia. Minister’s Task Force on Regionalized Healthcare
in Nova Scotia, 1999: 4-6). The Task Force, however, did not recommend the altering of
the boundaries for the four existing healthcare regions, stating that any changes would be
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premature and disruptive (Nova Scotia. Minister’s Task Force on Regionalized
Healthcare in Nova Scotia, 1999: 7).
Despite recommendations against changes altering the existing boundaries, in June of
2000 Bill 34 received royal assent, replacing the Regional Health Boards with District
Health Authorities (Nova Scotia. Legislative Assembly, 2000). By 2001 the four health
regions had become nine District Health Authorities (Black and Fierlbeck 2006: 508).
The initial creation of the four regional health units and the expansion to nine District
Health Authorities shared a common set of justifications – cost containment,
accountability, and citizen engagement (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 508). As Black and
Fierlbeck identify, contradictions and tensions characterize many theories of
regionalization: cost efficiencies through the removal of duplication requires greater
centralization, while enhanced public participation typically means greater
decentralization (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 508). While a degree of cost effectiveness
has been attributed to regionalization in general, Black and Fierlbeck attribute
regionalization in Nova Scotia to neither cost containment nor public participation (2006:
523). Rather, Black and Fierlbeck argue that the shift from authority from Regional
Health Boards to District Health Authorities took place for political purposes as it
restored the system of elite representation (2006: 522-523).
As with the other provinces, fiscal capacity and concerns over the ability to fulfill
obligations in healthcare played roles in raising questions over the shape of the
governance model in healthcare. The creation of the Regional Health Boards and District
Health Authorities, however, were political in nature. While the creation of the Regional
Health Boards shifted decision-making authority downward away from central
government and upward out of the hands of the local elite, political power was lost at the
local level. The decision to move to District Health Authorities restored some degree of
power to local elite.

6.3.4

Healthcare Authority Migration in Ontario

While the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia initiated similar
health system policy choices in the 1990s, the province of Ontario was both an early
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adopter of decentralization, and a late adopter of migrating decision-making authority. In
1973, twenty years ahead of the decentralization curve in healthcare, the Ontario Council
of Health via the Mustard Report devised the idea of District Health Councils (Warren,
1996: 128). In 1974, Ontario’s Health Planning Taskforce recommended that District
Health Councils, operating within the framework of guidelines and standards set out by
the Ministry, be responsible for the development of policies and plans for healthcare
within each district (1974: 25). The Health Planning Task Force was charged with the
responsibility of developing proposals for a comprehensive plan to meet the health needs
of Ontario residents (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1974: 1). The Task Force
stated that for effective planning and operation of the health services to take place a
suitable organizational arrangement needed to be established. To this end, the task force
stated that there should be local responsibility for planning within the healthcare system.
However, the existing mix of agencies and organizational arrangements operating in the
healthcare system did not allow for the development of a comprehensive health services
plan. To resolve this problem, the District Health Councils were recommended as an
additional level of planning. (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1974: 23-24).
In 1975 The Ontario Ministry of Health responded to The Health Planning Task Force
regarding the proposed changes to the Ontario healthcare system. The Ministry of Health
claimed that the proposed changes were too wide in scale to be completed without further
understanding, support and cooperation from public health, health professionals, and
health agencies. As such, further consultation was sought on the part of the Ministry
(Ontario. Ministry of Health, 1975: 2). In regard to the establishment of District Health
Councils, the Ministry’s consultation efforts found widespread support for this
recommendation from both the health community and public groups. A second
recommendation, the creation of area health service management boards responsible for
logical grouping of facilities and resources was found to be more contentious. In the end,
while the Ministry concurred that this recommendation would improve coordination and
efficiency, the Ministry conceded imposing such a change in the face of opposition from
health professionals and the public would be unproductive (Ontario. Ministry of Health,
1975: 12-13). The implementation of the District Health Councils was voluntary. Lead
citizens in the various districts had to take the initiative and convince local politicians,
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citizens, and health providers of the value of the District Health Councils. The result of
this strategy was a prolonged implementation, taking over 20 years to develop a full
network of District Health Councils across the province. Moreover, the responsibilities of
the District Health Councils were limited and defined as advisory in nature (Warren,
1996: 128).
In 1986, the minority Liberal government appointed the Ontario Health Review Panel to
look at Ontario’s health policy. The Panel reported its findings to the Premier in June of
1987 (Spasoff, 1992: 130). The report outlined five pressures on the existing healthcare
system: the changing demographic makeup of the province; changing patterns of illness;
changing public expectation of healthcare; new technology; and rising expenditures on
healthcare. In terms of expenditures, the report highlighted the 50% increase per capita in
expenditures on healthcare between 1981 and 1985, bringing healthcare to one-third of
the province’s total expenditures (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987: 17-18).
Consistent with the fiscal capacity hypothesis the report argued that participation from
government, individuals and organizations outside of government was necessary to meet
the challenges facing the healthcare system. The report further suggested there was a
need for a concept of health that embraced the totality of an individual’s wellbeing,
integrated government policy across all ministries that share responsibility for health, and
provided a balance between provincial and local perspectives (Ontario. Ontario Health
Review Panel, 1987: 63).
Calling for a local health strategy, the Ontario Health Review Panel report stated that it is
at the local level where interaction with the health system takes place. The report
identified inequity across the different regions in terms of health status, population, and
access to basic care. To address these inequities the report stressed the need to be able to
meet the unique priorities and experiences of all regions of the province, be they
northern, southern, rural or urban (Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel, 1987: 71-72).
The report concluded, however, that no new mechanisms were required as the District
Health Councils already reflected these basic principles. The Panel believed that, with the
assistance of local boards of health, the District Health Councils could assume
responsibility for local health strategies. To achieve this end, the Panel stated the need for
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government to strengthen the capacity of the District Health Councils (Ontario. Ontario
Health Review Panel, 1987: 72. In its concluding remarks the Panel stated, “Ontario has
an unprecedented opportunity to open lines of communication and broaden the base of
participation in enhancing the health of its residents” (Ontario. Ontario Health Review
Panel, 1987: 75).
Further calls for delegation of authority came in 1991 when the Premier’s Council on
Health Strategy released its report on local decision-making in healthcare. The report
recommended that government work towards devolving responsibility for the provision
of health services to local agencies. Two models were proposed, one based on local
government, and one based on special purpose bodies. The Council called for the
implementation and evaluation of both models on a pilot basis (Spasoff, 1992: 130-131).
However, the Premier’s Council on Health Strategy, which was established in 1987 under
a Liberal government, only met once after the NDP came to power in 1990. The NDP
replaced the Premier’s Council on Health Strategy with the Premier’s Council on Health,
Well-Being and Social Justice, but the momentum for change was lost (Spasoff, 1992:
132). While the NDP government in British Columbia had moved further than
recommended and delegated authority to Type II healthcare bodies, in Ontario the NDP
government allowed the reform process in healthcare to stall.
In 2003, the newly elected Liberal government faced both a healthcare reform agenda as
well as the need for major fiscal and bureaucratic reforms (Fenn, 2006: 528). With nearly
half of the Ontario budget used to fund health expenditures, there was concern that
continued unconstrained growth in costs would undermine other policy priorities
including economic performance (Fenn, 2006: 529). In response to the need for changes
in the healthcare system, the Liberal government instituted the Health Results Team
(Fenn, 2006: 528). Among the set goals for the Health Results Team was the creation of
an integrated healthcare system through the establishment of Local Health Integration
Networks (Ontario. Health Results Team, 2005: 4).
Speaking at the St Lawrence Market, then Minister of Health and Long-Term Care
George Smitherman introduced the creation of Local Health Integration Networks to the
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public. In the speech, Smitherman built the image of a healthcare system under strain
from an aging population, increasing demands for access and innovation. Smitherman
stated that to respond to pressures in health almost every other sector in government had
been asked to make sacrifices to free up funding, but that this approach was not
sustainable (Ontario. Minister of Health Health and Long-Term Care, 2004, 2). To make
the changes necessary to protect Ontario’s healthcare system, Smitherman claimed that it
was time to create “a comprehensive and integrated system of care that is shaped with the
active leadership of communities” (Ontario. Minister of Health Health and Long-Term
Care, 2004, 7). Local Health Integration Networks were stated to be a crucial step on the
path to better systems integration. According to Smitherman:
Although most healthcare is local, we are not all that effective at planning
and responding to local health needs. We call Ontario diverse yet often
fail to recognize the health implications of that diversity. Things like
average age, how far you live from the nearest hospital and whether your
area has a higher incidence of an ailment.
That’s why we will be taking some of the authority, which currently
resides at Queen’s Park, away from Queen’s Park, and shifting it to local
networks, closer to real people, closer to patients (Ontario. Minister of
Health Health and Long-Term Care, 2004: 19).
Faced with substantial fiscal obligations and the fear that continued growth in demand
would undermine future policy objectives Ontario had finally followed the other nine
provinces and delegated authority in healthcare. With the introduction of Bill 36, the
Local Health System Integration Act, 2005 Ontario had moved to a regional healthcare
governance structure. Unlike the legislation in other provinces that abolished local
hospital boards and other local health organizations, the Ontario legislation left the
existing local boards in place (Ronson, 2006: 46). The District Health Councils, which
had served in an important advisory capacity in the planning and provision of healthcare
for the past thirty years, ceased operations and the Local Health Integration Networks
became the primary vehicle for planning, coordinating, integrating, and funding the
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delivery of healthcare services at the regional level (Ontario. Health Results Team,
2005a). As laid out in the Preamble to the Local Health System Integration Act, the
transformation in regional health integration was positioned by the Liberal government as
a confirmation of the commitment to the Canada Health Act (Canada), a commitment to
enabling local communities to make decisions about their local healthcare systems, and
recognition that communities, health service providers, Local Health Integration
Networks and the government need to work together to reduce duplication and better
coordinate health service delivery (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 2006).

6.4 Discussion
Chapter 6 reevaluated two hypotheses: H4.3 – the lower the fiscal capacity of government
to meet governance demand the higher the rate of creation of Type II bodies; and H4.4 –
the further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a government sits lower the rate
of creation of Type II bodies. When assessing the effect of fiscal capacity in provincial
healthcare there is support for H4.3 as the findings suggest that a decline in fiscal
capacity promotes the creation of Type II bodies. The gap in time between the migration
authority in British Columbia and Ontario, however, suggests that there is more to the
story than just fiscal capacity. Mixed support was also found for the hypothesis H4.4.
A summary of the healthcare governance reforms discussed above is presented in Table
6.2. Instances that resulted in the migration of decision-making authority outside of
traditional government structure are highlighted in grey. As shown in Table 6.2, in each
instance of authority migration the challenges facing the healthcare system were framed
in terms of fiscal capacity and concern over the continued ability to fund the healthcare
system at a level that afforded the accustomed quality of care. In contrast, the results for
political parties indicate mixed support as was found in Chapter 4. As was evident above,
governments from both sides of the political spectrum play direct roles initiating and
halting the process of authority migration. While the results for hypothesis H4.3 provided
inconsistent support in Chapter 4, the results for healthcare policy were not unexpected
based on previous research. In regard to fiscal capacity, Hurley, Lomas and Bhatia argued
in 1994 that the combination of ever-growing expenditures and reduction of revenue
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streams had pushed provincial governments to reevaluate their healthcare systems and
initiate major healthcare reforms (1994: 491). Moreover, J. P. Vaughan had previously
observed that governments across political belief systems had felt the need to reform
healthcare by shifting authority to some degree away from central government (Vaughan,
1990: 139).
Table 6.2: Migration of Authority Timeline for Regional Healthcare
Year
1975

Ontario – PC government established District Health Councils as advisory
boards. Creation of advisory boards framed in terms of increasing coordination
and responsibility for planning at the local level.

1993

British Columbia – NDP government migrates authority to Community Health
Councils and Regional Health Authorities. Migration of authority framed in
terms of controlling healthcare costs, increasing citizen participation at the
local level and increased citizen responsibility for healthcare.

1994

Alberta - PC government migrates authority to Regional Health Authorities.
Migration of authority framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs,
increasing citizen participation at the local level, increased citizen
responsibility for health decisions, and the reduction of the size of central
government.

1996

Nova Scotia – Liberal government migrates authority to four Regional Health
Boards. Migration of authority was framed in terms of terms of controlling
healthcare costs, increasing citizen participation at the local level, and
increasing coordination and integration of healthcare services.

2000

Nova Scotia – PC government replaces existing Regional Health Boards with
nine District Health Authorities. Restructuring framed in terms of controlling
healthcare costs and increasing citizen participation at the local level.

2001

British Columbia – Liberal Government replaces existing Community Health
Council and Regional Health Authority structure with five Health Authorities.
Restructuring framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs and increasing
coordination in the healthcare system.

2005

Ontario – Liberal Government replaces District Health Councils with Local
Health Integration Networks. Restructuring framed in terms of controlling
healthcare costs, increasing coordination in the healthcare system and keeping
local decisions at the local level.

2008

Alberta - PC government eliminates the remaining nine Regional Healthcare
Authorities and created a single provincial entity, Alberta Health Services.
Restructuring framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs and increasing
coordination in the healthcare system.
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Consistent with the underlying fiscal challenges the migration of authority in healthcare
was consistently framed in terms of fiscal capacity, however, it was not framed in terms
of fiscal capacity alone. When looking at Table 6.2, it is evident that, in addition to fiscal
capacity, challenges facing healthcare were framed in the following manner: 1) between
1993 to 2000 decentralization and the migration of authority is consistently framed in
terms of the need for increased citizen participation in healthcare governance; 2)
beginning in 1996, the framing begins to migrate toward the need to improved
coordination within the healthcare system when recommending healthcare reform. It is
the inclusion of the second frame that makes healthcare reform palatable to citizens. It
makes healthcare reform not just about the reduction of healthcare spending but about
increased citizen participation or increased coordination (better service) within the
healthcare system.
In addition to the larger trends, province-specific frames were also evident, such as the
reduction of the size of government in Alberta. As discussed above, the reduction of
government size in Alberta was associated with both new public management and a
neoliberal ideology.
The availability of issue frames may also account for the delay in authority migration in
Ontario. The creation of the District Health Councils in 1975 produced healthcare bodies
that, while not having decision-making authority, limited the increased citizen
participation frame, as provincial, regional and local healthcare bodies already existed.
Moreover, subsequent government task forces supported the already institutionalized
District Health Councils. When support for devolved authority did emerge, a change in
government allowed the initiative to stall. When authority did migrate in Ontario,
healthcare reform was not framed in terms of citizen participation but in terms of keeping
local decisions local and the need for increased coordination in the healthcare system.
The government emphasized the need to work together to reduce duplication and better
coordinate health service delivery (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 2006). Just as the
framing of the problem and solution within the healthcare system was different so was
the solution. Unlike the other provinces, which eliminated the existing hospital boards,
Ontario maintained local boards when the LHINs were created.
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The framing of authority migration in healthcare is also relevant in the question of state –
centric or society-centric governance. Framing the decentralization of healthcare in terms
of increased citizen participation in healthcare governance may appear consistent with a
society-centric approach to multilevel governance. Society-centric governance advances
the idea that actors outside of government are engaged in more self-steering and that
government interacts with society to reach mutually acceptable decisions (Peters, 2000:
36). When only the initial cases of decision-making authority migration are considered,
as highlighted in Table 6.2, three of the four cases framed authority migration in terms of
increased citizen participation. In the case of Ontario, the evidence shows the issue being
framed in terms of keeping local decisions local, but not on specifically ‘increasing’
citizen participation. Ontario was also unique, however, in that it did not eliminate
existing local hospital boards and health organizations, but instead left the existing
structure in place (Ronson, 2006: 46). In Ontario, the creation of LHINs resulted in
decision-making authority being divided across three levels.
Skelcher et al. argue the creation of new governance actors does not mean a relationship
of equals (2005: 578). The role of external actors may be more modest than societycentred arguments presumes (Leuprecht and Lazar, 2007: 2). Still, by not removing the
existing local boards, the creation of Local Health Integration Networks in Ontario
presented the potential for increased citizen involvement as it left the existing pathway of
participation intact while at the same time creating another governance body for citizens
to engage with. Furthermore, the LHINs’ enabling legislation specified that Local Health
Integration Networks “shall engage the community of diverse persons and entities
involved with the local health system about that system on an ongoing basis, including
about the integrated health service plan and while setting priorities” (Ontario. Legislative
Assembly, 2006). In contrast, the removal of existing local boards within the other
provinces removed venues for citizen participation at the local level while adding one at
the regional level.
Healthcare system reforms up until the year 2000 were largely framed in terms of the
need to meet growing fiscal requirements and the desire to increase citizen participation –
giving the appearance that central government was guided by those two factors when
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migrating decision-making authority. As discussed above, however, Black and Fierlbeck
argue that despite the casting of healthcare reforms in terms of cost savings and citizen
engagement the shift of authority from Regional Health Boards to District Health
Authorities in Nova Scotia took place for political reasons. According to Black and
Fierlbeck, the change in governance structure was aimed at restoring the system of elite
representation that existed at the local level prior to the creation of Regional Health
Boards (2006: 522-523).
The movement toward increasing the number of regional units in Nova Scotia can be
viewed as driven by physicians who were discontent with having their direct influence
over local hospital boards curtailed (Black and Feirlbeck, 2006: 519-520). According to
Lomas, Woods, and Veenstra there are three groups that grant power during the authority
migration process: government, health professionals, and citizens. Moreover, each source
of power has its own agenda, with government’s health system expectations, providers’
interests and citizens’ preferences pitted against each other (Lomas, Woods, and Veenstra
1997: 734). Drawing on Black and Feirlbeck’s explanation of the shift from four to nine
healthcare bodies in Nova Scotia it can be argued that the initial migration of authority to
Regional Health Boards constituted a curtailing of the ability of health professionals to
exercise their power to achieve their interests. In altering the health systems design, the
government moved to ensure the health system met the government’s expectations. As
subsequent changes were undertaken, however, the previously held power of the
healthcare elite was somewhat restored. If this is indeed the case, the shift from Regional
Health Boards to District Health Authorities, while framed in terms of cost containment
and citizen, participation was in fact undertaken to restore the balance of power between
government and healthcare professionals.
Turning to Alberta and British Columbia, the similarities regarding the replacement of
local boards with regional governance structure suggests the same desire to curtail the
medical community’s ability to promote and protect their interests as initially occurred in
Nova Scotia. By migrating authority to the regional level while at the same time
eliminating the local level, decision-making was moved away from local decision makers
through the same process that moved decision-making authority away from central
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government. In doing so, the influence of medical professionals over the administration
of the healthcare system was curtailed. While inflationary pressure in the 1970s led to
increasingly harder lines being taken by governments in collective bargaining with
organized medicine (Naylor, 1999: 11), the migration of authority to newly created
regional bodies served to weaken the ability of organized medicine to negotiate.
Davidson argues that the government’s policy to shift power over health services in
British Columbia was an attempt to counter the power of health professional elites
(Davidson, 1999: S35). However, the changes in governance structure provided more
than a counteracting of the power of medical professionals - it truncated the power of the
medical profession.
In British Columbia the decision to restructure health services can be seen as an attempt
to an orientation toward community wellness (Davidson, 1999: S35). A similar framing
of healthcare restructuring was also present in Alberta and Nova Scotia. In Alberta the
Commission report recommended greater personal responsibility and accountability for
managing health and health resources and the need to return the power to make choices
closer to Albertans (Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for
Albertans, 1989b: 116). In the case of Nova Scotia, there was the call for greater user
participation in the planning of health services (Nova Scotia Royal Commission on
Healthcare, 1990: 29).
The removal of local boards, however, is contradictory to the stated goal of increased
citizen participation. While aspects of decision-making may have migrated from the
province to the region, local decisions that once occurred at local hospitals boards were
also shifted upward. In shifting decision-making to a regional level, it is unclear how
citizens are able to participate in the healthcare decision-making process to a greater
extent than when decisions were made at the local level. While healthcare advocates in
Nova Scotia may have initially embraced the regionalization of healthcare governance,
believing that it would provide a substantial level of grassroots decision-making, they
were in the end disappointed as community bodies were simply not strong enough to
challenge political decisions from higher up (Black and Fierlbeck, 2006: 519-520). As
stated above, the migration of authority to special purpose bodies has the potential for

182

more responsive governance than area-wide jurisdictions (Bollens, 1986: 119; Lowndes
and Wilson, 2001: 633), however, at the same time the risk exists that the governance
structure can become closed to public influence (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 104;
Peters, 2004: 133).
While citizen participation played a large role in framing authority migration as a
solution to the challenges facing healthcare, the resulting outcomes do not align with the
stated objective. Instead, it can be argued that the underlying objective of government
when migrating authority was to strengthen their ability to control costs in the healthcare
system through the weakening of medical professionals. With the underlying factor
leading to healthcare reform being the concern over the ability to meet the increasing
fiscal demands placed upon the systems, migrating authority to Type II bodies served to
strengthen the provincial governments’ ability to respond to this challenge by removing
control at the local level from organized medicine. In this scenario, the creation of Type
II healthcare bodies became a tool for altering the existing balance of power to the benefit
of central government, consequently strengthening their ability to take action in the
specific policy area.
As discussed in depth in Chapter 2, the underlying assumption of multilevel governance
is that state centralization has given way to new forms of governance. The result has been
the dispersion of decision-making authority among new actors across multiple levels,
rather than monopolized by state executives (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996: 346).
Regardless of the level of autonomy of new governance actors, however, governance
continues to occur within the shadow of hierarchy (Scharpf, 1994: 38-39). In the modern
state, both public and private actors can be seen to operate under the shadow of hierarchy
where government sets the legal rules of the game and intervenes to correct distortions or
outcomes that violate public interests (Börzel, 2010: 196-197). In the case of public
healthcare in Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario, regional health
authorities serve to strengthen the ability of government to set the rules of the game and
intervene to correct distortions or outcomes that are perceived to violate public interests.
Specifically, government has become better able to step in and address fiscal distortions
or outcomes without the unwanted interference of healthcare professionals.
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6.5 Conclusion
By legislating the creation of the Local Health Integration Networks in 2005, Ontario
joined the other nine Canadian provinces that had already delegated authority in
healthcare services to the regional level. Consistent with the hypothesis that a decline in
fiscal capacity promotes the creation of Type II bodies, all four provinces studied in this
chapter framed the need for healthcare reform in terms of concerns over meeting the
ever-growing funding requirements to deliver healthcare in the face of increasing demand
for services. The gap between the migration of authority in British Columbia and Ontario
suggests that more than just weakened fiscal capacity is required to devolve authority. In
Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia healthcare reform is framed in terms of both
controlling healthcare costs and increasing citizen participation. In the Ontario case,
healthcare reform is framed in terms of controlling healthcare costs and increasing
coordination within the healthcare system.
Mixed support was found for the hypothesis that parties further to the left are less likely
to delegate authority to Type II bodies. As seen throughout the chapter, parties from both
sides of the political spectrum migrated and ceased the migration of authority to Type II
bodies.
While the underlying pressures to initiate healthcare reforms can be seen to be fiscal, how
the changes were framed for public participation appear at odds with reality. To the
public, the framing of the healthcare restructuring included a strong element of increased
citizen participation and local decision-making. The migration of decision-making
authority to regional bodies, however, was used to curtail the power of local and medical
elites within the decision-making process. The outcomes were not consistent with the
stated goals of increased public participation or grassroots decision-making, but instead
shifted the power balance between government and organized medicine towards
government. Although Marks originally characterized multilevel governance as the
dispersal of power away from the centre (Marks 1993: 401-402), the results demonstrated
the potential for the opposite to also occur. In the case of healthcare reform, the creation
of Type II bodies was used as a tool of central government to shift the existing balance of
power in a policy area to its advantage. While authority did migrate from central
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government to newly created Type II bodies, the elimination of local boards in three of
the four provinces moved some aspects of decision-making upwards to regional bodies
and away from local elite. In doing so the provincial governments increased their ability
to control costs within the healthcare system by the curtailing of organized medicine’s
control over healthcare decisions.
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Chapter 7
“Within the traditional political dynamics of our federal system, the issue has become: who gets
to blame who – when funds earmarked for diagnostic equipment are used to buy a lawn-mower?”
-Bruce Harber and Ted Ball, Redefining Accountability in the Healthcare Sector

7

Accountability and Healthcare Reform

With the creation of Local Health Integration Networks in Ontario in 2006 all provincial
healthcare systems had migrated some degree of decision-making authority away from
central government toward non-elected Type II multilevel governance bodies. Having
explored how government framed the shift in decision-making authority in Chapter 6,
attention is now turned to the accountability relationships that emerged when decisionmaking authority in healthcare shifted to Type II jurisdictions. As in previous chapters,
the accountability relationships between Type II bodies and both government and society
will be assessed in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario.
To gain a better understanding of how Type II bodies are held accountable once decisionmaking authority has migrated, Chapter 7 investigates both formal accountability and
perceived accountability. Formal accountability is evaluated based upon the mechanisms
put in place by government through legislation and regulations. Perceived accountability
is assessed using the interview responses of members of provincial health authorities,
public service employees, elected representatives, and members of interest groups active
in the healthcare field. In doing so, this chapter begins where Chapter 5 stops – the
evaluation of the strength of accountability relationships through the existence of formal
accountability rules – and continues on to evaluate whether the formal rules are perceived
as adequate to exercise meaningful democratic accountability and control. Moreover,
Chapter 7 attempts to capture which factors either advance or impede the emergence of
effective accountability relationships.
Returning to Chapter 5, the strength of both the accountability relationship between Type
II bodies and government and the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and
society were evaluated. To test the strength of accountability relationship between Type
II bodies and government three hypotheses were put forward:
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H5.1 - The accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies has either
remained stable or increased in strength over time.
H5.2 – Governing parties further to the left on the political spectrum will produce
stronger accountability relationships between Type II bodies and government than
governing parties further to the right.
H5.4 – The accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies will
decrease as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.
A summary of whether support was found for each of the three hypotheses by dataset is
presented in Table 7.1. As shown in Table 7.1, when assessing the strength of the
accountability relationships between government and Type II bodies, the positive effect
of time was consistent across all datasets. Based on formal accountability rules the
strength of the accountability relationships with government strengthened in Alberta,
British Columbia, and Ontario and remained stable in Nova Scotia. The results for H5.2
were mixed, with only British Columbia producing results in the expected direction. The
results produced no support for the hypothesis that the accountability relationship
between government and Type II bodies decreases as the geographic scale of the Type II
body decreases.
Table 7.1: Government Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset
H5.1 – Time

H5.2 – Ideology

H5.4 – Geographic

All Provinces

Support

No Support

No Support

Alberta

Support

No Support

No Support

British Columbia

Support

Support

No Support

Nova Scotia

Support

No Support

No Support

Ontario

Support

No Support

No Support
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Two additional hypotheses were tested when looking at the strength of the accountability
relationship between Type II bodies and society:
H5.3 - The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased
in strength over time.
H5.5 – The accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase
as the geographic scale of the Type II body decreases.
A summary of whether support was found for each of hypotheses is provided in Table
7.2. As shown in Table 7.2, mixed support was found for both hypotheses.
Table 7.2: Government Accountability Index - Support for Hypotheses by Dataset
H5.3 – Time

H5.5 – Geographic

All Provinces

Support

Support

Alberta

Support

No Support

British Columbia

Support

Support

Nova Scotia

No Support

Partial Support

Ontario

Partial Support

Support

When assessing the effect of time on the strength of the accountability relationships the
results suggest an increase in the strength of formal rules across all datasets with the
exception of Nova Scotia. When assessing the effect of geographic scale, the results
suggest an increase in the strength of formal accountability rules as the size of the
geographic scale decreased for all datasets but Alberta.

7.1 Data and Methodology
As stated above, this chapter explores the relationship between accountability and the
migration of decision-making authority to Type II multilevel governance bodies in
healthcare in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario. The
specific cases are Alberta Health Services (AHS), British Columbia Health Authorities
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(BCHA), Nova Scotia’s District Health Authorities (DHA), and Ontario’s Local Health
Integration Networks (LHIN). As discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, the four
provinces were selected based on a combination of political regions and political
ideology. As discussed in Chapter 6, healthcare was selected due to the high level of
importance placed upon it by Canadian citizens and the consistency at which some
degree of authority has migrated outside of the central provincial government across all
Canadian provinces. The migration of authority has not been uniform across the
provinces: not all provinces transferred the same degree of authority; provincial outcomes
have varied; different governance models were employed; and the timing of authority
migration has not been consistent across all provinces. Consider the four provinces under
study: Alberta has moved from regionally distributed health authorities to one single
province-wide health body; British Columbia has also reduced the number of health
bodies, moving from fifty-four to nine; Nova Scotia in contrast has moved in the opposite
direction, expanding the number of health care bodies from four to nine; and Ontario,
unlike the other provinces, left existing hospital boards in place when migrating
provincial authority.
To assess accountability of Type II health care bodies both the formal accountability
rules as stipulated in the provincial legislation and the perceptions of individuals active in
the healthcare policy area were examined. When assessing the formal accountability
rules, Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability, which states “Accountability is a
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain
and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the
actor may face consequences” (2007: 450), is used. For each piece of legislation, both the
accountability relationship with government and the accountability relationship with
society will be evaluated against the elements present in Bovens’s definition of
accountability: processes which force agents to explain and justify actions to their
principals, processes which allow principals to question agents and pass judgment upon
their actions, and processes which enable principals to sanction their agents.
Moving beyond the existence of formal accountability rules, semi-structured interviews
were conducted to assess how accountable the Type II healthcare jurisdictions were
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perceived to be by key individuals. Interview participants were selected from four
categories: elected representatives, members of Type II body boards and management
teams, public employees from the Ministry of Health, and representatives of special
interest groups active in the healthcare policy field. For the elected representatives
category interviews were sought with both ministers and health critics, however, attempts
to interview health ministers were unsuccessful across all four provinces.
Interviews were sought with senior public employees, as the size, complexity, and
number of functions undertaken by the government makes it impossible for elected
officials to be involved in all aspects of how we are governed. As a result members of the
public service perform large portions of government activities (Flynn, 2011: 43). As
public employees perform much of the activities of government, they are attuned with the
operational reality of accountability mechanisms. A member of the department
responsible for health services was interviewed for each of the four provinces.
The views of interest group representatives were sought to gain insight into how
accountability of the Type II bodies was perceived outside of government and the
organization. In each province, the provincial associate of the Canadian Health Coalition
and the province’s medical association were contacted for interviews. The health
coalitions were selected due to their position as coalitions of organizations and
individuals who are active or interested in health care policy at the provincial level.
Medical associations were selected as they represent an important constituency group in
the delivery of health services.
Similar to the need to interview both elected politicians and public service employees,
both board members and upper management were recruited from the health authorities. In
each province, members of both the board and management were recruited from the
health authority responsible for the capital region. Participants from a second health
authority – with the exception of Alberta, which has only one health authority – were
recruited to allow for additional perspectives to be put forward. In selecting a second
regional authority regions that include rural areas were selected to offset the largely urban
characteristics of the capital region.
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As discussed in Chapter 3, it would have been ideal to interview participants from each
category and from each sub-category; unfortunately this was not the case as not all
possible interviewees consented to being interviewed. The number of participants per
category by province is shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Interview Participants by Category
British
Columbia

Nova
Scotia

Ontario

Total

Elected Representatives 1

1

1

2

5

Ministry Employees

1

1

1

1

4

Interest Groups

2

1

1

1

5

Type II Board

0

2

1

2

5

Type II Management

1

2

2

2

7

Total

5

7

6

8

26

Alberta

As discussed in depth in Chapter 3, the interviews were semi-structured in design, with a
set of predefined questions forming the general structure of the interview. A list of
interview questions is available in Appendix D. The interview process was comprised of
two sections. The first approached accountability from the perspective of the participant.
Participants were asked to first define or describe what being accountable meant to him
or her. Participants were then asked whom they believed the Type II healthcare bodies
were most accountable to and then whom they most represented in their decision-making.
Both questions were based on questions asked by Lomas et al. in their study of the
motivations, attitudes and approaches of regional health authority board members
published in 1997 (Lomas, Woods and Veenstra, 1997a: 673). For each accountability
relationship identified by a participant, probing questions were asked to obtain a fuller
understanding of the participant’s view of the relationship – such as the effectiveness of
the accountability relationship. When a participant did not identify an accountability
relationship between either Type II healthcare bodies and government or Type II
healthcare bodies and the public, participants were asked to provide their perspective on
each omitted accountability relationship.
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To facilitate comparison between the formal mechanisms of accountability examined in
the healthcare system and in Chapter 5, the second part of the interview utilizes Mark
Bovens’s definition of accountability. As touched on above, Bovens’s definition
identifies three parts to an accountability relationship: the obligation of the actor to
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the ability for the forum to pose questions and
pass judgement, and that the actor may face consequences (Bovens, 2007: 450). For both
the potential accountability relationship between the Type II body and government and
the Type II body and society each participant was asked to what extent there is an
obligation on the part of the Type II body to explain and justify their actions; to what
extent the ability exists to pose questions to the Type II body regarding their actions; and
to what extent the ability exists to sanction the Type II body if their actions do not meet
expectations. After each question unstructured follow-up questions were used to gain a
better understanding of how successful the participant believed the Type II body was at
fulfilling that aspect of the accountability relationship and what may have contributed to
or hindered accountability.
While a general framework for asking questions was employed, there were cases when
the participant’s definition of accountability was consistent with Bovens’s. This resulted
in questions from the second section being answered in the first. In such cases, the
unanswered questions from the second section were asked as part of the first section of
the interview.
In the case of Alberta a third section dealt with the migration of Alberta’s nine regional
health authorities into a single provincial wide health authority in 2008. Participants from
Alberta were asked to describe the impact the shift from regional authorities to the single
province health board had on the ability of both government and society to hold decisionmakers accountable. The question was asked to gain insight into the influence of
geographic scale on accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and
both government and society. Only participants from Alberta were asked, as Alberta was
the only province to move from regional health authorities to a single provincial entity –
making it unique among the cases being studied.
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7.2 Formal Accountability Rules
As stated above, the formal accountability rules were first evaluated using Bovens’s
definition of accountability. For each of the four cases, the legislation is assessed in terms
of the requirement of Type II bodies to explain and justify their actions, the opportunity
for government and members of society to question the Type II body and the opportunity
for government and members of society to impose sanctions on the Type II body.

7.2.1

Alberta Health Services

In the Alberta case, the formal accountability rules specified in the Regional Health
Authorities Act and the accompanying regulations suggest a strong accountability
relationship between government and Alberta Health Services (AHS). AHS is required by
law to submit an annual report, including both financial and performance information, to
the Minister who must then table the report in the Legislative Assembly. In addition to
the annual report, the Minister receives quarterly financial reports, AHS audit reports
(including observations and recommendations), board meeting minutes and may request
in writing any records, reports or returns deemed necessary to assess the performance of
AHS. Beyond written reports and records, the Minster has inspection powers that
authorize the Minister or a person delegated by the Minister to enter and inspect any
place under the jurisdiction of the AHS and access for the purpose of examination any
documents or records in the possession of the AHS. In combination, the above measures
produce a legal requirement for the AHS to explain and justify actions and the right of
government to ask questions and pass judgment.
Beyond the capacity to ask questions, the government has substantial tools to sanction the
AHS. The most powerful mechanism at the province’s disposal may be the dismissal of
members of the AHS board. As stated in the Regional Health Authorities Act, if the
Minister believes that AHS is not properly exercising its powers, carrying out its duties,
or acting in the best interest of the public the Minister may dismiss the board and appoint
an official administrator in the board’s place. While less dramatic, the Minister also has
the power to not reappoint a board member upon completion of the board member’s term,
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meaning that poor performance can be sanctioned by not renewing the member’s
appointment.
The accountability relationship between AHS and the public as specified in the
legislation is centered on the obligation to explain and justify and to a lesser extent the
ability of members of the public to ask questions. The legislation dictates that all
meetings of the AHS board must be open to the public unless holding the meeting in
public would result in the release of information relating to the personal interests,
reputation or privacy of any one person, or that would impair the ability of AHS to carry
out its responsibilities. Furthermore, when a meeting is held completely or partially in
private, no resolution relating to the subject matter discussed may be passed without the
meeting reverting to being public. The AHS must also make all meeting minutes
available for inspection by the public. A limited potential for the asking of questions can
be seen in the requirement to establish community health councils. In accordance with the
legislation, community health councils must be established to act in an advisory capacity
to AHS on the provision of health services. Missing from the accountability relationship
between AHS and the public is the formal ability to sanction. While the legislation allows
for either elected or appointed board members, the Minister appoints all AHS board
members.
When comparing the formal accountability between the AHS and government and the
AHS and society the rules mirror the results found in Chapter 5. While AHS is expected
to explain its actions to the people of Alberta and there are some rules in place that allow
citizens to ask questions, government maintains the more comprehensive of the two
accountability relationships.

7.2.2

British Columbia Health Authorities

The accountability relationship between the BC government and BC’s Health Authorities
as specified in the BC Health Authorities Act is again strong. Each Health Authority is
required to send to the Minister an annual report detailing the Authority’s operations and
fiscal statements for the proceeding fiscal year. The Minister also has the authority to
require an Authority to report on any matter deemed necessary by the Minister for the
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purpose of monitoring the Health Authority’s performance. Each Authority is also
required to have its books open for inspection by the Minister or a designate at all times
and the Minister may direct the Comptroller General to examine and report to the
treasury board on any or all financial or accounting operations of a Health Authority
board. In terms of sanctioning power, the government appoints board members and the
government has the power to dismiss the board and appoint a public administrator to
undertake the functions of the board. The Minister may also issue a special directive with
respect to the exercising of the board’s powers and performance of duties. Boards are
legally obligated to comply with all such directives.
Legislated accountability rules governing the relationship between BC’s Health
Authorities and the public is comparatively sparse. While the BC Health Authorities Act
dictates that all board meetings be open to the public, creating an obligation on the part of
Authority boards to explain and justify decisions, there is no legislated capacity for
members of the public to ask questions or sanction decision-makers. When comparing the
formal accountability relationship between the government and the BC’s Health
Authorities and society and the BC Health Authorities the relationship with government
is, like Alberta, the more comprehensive of the two. When comparing the British
Columbia and Alberta, the gap between the two accountability relationships appears to be
wider in British Columbia.

7.2.3

District Health Authorities (Nova Scotia)

Consistent with Alberta and British Columbia, the legislated accountability rules in Nova
Scotia provide for a strong accountability relationship between the District Health
Authorities and government. Satisfying the obligation to explain and justify, the Nova
Scotia Health Authorities Act requires each DHA to produce an annual report detailing
financial statements and results achieved in respect to performance objectives over the
previous year. The annual report is submitted to the Minister who then must table it in the
House of Assembly. Moreover, each DHA is required to provide the Minister with
monthly and quarterly financial statements and an audited year-end financial statement
including any management letters issued by the auditors. The Minister may also appoint
an individual to carry out an audit or review a District Health Authority or any program,
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facility or service, which satisfies Bovens’s second criteria, the ability to ask questions
and pass judgment. In terms of sanctioning power, the Minister has the power to appoint
DHA board members and Chairs, and has the power to remove or suspend any member
of a board of directors.
In looking at the accountability relationship between the District Health Authorities and
the public, DHA are required to hold a minimum of two public forums each year for the
purpose of providing information on the operations and activities of the DHAs and seek
input from the public. In this regard the legislation obligates the DHAs to explain and
justify their actions and provides the opportunity for those it serves to pose questions and
pass judgment. As in Alberta and British Columbia, the public in Nova Scotia lacks the
capacity to sanction, meaning the formal accountability relationship between government
and the District Health Authorities is again the more comprehensive of the two
accountability relationships.

7.2.4

Local Health Integration Networks (Ontario)

In the Ontario case, the formal accountability rules set out in the Local Health System
Integration Act suggest a strong accountability relationship between government and the
Local Health Integration Networks. Satisfying the obligation to explain and justify, each
LHIN is required to submit an annual report to the Minister and the Minister is required
to table the report in the Assembly. As the LHINs are subject to the powers of the
Auditor General there is the capacity to pose questions and pass judgment. Government is
also capable of sanctioning LHINs through its appointment power, which includes the
appointment, reappointment and termination of board members and board chairs and
vice-chairs.
Adding additional strength to the accountability relationship between the LHINs and
government is the legislated requirement for each LHIN to have an accountability
agreement with government. The accountability agreements set out detailed reporting
obligations, the ability of government to request meetings to discuss performance factors,
government inspection authority, and a performance management framework that allows
the government to initiate performance management activities including increased
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reporting, external reviews and changes to the governance structure. In essence, the
accountability agreements strengthen each aspect of the accountability relationship as
defined by Bovens.
Turning to the formal rules governing the accountability relationship between LHINs and
the public, all full board and committee meetings are open to the public and each LHIN
must carry out some form of community engagement. LHINs are required to engage the
community of diverse persons and entities involved with the health care system on an ongoing basis, and the methods of engagement may include community meetings, focus
group meetings, or the establishment of advisory committees. Again missing from the
formal accountability rules is the capacity to sanction. Consistent with the other three
provinces, the lack of the public’s capacity to sanction results in the formal accountability
relationship between government and the Local Health Accountability Networks being
the more comprehensive of the two relationships.

7.2.5

Overall Results

When looking at the health authority legislation in each of the four provinces, the results
consistently show a more comprehensive accountability relationship between government
and the Type II healthcare body than society and the Type II healthcare body. Table 7.4
provides a summary of which three aspects of Bovens’s definition of accountability are
legislated into the accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and
both government and society for each of the four provinces. As shown in Table 7.4 in
each province the relationship with government satisfies all aspects of Bovens’s
definition of accountability, while this is not the case for the accountability relationship
with society. When evaluating the provincial legislation, Type II healthcare bodies are
consistently obligated to justify their actions to government, while governments are able
to question, pass judgment and impose sanctions. Type II healthcare bodies are also
required to explain and justify their actions to the public in all provinces. In all provinces
but British Columbia the public was able to ask questions, however, the ability for the
members of the public to ask questions regarding decisions made is limited in
comparison to government. As shown in Table 7.4, the ability for the public to sanction
Type II healthcare bodies is lacking within the legislation across all four provinces.
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Table 7.4: Government and Society Formal Accountability Relationship by Province
Relationship with Government

Relationship with Society

Obligation
to Justify

Ability to
Question

Ability to
Sanction

Obligation Ability to
to Justify Question

Ability to
Sanction

Alberta

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

British
Columbia

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Nova
Scotia

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Ontario

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

7.3 Perceptions of Accountability
As discussed above, interview questions were divided into two or three sections
depending upon province. The first section approached accountability from the
perspective of the interview participant. The second looked at accountability from the
perspective of Mark Bovens’s definition of accountability. The third section sought to
gain insight into the migration of multiple health authorities into a single authority in the
province of Alberta. In presenting the interview results, participants’ definition of
accountability, or what it meant for the Type II healthcare bodies to be accountable, is
presented first, followed by the results from the remaining sections.

7.3.1

Defining Accountability

Accountability – as an idea – is consistently viewed in a positive light, however, what it
means to be accountable has remained elusive, as it conjures up different images for
different individuals (Koppell, 2005: 94; Bovens, 2007: 448). As discussed in Chapter 3,
each interview participant was first asked to describe what accountability means to him
or her. Of the twenty-six participants, twenty-two provided characteristics that they felt
necessary for the existence of accountability. The remaining four participants did not
provide a description of accountability, but instead provided examples of accountability
relationships that existed within the provincial healthcare system. There were also
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participants who provided both characteristics of accountability and described existing
accountability relationships.
When all the participant’s responses are considered, a number of themes emerge. A
frequent theme was the need for clear and well-understood responsibilities. As stated by
one participant, “ideally accountabilities are clear in terms of who is responsible for
what,” and “when there isn’t clarity that’s when there are problems.” At least one
participant from each participant category with the exception of public employees
identified clarity in knowing who has the authority to make what decision as part of
accountability. In fact, the theme of clarity in decision-making authority was so
pronounced throughout the interview process, that greater attention is given to it later in
the chapter.
A second recurring theme when describing accountability was the obligation to report
goals and performance to those you are accountable to. At least one participant from each
of the five participant categories included some form of goals and performance reporting
against those goals in their definition of accountability. Multiple participants also
described accountability in terms of answerability. One interviewee stated that to be
accountable you must “help people to understand what you’re are doing with the
resources they have entrusted to your care. It’s answering for your actions.” The
requirement to be answerable and consult with those that you are accountable to was
again present across all five participant categories.
Accountability was also described in terms of transparency. Accountability was described
as having a “process in place, which allows us to have transparency in our decisionmaking,” as well as “having a framework and reasoned rationale as to how we make
decisions.” At least one member from both Type II healthcare body management and the
public employee category included the need for transparency within the decision-making
process when describing accountability. In addition, at least one participant from the
Type II body board member, elected representative, and interest group member
categories described accountability in part as the need to take ownership for decisions
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made. Moreover, both the Type II body management and the interest group member
categories included the ability to sanction within their definition of accountability.
While not capturing each individual definition of accountability, the characteristics of
accountability provided by the twenty-two participants have been compiled and presented
by category in Table 7.5. The columns in Table 7.5 provide a consolidated accountability
definition compiled from the varied descriptions provided by the different members of
each group of participants.
Table 7.5: Characteristics of Accountability Reported by Participant Group
Type II Body
Board Members

Type II Body
Management

Elected
Representatives

- Need to know
who is making
what decision

- Need to know
who is making
what decision

- Need to know
who is making
what decision

- Obligated to
report goals
and
performance
to those you
are
accountable to

- Obligated to
report goals
and
performance
to those you
are
accountable to

- Obligated to
report goals
and
performance
to those you
are
accountable to

- Required to
consult and be
answerable to
those you are
accountable to

- Required to
consult and be
answerable to
those you are
accountable to

- Required to
consult and be
answerable to
those you are
accountable to

- Taking
ownership of
decisions you
make

- Able to
sanction if
expectations
are not met

- Taking
ownership of
decisions you
make

- Actions and
decisionmaking process
must be
transparent

Public
Employees
- Obligated to
report goals
and
performance
to those you
are
accountable to
- Required to
consult and be
answerable to
those you are
accountable to
- Actions and
decisionmaking process
must be
transparent

Interest Group
Members
- Need to know
who is making
what decision
- Obligated to
report goals
and
performance
to those you
are
accountable to
- Required to
consult and be
answerable to
those you are
accountable to
- Able to
sanction if
expectations
are not met
- Taking
ownership of
decisions you
make

As stated in Chapter 2, Bovens’s definition of accountability is a “relationship between
an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or
her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face
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consequences” (2007: 450). All three aspects of Bovens’s definition of accountability are
evident in Table 7.5. The obligation to explain and to justify one’s conduct (while not
identical) is similar to the notion of reporting on goals and performance against those
goals. The ability of the forum to pose questions and pass judgement aligns well with the
underlying tone of the requirement to consult and be answerable to those you are
accountable to. Lastly, Bovens’s view that actors may face consequences is consistent
with participant responses that accountability requires the ability to enact sanctions if
expectations are not met. Of the three aspects both the obligation to report on goals and
performance and the obligation to consult and be answerable are consistent across all
participant categories, while the need for sanctioning is only evident in the Type II body
management and the healthcare interest group categories.
The inconsistent inclusion of sanctioning within even the consolidated definitions of
accountability is interesting as it mirrors the contested perception of the need to sanction
(Mulgan, 2000: 556) discussed in Chapter 2. On one extreme, there is the opinion that
one cannot have accountability without liability and that accountability without fear of
consequences is not likely to be accountability at all (Fraser, 1996: 36). Others question
whether sanctioning is an essential element of an accountability relationship (Harlow and
Rawlings, 2007: 545). For example, Harlow and Rawlings suggest that recommendations
for improvement alone may be sufficient to satisfy accountability requirements (2007:
546). In mirroring the debate over the need for sanctioning, the inconsistency of the
inclusion of sanctioning in Table 7.5 supports asking the question of whether sanctioning
is an essential element of accountability.
In addition to raising questions over the necessity of sanctioning within an accountability
relationship, the participant groups that included the ability to sanction as part of the
definition of accountability are noteworthy. The two groups include interest group
members and the healthcare bodies’ senior management. Interest group members are
currently unable to sanction Type II healthcare bodies through formal means, while
members of senior management could be sanctioned for administrative decisions.
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Aside from the contested nature of sanctioning, what is evident across the five participant
categories is that there exists degree of consistency regarding how accountability is
described. The most pressing concern is a need for clarity in who is making which
decision. Furthermore, the most consistent descriptive statements regarding what it means
to be accountable focus on the need to provide information to and consult with those you
are accountable to.

7.3.2

To whom do you feel the Type II Healthcare Body is Most
Accountable To?

In identifying to whom the Type II healthcare bodies were most accountable to, the
majority of respondents stated that they were most accountable to either government or to
both government and the public. As shown in Figure 7.1, forty-six per cent of participants
identified government as the most prominent accountability relationship, while thirty-five
per cent of participants identified both the accountability relationship with government
and the accountability relationship with the public. Also shown in Figure 7.1, eleven per
cent of participants stated that the Type II healthcare bodies were most accountable to the
public; all were from the healthcare bodies’ senior management category.
Figure 7.1: Whom do you feel the Type II Healthcare Body is Most Accountable To?

!
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The number of participants who identified multiple relationships when asked to identify
the most important accountability relationship suggests complex multifaceted
accountability environments. In describing the complex nature of accountability, one
participant described the existence of both a legal and a moral accountability, stating that
there is a legal accountability to government that ties back to the community through the
election process, and a moral accountability that is directly to the community. Other
participants noted that the public nature of the healthcare system means that either
through direct or indirect means that Type II healthcare bodies are ultimately accountable
to the public. One participant described the nature of being accountable to the public in
the following manner:
“Being accountable to the public has the two faces to it, it is the actual
individual person on the street that’s in their local area getting services,
but there is also the public writ large as the group of individuals who pay
taxes and elects a government to represent them [sic].”
In describing the relationship between Type II healthcare bodies and the public in this
manner the relationship expands beyond the local to the public at large. Public issues are
no longer limited to local health service delivery but transcend the boundaries of the
health authority when issues of fund management or more importantly mismanagement
arise.
Participants also commented on the potential for tension between the public nature of the
healthcare system and professional accountability. While ultimately accountable to the
public, healthcare professionals must also maintain their professional accountability.
Participants identified a need to remove the ‘either/or’ mindset and encouraging
individuals to feel accountable to the health system as a whole, while at the same time
maintaining their professional accountability.
The sole participant who did not identify government, the public, or a combination of the
two as the entity to whom the Type II healthcare body is ultimately most accountable
instead suggested that there are four possible entities to which the healthcare body could
be most accountable. Specifically, the Type II healthcare body was stated as being most
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accountable to one of the four entities depending upon the issue at hand: government as
its funding agency, elected officials at all levels of government as the peoples’ elected
representatives; the public as the recipients of health services; and internal staff and
volunteers and providers of those services.
Lastly, as shown in Figure 7.1, one participant did not indicate whom they believed the
Type II healthcare body was most accountable to. In this instance, the participant
continued to cite the specifics of legislation and regulations and was careful not to convey
their opinion on how the legislation and regulation was working in practice.
In addition to responses that highlighted the duality of accountability, there were
responses that were aligned with conclusions drawn in Chapter 6. As discussed in the
previous chapter, how changes to the healthcare system were framed were not always
consistent with the form changes to the system took once implemented. Restructuring
was framed in terms of increased citizen participation. Outcomes, however, were not
consistent with the stated goals of increased participation or grassroots decision-making,
but instead shifted the power towards government. Consistent with this position, both
elected representatives from the opposition parties and members of interest groups
responded that Type II healthcare bodies should be most accountable to the public but
were most accountable to the government. In total, five, out of the ten participants from
the elected representatives and members of interest groups categories stated that Type II
healthcare bodies are most accountable to government in their current form, but should be
most accountable to the public.

7.3.3

Whose interests do you feel the decisions of the Type II
healthcare body most represent?

When assessing whose interests the decisions of the Type II healthcare bodies most
represented, the most frequent answer was government. The most common responses to
whose interest do the decisions of Type II healthcare bodies most represent are presented
in Figure 7.2. As shown in Figure 7.2, thirty-eight per cent of participants believed that
the decisions of the Type II healthcare bodies most represented the interests of
government, while thirty-one per cent of believed that decisions most represented the
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interests of the public. One participant felt that the decisions represented the interests of
both government and the public.
In addition to the participants who believed that decisions made by Type II healthcare
bodies represented the interests of the public, government or a combination of the two,
five participants provided an alterative account. Two participants stated that decisions
most represented the interests of both public and staff. One participant stated that
decisions surrounding the actions of Type II healthcare bodies were most frequently
made based on the interests of the stakeholder group that was most impacted by the
decision. Another participant felt that the decisions most represented the interests of the
CEO and staff. Finally, two participants were unsure whose interests the decisions made
by the Type II healthcare body most represented. One participant did not provide an
answer to the question, “Whose interests do you feel the decisions of the Type II
healthcare body most represent?”
Figure 7.2: Whose Interests do you feel the Decisions of the Type II Healthcare body
Most Represent?

!
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While Figure 7.2 presents a fairly even divide between the number of participants who
felt that the Type II healthcare bodies acted in the interest of the public and in the interest
of government, a different picture emerges when the results are broken down by
participant category. When asked who the decisions of Type II healthcare bodies most
represented, all seven members of the senior management category included the public in
some form. Five of the Type II healthcare body management participants stated that
decisions represented the interests of the public. One participant provided a particularly
nuanced perspective stating, who decisions should most represent, “is something that we
struggle with, we toil with everyday.” The constant struggle stems from a feeling of
obligation to all stakeholders. The participant believed that the Type II healthcare body
attempted to orient itself depending “on the scale and the magnitude and the impact of the
decision in the sense of who is likely to be most negatively impacted by the decision.”
From the participant’s perspective, all stakeholders are important within the healthcare
system and all need to be treated as such. The final participant from the Type II body
management category believed that decisions represented the interests of both the public
and staff.
In contrast to Type II healthcare body senior management, the views put forward by both
elected representatives and the members of interest groups placed the interests of
government closer to the center of the decision-making process of Type II healthcare
bodies. Two main accounts were put forward as the reasoning behind government’s
interest being dominant over the interests of other parties in the decision-making
processes. First, members from both elected representatives and interest groups stated
that governments interests must come first as they have the entire health system to
consider. Drawing on the words of one of the participants, decisions must first represent
the “broader framework strategic priorities and structure,” then they are to “carry out that
mandate on behalf of the people in their local area.” The second account, again put
forward by both elected representatives from the opposition parties and members of
interest groups, states that the fiscal power held by government places Type II healthcare
bodies in a position where they must adhere to the wishes of provincial government.
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Participants from both the public employee and board member categories demonstrated
more diverse opinions. Of the five board members interviewed, two stated that decisions
ultimately represented government, while three stated that decisions represented the will
of the public. In the case of public employees, the responses were even more diverse,
with each of the four participants providing a different answer. One participant stated that
decisions represented the interests of the government, a second stated the public and
government, a third stated the public and the staff, while the final participant declined to
provide an answer.
A couple of observations can be made in comparing the responses to the following
questions: To whom do you feel the Type II healthcare body is most accountable to?; and
Whose interests do you feel the decisions of the Type II healthcare body most represent?
First, in terms of accountability the vast majority of participants believe that Type II
healthcare bodies are most accountable to government, either solely or jointly with the
public. Second, there is no agreement as to whom the decisions of Type II healthcare
bodies most represent. Moreover, given the general agreement that Type II healthcare
bodies are accountable to government it would seem logical that a similar consensus
would exist surrounding who Type II healthcare body decisions most represent.
However, in contrast to definitions of accountability which suggest A is obligated to act
in someway on behalf of B, the results indicate that perceptions of who decisions most
represent are highly dependent upon the participant group the interviewee belongs to.

7.3.4

Explain, Question, and Sanction – Accountability to
Government

When asked to assess the accountability relationship between the provincial Type II
healthcare bodies and government using Bovens’s definition of accountability (2007:
450), participant results closely resembled the formal accountability rules dictated in the
legislation and regulations. For the most part, participants believed that Type II
healthcare bodies are obligated to explain and justify their actions to government. That
government is able to ask questions and pass judgment and government has the capacity
to sanction healthcare bodies if the healthcare bodies are not fulfilling their obligations as
set forth by government.
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When asked about the need for Type II healthcare bodies to explain and justify their
actions to government, all participants stated that there was an obligation on the part of
the healthcare bodies to report back to government and keep government apprised of the
activities of the healthcare body regarding either healthcare outcomes, how they were
meeting their fiscal obligations, or both. Participants from all provinces but Ontario,
however, raised concerns that while an obligation to explain and justify decisions existed,
shortcomings existed within the current structure. As reflected in their observations,
concerns were raised by public employees, healthcare body management and members of
interest groups that a focus on financial reporting overshadowed reporting on health
outcomes. Participants argued that the time had come to expand reporting requirements
beyond issues of healthcare costs and procedure time requirements to issues of health
system sustainability and the delivery of better health outcomes.
In assessing the ability of government to question and pass judgement on the Type II
healthcare bodies, respondents from all four provinces and across all five participant
groups felt that government was able to question and pass judgement on Type II
healthcare bodies. As discussed above, formal mechanisms are made available to
government through the enabling legislation, however, an evenly distributed numbers of
participants identified formal and informal mechanisms. As presented in Figure 7.3,
twenty-four per cent of participants identified formal means, thirty-one identified
informal means and thirty-five per cent of participants identified both formal and
informal methods. Three of the participants did not provide an indication of whether the
accountability relationship with government includes the ability to pose questions and
judgement. Two participants from the interest group member category focused on the
ability of societal members to pose questions, while an elected representative provided an
account of the inability of members of the opposition to effectively pose questions, but
did not touch directly upon the ability of the government to pose questions.
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Figure 7.3: Participant Description of Methods used by Government to Question
Actions of Type II Healthcare Bodies

!
The formal mechanisms described by participants included: standing meetings at various
organizational levels that allow government officials to question the actions of the
healthcare body; monthly meetings between Minister and board chair and CEO; the
creation of formal joint government and Type II healthcare body committees; quarterly
healthcare body performance reviews; and annual budget and planning processes. From
an informal perspective a great deal of emphasis was placed upon the ability of the
Minister as well as department officials to pick up the phone when it was felt necessary to
question the actions of the Type II healthcare body. Of the eighteen participants
interviewed from the healthcare board and management as well as public employee
groups, fifteen commented on the informal ability of government officials to ask
questions of Type II healthcare bodies. Multiple participants described communication as
being bi-directional and daily between the healthcare body and government. It was
mentioned, however, that there is a hierarchy to communication: the board communicates
with the Minister, the CEO communicates with the Deputy Minister, and so on.
When asked about the capacity to sanction, no participant denied government held
political authority. Not all participants believed, however, that the sanctioning
capabilities provided to government through legislation were effectively used. Concerns
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were raised that poor performance was only met with either “a slap on the wrist” or
prolonged discussion without repercussions for poor performance. Concerns over the
effectiveness of sanctions were raised in all provinces with the exception of Ontario, and
concerns came from participants both internal and external to the healthcare bodies. In
contrast, however, to concerns over government’s unwillingness to utilize the tools
available to deal with underperformance, others warned of government’s unwarranted use
of the same mechanisms. There were claims that government had used the available tools
not to sanction underperformance, but to remove board members who had publically
criticized the actions of government.
Just as dictated in the legislation, the responses of the participants suggest that all three
elements of Bovens’s definition of accountability are present in the accountability
relationship between government and Type II healthcare bodies. Their existence,
however, does not mean that challenges in fulfilling the requirements do not exist. Of the
three elements, the ability for government to question and pass judgement is the least
fragile. As evident from the survey responses, government has both formal and informal
methods of questioning the actions of the Type II healthcare bodies. Both the requirement
to explain and justify and the ability to sanction, however, were called into question.
Questions were raised about whether the current reporting regime was sufficient as well
as whether government was utilizing its sanction power to address issues of performance.

7.3.5

Explain, Question, and Sanction – Accountability to the
Public

As discussed above, participant results provide a picture of the accountability relationship
between Type II healthcare bodies and government that closely resembled the
relationship mandated by the provincial legislation that migrated decision-making
authority. When looking at the accountability relationship between the healthcare bodies
and the public, however, the results show a greater degree of difference between the
formal accountability rules as laid out in the legislation and perceptions brought forward
by the participants.
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Using the three components of Bovens’s definition of accountability (2007: 450), Table
7.6 presents the formal accountability relationship as legislated by the provinces. As
discussed above, in each of the four provinces the Type II health care bodies are
obligated to explain and justify their actions to the public. In all cases, with the exception
of BC’s Health Authorities, there is an obligation on the part of the healthcare bodies to
provide a venue for members of the community to question their actions within the
legislation. In the accountability relationship with society, however, no formal
mechanism exists by which to sanction a Type II healthcare body in any of the four
provinces.
Table 7.6: Relationship with Society – Meeting Formal Accountability Criteria by
Province
Obligation to
Justify

Ability to
Question

Ability to
Sanction

Alberta

Yes

Yes

No

British Columbia

Yes

No

No

Nova Scotia

Yes

Yes

No

Ontario

Yes

Yes

No

Continuing to use Bovens’s definition of accountability, Figure 7.4 captures how
participants perceive the accountability relationship between Type II healthcare bodies
and society. As shown in Figure 7.4, consistent with the formal accountability rules,
eighty-eight per cent of participants believed that healthcare bodies are obligated to
explain and justify their actions, while twelve per cent believed they have no such
obligation. In regard to the ability to ask questions, fifty per cent of participants
responded in the positive, thirty-five responded in the negative, while fifteen did not
provide an answer. If we consider only the participants from British Columbia, the sole
province in the study where the ability to ask questions is not legislated, fifty-seven per
cent responded in the positive, twenty-nine in the negative and fourteen did not provide
an answer. The BC results suggest that even though not required by legislation, there are
efforts being made to engage the public and provide forums through which the public can
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question the actions the Type II healthcare bodies. Returning to the full sample, when
asked about the ability to sanction Type II healthcare bodies, forty-two per cent of
participants stated that society was able to sanction healthcare bodies, thirty-one per cent
stated it was not and twenty-seven per cent did not provide an answer.
Figure 7.4: Participant Perception of Accountability Relationship with Society

!
While the majority of participants believed that Type II healthcare bodies had an
obligation to justify their actions to society, concern was raised by a number of interest
group members and elected representatives from opposition parties that the obligation to
fully explain and justify the actions of the healthcare body was either absent or not
adhered to. In responding to the ability of members of the public to question and pass
judgment, responses indicated that while there is a lot of work done to engage the
community prior to decisions being made, there is limited capacity for members of the
public to pose questions afterwards. In two cases, once by an elected representative, and
once by a board member, freedom of information requests were listed as a mechanism by
which members of the public could question and access information on how decisions
were made after the fact. On a positive note, in three instances the participants’ responses
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suggest that the legal requirements were treated as minimal requirements with members
of the public either able to speak and pose questions at board meetings or other
formalized proceedings. In responding to the ability to sanction, forty-two per cent of the
respondents indicated that while no formal sanctioning capacity existed, the public has
the means to informally sanction the healthcare bodies through the use of the media,
demonstrations, complaints to elected officials, or any other venues that would bring the
issue to the forefront.
When describing the overall effectiveness of the accountability relationships three themes
emerged: a lack of role clarity within the healthcare system; a lack of knowledge at the
citizen level; and concerns over the type of information provided to the public. Concern
over a lack of role clarity was raised by at least one participant from each of the four
provinces. While such concerns came mostly from interest group representatives, at least
one public servant and an elected representative also brought the issue forward. Perhaps
not surprising due to their familiarity with the system, no individual working within a
Type II healthcare body raised clarity of roles within the healthcare system as a concern.
When describing role clarity as a problem, participants suggested that an inability to
clearly delineate the role of the Type II healthcare bodies in relation to other actors in the
healthcare field limited the ability of the public to hold the correct actor accountable for
decisions made.
Participants from each of the four provinces also expressed the issue of low levels of
citizen knowledge. Just less than two-thirds of interviewees, comprised of participants
from all categories, expressed the belief that citizens held a limited understanding of the
role of the Type II healthcare body in their region, the decision-making process, or the
work that their healthcare body is undertaking. In regard to accountability the concern
was concisely put by one participant who stated that “you cannot hold someone to
account if you do not know who they are or what they are doing.” While a number of
participants did state that public knowledge around the role and activities undertaken by
healthcare bodies is increasing, the same respondents frequently acknowledged that in
terms of public education there is still “a ways to go”. On a positive note, multiple
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healthcare body representatives, from both the executives and the boards, spoke of the
need for healthcare bodies to continue to educate the public.
Closely tied to citizen knowledge is the type of information provided by the healthcare
bodies to the public. At least one participant from each province called into question the
type of information provided to the public. The most prevalent concern was that the
information provided to the public was the same information produced for government
consumption. While meeting the informational demands of government, the information
is described as overly technical and bureaucratic and not accessible to a majority of the
public. To a lesser extent, concerns were raised over the likelihood of a citizen knowing
where to look for the information that is available to him/her.
Overall, participant perceptions of the accountability relationship between Type II
healthcare bodies and society, while weaker than the relationship with government, may
be stronger than the relationship that appears on paper. While challenges of role clarity,
citizen knowledge, and information distribution must be met, participant responses
indicate that there are those within the healthcare system that view the legal requirements
as minimal requirements. Furthermore, there is a belief that while no legal means to
sanction Type II healthcare bodies exists, the public is able use informal channels to
sanction Type II healthcare bodies when performance does not meet with expectations.

7.3.6

And then there was One: From Nine Regional Authorities to
a Single Provincial Board in Alberta

In Alberta nine regional health authorities, the Cancer Board, the Mental Health Board
and the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission, were dissolved and rolled into Alberta
Health Services (Liepert, 2009). As a result of this dramatic change in the Alberta
healthcare system, participants were asked to describe the effect of moving from nine
regional authorities to a single province wide health board on the ability to hold decisionmakers accountable. Out of the five participants from Alberta, four provided insight into
the impact of the change in direction undertaken by the province.
When comparing the responses on the effect of moving from regional to a provincial
healthcare body three themes were identified. The most commonly shared belief was that
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in moving from regional health authorities to a provincial authority, there was a loss of
connection between the decision-makers and the community. All four participants
expressed a degree of concern over the loss of local connection within the decisionmaking process. Moreover, two of the four respondents commented on the loss of
connection between the people and decision-makers that previously occurred when the
regional healthcare bodies where implemented. At each step, from local hospital boards
to Regional Health Authorities to AHS, there has been a “loss of connection between the
people of Alberta and healthcare decisions.” One participant also noted that with shifting
to one large provincial body there is the impression that “Calgary and Edmonton make all
the decisions”. While four participants expressed a degree of concern over the weakening
of the connection between citizens and healthcare decisions, one participant (from outside
of AHS) expressed this as a known problem that Alberta Health Services is actively
working to overcome.
In contrast to concerns over the loss of connection between Alberta Health Services and
the public, two participants suggested that the shift from nine regional health authorities
to one provincial body has strengthened government control over decisions made in the
healthcare system. One participant speculated that the shift from regional authorities to a
single health authority was based on the perceived need of government to obtain greater
control than that which existed under the regional system. Lastly, one participant noted
that the change has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish where Alberta Health
ends and Alberta Health Services begins.
While not asked about the effect of the shift from nine regional bodies to one provincial
wide healthcare authority in Alberta, at least one participant in each of the other three
provinces specifically commented on the institutional change made in Alberta. Two
participants believed that the current number of Type II healthcare bodies in his/her
province was too many and resulted in inefficiencies, by moving to a single provincial
body, as was done in Alberta, the system would lose sight of local differences. Another
participant, however, viewed a move to a single Type II healthcare body as potentially
being in her/his province’s best interest. One participant did not speculate on whether
his/her province would benefit from following the same path as Alberta but simply stated
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that it appeared that the shift from nine regional authorities to one provincial bodies had
left little room for local decision-making and that the change could be seen as a move by
the provincial government to retake control of decision-making in the healthcare system.

7.4 Discussion: Direct and Indirect Accountability in
Healthcare
When looking at the migration of authority in healthcare for the provinces of Alberta,
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Ontario the results suggest a strong accountability
relationship between provincial governments and Type II healthcare bodies alongside a
weaker accountability relationship between healthcare bodies and the public. The
difference in capacity between the two relationships is evident in both the formal
accountability rules as described in the legislation and the perception of accountability
provided by interview participants. As discussed in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 7.5,
the relationships can be considered direct and indirect accountability relationships
between the public and the Type II healthcare bodies.
Figure 7.5: Type II Healthcare Bodies Accountability Pathways in Healthcare
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While the direct accountability relationship with government is stronger, society is
intended to remain the benefactor of the relationship. Within each of the four provinces,
the ability to hold the Type II healthcare bodies to account is rooted in the democratic
institution of parliament. Within each provincial parliament or legislative assembly,
provincial power is executed in accordance with the requirements of ministerial
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responsibility and parliamentary accountability. Ministers are answerable to Parliament
for the actions of government and Parliament may hold to account all those who exercise
the power of the state, be they elected or non-elected (D’Ombrian, 2007: 198-199).
Despite the potential for both a direct and indirect accountability relationship through
government, however, both pathways may be undermined by limited clarity and lack of
citizen knowledge surrounding the decision-making in the healthcare system. In a
representative democracy, accountability is the principal mechanism through which mass
publics exert control over their elected officials (Rudolph, 2006: 99), but for public
responsiveness to be effective an accurate signal of what government is doing is required
(Soroka and Wlezien, 2004: 552; 2011: 33). As stated in Chapter 2, the dispersion of
decision-making authority vertically to an increasing number of government levels
lessens the ability of citizens to accurately attribute which decision-making authority
belongs to which level of government (Anderson, 2006; Brzinski, Lancaster and
Tuschloff, 1999; Schneider, Jacoby and Lewis, 2011). In the case of authority migration
in healthcare, interview results suggest that the migration of decision-making authority
horizontally to Type II multilevel governance bodies has clouded citizens’ perceptions of
who is responsible for policy decisions.
Within the provincial healthcare systems the shifting of decision-making power
horizontally increased both the length and number of accountability chains. This can be
seen as the result of the growing number of institutions involved in the decision-making
process. In a parliamentary democracy, four steps in an accountability chain can be
identified: 1) voters to their elected representatives; 2) elected representatives to the
executive branch; 3) from the head of government (prime minister or premier) to
executive departmental heads (ministers); and 4) from the heads of executive departments
to the civil servants (Strøm 2000: 267). As each of the four provincial governments being
studied added a Type II multilevel governance body to the provincial health care system,
a second accountability chain was created. Both of the accountability chains are
presented in Figure 7.6. In each of the four provinces a portion of the healthcare decisions
remained within the purview of the provincial government. As a result, Strøm’s
accountability chain remained in place, while at the same time the new accountability
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chain was brought into existence. The new accountability chain includes the following
additional accountability steps: from the head of the ministry responsible for healthcare to
the boards of the Type II healthcare bodies; from the board of the Type II healthcare body
to the CEO; and from the CEOs of the healthcare bodies the healthcare body
bureaucracies.
In migrating decision-making authority horizontally, the provincial governments
increased the number of actors in the provincial healthcare systems and in doing so
created a second accountability chain. Interview responses suggest that the result has
compromised the ability of citizens to accurately attribute decision-making authority. As
Papadopoulos would predict (2007: 479), the interworking of the healthcare policy
process is most clear to those working within the system. Participants from each of the
four provinces raised concerns regarding the ability of citizens to clearly attribute the
roles and responsibilities of actors within the provincial healthcare system. The majority
of such concerns came from members of the special interest group category who are
furthest from the centre of the healthcare system. The issue was also brought forward,
however, by at least one public employee and elected representative. Supporting
Papadopoulos’ argument, not one participant working within the four Type II healthcare
bodies raised the ability of citizens to accurately attribute responsibilities as a concern.
The results suggest that as healthcare policy processes have become increasingly
obscured to all but the most closely involved it is becoming increasingly difficult for
citizens to accurately attribute responsibility for policy actions.
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Figure 7.6: Parliamentary and Type II Healthcare Body Accountability Chains
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The fear that democratic accountability will be lost as the number of players within the
policy process increases is not new. As stated by Alexander Hamilton in 1788, “one of
the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against
the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility”
(Hamilton, 1788). Much more recently, Cameron Anderson argued that governances
could create incentives for governments within the multilevel system to camouflage their
responsibility for decisions and outcomes (2006: 450). Looking specifically at health
policy, Jonathan Lomas claimed that devolved authorities make an easy way to shift
blame and place a buffer between provincial governments and the discontent that comes
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with unpopular decisions (1997:821). Harber and Ball observe that an unintended
consequence of healthcare systems, structures and processes is blame-avoidance at the
cost of true accountability (2004: 41).
At risk within the healthcare system is the loss of public input and democratic
accountability. Delegation of authority threatens to weaken democratic accountability, as
citizens are unable to accurately attribute responsibilities across the healthcare system.
While mechanisms of accountability may exist within the legislation and regulation,
democratic accountability may not exist. If a citizen is unable to accurately attribute the
responsibilities and actions of the various policy actors within the healthcare system they
cannot effectively hold policy actors to account. For example, consider the capacity to
sanction. Dunn states that it is unlikely that a decision-maker will be rationally sanctioned
without sufficient public knowledge and understanding (1999: 335). Based on
participants’ remarks, in the public sphere there exists a weak understanding of the roles
and responsibilities of actors involved in the governance of the healthcare system.
Without the background knowledge, citizens do not have the necessary tools to make
rational conclusions about the effectiveness or appropriateness of a Type II healthcare
body’s actions, let alone sanction them. Moreover, within an accountability chain, the
policy process is most visible to those who are most closely involved in the decisionmaking process, and in multilevel environments actors are more likely to be subject to
administrative rather than democratic accountability (Papadopoulos, 2007: 479). As such,
accountability mechanisms may exist within each province’s legislation and regulations,
but a lack of role clarity within the healthcare system may limit the effectiveness of such
mechanisms to the detriment of democratic accountability.

7.5 Discussion: Accountability and the Quality of
Information in Healthcare
The previous section focused on how a lack of clarity surrounding the roles and
responsibilities of policy actors in healthcare policy poses a risk to democratic
accountability. Attention is now turned to the ability of citizens to accurately assess the
desirability of actions taken by actors within the policy process. To accurately assess the
actions of policy actors, citizens must have access to a sufficient quality and quantity of
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information. As presented above in Chart 7.5, while eighty-eight per cent of participants
stated that Type II healthcare bodies are obligated to explain and justify their actions to
the public, participants also brought forward a number of concerns regarding the
effectiveness of the information provided.
The most prevalent concern voiced by participants was the format of the information
provided to the public. One issue was that the reports produced to fulfill government
reporting requirements and specifications where repurposed to fulfill obligations to report
to citizens. While government officials assessing the information have the required
expertise to accurately interpret the information, concerns were raised that most citizens
lack the prerequisite knowledge to determine the appropriateness of actions. The
technical nature of reports is visible in Alberta Health Services’ reporting of performance
measures as seen in their 2013-2014 annual report (provided in Appendix G). Concerns
were also raised regarding the time constraints faced by most citizens if they wished to
acquire the necessary knowledge to understand and accurately interpret the information
provided to the public by Type II healthcare bodies. As argued by Abelson et al., public
deliberation efforts in health policy are constrained by the time and commitment it takes
for participants to learn about the issues and work through their implications (Abelson et
al., 2012: 27). According to Tomblin the rhetoric for the need for civic engagement in the
healthcare system is at odds with the findings that civic literacy and political knowledge
are decreasing. Most citizens operate at the margins of politics and their lack of
knowledge promotes attachment to existing institutions (Tomblin, 2004: 285).
Furthermore, as Julie Simmons states, most citizens remain largely unaware of public
reporting exercises and even Legislatures and parliaments that mandate the collection of
data make little use of it when holding decision-makers to account (2011:156).
From the above discussion five factors can be identified that limit the ability of members
of the public to hold Type II healthcare bodies to account:
1. Many citizens lack the level of political engagement required to seek out existing
public reports.
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2. Existing public reports/information are presented in a technical format that requires
a high degree of background knowledge to understand.
3. Many citizens lack the technical expertise required to accurately assess the reported
information.
4. Many citizens lack the time necessary to acquire the expertise necessary to
accurately assess the reported information.
5. Many citizens lack the level of political engagement required to seek out the
expertise necessary to accurately assess the reported information.
While each of the five factors can be viewed as interrelated, they can also be broken
down into two distinct sets of problems: the first being a lack of political engagement and
the second being the nature of the data provided to the public. The first problem falls
outside the scope of this project, however, multiple participants claimed that citizens do
become more politically engaged in health policy once either they or a loved one requires
treatment for either a serious/life threatening disease or injury.
With the first problem outside the scope of the project, further consideration will be given
to the second. In compiling participant responses, results show concerns were raised in
each of the four provinces that the reports made available to the public were in a format
that did not aid the public in assessing the performance of the Type II healthcare bodies.
One participant, however, stated that when citizens were provided with the information
available, they reached similar conclusions as the Type II healthcare body regarding
health system decisions.
“If you provide the public with the same information that I have, I find
that they often can reach much the same conclusions around services or
proposed models of delivery and do so in a matter that is very practical
and very pragmatic [sic].”
If this is true, the problem and the solution are inherent in the two accountability
relationships and by extension the two accountability chains discussed above.
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In responding to the problem, what require consideration are the accountability
relationships, and the actors that exist at each link in the accountability chain. First
consider that healthcare professionals are recognized as having greater knowledge of
what constitutes good healthcare, while citizens are recognized as being in a better
position to understand local needs and the relation to health (Frankish et al. 2002: 1474).
Second, lay participants who serve on health boards have little basis on which to make
health care decisions and typically accept the recommendations of the healthcare
professionals on staff (Björkman, 1985: 415-416). Now, within the two accountability
chains healthcare professionals are located in both the Type II Multilevel Governance
Bureaucracies and the ranks of Public Employees. Accordingly, it is logical that the
reports provided by the Type II healthcare bodies would be technical in nature. If, as one
participant suggested, you can provide the public with sufficient information to have
them reach practical and pragmatic conclusions regarding the operation of the healthcare
system it would appear a second set of reporting mechanisms is required. While none of
the four provinces included in the study had mandated reporting that focuses on the
unique informational needs of the citizen, participants from two of the four provinces
discussed measures being taken to produce citizen-focused reports. In both cases the
initiatives appear to have been initiated from within Type II healthcare bodies
themselves.
Aside from modifying report outputs, the media was identified by fifty per cent of
participants as having a role to play in holding Type II healthcare bodies accountable to
the public. As one participant noted, the media acts as a filter for citizen knowledge, with
health policy being filtered through the media for the majority of citizens. Another
participant stated that the media brought benefits to both the Type II healthcare bodies
and citizens. When working well, the media serves to both distribute pertinent
information as well as ask the questions that people are seeking answers to. Participant
data on the media’s role in holding Type II healthcare bodies to account is presented in
Figure 7.7.
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Figure 7.7: The Media’s Role in Holding Type II Healthcare Bodies Accountable

!
While strong overall support existed for the media as an accountability mechanism,
concerns were raised in regard to specific perceived shortcomings when reporting on
healthcare. Specifically participants raised concerns regarding a disproportionally high
focus on negative in comparison to positive news stories, a lack of depth when reporting
on healthcare policy issues and a limited number of reporters with sufficient healthcare
knowledge to be able to look into and keep track of health care policy information.
Participant data on perceived media shortcomings in reporting on healthcare is presented
in Figure 7.8. The results are consistent with the results of a 1996 study examining citizen
participation in volunteer-based health-system governance in British Columbia. The
study suggests the possibility of a larger role for the media in promoting a better
understanding at the level of the citizen; however, this would require a fuller account of
healthcare reform including a balance of positive and negative stories (Frankish et al.,
2002a: 144).
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Figure 7.8: Perceived Media Shortcomings in Reporting on Healthcare
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The results presented in Figure 7.8 suggest that the potential of the media to promote a
better understanding of healthcare policy to citizens has not been fully realized. The
media however, continues to play an important role as they allow an issue to penetrate the
public interest. As stated by one participant, it is amazing how accountable an
organization or individual can become once there is media attention.

7.6 Conclusion
The findings above suggest that the legislated accountability relationships between Type
II healthcare bodies and both government and society include sufficient accountability
mechanisms for the public to hold Type II healthcare bodies to account. Participant
responses, however, suggest that challenges, including a lack of role clarity in decisionmaking and citizen knowledge, lend credence to accountability concerns. Overall the
accountability story that emerges is one in which sufficient accountability mechanisms
exist, but the sufficient knowledge on the part of the citizen to utilize the mechanisms
may not.
In looking at the accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and both
government and society, the results from Chapter 7 support the conclusions made in
Chapter 5. First, citizens are able to hold Type II bodies either directly or indirectly
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accountable. Second, of the two accountability relationships the accountability
relationship between government and Type II healthcare bodies is the stronger. Moving
from working strictly with formal legislation to participant perceptions, however, Chapter
7 provides interesting contradictions between formal rules and what is believed to occur.
In the case of the ability to sanction, all provincial governments had the legislated ability
to sanction, while the public did not. A common perception, however, was that
government was unwilling to use its sanctioning power to ensure accountability while
members of the public could employ informal sanctioning mechanisms to hold Type II
healthcare bodies to account. In regard to the ability to ask questions and pass judgment,
interview results suggested that governments had significantly greater ability to ask
questions than what was legislated, while it was felt by some participants that the public
was often unable to ask questions once decisions had been made. So while the
accountability relationship between government and Type II bodies may be stronger,
participant perceptions of how each accountability relationship works in practice suggest
practical accountability benefits exist in each relationship.
More important than the existence and strength of an accountability relationship is its
successful functioning. In shifting authority to new governance bodies it is not sufficient
to build accountability rules into the system; sufficient knowledge must also exist to
make the accountability mechanisms meaningful. While the results suggest that
government is fully capable of holding healthcare bodies to account, a gap exists between
the power to hold healthcare bodies to account and public knowledge. The shifting of
decision-making authority horizontally has resulted in the camouflaging of responsibility,
which coupled with insufficient knowledge at the citizen level continues to present
challenges for democratic input and accountability. Fortunately in the field of healthcare,
the responses from both board members and senior management suggest an obligation to
act in the best interests of the public they serve. The challenge in healthcare is to ensure a
clear delineation of roles, adequate public information, and a venue for public input that
ensures the standards of democratic input and accountability are met.
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Chapter 8
8

Authority Migration and Type II Multilevel Governance:
Conclusions

An overarching challenge is that governance is complex. It brings together multiple
actors, of whom not all are working to achieving the same objective at any given time.
Furthermore, as governance patterns have altered, decision-making authority has
migrated both vertically and horizontally away from the traditional political centre. New
governance arrangements have emerged that no longer align with conventional
government hierarchies. New governance actors are operating with autonomy from the
dictates of legislatures and public agencies (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 316). In 1999, the
Auditor General of Canada observed changes in how Canadians are being governed,
stating that some policy initiatives had moved beyond the traditional forms of governance
to entities outside of government (Auditor General of Canada, 1999: 23-27). In 2002, the
Auditor General of Canada observed that accountability relationships had become
increasing complex as public objectives had become increasingly achieved through nonhierarchic relationships (2002: 4-5).
Shifts in decision-making authority have moved governance models away from a single
agency model toward a multi-actor system and increased the complexity of accountability
relationships. The preceding chapters focused on: 1) the extent to which Canadian
provinces have opted to migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to
policy issues and what factors explain the migration of authority; and 2) the existence and
relative strength of the accountability relationships that emerge once authority has been
migrated, especially the accountability relationship between the new governance actors
and both government and society. This final chapter will focus on reviewing the findings
of the previous chapters and discuss the implications.

8.1 Review of Findings
Beginning in Chapter 4, a number of hypotheses have been evaluated regarding the
migration of authority and the effect of this migration on public input and democratic
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authority. Chapter 4 evaluated the historical rate of authority migration as well as the
effect of fiscal capacity and political ideology on the annual rate of authority migration.
These results showed that the cumulative number of Type II bodies have been increasing
over time, while the annual rate of Type II body creation has remained consistent over the
past sixty years. This suggests that the use of Type II bodies by government is not a
recent phenomenon. Instead the evidence indicates that provincial governments in
Canada have been using Type II bodies as a policy option consistently over the past sixty
years. Chapter 4 yielded inconsistent support for the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal
capacity of government the higher the rate of creation of Type II bodies with support
being found largely in Alberta which exhibited a unique period of debt reduction. Support
for the hypothesis that the further to the left-of-centre on the political spectrum a
government sits the fewer the number of Type II bodies created was also inconsistent
between provinces.
Building upon the results from Chapter 4, Chapter 6 looked again at the effect of fiscal
capacity and political ideology on the use of authority migration to Type II bodies as a
policy option by government. While Chapter 4 employed a quantitative methodology
using a custom built dataset, Chapter 6 focused specifically on healthcare policy. The
findings in Chapter 6 support the hypothesis that the lower the fiscal capacity of
government the higher the rate higher rate of Type II body creation. In the case of
healthcare reform, limited fiscal capacity to fulfill a growing demand for services was the
underlying factor in each of the four provinces. How changes in healthcare were framed
for the public, however, did not always align with the underlying fiscal challenges.
Healthcare restructuring was frequently framed in terms of increased citizen participation
and local decision-making. There is disagreement, however, as to whether greater citizen
participation in decision-making has been realized (Collier, 2010: 331). As with Chapter
4, Chapter 6 yielded inconsistent support for the hypothesis that the further to the left-ofcentre on the political spectrum a government sits the fewer the number of Type II bodies
created.
While Chapters 4 and 6 focused on the migration of authority to Type II bodies, Chapters
5 and 7 explored the resulting accountability relationships that emerged. In Chapter 5, the
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strength of the accountability relationship between the Type II bodies and both
government and society were investigated. The results in Chapter 5 showed consistent
support across all datasets for the hypothesis that the strength of the accountability
relationship between government and Type II bodies has either increased or remained
stable over time. Inconsistent support was found for the hypothesis that governing parties
further to the left on the political spectrum produce stronger accountability relationships
between Type II bodies and government than governing parties further to the right. No
support was found for the hypothesis that the strength of the accountability relationship
between government and Type II bodies will decrease as the geographic scale of the Type
II body decreases. When looking at the direct accountability relationship between Type II
bodies and society in Chapter 5 two hypotheses were tested: the accountability
relationship between society and Type II bodies has increased in strength over time; and
the accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies will increase as the
geographic scale of the Type II body decreases. The results for each hypothesis were
inconsistent.
Beyond evaluating the five hypotheses, the results in Chapter 5 revealed that of the two
relationships, the accountability relationship between the government and Type II bodies
has been and continues to be the dominant one. Based on the strength of each
accountability relationship the results suggest that while there are increasing levels of
societal-steering, the state remains the dominant actor in the governance structure.
Like Chapter 5, Chapter 7 evaluated the accountability relationships between Type II
bodies and both government and society. Consistent with Chapter 5, the results from
Chapter 7 show accountability relationships between Type II healthcare bodies and
government to be the stronger of the two relationships. When interview responses are
taken into account, however, the results suggest that practical accountability benefits can
be gained from each accountability relationship. Results from Chapter 7 also suggest that
while sufficient legislation and regulations exist to hold Type II healthcare bodies to
account, concerns over a lack of role clarity and limited citizen knowledge caused
participants to question the ability of the public to hold Type II healthcare bodies to
account. In shifting authority to new governance bodies it is insufficient to build
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accountability rules into the system; sufficient knowledge must also exist to make the
accountability mechanisms meaningful. While the results suggest that government has
the legislated tools to hold healthcare bodies to account, a gap exists between the powers
to do so and public knowledge.
When the results of the previous four chapters are considered as a whole, we see that the
use of Type II bodies in response to policy issues is not new, nor is it likely to change.
Moreover, when faced with financial challenges, as in the case of healthcare policy, the
horizontal migration of decision-making responsibility to Type II bodies remains a policy
option for government. Given the continued use of Type II bodies as a policy option,
public input and democratic accountability concerns must be taken seriously. The results
from Chapter 5 suggest an overall strengthening of the indirect accountability
relationship between the public and Type II bodies through government. When looking at
the direct accountability relationship between society and Type II bodies, however, the
Ontario case showed how possible accountability gains could be lost. Also, as
demonstrated in Chapter 7, the existence of sufficient accountability mechanisms, either
formal or informal, does not fully alleviate accountability concerns. Interview results
from Chapter 7 show role clarity among the actors involved in healthcare as challenges to
accountability. As decision-making authority shifts horizontally, there is the risk of
camouflaging responsibility, which, coupled with insufficient knowledge at the citizen
level, presents a challenge to public input and democratic accountability.

8.2 Implications
The first implication of the thesis findings is that the use of horizontal authority migration
as a policy tool is not new. While the rate of increase has remained stable, the cumulative
number Type II bodies have been increasing in Canadian provinces over the past 60
years.
In Chapter 1 the argument put forward was that the demand for governance had expanded
beyond the capacity of the state to the point where governance requirements cannot be
fulfilled without widespread delegation (Flinders, 2006: 223). As a result the modern
state no longer monopolizes the governance process, and governments are subject to
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negotiations with a wide range of public, semi-public, and private actors when engaged in
policy formation (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007: 3-4). The consistent use of authority
migration over the past sixty years, however, suggests that such concerns, if not
misplaced, are not the reason behind the use of Type II bodies by provincial
governments.
The second implication of the findings is that while the number of Type II bodies created
by the provinces has increased, the rate of increase has not expanded under the weight of
increased governance demand as predicted in the literature. Instead, the provinces of
Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario have used Type II bodies
consistently as a policy tool over the past 60 years. This suggests that the reason why
governments continue to the use Type II bodies may need to be reconsidered. Because
government alone holds the legislative ability to set the rules of governance (Bartle and
Vass, 2007: 895; Rhodes, 2007: 1244; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 13) government also
holds a unique level of control over Type II bodies. It may yield more interesting results
to look at the policy environment from which Type II bodies emerged. For instance,
perhaps the creation of Type II bodies by Canadian provinces are a mechanism through
which governments of all political stripes are able to deflect some of the direct attention
of the public in respect to certain policy issues.
In addition to increased governance demand, Chapter 1 also raised concerns that the
dispersal of authority had reshaped the governance landscape and brought into question
democratic input and accountability within the governance process (Peters and Pierre,
2006: 209). While the concern remains valid, the consistent use of authority migration
over the past sixty years reminds us that threats to public input and democratic
accountability are themselves not a modern phenomenon.
The third implication to be taken away from the quantitative results is that while the
cumulative number of Type II bodies involved in public governance continues to expand,
the increased strength of the accountability relationship between Type II bodies and
government and Type II bodies and society has positive implications for public input and
democratic accountability. As discussed in Chapter 2, three different accountability
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arrangements may exist by which citizens can hold Type II bodies to account. First,
society may act as principals with Type II bodies as agents where Type II bodies are
directly accountable to society. Second, citizens may act as principals with
democratically elected government as agents, who in turn act as principals of Type II
bodies, making Type II bodies indirectly accountable to the citizens. Lastly, both
accountability arrangements may exist. The results indicate the existence of both
accountability arrangements, with citizens increasingly able to hold Type II bodies both
directly and indirectly to account.
The quantitative results also show, however, that while overall there has been a trend
toward the strengthening of both accountability relationships the potential exists for the
accountability relationship to weaken. The Ontario case, where an increase in the strength
of the society accountability relationship index emerged only to dissipate a decade later,
reminds us that the current levels of public input and democratic accountability are not
certain going forward. In addition to the lesson learned from Ontario, the mean
government and society accountability index scores demonstrate the limitations in the
existing legislated accountability relationships. For both indexes, the 1996 to 2005 time
period provide the highest mean scores: 2.46 for the government accountability index and
1.50 the society accountability index. Both are well below the maximum accountability
score of 3, suggesting that while the strength of the accountability relationships may be
improving a full accountability relationship with both government and society is not
legislated for a large number of Type II bodies.
In healthcare, while sufficient legislated rules exist to hold Type II healthcare bodies fully
accountable to government in each of the four provinces studied, concerns over pubic
input and democratic accountability were still raised by interview participants. Moreover,
while no legal sanction mechanism exists, close to half the participants interviewed felt
that society, through the use of informal sanctioning techniques, had the potential to hold
Type II healthcare bodies to account. The larger implications, however, are that in
shifting authority to new governance bodies it is not sufficient to build accountability
rules into the system, or that citizens have access to informal mechanisms of
accountability. Within the new governance environment sufficient knowledge must also

232

exist to ensure the accountability mechanisms are accessible, understandable, and
meaningful to those who are impacted by decisions. In the case of healthcare, the results
suggest a gap exists between availability of accountability mechanisms by which citizens
could hold Type II healthcare bodies to account and the public knowledge required by
citizens to make use of those mechanisms.
As discussed in Chapter 3 vertical multilevel governance can create difficulties for
citizens in attributing policy decisions to policy actors. Such information challenges can
be exacerbated by the actions of governments who engage in blame shifting and credit
taking for policy outcomes as authority migrated vertically from one level of elected
government to another (Anderson, 2006: 450; Cutler, 2004: 19; Hamilton, 1788). The
informational challenges of citizens are further clouded as authority is migrated both
horizontally and vertically. The risk to public input and democratic accountability is far
greater as authority migrates horizontally. As the number of non-hierarchical governance
relationships increase the greater the complexity of the accountability relationship
between society and public decision-makers.

8.3 Future Directions
The focus of this work has been on the extent to which Canadian provinces have opted to
migrate decision-making authority horizontally in response to policy issues and the effect
of horizontal authority migration on public input and democratic authority migration.
From the four provinces studied, the results suggest that governments have been relying
upon the use of Type II governance bodies as solutions to policy challenges for more than
the past sixty years. The findings also show that differences exist across the four
provinces. Contextual differences between provinces resulted in differences in outcome.
Given that the work to date has only looked at Canada, it may prove useful to incorporate
additional countries within the same research framework. In doing so further
consistencies and differences would be explored and a fuller picture of the use of Type II
bodies beyond the Canadian context would be made available.
Beyond expanding upon the scope of the existing project a further line of inquiry is the
explanation behind the expectation put forward in Chapter 3 that the rate of horizontal
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authority migrating is increasing while the evidence shows that it has remained constant.
The question as to why the difference between the expected and actual rates of Type II
body creation remains unanswered. Multiple reasons for the disjuncture are possible
including: the increased use of Type II bodies in policy areas that are of high importance
to citizens and traditionally viewed as the sole jurisdiction of the state; the more visible
use of private actors in service delivery; and/or the result of government stepping aside so
that new areas of what may have been considered public life are now regulated by market
mechanisms which have stepped in to fill the void. Regardless of the exact explanation,
there is the opportunity to further explore the emerging governance arrangements and
why reality has not played out as expected.
While understanding governance arrangements remains important, the consistent usage of
horizontal authority migration as a public policy tool combined with the challenges
associated with the existing accountability relationships lead to additional research
questions. The results from Chapter 5 suggest that in a great number of instances the
legislated accountability obligations do not fulfill all three elements of an accountability
relationship as defined by Bovens: the obligation of the accountable party to explain and
to justify his or her conduct; the ability to pose questions and pass judgement on the
accountable party; and to sanction the accountable party (Bovens, 2007: 450). Moreover,
even when sufficient accountability rules are legislated, as was the case in the
relationship between government and Type II healthcare bodies as presented in Chapter
7, concerns exist over the ability to hold such bodies accountable. Given such
accountability challenges, future research can be directed toward identifying factors that
promote meaningful accountability. As outlined above, when decision-making authority
migrates to new governance bodies it is not sufficient to build formal accountability rules
within the legislative framework. An effort must be made to ensure that sufficient
knowledge and capacity exist to make the accountability mechanisms workable.
In researching the knowledge required to hold Type II bodies to account, two paths of
inquiry may be taken. One area to explore is what and how information is transmitted
from Type II bodies to the public. For example, when researching healthcare there was
concern that the information provided to the public was produced to fulfill government
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reporting requirements and was of a technical nature. The underlying questions are
whether there are sufficient communication obligations and whether the information
provided by the Type II body to the public is in an accessible format.
A second area of exploration is the role of the media. Strong support existed for the
media as an accountability mechanism, however, the results from Chapter 7 showed
concern that the media was unable to live up to its idealized role when reporting on
complex policy issues. In the case of healthcare, interview participants stated that there
was a lack of depth when reporting on healthcare policy issues, a limited number of
reporters with sufficient healthcare knowledge, and a disproportionally high focus on the
negative in comparison to positive news stories.

8.4 Closing Thoughts
Regardless of whether the practice is old or new, the dispersal of decision-making
authority horizontally to actors that exist beyond the reach of the ballot box challenges
public input and accountability norms within the democratic governance process.
Democratic theory holds elections as a vital mechanism of accountability, through which
the policy preferences of the people can influence government action (Fearon, 1999: 57).
If, in a representative democracy, accountability is the principal mechanism through
which mass publics exert control over their elected officials (Rudolph, 2006: 99), thought
must go into how we hold to account public decision-makers that are not elected.
Schattschneider hypothesized that the result of political contests is determined by the
scope of public involvement in conflicts (1975: 5). Schattschneider further asked if
decisions made by government empowered external bodies are as public as those that
occur within elected legislatures (1975: 65). The results from Chapter 7 suggest that they
are not.
With the migration of authority outside of government making decision-making less
public, how do we continue to make decision-makers accountable for acts of public
governance? Two accountability relationships have been considered throughout the
duration of this work - the relationship with government and the relationship with society.
Of the two, results from Chapters 5 and 7 suggest that the indirect accountability
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relationship through government has remained the stronger of the two. Overall, while
citizens have gained capacity to directly hold Type II decision-makers to account, our
elected representatives are able to exercise a unique accountability mechanism on our
behalf, the ability to legislate. The question remains, however, how are we to ensure that
actors are held to account. The answer to this seems to be tied to how public the decisionmaking process continues to be once authority has migrated. The more public the
decision-making process, the wider the scope of the political contest and the stronger the
democratic accountability.

236

References
Abelson, J., F. Miller, M. Giacomini. 2009. “What does it mean to trust a health system?
A qualitative study of Canadian health care values.” Health Policy 91.1 63-70.
Abelson, J., M. Warren and P. Forest. 2012. “The Future of Public Deliberation on
Health Issues.” The Hastings Centre Report. 42.2 27-29.
Adamany, D. 1975. “Introduction.” In The Semisovereing People: A Realist's Veiw of
Democracy in America,, by E. E. Schattschneider. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden
Press.
Adserà, A., C. Boix, and M. Payne. 2003. “Are You Being Served? Political
Accountability and Quality of Government.” Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 19.2: 445-490.
Alberta Health Services. 2012. About AHS. http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/about.asp
(accessed 25-Sep-2012).
Alberta Health Services. 2014. Alberta Health Services Annual Report 2013-2014.
http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/Publications/ahs-pub-2013-2014-annualreport.pdf (accessed 11-Aug-2014).
Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness. 2008. Provincial Service Optimization Review:
Final Report. Government, Edmonton: Queen's Printer for Alberta.
Alberta. Alberta Health and Wellness. 2004. Tracking Health Refrom in Alberta: Alberta
Health Reform Implementation Team Final Report January 2004. Government,
Edmonton: Queen's Printer for Alberta.
Alberta. Elections Alberta. 2012. Candidate Summary of Results (General Elections
1905-2012). 21-Dec-2012. www.elections.ab.ca/Public Website/746.htm
(accessed 02-Feb-2013).
Alberta. Legislative Assembly. 2000. “Regional Health Authorities Act, Revised Statutes
of Alberta 2000, Chapter R-10.” Edmonton, AB: Queen's Publisher for Alberta.
Alberta. Premier's Advisory Council on Health. 2001. A Framework for Reform: Report
of the Premier's Advisory Council on Health. Government, Edmonton: Queen's
Printer for Alberta.
Alberta. Premier's Commission on Future of Health Care for Albertans. 1989a. The
Rainbow Report: Our Vision of Health, Volume 1. Government, Edmonton:
Queen's Printer for Alberta.
Alberta. Premiers's Commission on Future Health Care for Albertans. 1989b. The
Rainbow Report: Our Vision of Health, Volume 2. Government, Edmonton:
Queen's Printer for Alberta.
Althaus, S. L. 2003. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and
the Will of the People. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press.

237

Anderson, C. D. 2006. “Economic Voting and Multilevel governance: A Comparative
Individual-Level Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 50.2: 449-463.
Anderson, C. D. 2008. “Economic Voting, Multilevel Governance and Information in
Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 41.2: 329-354.
Anderson, M. 1996. “New Zealand.” In How many roads? Queen's-CMA Conferene on
Regionalization & Decentralization in Health Care, edited by J. Dorland and S.
Davis. Kingston, ON: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University.
Andrew, C., and M. Goldsmith. 1998. “From Local Government to Local Governance
and Beyond?” International Political Review 19.2: 101-117.
Archer, K., and L. Berdahl. 2011. Explorations: Conducting Empirical Research in
Canadian Political Science. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
Arnstein, S. 1969. “The Ladder of Citizen Participation.” Journal of the American
Institute of Planners 35.4: 216-224.
Aucoin, P. 2003. “Independent foundations, public money and public accountability:
Whither ministerial responsibility as democratic governance?” Canadian Public
Administration 46.1: 1-26.
Aucoin, R., and R. Heintzman. 2000. “The dialectics of Accountability for Performance
in Public Management Reform.” International Review of Administrative Sciences
66.1: 45-55.
Auditor General of Canada. 1999. “Chapter 23: Involving Others in Governing
Accountability at Risk.” http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/9923ce.pdf
(accessed 30-Oct-2012).
Auditor General of Canada. 2002. “Chapter 9: Modernizing Accountabilty in the Public
Sector.” Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons.
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/20021209ce.pdf (accessed 30-Oct-2012).
Bache, I., and M. Flinders. 2005. “Themes and Issues in Multi-Level Governance.” In
Multi-Level Governance, edited by I. Bache and M. Flinders. New York, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Bache, I., and M. Flinders. 2005a “Multi-level Governance: Conclusions and
Implications.” In Multi-level Governance, edited by I. Bache and M. Flinders.
New York, New York: Oxford University Press.
Baker, A., D. Hudson, and R. Woodward. 2005. “Introduction: Financial Globalization
and Multilevel Governance.” In Governing Financial Globalization: International
Political Economy and Multi-level Governance, edited by A. Baker, D. Hudson
and R. Woodward. UK: Routledge.
Baker, R., and M. Rennie. 2011. “Net debt in the Canadian public accounts: Its
emergence and entrenchment.” Canadian Public Administration 54.3: 359-375.
Ball, T., and R. Dagger. 1995. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal. 2nd
Edition. New York, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.

238

Bartle, I., and P. Vass. 2007. “Self-Regulation Within the Regulatory State: Towards a
New Regulatory Paradigm?” Public Administration 85.4: 885-905.
Baumgartner, F., and B. Jones. 2009. Agendas and Instability in America Politics. 2nd
Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Bélanger, E., and R. Nadeau. 2010. “Third-Party Support in Canadian Elections: The
Role of the Economy.” In Voting Behaviour in Canada, edited by C. Anderson
and L. Stephenson. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Bell, S., and A. Hindmoor. 2009. Rethinking Government: The Centrality of the State in
Modern Society. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bell, S., and A. HIndmoor. 2009a. “The Governance of Public Affairs.” Journal of Public
Affairs 9.2: 149-159.
Benz, A. 2007. “Accountability Multilevel Governance by the Open Method of
Coordination?” European Law Journal 13.4: 505-522.
Berg, B. 2007. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. 6th Edition.
Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc,.
Bevir, M. 2010. Democratic Governance. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Bickerton, J. 2001. “Nova Scotia: The Political Economy of Regime Change.” In The
Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and Territories, edited by
K. Brownsey and M. Howlett. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Björkman, J. 1985. “Who governs the Health Sector? Comparative European and
American Experiences with Representation, Participation and Decentralization.”
Comparative Politics 17.4: 399-420.
Black, M., and K. Fierlbeck. 2006. “Whatever happened to regionalization? The curious
case of Nova Scotia.” Canadian Public Administration 49.4: 505-526.
Blais, A., P. Everitt, P. Fournier, E. Gidengil, and. N Nevitte. 2007. Canadian Election
Study 2004-2006. dataset, Institiution of Social Research; York University;
Elections Canada; Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Blatter, J. 2003. “Debordering the World of States: Toword a Multi-Level System in
Europe and a Multi-Polity System in North America? Insights from Border
Regions.” In State/Space: A Reader, edited by N. Brenner, B. Jessop, M. Jones
and G. Macleod. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Bollens, S. 1986. “Examining the Link between State Policy and the Creation of Local
Special Districts.” State and Local Government Review 18.3: 117-124.
Börzel, T. 2010. “Governance: Negotiation and Competition in the Shadow of
Hierarchy.” Journal of Common Market Studies 48.2: 191-219.
Boessenkool, K. 2013. “The Future of the Provincial Role in Canadian Health Care
Federalism” In Health Care Federalism in Canada: Critical Junctures and
Critical Perspectives, edited by K. Fierlbeck and W. Lahey. Montreal &
Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
239

Bovens, M. 2007. “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework.”
European Law Journal 13.4: 447-468.
Bovens, M. 1990. “Review Article: The Social Steering of Complex Organizations.”
British Journal of Political Science 20.1: 91-117.
Bradford, N. 2000. “The Policy Influence of Economic Ideas: Interests, Institutions and
Innovations in Canada:.” In Restructuring and Resistance: Canadian Public
Policy in an Age of Global Capitalism, edited by M. Burke, C. Mooers and J.
Shields. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing.
Bradford, N. 2003. “Public-Private Partnership? Shifting Paradigms of Economic
Governance in Ontario.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 36.5: 1005-1033.
Braën, A. 2004. “Health and the Distribution of Powers in Canada.” In The Governance
of Health Care in Canada: The Rmanow Papers, Volume 3., edited by P. Forest,
G. Marchildon and T. McIntosh. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
British Columbia. Legislative Assembly. 1988. An Electoral history of British Columbia,
1871-1987. Victoria: Queen's Printer of British Columbia.
British Collumbia. Legislative Assembly. 1996. “Health Authorities Act, Revisesed
Statutes of British Columbia 1996, Chapter 180.” Victoria, BC: Queen's Printer
for British Columbia.
British Columbia. Legislative Assembly. 2002. Electoral history of British Columbia:
Supplement, 1987 - 2001. Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia.
British Columbia. Ministry of Health. 1993. New Directions for a Healthy British
Columbia. Government, Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia.
British Columbia. Ministry of Health Planning. 2001. A new Era for Patient-Centred
Health Care: Building a Sustainable, Accountable Structure for Delivery of HighQuality Patient Services. Government, Victoria: Queen's Printer for British
Columbia.
British Columbia. Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs. 1991. Closer to Home:
Teh Report of the British Columbia Royal Commission on Health Care ad Costs
Volume 2. Government, Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia.
Brzinski, J., T. Lancaster, and C. Tuschloff. 1999. “Federalism and Compounded
Representation: Key Concepts and Project Overview.” Publius: The Journal of
Federalism 29.1: 1-17.
Burgess, M. 2000. Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950-2000.
New York, New York: Routledge.
Burke, M., C. Mooers, and J. Shields. 2000. “Introduction: Critical Perspectives on
Canada.” In Restructuring and Resistance: Canadian Public Policy in an Age of
Global Capitalism, edited by M. Burke, C. Mooers and J. Shields. Halifax, Nova
Scotia: Fernwood Publishing.

240

Busuioc, M., D. Curtin, and M. Groenleer. 2011. “Agency Growth between Autonomy
and Accountability: the European Police Office as a 'Living Institution'.” Journal
of European Public Policy 18.6: 848-867.
Canada. Canada Research Chairs. 2011. Canada Research Chair in Multilevel
Governance. http://www.chairs-chaires.gc.ca/chairholders-titulaires/profileeng.aspx?profileId=856 (accessed 15-Feb-2013).
Canada. Statistics Canada. 1983. “Historical Statistics of Canada.”
Canada. Statistics Canada. “CANSIM: Statistics Canada's socioeconomic database.”
Statistics Canada.
Canada. Statistics Canada. 2013. Population by year, by province and territory (Number).
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm
(accessed 14-Jan-2014).
Canada. Statistics Canada. 2011. Standard Geographical Classification (SGC) 2011.
http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p3VD.pl?Function=getVDPage1&db=imdb&di
s=2&adm=8&TVD=116940 (accessed 14-Jan- 2014).
Caporaso, J. 1996. “The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or
Post Modern?” Journal of Common Market Studies 34.1: 29-52.
Chevallier, J. 2003. “La Gouvernance, un Nouveau Paradigme Étatique?” Revue
française d'administration publique 105/106: 203-217.
Church, J., and N. Smith. 2008. “Health Reform in Alberta: The Introduction of Health
Regions.” Canadian Public Administration 51.2: 217-238.
Cochrance, C. 2010. “Left/Right Ideology and Canadian Politics.” Canadian Journal of
Political Science 43.3: 583-605.
Cohen, J., and C. Sabel. 1997. “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy.” European Law Journal
3.4: 313-342.
Collier, R. 2010. “Is Regionalization Working?” Canadian Medical Association Journal
18.4: 331-332.
Cross, W., and L. Young. 2002. “Policy Attitudes of Party Members in Canada: Evidence
of Ideological Politics.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35.4: 859-880.
Cross, W. 2002. “The Increasing Importance of Region to Canadian Electoral
Campaigns.” In Regionalism and Party Politics in Canada, edited by L. Young
and W. Cross. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.
Crouch, C. 2004. “The State and Innovations in Economic Governance.” The Political
Quarterly 75.s1: 100-116.
Cutler, F. 2004. “Government Responsibility and Electoral Accountability in
Federations.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 34.2: 19-38.
Davidson, A. 1999. “British Columbia's Health Reform 'New Directions' and
Accountability.” Canadian Journal of Public Health 90.Supplement 1: S3S-S38.

241

Deber, R. B. 2003. “Health Care Reform: Lessons From Canada.” Anerican Journal of
Public Health 93.1: 20-24.
Dekker, E. 1994. “Health Care Reforms and Public Health.” European Journal of Public
Health, 4.4: 281-286.
Delli Carpini, M., Keeter, S. 1996. What Americans know about politics and why it
matters. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Disch, L. 2012. “Democratic Representation and the Constituency Paradox.”
Perspectives on Politics 10.3: 599-616.
D'Ombrain, N. 2007. “Ministerial Responsibility and the Machinery of Government.”
Canadian Public Administration 50.2: 195-217.
Dorland, J., and S. Davis. 1996. “Regionalization as Health-care Reform.” In How many
roads? Queen's-CMA Conference on Regionalization & Decentralization in
Health Care, edited by J. Dorland and S. Davis. Kingston, ON: School of Policy
Studies, Queen’s University.
Dreyer Lassen, D, and D. Serritzlew. 2011. “Jurisdictional and Local Democracy:
Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform.” American Political Science
Review 105.2: 238-258.
Duckett, S. 2009. “Second wave reform in Alberta.” Health Management Forum 23.4
156-158.
Duckett, S. 2011. “Getting the Foundations Right: Alberta’s Approach to Healthcare
Reform.” Healthcare Policy 6.3 22-27.
Dunn, C. 2001. “Comparative Provincial Politics: A Review.” In The Provincial State in
Canada: Politics in the Provinces and Territories, edited by K. Brownsey and M.
Howlett. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Dunn, J. 1999. “Situating Democratic Political Accountability.” In Decocracy,
Accountability, and Representation, edited by A. Przeworski, S. Stokes and B.
Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dunn, W. 2004. Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. 3rd Edition. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Dyck, R. 2006. “Provincial Politics in a Modern Era.” In Provinces: Canadian Provincial
Politics, edited by C. Dunn. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press.
Esselment, A. L. 2010. “Fighting Elections: Cross-Level Political Party Integration in
Ontario.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43.4: 871-892.
Fearon, J. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good
Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation, edited by A. Przeworski, S. Stokes and B. Manin. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Fenn, M. 2006. “Reinvigorating publicly funded medicare in Ontario: new public policy
and public administration.” Canadian Public Administration 49.4: 527-547.

242

Fierlbeck, K. 2013. “Introduction: Renewing Federalism, Improving Health Care: Can
this Marriage Be Saved?” In Health Care Federalism in Canada: Critical
Junctures and Critical Perspectives, edited by K. Fierlbeck and W. Lahey.
Montreal & Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Finkel, A. 1989. The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Flinders, M. 2006. “Public/Private: The Boundaries of the State.” In The State Theories
and Issues, edited by C. Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh. New York, New York:
Palgrave MacMillan,
Flinders, M. 2011. “Devolution, Delegation and the Westminister Model: A Comparative
Analysis of Developments within the UK, 1998-2009.” Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics 49.1: 1-28.
Flynn, G. 2011. “Politicians Control Government.” In Approaching Public
Administration: Core Debates and Emerging Issues, edited by R. Leone and F.
Ohemeng. Toronto, Ontario: Emond Montgomery Publications.
Fortier, M. 1996. “The Evolving Federal Role in Health Care.” In How many roads?:
Queens's CMA Conference on Regionalization & Decentralization in Health
Care, edited by J. Dorland and S. Davis. Kingston, ON: School of Policy Studies,
Queen's University.
Frankish, C., B. Kwan, P. Ratner, J. Higgins, and C. Larsen. 2002. “Challenges of citizen
participation in regional health authorities.” Social Science & Medicine 54.10:
1471-1480.
Frankish, C., B. Kwan, P. Ratner, J. Higgins, and C. Larsen. 2002a. “Social and political
factors influencing the functioning of regional health boards in British Columbia
(Canada).” Health Policy 61.2: 125-151.
Fraser, R. 1996. “Accountability and Regionalization.” In How many roads? Queen'sCMA Conference on Regionalization & Decentralization in Health Care, edited
by J. Dorland and S. Davis. Kingston, ON: School of Policy Studies, Queen's
University.
Frey, B., and R. Eichenberger. 1999. The New Democratic Federalism for Europe.
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Fung, A. 2006. “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance.” Public
Administration Review Special Issue: 66-76.
Gerber, E., and K. Kollman. 2004. “Introduction - Authority Migration: Defining an
Emerging Research Agenda.” PS: Political Science and Politics 37.3: 397-401.
Gotham, K. F. 2012. “Disaster, Inc.: Privatization and Post-Katrina Rebuilding in New
Orleans.” Perspectives on Politics 10.3: 633-646.
Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant LHIN. 2009. Integration Decisions Directs Niagara
Health System to Make Changes at its Fort Erie Site. 27-Jan-2009.
http://www.hnhblhin.on.ca/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=4228 (accessed 17May-2010).
243

Hamilton Spectator. 2010. Hudak would reopen Fort Erie hospital ER. 29-April-2010.
http://www.thespec.com/news/article/17875--hudak- (accessed 28-Aug-2012).
Hamilton, Alexander. 1788. “The Federalist No. 70: The Executive Department Further
Considered.” Constitution Society. http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa70.htm
(accessed 24-Aug-2012).
Harber, B., T. Ball. 2004 “Redefining Accountability in the Healthcare Sector.” Law and
Governance 8.6: 41-48.
Harlow, C., and R. Rawling. 2007. “Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance:
A Network Approach.” European Law Journal 13.4: 542-562.
Harmes, A. 2006. “Neoliberalism and mulilevel governance.” Review of International
Political Economy 13.5: 725-749.
Harrison, K. 2003. “Passing the Environmental Buck.” In New Trends in Canadian
Federalism, edited by F. Rocher and M. Smith. Peterorough, ON: Broadview
Press.
Hayes, T., and B. Bishin. 2012. “Issue Salience, Subconstituency Politics, and Legislative
Representation.” Congress & the Presidency 39.2: 133-159.
Heinmiller, B. T. 2011. “Ministerial Responsibility: The Cornerstone of Administrative
Accountability in Canadian Government.” In Approaching Public Administration:
Core Debates and Emerging Issues, edited by R. Leone and F. Ohemeng.
Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications.
Henderson, A. 2004. “Regional Political Cultures in Canada.” Canadian Journal of
Political Science 37.1: 595-615.
Hirst, P. 2000. “Democracy and Governance.” In Debating Governance: Authority,
Steering and Democracy, edited by J. Pierre. New York, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hodgetts, J. E. 1973. The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government, 18671970. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Hoehn, F. 2011. “Privatization and the boundaries of judicial review.” Canadian Public
Administration 54.1: 73-95.
Hueglin, T., and A. Fenna. 2006. Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry.
Toronto, ON: Broadview Press.
Hughs, O. 2010. “Does Governance Exist?” In The New Public Governance?: Emerging
Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance, edited by S.
Osborne. New York, New York: Routledge.
Hurley, J., J. Lomas, and V. Bhatia. 1994. “When tinkering is not enough: provincial
reform to manage health care resources.” Canadian Public Administration 37.3:
490-514.
Hutchings, V. 2001. “Political Context, Issue Salience, and Selective Attentiveness:
Constituent Knowledge of the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Vote.” Journal of
Politics 63.3: 846-868.

244

Jackson, R. and D. Jackson. 2001. Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour
and Public Policy. Toronto, ON: Prentice Hall.
Jerit, J. 2008. “Issue Framing and Engagement: Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy
Debates.” Political Behaviour 30.1: 1-24.
Jessop, B. 2004. “Hollowing Out the 'Nation-State' and Multi-Level Governance.” In A
Handbook of Comparative Social Policy, edited by P. Kennett. Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Jessop, B. 2005. “Multi-level Governance and Multi-level Metagovenance.” In Multilevel Governance, edited by I. Bache and M. Flinders. New York, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Johnson, C. 2004. “Health Care Politics and the Intergovernmental Framework in
Canada.” In The Governance of Health Care in Canada: The Romanow Papers,
Volume 3, edited by P. Forest, G. Marchildon and T. McIntosh. Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press.
Kahler, M., and D. Lake. 2004. “Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in
Transition.” PS: Political Science and Politics 37.3: 409-414.
Kennett, P. 2010. “Global Perspectives on Governance.” In The New Public
Governance?: Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public
Governance, edited by Stephen Osborne. New York, New York: Routledge.
Kernaghan, K., B. Marson, and S. Borins. 2005. The New Public Organization. Toronto,
ON: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada.
Kohler-Koch, B., and B. Rittberger. 2007. “Charting Crowded Territory: Debating the
Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union.” In Debating the Democratic
Legitimacy of the European Union, edited by B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger.
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
Kooiman, J. 1999. “Social-Political Governance: Introduction.” In Modern Governance,
edited by J. Kooiman. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Kooiman, J. 1999a. “Governance and Governability: Using Complexity Dynamics and
Diversity.” In Modern Governance, edited by J. Kooiman. London: Sage
Publications Ltd, 1993a.
Kooiman, J. 2010. “Governing and Governability.” In The New Public Governance:
Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance, edited
by Stephen Osborne. New York, New York: Routledge.
Koppell, J. 2005. “Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of 'Multiple
Accountability Disorder'.” Public Administration Review 65.1: 94-108.
Löffler, E. 2009. “Public Governance in a Network Society.” In Public Management and
Governance, edited by E. Löffler and T. Bovaird. New York, New York:
Routledge.
Lagona, F., and F. Padovano. 2008. “The Political Legislation Cycle.” Public Choice
134.3/4: 201-229.
245

Larner, W. 2000. “Neo-Liberal: Policy, Ideology, Govenmentality.” Studies in Political
Economy 63: 5-25.
Laver, M., and K. Shepsle. 1999. “Government Accountability in Parliamentary
Democracy.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by A.
Przeworski, S. Stokes and B. Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lavis, J. 2004. “Political Elites and Thier Influence on Health Care Reform in Canada.”
In The Governance of Health Care in Canada: The Romanow Papers Volume 3,
edited by P. Forest, G. Marchildron and T. McIntosh. Toronto, ON: University of
Toronto Press.
Lazar, H. 2013. “Why Is It So Hard to Reform Health-Care Policy In Canada?” In
Paradigm Freeze:Why It Is So Hard to Reform Health-Care Policy In Canada
edited by H. Lazar, P. Forest, and John Church. Montreal & Kingston, Canada:
McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Lazar, H., P. Forest, J. Lavis and J. Church. 2013. “Canadian Health-Care Reform: What
Kind? How Much? Why?” In Paradigm Freeze:Why It Is So Hard to Reform
Health-Care Policy In Canada edited by H. Lazar, P. Forest, and John Church.
Montreal & Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Leo, C., and M. August. 2009. “The Multilevel Governance of Immigration and
Settlement: Making Deep Federalism Work.” Canadian Journal of Political
Science 42.2: 491-510.
Lerner, J., and P. Tetlock. 1999. “Accounting for the Effects of Accountability.”
Psychology Bulletin 125.2: 255-275.
Leuprecht, C., and H. Lazar. 2007. “From multilevel to 'multi-order' governance?” In
Spheres of Governance: Comparative Studies of Cities Multilevel Governance
Systems, edited by C. Leuprecht and H. Lazar. Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen's University Press.
Liepert, R. 2009. “Recent changes to health structures in Alberta.” In Health Innovations
Forum: Raising the bar on health system performance. Montreal: MUHC ISAI
http://www.healthinnovationforum.org/2009/nov/01/recent-changes-healthstructures-alberta/. (accessed 21-Jan-2014).
Lieske, J. 2012. “American State Culture: Testing a New Measure and Theory.” Publius:
The Journal of Federalism 42.1: 108-133.
Lomas, J. 1996. “Devolved Authorities in Canada: the New Site of Health-Care System
Conflict?” In How many roads? Queen's-CMA Conference on Regionalization &
Decentralization in Health Care, edited by J. Dorland and S. Davis. Kingston,
ON: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University.
Lomas, J. 1997. “Devolving authority for health care in Canada’s provinces: 4. Emerging
issues and prospects.” Canadian Medical Association Journal 156.6: 817-823.
Lomas, J., G. Veenstra, and J. Woods. 1997. “Devolving authority for health care in
Canada's provinces: 2. Backgrounds, resources and activities of board members.”
Canadian Medical Association Journal 156.4: 513-520.

246

Lomas, J., J. Woods, and G. Veenstra. 1997. “Devolving authority for health care in
Canada's provinces: 1. An Introduction to the issues.” Canadian Medical
Association Journal 156.3: 371-377.
Lomas, J., J. Woods, and G. Veenstra. 1997a. “Devolving authority for health care in
Canada's provinces: 3. Motivations, attitudes and approaches of board members.”
Canadian Medical Association Journal 156.5: 669-676.
Lowndes, V., and D. Wilson. 2001. “Social Capital and Local Governance: Exploring the
Institional Design Variable.” Political Studies 49.4: 629-647.
Majone, G. 1997. “From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences
of Changes in the Modes of Governance.” Journal of Public Policy 17.2: 139167.
Manin, B., A. Przeworske, and S. Stokes. 1999. “Elections and Representation.” In
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by A. Przeworske, S.
Stokes and B. Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mann, M. 2003. “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and
Results.” In State/Society: A Reader, edited by N. Brenner, B. Jessop, M. Jones
and G. Macleod. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing
Mansbridge, J. 2011. “Clarifying the Conception of Representation.” American Political
Science Review 105.3: 621-630.
Marchildon G. 2013. Health Systems in Transitions: Canada. 2nd Edition. Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press.
Marks, G. 1993. “Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC.” In The State of
the European Community vol 2: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, edited by
A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal. Boulder, CO: Lyne Riener Publishers.
Marks, G., and L. Hooghe. 2003. “Unraveling the Central State, but how? Types of
Multi-level Governance.” American Political Science Review 97.2: 233-243.
Marks, G, and L Hooghe. “Contrasting Visions of Multilevel Governance.” In MultiLevel Govenance, edited by Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders. New York, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Marks, G., L. Hooghe, and K. Blank. 1996. “European Integration from the 1980s: StateCentric v. Multi-level Governance.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34.3:
341-378.
Marlowe, C. 1604. “The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus by Christopher Marlowe.”
www.gutenburg.org. Edited by A. Dyrc. http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/779
(accessed 22-Jan-2013).
Matthews, F. 2012. “The Capacity to Co-ordinate - Whitehall Governance and the
Challenge of Climate Change.” Public Policy and Administration 27.2: 169-189.
McBride, S., and J. Shields. 1997. Dismantling a Nation: The Transition to Corporate
Rule in Canada. 2nd Edition. Halifax, NS: Fernwod Publishing.

247

McRoberts, K. 1997. Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity. Toronto,
ON: Oxford University Press.
Mills, A. 1990. “Dencentralization Concepts and Issues: A Review.” In Health System
Decentralization: Concepts, Issues and Country Experiences., edited by A. Mills,
P. Vaughan, D. Smith and I. Tabibzadeh. Geneva: World Health Organization.
Mulgan, R. 2000. “'Accountability': An Ever-expanding Concept?” Public Administration
78.3: 555-573.
Naylor, C. D. 1999. “Health care in Canada: Instrumentalism under fiscal duress.” Health
Affairs 18.3 9-26.
Nelson, T., and D. Kinder. 1996. “Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public
Opinion.” The Journal of Politics 58.4: 1055-1078.
Nevitte, N. 1996. Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National
Perspective. Peterborough, ON: Broadview, Press.
Newman, J. 2005. “Introduction.” In Remaking Governance: Peoples, Politics and the
Public Sphere, edited by J. Newman. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Nova Scotia. Elections Nova Scotia. Election Statistics.
http://electionsnovascotia.ca/election-data/statistics.
Nova Scotia. Legislative Assembly. 2000. “District Health Authorities Act, Chapter 6 of
the Acts of 2000.” Halifax, NS: Queen's Printer for Nova Scotia.
Nova Scotia. Minister's Task on Regionalized Health Care in Nova Scotia. 1999. Final
Report and Recommendations. Government, Halifax: Queen's Printer for Nova
Scotia.
Nova Scotia. Nova Scotia Legislature. 2014. Past Premiers.
http://nslegislature.ca/index.php/about/past-premiers/ (accessed 16-Jan-2014).
Nova Scotia. Royal Commission on Health Care. 1990. Health Strategies for the
Nineties: Managies Better Health. Government, Halifaz: Queen's Printer for Nova
Scotia.
Oates, W. 2004. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.” In Fiscal Federalism and European
Economic Integration, edited by M. Baimbridge and P. Whyman. London:
Routledge.
OECD. 2003. Glossary of Statistical Terms. http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/
detail.asp?ID=3020 (accessed 3-Dec-2012).
Olseen, G. 2002. The Politics of the Welfare State: Canada Sweden, and the United
States. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press.
Olsson, J. 2003. “Democracy paradoxes in Multi-level Governance: Theorizing on
Structural Fund System Research.” Journal of European Public Policy 10.2: 283300.

248

Ontario Local Health Integration Network. 2006. “About LHINs” Ontario’s Local Health
Integration Networks.” Local Health Integration Network. Edited by Queen's
Printers for Ontario. http://www.lhins.on.ca/aboutlhin.aspx?ekmensel=
e2f22c9a_72_184_btnlink (accessed 19-May-2010).
Ontario. Health Results Team. 2005. Health Reslths Team First Annual Report 2004-05.
Government, Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario.
Ontario. Health Results Team. 2005a. “Bulletin No. 6.” Local Health Integration
Networks: Building a True System. Toronto, ON: Queen's Printers for Ontario.
Ontario. Legislative Assembly. 2006. “Local Health System Integration Act, Statutes of
Ontario, 2006, Chapter 4.” Toronto, ON: Queen's Printers for Ontario.
Ontario. Minister of Health Health and Long-Term Care. 2004. “Ontario's Health
Transformation Plan Purpose and Progress. Speaking Notes for: The Honourable
Minister of Health and Long-Term Care September 9, 2004.” Queen's Printer for
Ontario.
Ontario. Ministry of Health. 1975. Report, Reactions Response: The Health Care System
in Ontario. Government, Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario.
Ontario. Ontario Health Planning Task Force. 1974. Report of the Health Planning Task
Force. Government, Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, Toronto.
Ontario. Ontario Health Review Panel. 1987. Toward a Shared Direction for Health in
Ontario: Report of the Ontario Health Review Panel, June 1987. Government,
Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario.
Ornstein, H., M. Stevenson, and A. Williams. 1980. “Region, Class and Political Culture
in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 13.2: 227-271.
Pal, L. 2006. Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times. 3rd
Edition. Toronto, ON: Thomson Nelson.
Papadopoulos, Y. 2007. “Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and
Multilevel Governance.” European Law Journal 13.4: 469-486.
Pestoff, V., and T. Brandsen. 2010. “Public Governance and the Third Sector:
Opportunities for Co-operation and Innovation.” In The New Public Governance:
Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance, edited
by Stephen Osborne. New York, New York: Routledge.
Peters, G. 2000. “Governance and Comparative Politics.” In Debating Governance:
Authority, Steering and Democracy, edited by J. Pierre. New York, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Peters, G. 2004. “Back to the Centre? Rebuilding the State.” The Political Quarterly
75.s1: 130-140.
Peters, G. 2010. “Bureaucracy and Democracy.” Public Organization Review 10.3: 209222.

249

Peters, G. 2010a. “Meta-governance and Public Management.” In The New Public
Governance: Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public
Governance, edited by Stephen Osborne. New York, New York: Routledge.
Peters, G., and J. Pierre. 1998. “Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public
Administration.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8.2: 223243.
Peters, G., and J. Pierre. 2005. “Multi-level Governance and Democracy: A Faustian
Bargain” In Multi-level Governance, edited by I. Bache and M. Flinders. New
York, New York: Oxford University Press.
Peters, G., and J. Pierre. 2006. “Governance, Government and the State.” In The State
Theories and Issues, edited by C. Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh. New York, New
York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Peterson, D. 1996. “Reflections on Medicare as a National Institution.” In How many
roads? Queen's-CMA Conference on Regionalization & Decentralization in
Health Care, edited by J. Dorland and S. Davis. Kingston, Ontario: School of
Policy Studies, Queen's University.
Philippon, D., and S. Wasylyshyn. 1996. “Health-care reform in Alberta.” Canada Public
Administration 39.1: 70-84.
Pierre, J. 2000. “Conclusion: Governance beyond State Strength.” In Debating
Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, edited by J. Pierre. New York,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Pierre, J., and G. Peters. 2005. Governing Complex Societies: Trajectories and Scenarios.
New York, New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Pollock, P. 2009. The Essentials of Political Analysis. 3rd Edition. Washington, DC: CQ
Press.
Rein, M., and D. Schon. 1991. “Frame-Reflective Policy Discourse.” In Social Sciences
and Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads, edited by
P. Wagner, C. Hirsch Weiss, B. Wittrock and H. Wollman. Cambridge University
Press.
Rhodes, R. 1997.Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity
and Accountability. Bristal, Pennsylvania: Open University Press.
Rhodes, R. 2007. “Understanding Governance: Ten Years On.” Organizational Studies
28.8: 1243-1264.
Richardson, J. 2011. “Dillon's Rule is From Mars, Home Rule is From Venus: Local
Government Autonomy and the Rules of Statuary Construction.” Publius: The
Journal of Federalism 41.1: 662-685.
Robichau, R. W. 2011. “The Mosaic of Governance: Creating a Picture with Definitions,
Theories, and Debates.” Policy Studies Journal 39.S1: 113-131.
Ronson, J. 2006. “Local Health Integration Networks: Will 'Made in Ontario' Work?”
Healthcare Quarterly 9.9: 46-48.

250

Rosenau, J. 2000. “Change, Complexity and Covernance in a Globalizing Space.” In
Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy, edited by J. Pierre.
New York, New York: Oxford University Press.
Rosenau, J. 2005. “Strong Demand, Hugh Supply: Governance in an Emerging Epoc.” In
Multi-level Governance, edited by I. Bache and M. Flinders. New York, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Rosenau, J. 2007. “Governing the Ungovernable: The Challenge of a Global
Disaggregation of Authority.” Regulation and Authority 1.1: 88-97.
Rudolph, T. J. 2006. “Triangulating Political Responsibility: The Motivated Formation of
Responsibility Judgements.” Political Psychology 27.1: 99-122.
Sørensen, E. 2006. “Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of
Democratic Governance.” American Review of Public Administration 36.1: 98114.
Sørensen, E., and J. Torfing. 2008. “Governance Network Research:Toward a Second
Generation.” In Theories of Democratic Network Governance, edited by E.
Sørensen and J. Torfing. New York, New York: Palgrave MacMillian.
Saviour, D. 2006. Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes.
Toronto, ON: Toronto University Press.
Scharpf, F. 1994. “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Nagative Coordination in
Embedded Negotiations.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6.1: 27-53.
Scharpf, F. 1997. “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State.” Journal of
European Public Policy 4.1: 18-36.
Schattschneider, E. E. 1975. The Semisovereign People: a Realist's View of Democracy
in America. reissued with an introduction by David Adamany. Hinsdale, Illinois:
The Dryden Press.
Schneider, S., W. Jacoby and D. Lewis. 2011. “Public Opinion Toward
Intergovernmental Policy Responsibilities.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism
41.1: 1-30.
Seabright, P. 1996. “Accountability and decentralization in government: An incomplete
contracts model.” European Economic Review 40: 61-89.
Siaroff, A. 2006. “Provincial Political Data Since 1900.” In Provinces: Canadian
Provincial Politics, edited by C. Dunn. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto
Press.
Simeon, R., and D. Elkins. 1974. “Regional Political Cultures in Canada.” Canadian
Journal of Political Science 7.3: 397-437.
Simmons, J. 2011. “Desperate Measures: Why Performance Management Just Doesn't
Measure Up.” In Approaching Public Administration: Core Debates and
Emerging Issues, edited by R. Leone and F. Ohemeng. Toronto, ON: Emond
Montgomery Publications.

251

Singleton, R., and B. Straits. 2005. Approaches to Social Research. New York, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Skelcher, C. 2005. “Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic
Governance.” Governance 18.1: 89-110.
Skelcher, C. 2007. “Does Democracy Matter? A Transatlantic Research Design on
Democratic Performance and Special Purpose Governments.” Journal of Public
Admin Research and Theory 17.1: 61-76.
Skelcher, C., N. Mathur, and M. Smith. “The Public Governance of Collaborative
Spaces: Discourse, Design and Democracy.” Public Administration 83.3: 573596.
Skogstad, G. 2003. “Who Governs? Who Should Govern?: Political Authority and
Legitimacy in Canada in the Twenty-First Century.” Canadian Journal of
Political Science 35.5: 955-973.
Sniderman, P., and S. Theriault. “The Structure of Political Argument and Logic of Issue
Framing.” In Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement
Error, and Change, edited by W. Saris and P. Sniderman. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Soroka, S. 2007. A report to the Health Council of Canada: Canadian Perceptions of the
Health Care System. Toronto: Health Council of Canada.
Soroka, S., and C. Wlezien. 2004. “Opinion Representation and Policy Feedback: Canada
in Comparative Perspective.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 37.3: 531559.
Soroka, S., and C. Wlezien. 2011. Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy.”
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 41.1: 31-52.
Spasoff, R. A. 1992. “A New Approach to Health Promotion in Ontario.” Health
Promotion International 7.2: 129-133.
StataCorp LP. 2013. Stata Base Reference Manual: Release 13. College Station, Texas:
Stata Press.
Stefanick, L. 2011. “Government Outsourcing of Service Provision: Be Careful What
You Wish For.” In Approaching Public Administration: Core Debates and
Emerging Issues, edited by R. Leone and F. Ohemeng. Toronto, ON: Emond
Montgomery Publications.
Stewart, D., and R. Kenneth Carty. 2006. “Many Political Worlds? Provincial Parties and
Party Systems.” In Provinces: Canadian Provincial Politics, edited by C. Dunn.
Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Stivers, C. 2008. Governance in Dark Times: Practical Philosophy for Public Service.
Washington, DC: Georgtown University Press.
Stone, D. 1989. “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.” Political Science
Quarterly 104.2: 281-300.

252

Strøm, K. 2000. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” Journal
of Political Research 37.3: 261-289.
Teeple, G. 2000. Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform: Into the Twenty-First
Century. Aurora, ON: Garamond Press.
Thompson, D. 1980. “Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many
Hands.” American Political Science Review 74.4: 904-916.
Tomblim, S. 2004. “Creating a More Democratic Health System: A Critical Review of
Constraints and a New Approach to Health Restructuring.” In The Governance of
Health Care in Canada: The Romanow Papers, Volume 3, edited by P. Forest, G.
Marchildon and T. McIntoch. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
Torfing, J., and T. Triantafillou. 2011. “Introduction to Interactive policy making,
metagovernance and democracy.” In Interactive Policy Making, Metagovernance
and Democracy, edited by J. Torfing and T. Triantafillou. Colchester: ECPR
Press.
Torfing, J., G. Peters, J. Pierre, and E. Sorensen. 2012. Interactive Governance:
Advancing: the Paradigm. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.
Vancouver. Board of Parks and Reacreation. 2012. Park Board Commissioner.
http://vancouver.ca/your-government/park-board-commissioners.aspx (accessed
1-Aug-2012).
Vaughan, P. 1990. “Lessons from Experience.” In Health System Decentralization:
Concepts, Issues and Country Experiences, edited by A. Mills, P. Vaughan, D.
Smith and I. Tabibzadah. Geneva: World Health Organization.
Vining, A. R., and A. E. Boardman. 2008. “Public-private partnerships in Canada:
Theory and evidency.” Canadian Public Administration 51.1: 9-44.
Wainwright, H. 2004. “Reclaiming 'The Public' through the People.” The Political
Quarterly 75.s1: 141-156.
Wallington, T., G. Lawrence, and B. Loechel. 2008. “Reflections on the Legitimacy of
Regional Environmental Governance: Lessons from Australia's Experiment in
Natural Resource Management.” Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning
10.1: 1-30.
Warren, A. 1996. “Ontario.” In How many roads? Queen's-CMA Conference on
Regionalization & Decentralization in Health Care, edited by J. Dorland and S.
Davis. Kingston, ON: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University.
Warren, M. 2011. “Voting with Your Feet: Exit-based Empowerment in Democratic
Theory.” American Political Science Review 105.4: 683-701.
Wiseman, N. 2008. “Provincial Political Cultures.” In Provinces: Canadian Provincial
Politics, edited by C. Dunn. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

253

Appendix A: Accountability Mechanism Coding – Government/Society Relationship
with Type II Bodies
Accountability Mechanism

Relationship

Accountability Component

Provincial government appoints board
members

Government

Sanction

Provincial government can terminate
board members

Government

Sanction

Provincial government appoints board
chair

Government

Sanction

Provincial members of government
named to the board

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Provincial members of government
named to board as ex officio members

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Members of provincial legislature
named to the board

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Provincial public service positions
named to the board

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Provincial public service positions
named to board as ex officio members

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Other level of government appoints
board members

Government

Sanction

Other level of government can
terminate board members

Government

Sanction

Other level of government appoints
board chair

Government

Sanction

Member of other level of government
named to the board

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Member of other level of government
named to board as ex officio member

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Special interest actor appoints or
elects board members

Special Interest

Sanction
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Accountability Mechanism

Relationship

Accountability Component

Special interest actor can terminate
board members

Special Interest

Sanction

Special interest actor appoints board
chair

Special Interest

Sanction

Public elects board members

Society

Sanction

Public can terminate board members

Society

Sanction

Public appoints board chair

Society

Sanction

Board members have a fixed
appointment time

N/A

N/A

Provincial government is able to
reappoint board members after term is
completed

Government

Sanction

Type II body must submit an annual
report to the provincial government

Government

Explanation/Justification

Type II body must submit an annual
report to the provincial legislature

Government

Explanation/Justification

Government can request ad hoc
reports from the Type II body

Government

Explanation/Justification

Type II body must submit an annual
report to municipal government(s)

Government

Explanation/Justification

Type II body subject to having its
accounts audited by provincial auditor
or external auditor appointed by
provincial auditor

Government

Questioning/Judgment

Type II body subject to having its
accounts audited by a municipal
auditor

Government

Questioning/Judgment

Type II body subject to having its
accounts audited by the Auditor
General of Canada

Government

Questioning/Judgment
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Accountability Mechanism

Relationship

Accountability Component

Type II body subject to audit by
Government
ministry officials or ministry approved
auditor

Questioning/Judgment

Audited financial reports sent to
provincial government

Government

Questioning/Judgment

Audited financial reports submitted to
provincial legislature

Government

Questioning/Judgment

Audited financial reports sent to
municipal government

Government

Questioning/Judgment

Provincial government funds Type II
body based on performance standards

Government

Sanction

Provincial government appoints
members of an overseeing or review
body

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Provincial government has the power
to transfer Type II bodies power to an
alternate entity

Government

Sanction

Mechanism by which public
complaints against actors under
jurisdiction of the Type II body are
heard and investigated

Society

Questioning/Judgment

Formal process by which the public
Society
can appeal the decisions of the Type II
body

Questioning/Judgment

Formal process by which provincial
government can appeal the decisions
of the Type II body

Government

Questioning/Judgment

Type II body required to hold public
consultations prior to making policy
decisions

Society

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Public may force the dissolution of a
Type II body by petition or other
action

Society

Sanction
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Accountability Mechanism

Relationship

Accountability Component

Municipal government may withdraw
from a Type II body

Government

Sanction

Type II body reports must be
publically read or published

Society

Explanation/Justification

Type II body must hold an annual
ratepayers meeting

Society

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Annual general meeting (members
only)

Special Interest

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Public meeting can be initiated by the
public

Society

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Type II body committee members are
elected by the public

Society

Sanction

Type II body or government appoints
citizens committee positions

Society

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Type II body board meetings are open
to the public

Society

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment

Type II body board meeting minutes
are open to the public

Society

Explanation/Justification

Type II body board meeting minutes
are sent to the provincial government

Government

Explanation/Justification

Type II body accountability
agreement required by government

Government

Sanction

Type II body budget (or aspects of it)
must be approved by government

Government

Sanction

Formal process exists by which
government may block decisions
made by the Type II body

Government

Sanction

A service plan or memorandum of
understanding is required between
Type II body and government

Government

Explanation/Justification
Questioning/Judgment
Sanction
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Appendix B: Type II Bodies
Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

ABC Benefits
Corporation

ABC Benefits
Corporation Act

1996

Alberta

Agricultural Products
Marketing Council

The Marketing of
Agricultural Products
Act

1965

Alberta

Agricultural Relief
Adjustment Board

Municipal Government
Act

Alberta

Agriculture Financial
Services Corporation

Agriculture Financial
Services Act

1963

Alberta

Alberta Agricultural
Research Institute

Alberta Science and
Research Authority Act

1970

Alberta

Alberta Alcoholism and
Drug Abuse Commission

Alberta Alcoholism and
Drug Abuse Commission

1970

Alberta

Alberta Apprenticeship
and Industry Training
Board

Apprenticeship and
Industry Training

1991

Alberta

Alberta Art Foundation

Alberta Foundation for
the Arts

1972

1991

Alberta

Alberta Assessment
Equalization Board

The Municipalities
Assessment and
Equalization Act

1957

1994

Alberta

Alberta Association of
Architects

The Alberta Architects
Act

Alberta

Alberta Association of
Dental Technicians

Health Professionals Act

(before 1946
blank)
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1994

1961

2000

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

Alberta Association of
Midwives

Health Professionals Act

Alberta

Alberta Association of
Registered Nurses

Health Professionals Act

Alberta

Alberta Association of
Registered Occupational
Therapists

Health Professionals Act

1987

Alberta

Alberta Association of
Registered Social
Workers

Health Professionals Act

1969

Alberta

Alberta Cancer
Foundation

Alberta Cancer
Foundation Act

1984

Alberta

Alberta Chiropractic
Association

Health Professionals Act

Alberta

Alberta Colleges
Commission

The College Act

1969

1973

Alberta

Alberta Cultural Heritage
Foundation

Alberta Cultural Heritage
Act

1984

1987

Alberta

Alberta Dairy Control
Board (Formerly Milk
Control Board)

The Dairy Industry Act

1969

1999

Alberta

Alberta Dental
Association

Health Professionals Act

Alberta

Alberta Drama Board

The Cultural
Development Act

1946

1966

Alberta

The Alberta Educational
Communications
Corporation

Alberta Educational
Communications
Corporation Act

1973

1996

(before 1946
blank)
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2001

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

Alberta Electric Energy
Marketing Agency

Electric Energy
Marketing Act

1981

Alberta

Alberta Energy and
Utilities Board

Alberta Energy and
Utilities Board Act

1994

Alberta

Alberta Environmental
Research Trust

Alberta Environmental
Research Trust Act

1971

Alberta

Alberta Foundation for
the Arts

Alberta Foundation for
the Arts Act

1991

Alberta

Alberta Foundation for
University Research and
Education in Alcoholism
and Drug Abuse

Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse Foundation Act

1972

Alberta

Alberta Gaming and
Liquor Commission

Gaming and Liquor Act

Alberta

The Alberta Hail and
Crop Insurance
Corporation

Agriculture Financial
Services Act

Alberta

Alberta Handicraft Board

The Cultural
Development Act

1946

1966

Alberta

Alberta Health Care
Insurance Commission

Department of Hospitals
and Medicare Act

1969

1977

Alberta

Alberta Heritage
Foundation for Medical
Research

Alberta Heritage
Foundation For Medical
Research Act

1979

Alberta

Alberta Heritage
Foundation for Science
and Engineering
Research

Alberta Heritage
Foundation for Science
and Engineering
Research Act

2000

Alberta

Alberta Hospital Districts Hospitals Act

(before 1946
blank)
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1997

1995

1993

1993

1996

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

Alberta Industrial
Corporation

Business Development

1946

Alberta

Alberta Institute of
Agrologists

The Agrologists Act

1947

Alberta

Alberta Land Survivors'
Association

Land Surveyors Act

Alberta

Alberta Library Board

The Cultural
Development Act

1946

1966

Alberta

Alberta Library Board

Libraries Act

1983

1998

Alberta

Alberta Mortgage and
Housing Corporation

Alberta Mortgage and
Housing Corporation Act

1970

1984

Alberta

Alberta Motor
Transportation Safety
Board

Traffic Safety Act

1977

Alberta

Alberta Municipal
Financing Corporation

The Alberta Municipal
Financing Corporation
Act

1956

Alberta

Alberta Music Board

The Cultural
Development Act

1946

1966

Alberta

Alberta Oil Sands
Technology and
Research Authority

Alberta Science and
Research Authority Act

1974

2000

Alberta

Alberta Opportunity
Company

Agriculture Financial
Services Act

Alberta

Alberta Opticians
Association

Health Professionals Act

Alberta

The Alberta Optometric
Association

Health Professionals Act

(before 1946
blank)
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1972

2002
1965

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Alberta

Alberta Petroleum
Marketing Commission

Petroleum Marketing Act

Alberta

Alberta Pharmaceutical
Association

Health Professionals Act

Alberta

Alberta Physical
Recreation Board

The Cultural
Development Act

1946

Alberta

Alberta Podiatry
Association

The Podiatry Act

1952

Alberta

Alberta Power
Commission

Hydro and Electric
Energy Act

Alberta

Alberta Racing
Corporation

Horse Racing
Commission Act

1962

Alberta

The Alberta Registered
Dietitians Association

Health Professionals Act

1959

Alberta

Alberta Registered
Professional Foresters
Association

Forest Professionals Act

1985

Alberta

Alberta Science and
Research Authority

Alberta Science,
Research and
Technology Authority
Act

Alberta

Alberta Securities
Commission

Securities Act

Alberta

Alberta Teachers'
Association

The Teaching Profession
Act

Alberta

Alberta Tourism
Education Council

Tourism Education
Council Act

1988

Alberta

The Alberta Veterinary
Medical Association

Veterinary Profession
Act

1953

End

(before 1946
blank)

262

1973

1966

1971

1967

1996

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Alberta

Alberta Visual Arts
Board

The Cultural
Development Act

Alberta

Ambulance Advisory and Ambulance Services Act
Appeal Board

1990

Alberta

The Association of
Professional Engineers,
Geologists and
Geophysicists of Alberta

The Engineering,
Geological &
Geophysical Professions
Ac

1955

Alberta

Board of Administrators
of the Teachers
Retirement Fund

Teachers' Pension Plans
Act

Alberta

Board of Reference

School Act

Alberta

Board of Trustees for
each school district

The School Act

Alberta

Calgary Municipal
Heritage Property
Authority

Calgary Municipal
Heritage Property
Authority

1984

Alberta

The Calgary Research
and Development
Authority

The Calgary Research
and Development
Authority Act

1981

Alberta

Certified General
Accountant Association
of Alberta

Regulated Accounting
Profession Act

1984

Alberta

Child and Family
Services Authority

Child and Family
Services Authorities

1996

Alberta

College Boards (Public
Colleges)

The College Act

1969

End

(before 1946
blank)
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1946

1966

1988

1973

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

College of
Acupuncturists of
Alberta

Health Professionals Act

Alberta

College of Physicians
and Surgeons of the
Province of Alberta

The Medical Profession
Act

Alberta

Combined Laboratory
and X-ray Technicians

Health Professionals Act

2005

Alberta

Community Library
Boards

Libraries Act

1948

Alberta

Consulting Engineers of
Alberta

Consulting Engineers of
Alberta Act

1992

Alberta

Council of the Society of
the Management
Accountants of Alberta

Regulated Accounting
Profession Act

Alberta

The Crimes
Compensation Board

The Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act

Alberta

Debtors' Assistance
Board

The Debtors' Assistance
Act

Alberta

Dental Assistants
Association

Health Professionals Act

1990

Alberta

Dental Hygienist
Association

Health Professionals Act

1990

Alberta

The Disabled Persons
Act (Creation of body
specified in legislation

Assured Income for the
Severely Handicapped
Act

1955

1979

Alberta

The Disabled Persons'
Pension Act (Creation of
Board Specified)

Assured Income for the
Severely Handicapped
Act

1952

1979

(before 1946
blank)
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1999

1969

1996

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

District Ambulance
Boards

Ambulance Services Act

Alberta

Drainage District Boards

The Drainage Districts
Act

Alberta

Eastern Rockies Forest
Conservation Board

The Forest Reserves Act

1955

1976

Alberta

Edmonton Convention
and Tourism Authority

Edmonton Convention
and Tourism Authority

1982

1993

Alberta

Edmonton Economic
Development Authority

Edmonton Economic
Development Authority

1982

Alberta

Edmonton Research and
Development Park
Authority

Edmonton Research and
Development Park
Authority Act

1980

Alberta

The Education of Service
Men's Children

The Education of Service
Men's Children Act

1946

1997

Alberta

Energy Resources
Conservation Board

Energy Resources
Conservation Act
Hydro and Electric
Energy Act

Alberta

Geographic Board of
Alberta

The Alberta Heritage
Amendment Act

1949

1974

Alberta

Hazardous Chemical
Advisory Committee

Environmental Protection
Act

1978

1992

Alberta

Health Occupations
Board

Health Occupations Act

1980

1986

Alberta

Health Unit Board

Public Health Act

1951

1994

Alberta

Hearing Aid Practitioners Health Professionals Act

(before 1946
blank)

265

1990

2002

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Alberta

Horse Racing Appeal
Tribunal

Horse Racing
Commission Act

Alberta

Institute of the Chartered
Accountants of Alberta

Regulated Accounting
Profession Act

Alberta

Irrigation Council

Irrigation Districts Act

British
Columbia

Labour Relations Board

Labour Relations Code

1947

Alberta

Land Compensation
Board

Expropriation Act

1974

Albert

Law Enforcement
Review Board

Police Act

1973

Alberta

Law Society of Alberta

The Legal Profession Act

Alberta

Library System Boards

Libraries Act

1948

Alberta

Licensed Practical
Nurses Profession

Health Professionals Act

2003

Alberta

The Local Authorities
Board

The Local Authorities
Board Act

1961

Alberta

M.S.I. Foundation

M.S.I. Foundation Act

1970

Alberta

Medical Laboratory
Technologists

Health Professionals Act

2001

Alberta

Medical Radiological
Technicians Board

Radiation Protection Act

1963

Alberta

Municipal Government
Board

Municipal Government
Act

1994

Alberta

Municipal Library
Boards

Libraries Act

1948

Alberta

Municipal Police

Police Act

1973

End

(before 1946
blank)
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2002

1994

1985

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

(before 1946
blank)

Commission
Alberta

Natural Resources
Conservation Board

Natural Resources
Conservation Board Act

1990

Alberta

Naturopathic Association
of Alberta

The Naturopathy Repeal
Act

1948

Alberta

Persons with
Developmental
Disabilities Foundation

Persons with
Developmental
Disabilities Foundation
Act

1996

Alberta

Physical Therapy
Profession Act

College of Physical
Therapists of Alberta

Alberta

Private Colleges
Accreditation Board

Post-Secondary Learning
Act

1983

Alberta

Profession of Denturists

Health Professionals Act

1961

Alberta

Provincial Cancer
Hospitals Board

Cancer Programs Act

1967

Alberta

Provincial General
Hospital Boards

The Provincial General
Hospitals Act

1959

Alberta

Provincial Universities.
Board of Governors

The Universities Act

Alberta

Psychiatric Nurses
Association

The Psychiatric Nurses
Association Act

1963

Alberta

Psychologists
Association of Alberta

Health Professionals Act

1967

Alberta

Public Health Advisory
and Appeal Board

Public Health Act

1984

Alberta

Public Utilities Board

The Public Utilities
Board Act

267

1986

2003

1995
1973
1986

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

Real Estate Council of
Alberta

Alberta Real Estate Act

1995

Alberta

The Recreation, Parks
and Wildlife Foundation

Recreation, Parks and
Wildlife Foundation Act

1976

Alberta

Regional Airport
Authorities

Regional Airport
Authorities Act

1989

Alberta

Regional Health
Authorities

Regional Health
Authorities Act

1994

Alberta

Regional Health
Foundations

Regional Health
Foundations Act

1996

Alberta

Regional Service
Commissions

Municipal Government
Act

1994

Alberta

Registered Music
Teachers' Association
Repeal Act

The Alberta Registered
Music Teachers
Association

1947

1983

Alberta

School Buildings Board

The School Act

1952

2001

Alberta

Small Producers
Assistance Commission

Small Producers
Assistance Commission

1987

1989

Alberta

Speech-Language
Pathologists

Health Professionals Act

2002

Alberta

Students Finance Board

Students Finance Act

1953

1998

Alberta

Surface Reclamation
Council

Land Surface
Conservation and
Reclamation Act

1963

1973

Alberta

Surface Rights Board

Surface Rights Act

1952

Alberta

The Assessment Appeal
Board

Municipal Government
Act

(before 1946
blank)
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2003

1994

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Alberta

The Old Age Assistance
Act (Board not named in
the Act)

The Old Age Assistance
Act

Alberta

Sexual Sterilization Act
(Board appointed under
the Act)

The Sexual Sterilization
Act

Alberta

Universities Coordinating Council

The Universities Act

1964

Alberta

Universities Commission

The Universities Act

1964

1973

Alberta

Widows' Pension Act
The Widows' Pension
(Board not named in Act) Act

1952

1967

Alberta

Wild Rose Foundation

Wild Rose Foundation
Act

1984

Alberta

Workman's
Compensation Board

The Workman's
Compensation Act

British
Columbia

Alcohol and Drug
Commission

Alcohol and Drug
Commission Act

1973

British
Columbia

Applied Science
Technologists and
Technicians of British
Columbia

Applied Science
Technologists and
Technicians Act

1985

British
Columbia

Architectural Institute of
British Columbia

British Columbia

British
Columbia

Arts Council of British
Columbia

Arts Council Act

1995

British
Columbia

Association of British
Columbia Foresters

Foresters Act

1947

(before 1946
blank)
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1952

1976

1972

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

British
Columbia

The Association of
Professional Engineers
and Geoscientists of the
Province of British
Columbia

Engineers and
Geoscientists Act

British
Columbia

The Barbers Association
of British Columbia

Barbers Act

British
Columbia

BC Ferry Authority

Coastal Ferry Act

1976

British
Columbia

Blind Persons'
Allowance Board

Blind Persons'
Allowances Act

1951

British
Columbia

Board of Brand
Commissioners

Livestock Brands Act
(1979)

1997

British
Columbia

Board of Eugenics

Sexual Sterilization Act

1973

British
Columbia

Board of Governors

University Act

British
Columbia

Board of Hearing Aid
Dealers and Consultants

Hearing Aid Act

British
Columbia

Board of Industrial
Relations

Male Minimum Wage
Act (Employment
Standards Act)

British
Columbia

Board of School Trustees

School Act

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Assessment Authority

Assessment Authority
Act

1974

British
Columbia

British Columbia Broiler
Hatching Egg
Commission

Natural Products
Marketing (British
Columbia) Act

2004

(before 1946
blank)
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2003

1971

1980

2002
1983

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Buildings Corporation

Public Agency
Accommodation Act

1976

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Chicken Marketing
Board

Natural Products
Marketing (British
Columbia) Act

1961

British
Columbia

British Columbia College Social Workers Act
of Social Workers

1968

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Cranberry Marketing
Commission

Natural Products
Marketing (British
Columbia) Act

1968

British
Columbia

British Columbia Dyking
Authority

Dyking Authority Act

1965

British
Columbia

British Columbia Egg
Marketing Board

Natural Products
Marketing (British
Columbia) Act

1967

British
Columbia

British Columbia Energy
Commission

Energy Act

1973

1980

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Harbours Board

Harbour Board Act

1967

1983

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Heritage Trust

Heritage Conservation
Act

1977

British
Columbia

British Columbia Human
Rights Tribunal

Human Rights Act

1984

British
Columbia

British Columbia Hydro
and Power Authority

Hydro and Power
Authority Act

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Institute of Argologists

Agrologists Act

British
Columbia

British Columbia Milk
Marketing Board

Natural Products Act

(before 1946
blank)
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1947

2006

1999

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Petroleum Corporation

Petroleum Corporation
Act

1973

1994

British
Columbia

British Columbia Police
Commission

Police Act

1974

1997

British
Columbia

British Columbia Racing
Commission

Gaming Control Act

1959

2003

British
Columbia

British Columbia Safety
Authority

Safety Authority Act

2003

British
Columbia

British Columbia Society
of Landscape Architects

Architects (Landscape)
Act

1968

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Systems Corporation

System Act

1977

British
Columbia

British Columbia Turkey
Marketing Board

Natural Products
Marketing (British
Columbia) Act

1966

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Utilities Commission

British Columbia
Utilities Commission

1980

British
Columbia

British Columbia
Vegetable Marketing
Commission

Natural Products
Marketing (British
Columbia) Act

1980

British
Columbia

Building Officials
Association

Building Officials
Association Act

1997

British
Columbia

Bull Control Committee

Animals Act

British
Columbia

Business Practice and
Consumer Protection
Authority

Business Practice and
Consumer Protection
Authority Act

(before 1946
blank)

272

2004

1998

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

British
Columbia

Cattle Industry
Development Council

Farming and Fishing
Industries Development
Act

1973

British
Columbia

Certified General
Accountants' Association
of British Columbia

Certified General
Accountants Act

1951

British
Columbia

Child and Family Review Child, Family and
Board
Community Services Act

1994

British
Columbia

Children's Aid Societies

Child, Family and
Community Services

1943

British
Columbia

Coal and Petroleum
Products Control Board

Coal and Petroleum
Products Control Board

British
Columbia

College of Applied
Biology

College of Applied
Biology Act

British
Columbia

College of Chiropractors
of British Columbia

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Dental
Hygienists of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Dental
Surgeons

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Dental
Technicians of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

1958

British
Columbia

College of Denturists of
British Columbia

Health Professions Act

2000

British
Columbia

College of Dietitians of
British Columbia

Health Professions Act

2002

End

(before 1946
blank)
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1994
1953

2002

1994

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

British
Columbia

College of Message
Therapists of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

1994

British
Columbia

College of Midwives of
British Columbia

Health Professions Act

1995

British
Columbia

College of Naturopathic
Physicians

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Occupational
Therapists of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

1998

British
Columbia

College of Opticians

Health Professions Act

1994

British
Columbia

College of Optometrists
of British Columbia

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Pharmacists

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Physical
Therapists of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

Nova
Scotia

College of Physicians
and Surgeons of Nova
Scotia

Medical Act

British
Columbia

College of Podiatric
Surgeons of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Practical
Nurses of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

(before 1946
blank)

274

1946

1951

End

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

British
Columbia

College of Psychologists
of British Columbia

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Registered
Nurses of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

College of Registered
Psychiatric Nurses of
British Columbia

Health Professions Act

1951

British
Columbia

College of Speech and
Hearing Health
Professionals of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

2008

British
Columbia

College of Teachers

Teaching Professionals
Act

1987

British
Columbia

College of Traditional
Chinese Medicine
Practitioners and
Acupuncturists of British
Columbia

Health Professions Act

2000

British
Columbia

Columbia Basin Trust

Columbia Basin Trust
Act

1995

British
Columbia

Commission for the
Education of Soldiers'
Dependent Children

Education of Soldiers
Dependent Children Act

British
Columbia

Community Living
Authority

Community Living
Authority Act

2004

British
Columbia

Community Resources
Board

BC Benefits (Income
Assistance) Act

1974

British
Columbia

Corporation of Land
Surveyors

Land Surveyors Act

End

(before 1946
blank)
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1977

1973

1996

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

British
Columbia

Disabled Persons'
Allowance Board

Disabled Persons'
Allowance Act

British
Columbia

Drainage and Dyking
Districts

Drainage, Dyking and
Development Act

British
Columbia

Emergency Health
Services Commission

Emergency and Health
Services Act

1974

British
Columbia

Emergency Medical
Assistants Licensing
Board

Emergency and Health
Services Act

1974

British
Columbia

Employment Standards
Tribunal

Employment Standards
Act

1995

British
Columbia

Environmental Appeal
Board

Environmental
Management Act

1981

British
Columbia

Farm Industry Review
Board

Natural Products
Marketing (British
Columbia) Act

British
Columbia

Fence Viewers

Line Fences Act

British
Columbia

Financial Institutions
Commission

Financial Institutions Act

1989

British
Columbia

Forest Appeals
Commission

Forest Practices Code of
British Columbia Act

1994

British
Columbia

Gaming Control Act

Lottery Corporation Act

1985

British
Columbia

Grasshopper-control
Committees

Grasshopper-control Act

1998

British
Columbia

The Hairdressers
Association of British
Columbia

Hairdressers Act

2003

(before 1946
blank)

276

1954

1980

1971

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

British
Columbia

Health Insurance
Commission

Health Insurance Act

British
Columbia

Health Professionals
Review Board

Health Professions Act

British
Columbia

Improvement District

Water Act

British
Columbia

Industry Training
Authority

Industry Training
Authority Act

British
Columbia

Institute of Chartered
Accountants of British
Columbia

Chartered Accountants
Act

British
Columbia

Insurance Corporation of
British Columbia

Insurance Corporation
Act

1973

British
Columbia

Insurance Council of
British Columbia

Financial Institution Act

1969

British
Columbia

Land Settlement Board

Land Settlement and
Development Act

British
Columbia

Land Title and Survey
Authority of British
Columbia

Land Title and Survey
Authority Act

British
Columbia

Law Society of British
Columbia

Legal Professions Act

British
Columbia

Legal Services Society

Legal Services Society
Act

British
Columbia

Liquor Control Board

Liquor Control and
Licensing Act

British
Columbia

Medical Services
Commission

Medical Protection Act

End

(before 1946
blank)

277

1973
1990

1977

1968
2004

1975
1977
1967

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

British
Columbia

Municipal Finance
Authority

Municipal Finance
Authority Act

1970

British
Columbia

Municipal Police Boards

Police Act

1974

British
Columbia

Municipal Public
Libraries' Public Library
Board

Libraries Act

British
Columbia

Ocean Falls Corporation

Ocean Falls Corporation
Act

1973

British
Columbia

Oil and Gas Commission

Oil and Gas Commission
Act

1998

British
Columbia

Old-age Assistance
Board

Old-Age Assistance Act

1951

British
Columbia

Passenger Transportation
Board

Passenger Transportation
Act

2004

British
Columbia

Pesticide Control Appeal
Board

Integrated Pest
Management Act

1977

2003

British
Columbia

Pollution Control Board

Pollution Control Board

1956

1981

British
Columbia

Property Assessment
Appeal Board

Assessment Act

1953

British
Columbia

Provincial Adult Care
Facilities Licensing
Board

Community Care and
Assisted Living Act

1969

British
Columbia

Provincial Agricultural
Land Commission

Agricultural Land
Commission Act

1973

British
Columbia

Provincial Capital
Commission

Capital Commission Act

1956

(before 1946
blank)

278

1986

1980

2002

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

British
Columbia

Provincial Child Care
Facilities Licensing
Board

Community Care and
Assisted Living Act

1969

British
Columbia

Provincial Council of
British Columbia Music
Teachers Association

Registered Music
Teachers Act

1947

British
Columbia

Public Library
Associations

Public Libraries Act

British
Columbia

Public Library
Commission

Public Libraries Act

1978

British
Columbia

Public Utilities
Commission

Public Utilities Act

1973

British
Columbia

Real Estate Council

Real Estate Services Act

1958

British
Columbia

Real Estate Foundation

Real Estate Act

1985

British
Columbia

Regional Health Boards

Health Authorities Act

1993

British
Columbia

Rent Review
Commission

Residential Tenancy Act

1977

British
Columbia

Royal British Columbia
Museum

Museum Act

2003

British
Columbia

Securities Commission

Securities Act

1962

British
Columbia

Seed-control Committee

Seed-growers' Protection
Act

British
Columbia

Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals

Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals Act

(before 1946
blank)

279

2002

1984

2003

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

British
Columbia

Society of Management
Accountants

Accountants
(Management) Act

British
Columbia

South Cost British
Columbia Transportation
Authority

South Coast British
Columbia Transportation
Authority

British
Columbia

Steam-boiler Inspection
Committee

Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Act

British
Columbia

Surface Rights Board

Petroleum and Natural
Gas Act

1954

British
Columbia

Trade and Development
Corporation

Development
Corporation Act

1973

2007

British
Columbia

Travel Assurance Board

Business Practice and
Consumer Protection
Authority Act

1977

2004

British
Columbia

Universities Council

University Act

1974

1987

British
Columbia

Urban Transit Authority
of British Columbia

British Columbia Transit
Act

1979

British
Columbia

Veterinary Association
of British Columbia

Veterinary Act

British
Columbia

Workmen's
Compensation Board

Workmen's
Compensation Act

Nova
Scotia

Advisory Council on the
Status of Women

Advisory Council on the
Status of Women Act

1977

Nova
Scotia

Agricultural Marshland
Conservation
Commission

The Agricultural
Marshlands Conservation
Act

2000

Nova
Scotia

Art Council of Nova
Scotia

Art Council Act

1995

(before 1946
blank)

280

1998

1949

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Nova
Scotia

Art Gallery of Nova
Scotia

Art Gallery of Nova
Scotia Act

Nova
Scotia

Association of Interior
Interior Designers Act
Designers of Nova Scotia

Nova
Scotia

Association of Nova
Scotia Land Surveyors

Nova
Scotia

Association of
Engineering Profession
Professional Engineers of Act
the Province of Nova
Scotia

Nova
Scotia

Association of
Professional
Geoscientists of Nova
Scotia

Geoscience Profession
Act

2002

Nova
Scotia

Atlantic Institute of
Education

Atlantic Institute of
Education Act

1969

Nova
Scotia

Atlantic Provinces
Special Education
Authority

Handicapped Persons'
Education Ac

1960

Nova
Scotia

Bedford Waterfront
Development
Corporation

Bedford Waterfront
Development
Corporation Act

1983

Nova
Scotia

Board of Commissioners
of Public Utilities

Public Utilities Act

Nova
Scotia

Board of Dispensing
Opticians

Dispensing Opticians Act

Nova
Scotia

Board of Examiners for
Scalers

Scalers Act

End

(before 1946
blank)

1775
1990

Land Surveyors Act

281

1992
1968

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Nova
Scotia

Board of Examiners for
Stationary Engineers

Stationary Engineers Act

Nova
Scotia

Boards of Health

Health Act

Nova
Scotia

Board of Registration of
Embalmers and Funeral
Directors

Embalmers and Funeral
Directors Act

1955

Nova
Scotia

Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum
Board

Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum
Resources Accord
Implementation Act

1987

Nova
Scotia

Canadian Information
Processing Society of
Nova Scotia

Canadian Information
Processing Society of
Nova Scotia Act

2002

Nova
Scotia

Cancer Treatment and
Research Foundation of
Nova Scotia

Cancer Treatment and
Research Foundation

1980

Nova
Scotia

Certified Engineering
Technicians and
Technologists of Nova
Scotia

Applied Science
Technology Act

1999

Nova
Scotia

Certified General
Accountants

Certified General
Accountants Act

1998

Nova
Scotia

Clean Nova Scotia
Foundation

Clean Nova Scotia
Foundation Act

1988

Nova
Scotia

College of Licensed
Practical Nurses of Nova
Scotia

Licensed Practical
Nurses Act

1988

Nova
Scotia

College of Paramedics of
Nova Scotia

Paramedics Act

2005

End

(before 1946
blank)

282

1980
2004

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Nova
Scotia

College of Registered
Nurses of Nova Scotia

Registered Nurses Act

Nova
Scotia

Cosmetology Association Cosmetology Act
of Nova Scotia

Nova
Scotia

County Health Boards

Public Health Act

Nova
Scotia

Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board

Compensation for
Victims of Crime Act

1975

Nova
Scotia

Cultural Foundation

Cultural Foundation Act

1978

Nova
Scotia

Cumberland
Development Authority

Regional Community
Development Act

1988

Nova
Scotia

Denturist Licensing
Board

Denturist Act

1973

Nova
Scotia

District Health
Authorities

Health Authorities Act

2000

Nova
Scotia

Drug Dependency
Foundation

Drug Dependency
Foundation Act

1959

Nova
Scotia

Energy and Mineral
Recourses Conservation
Board

Energy Conservation Act

1980

2001

Nova
Scotia

Family Benefits Review
Board

Family Benefits Act

1977

2000

Nova
Scotia

Farm Practices Board

Farm Practices Act

2000

Nova
Scotia

Film Nova Scotia

Film Nova Scotia

1990

(before 1946
blank)

283

1962
1962

1996

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Nova
Scotia

Fire Protection Districts

Rural Fire Districts Act

1963

Nova
Scotia

Forest Practice
Improvement Board

Forest Enhancement Act

1965

Nova
Scotia

Foresters Association

Foresters Association
Act

1999

Nova
Scotia

Halifax-Dartmouth Port
Development
Commission

Halifax-Dartmouth Port
Development
Commission

1984

Nova
Scotia

Health Research
Foundation

Health Research
Foundation Act

1998

Nova
Scotia

Health Services and
Insurance Commission

Health Services
Insurance Act

1958

Nova
Scotia

Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Nova
Scotia

Chartered Accountants
Act

Nova
Scotia

Labour Relations Board
of Nova Scotia

Trade Union Act

Nova
Scotia

Licensed Professional
Planners Association of
Nova Scotia

Professional Planners
Act

2005

Nova
Scotia

Liquor License Board

Liquor Control Act

1961

Nova
Scotia

Louisbourg District
Planning and
Development
Commission

Louisbourg District
Planning and
Development
Commission

1963

End

(before 1946
blank)

284

1986

2001

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Nova
Scotia

Maritime Provinces
Harness Racing
Commission

Maritime Provinces
Harness Racing
Commission Act

1946

Nova
Scotia

Maritime Provinces
Higher Education
Commission

Maritime Provinces
Higher Education
Commission Act

2004

Nova
Scotia

Marsh Body

The Agricultural
Marshlands Conservation
Act

1949

Nova
Scotia

Marshland Reclamation
Commission

The Agricultural
Marshlands Conservation
Act

1949

Nova
Scotia

Municipal Board of
Police Commissioners

Police Act

1974

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Association
of Architects

Architects Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Association
of Occupational
Therapists

Occupational Therapists
Act

1970

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Association
of Physiotherapists

Physiotherapy Act

1958

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Association
of Real Estate Appraisers

Real Estate Appraisers
Act

1998

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Association
of Social Workers

Social Workers Act

1963

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Barristers'
Society

Legal Profession Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Board of
Censors

Theatres and
Amusements Act

End

(before 1946
blank)
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2000

2000

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

(before 1946
blank)

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Board of
Psychologists Act
Examiners in Psychology

1980

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Boxing
Authority

Boxing Authority Act

1973

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Business
Incorporated

Nova Scotia Business
Incorporated Act

1986

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Chiropractic
Association

Chiropractic Act

1972

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia College of
Medical Laboratory
Technologists

Medical Laboratory
Technologists Act

2000

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Crop and
Livestock Insurance
Commission

Crop and Livestock
Insurance Act

1968

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Dairy
Commission

Dairy Industry Act

1967

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Dental
Technicians Association

Dental Technicians Act

1965

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Dietitian
Association

Professional Dietitians
Act

1973

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Economic
Council

Economic Council Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia
Environmental
Assessment Board

Environment Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Farm Loans
Board

Agriculture and Rural
Credit Act

286

1994

2000

2000

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Fisheries
and Aquaculture Loan
Board

Fisheries and Coastal
Resources Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Gaming
Control Commission

Gaming Control Act

1994

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Gaming
Corporation

Gaming Control Act

1994

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Housing
Commission

Housing Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Human
Rights Commission

Human Rights
Commission Act

1967

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Innovation
Corporation

Innovation Corporation
Act

1994

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Institute of
Agrologists

Agrologists Act

1953

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Legal Aid
Commission

Legal Aid Act

1977

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Liquor
Corporation

Liquor Control Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Lottery
Commission

Gaming Control Act

1976

1994

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Municipal
Board

Utility and Review Board
Act

1981

1992

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Municipal
Finance Corporation

Municipal Finance
Corporation Act

1979

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Museum of
Science

Nova Scotia Museum
Act

1947

(before 1946
blank)
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1983

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

(before 1946
blank)

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia
Optometry Act
Optometrical Association

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society

Pharmacy Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Police
Commission

Police Act

1974

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Police
Review Board

Police Act

1985

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Power
Finance Corporation Act

Nova Scotia Power
Finance Corporation Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Primary
Forest Products
Marketing Board

Primary Forest Products
Marketing

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Registered
Barbers Association

Registered Barbers Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Resources
Development Board

Business Capital
Corporation Act

1971

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Securities
Commission

Securities Act

1987

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Society of
Radiological Technicians

Medical Radiological
Technicians Act

1965

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Veterinary
Association

Veterinary Medical Act

Nova
Scotia

Nova Scotia Water
Authority

Water Act

1963

Nova
Scotia

Pay Equity Commission

Pay Equity Act

1988

288

2004

1972

1986

1972

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Nova
Scotia

Prescription Monitoring
Board

Prescription Monitoring
Act

2004

Nova
Scotia

Provincial
Apprenticeship Board

Apprenticeship and
Trades Qualifications
Act

1988

Nova
Scotia

Provincial Community
Pastures Board

Agriculture and
Marketing Act

1957

Nova
Scotia

Provincial Dental Board

Dental Act

Nova
Scotia

Provincial Grain
Commission

Provincial Grain
Commission Act

1977

Nova
Scotia

Public Accountants
Board of Nova Scotia

Public Accountants Act

1952

Nova
Scotia

Regional Health Boards

Regional Health Boards

1993

Nova
Scotia

Regional Library Boards

Libraries Act

Nova
Scotia

Rent Review
Commission

Rent Review Act

1975

Nova
Scotia

Research Foundation of
Nova Scotia

Research Foundation Act

1946

Nova
Scotia

School Boards

Education Act

Nova
Scotia

Shipbuilding
Commission

Shipbuilding
Commission Act

Nova
Scotia

Small Business
Development
Corporation

Small Business
Development Act

End

(before 1946
blank)

289

2004

2000

1967
1981

2001

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Nova
Scotia

Society of Management
Accountants of Nova
Scotia

Certified Management
Accountants of Nova
Scotia Act

1950

Nova
Scotia

Sydney Steel
Corporation

Sydney Steel
Corporation Act

1967

Nova
Scotia

Sydney Waterfront
Development
Corporation

Sydney Waterfront
Development
Corporation

1988

1994

Nova
Scotia

Tidal Power Corporation

Government
Restructuring Act

1971

2001

Nova
Scotia

Utility and Review Board Utility and Review Board
Act

Nova
Scotia

Workmen's
Compensation Board of
Nova Scotia

Workmen's
Compensation Act

Ontario

AgriCorp

AgriCorp Act

1996

Ontario

Agricultural Research
Institute of Ontario

The Agricultural
Research Institute of
Ontario Act`

1961

Ontario

Agricultural Societies

Agricultural Societies
Act

Ontario

Alcohol and Gaming
Commission

Alcohol and Gaming
Regulation and Public
Protection Act

1996

Ontario

Alcoholism and Drug
Addiction Research
Foundation

The Alcoholism and
Drug Addiction Research
Foundation Act

1965

Ontario

Algonquin Forest
Authority Act

Algonquin Forestry
Authority Act

1974

(before 1946
blank)
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1992

1988

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Ontario

Art Gallery of Ontario

The Art Gallery of
Ontario Act

Ontario

Association of Ontario
Land Surveyors

Surveyors Act

Ontario

Association of
The Professional
Professional Engineers of Engineers Act
Ontario

Ontario

Board of Funeral
Services

Funeral Directors &
Establishments

Ontario

Board of Parole

Department of
Correctional Services

Ontario

Boards of School
Trustees

Education Act

Ontario

Burlington Beach
Commission

The Burlington Beach
Act

Ontario

Centennial Centre of
Science and Technology

The Centennial Centre of
Science and Technology
Act

1965

Ontario

Child and Family
Services Review Board

Child and Family
Services Act

1978

Ontario

Children's Aid Societies

Child and Family
Services Act

Ontario

Co-operative Loans
Board of Ontario

Co-operative Loans Act

1956

Ontario

College of Audiologists
and Speech-Language
Pathologists of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

Ontario

College of Chiropractors
of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

End

(before 1946
blank)
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1966

1947

1956

1994

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Ontario

College of Dental
Hygienists of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

Ontario

College of Dietitians of
Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

Ontario

College of Medical
Regulated Health
Laboratory Technologists Professions Act
of Ontario

1991

Ontario

College of Message
Therapists of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

Ontario

College of Midwives of
Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

Ontario

College of Occupational
Therapists of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

Ontario

College of Medical
Radiation Technologists
of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1962

Ontario

College of Nurses of
Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1951

Ontario

College of Opticians of
Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1960

Ontario

College of Optometrists
of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

Ontario

College of
The Psychologists
Registration Act
Psychotherapists and
Registered Mental Health
Therapists of Ontario

1960

Ontario

College of
Physiotherapists of
Ontario

1991

(before 1946
blank)

Regulated Health
Professions Act
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End

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Ontario

College of Respiratory
Therapists of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1991

Ontario

Collision Repair
Advisory Board

Collision Repair
Standards Act

2002

Ontario

Commercial Registration
Appeal Tribunal

Ministry of Consumer
and Commercial
Relations

1968

Ontario

Commission for the
Investigation of Cancer
Remedies

The Cancer Remedies
Act

Ontario

Community Care Access
Corporations

Community Care Access
Corporation Act

2001

Ontario

Consent and Capacity
Board

Health Care Consent Act

1996

Ontario

Conservation Authorities

Conservation Authorities
Act

1946

Ontario

Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board

Compensation for
Victims of Crime Act

1967

Ontario

Crop Insurance
Commission of Ontario

AgriCorp Act

1966

Ontario

Custody Review Board

Child and Family
Services Act

1984

Ontario

Deposit Insurance
Corporation of Ontario

Credit Unions and
Caisses Populaires Act

1994

Ontario

District Social Services
Administration Boards

District Social Services
Administration Boards
Act

1962

Ontario

Drugless Practitioners
Board of Regents

The Drugless
Practitioners Act

End

(before 1946
blank)

293

1999

1997

1996

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Ontario

Eastern Ontario
Development
Corporation

Development
Corporations Act

1973

Ontario

Education Quality and
Accountability Office

Education Quality and
Accountability Office
Act

1996

Ontario

Electrical Safety
Authority

Electricity Act

1998

Ontario

Environmental Review
Tribunal

Environmental
Assessment Act

1975

2000

Ontario

Environmental Appeal
Board

Environmental Protection
Act

1975

2000

Ontario

Farm Income
Stabilization
Commission

Farm Income
Stabilization Act

1976

1996

Ontario

Farm Practices
Protection Commission

Farm Practices
Protection Act

1988

1998

Ontario

Farm Products Appeal
Tribunal

Ministry of Agriculture
and Food Act

1978

Ontario

Farm Products Payment
Boards

Farm Products Payments
Act

1967

Ontario

Governing Board of
Dental Technicians

The Dental Technicians
Act

1946

Ontario

Health Disciplines Board

Regulated Health
Professions Act

1974

1991

Ontario

Health Facilities Appeal
Board

Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care Appeal
and Review Boards Act

1974

1998

(before 1946
blank)
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Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Ontario

Health Protection Appeal
Board

Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care Appeal
and Review Boards Act

1983

Ontario

Health Professions
Appeal and Review
Board

Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care Appeal
and Review Boards Act

1998

Ontario

Health Services Appeal
Board

Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care Appeal
and Review Boards Act

1972

1998

Ontario

Hospital Services
Commission of Ontario

Health Insurance Act

1957

1972

Ontario

Hydro One Inc.

Electricity Act

1998

Ontario

Independent Electricity
System Operator

Electricity Act

1998

Ontario

Land Compensation
Board (Board of
Negotiation)

Expropriations Act

1968

Ontario

License Appeal Tribunal

License Appeal Tribunal
Act

1999

Ontario

License Suspension
Appeal Board

Highway Traffic Act

1973

1999

Ontario

Liquor License Appeal
Tribunal

The Liquor License Act

1975

1990

Ontario

Liquor Control Board of
Ontario

The Liquor Control Act

Ontario

Liquor License Board of
Ontario

Alcohol and Gaming
Regulation and Public
Protection Act (and
Liquor License Act)

1946

1996

(before 1946
blank)
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1998

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Ontario

Local Boards of Health

Health Protection and
Promotion Act

Ontario

Local Roads Area Board

The Local Roads Boards
Act

1964

Ontario

Local Services Boards

Northern Services Board
Acts

1979

Ontario

Long Point Park
Commission

Long Point Park Act

Ontario

Metro Toronto
Convention Centre

Metropolitan Toronto
Convention Centre
Corporation Act

Ontario

Milk Industry Board of
Ontario

The Milk Act

Ontario

Milk Commission of
Ontario

The Milk Act

1965

1988

Ontario

Milk Industry
Commission of Ontario

Milk Industry Act

1954

1957

Ontario

Milk Products Board of
Ontario

Milk Industry Act

1954

1957

Ontario

Milk Products Producers'
Co-ordinating Board

The Milk Act

1954

1965

Ontario

Moosonee Development
Area Board

Town of Moosonee Act

1966

Ontario

Municipal Police
Services Boards

Police Services Act

1964

Ontario

New Homes Warranty
Plan Corporation

Ontario New Home
Warranties Act

1976

(before 1946
blank)
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1954
1988

1965

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Ontario

Niagara Escarpment
Commission

Niagara Escarpment
Planning and
Development Act

Ontario

Niagara Parks
Commission

The Niagara Parks Act

Ontario

Northern Ontario
Development
Corporation

Development
Corporations Act

1970

Ontario

Northern Ontario Grow
Bonds Corporation

Northern Ontario Grow
Bonds Corporation Act

2004

Ontario

Northern Ontario
Heritage Fund
Corporation

Northern Ontario
Heritage Fund Act

1988

Ontario

Nursing Homes Review
Board

Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care Appeal
and Review Boards Act

1972

1998

Ontario

Old Age Pension
Commission

Old Age Pension Act

1948

1951

Ontario

Ontario Association of
Architects

The Architects Act

Ontario

Ontario Cancer
Treatment and Research
Foundation

The Cancer Act

Ontario

Ontario Certified General Certified General
Accountants Association Accountant Act

1983

Ontario

Ontario Civilian
Commission on Police
Services

1961

(before 1946
blank)

Police Services Act
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1973

1957

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Ontario

Ontario Clean Water
Agency

Capital Investment Plan
Act

Ontario

Ontario College of
Pharmacy

Regulated Health
Professions Act

Ontario

Ontario College of Social Social Work and Social
Services Act
Workers and Social
Services Workers

1998

Ontario

Ontario Deposit
Insurance Corporation

The Ontario Deposit
Insurance Corporation
Act

1967

Ontario

Ontario Development
Corporation

Development
Corporations Act

1966

Ontario

Ontario Education
Communications
Authority

The Ontario Education
Communications
Authority Act

1970

Ontario

Ontario Energy Board
Act

Ontario Energy Board
Act

1960

Ontario

Ontario Energy
Corporation

Ontario Energy
Corporation Act

1974

Ontario

Ontario Farm Products
and Marketing
Commission

The Farm Products
Marketing Act

1946

Ontario

Ontario Film Review
Board

Film Classifications Act

Ontario

Ontario Financing
Authority

Capital Investment Plan
Act

1955

Ontario

Ontario Food Terminal
Board

The Ontario Food
Terminal Act

1946

End

(before 1946
blank)
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1993

1997

1998

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Ontario

Ontario Heritage
Foundation

Ontario Heritage Act

1967

Ontario

Ontario Highway
Transportation Board

The Ontario Highway
Transportation Board Act

1956

Ontario

Ontario Housing
Corporation

The Ontario Housing
Corporation Act

1964

Ontario

Ontario Human Rights
Commission

Human Rights Code

1958

Ontario

Ontario Hydro

Electricity Act

Ontario

Ontario LabourManagement Arbitration
Commission

Labour Relations Act

Ontario

Ontario Labour Relations
Board

Labour Relations Act

Ontario

Ontario Land
Corporation

Ontario

End

(before 1946
blank)

1998
1968

1979

Capital Investment Plan
Act

1974

1993

Ontario Library Services
Board

Public Libraries Act

1984

Ontario

Ontario Lottery
Corporation

Ontario Lottery and
Gaming Corporation Act

1974

Ontario

Ontario Municipal Board

Ontario Municipal Board
Act

Ontario

Ontario Municipal
Health Services Board

Municipal Health
Services Act

Ontario

Ontario Northland
Transpiration
Commission

Ontario Northland
Transpiration
Commission Act

299

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

Ontario

Ontario Parks Integration
Board

Ministry of Natural
Resources Act

1956

Ontario

Ontario Place
Corporation

Ontario Place
Corporation Act

1972

Ontario

Ontario Power Authority

Electricity Act

1998

Ontario

Ontario Power
Generation Inc.

Electricity Act

1998

Ontario

Ontario Racing
Commission

Racing Commission Act

1950

Ontario

Ontario Rental Housing
Tribunal

Tenant Protection Act

1997

Ontario

Ontario Securities
Commission

Securities Act

Ontario

Ontario Stock Yards
Board

Stock Yards Act

Ontario

Ontario Teachers'
Federation

Teaching Profession Act

Ontario

Ontario Telephone
Development
Corporation

Ontario Telephone
Development
Corporation Act

1955

Ontario

Ontario Transportation
Capital Corporation

Capital Investment Plan
Act

1993

Ontario

Ontario Veterinary
Association

Veterinarians Act

1958

Ontario

Ontario Waste
Ontario Waste
Management Corporation Management Corporation
Act

End

(before 1946
blank)

300

1972

1999

1981

1999

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Ontario

Ontario Water Resources
Commission

Government
Reorganization Act

Ontario

Operating Engineers
Board of Examiners

The Operating Engineers
Act

Ontario

Ottawa Congress Centre

Ottawa Congress Centre
Act

1988

Ontario

Pay Equity Commission
of Ontario

Pay Equity Act

1987

Ontario

Pension Commission of
Ontario

Financial Services
Commission of Ontario

1965

1997

Ontario

Planning and
Implementation
Commission

Education Act

1986

1997

Ontario

The Presqu'lle Parks Act

The Presqu'ile Park Act

Ontario

Professional
Geoscientists of Ontario

Professional
Geoscientists Act

2000

Ontario

Province of Ontario Arts
Council

The Arts Council Act

1962

Ontario

Public Accountants
Council for the Province
of Ontario

The Public Accountancy
Act

Ontario

Public Library Boards

Public Libraries Act

Ontario

Public Library
Associations

Public Libraries Act

1966

Ontario

Public Utility
Commission

Public Utilities Act

2001

(before 1946
blank)
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1957

1972
1965

1954

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Ontario

Regional Growth
Councils

The Regional
Development Councils
Act

1966

Ontario

Registered Insurance
Brokers of Ontario

Registered Insurance
Brokers

1980

Ontario

Rent Review Hearings
Board

Ontario Rent Control Act

1986

1992

Ontario

Research Foundation

Research Foundation Act

Ontario

Residential Rental
Standards Board

Ontario Rent Control Act

1986

1992

Ontario

Roads Commissioners

Statute Labour Act

Ontario

Royal College of Dental
Surgeons of Ontario

Regulated Health
Professions Act

Ontario

Royal Ontario Museum

The Royal Ontario
Museum Act

1968

Ontario

Sheridan Park
Corporation

The Sheridan Park
Corporation Act

1964

Ontario

Social Assistance
Review Board

Ministry of Community
and Social Services Act

1975

Ontario

Social Benefits Tribunal

Ontario Works Act

1997

Ontario

Soldiers Aid
Commission

Soldiers Aid
Commission

Ontario

St. Clair Parkway
Commission

St. Clair Parks
Commission Act

1966

Ontario

St. Lawrence
Development
Commission

St. Lawrence
Development
Commission Act

1958

Ontario

Stallion Enrolment Board The Stallions Act

(before 1946
blank)
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1973

1979

1966

Province

Most Recent Type II
Body Name

Most Recent Act

Creation

End

Ontario

Suburban Service Board

Suburban Area
Development Act

Ontario

Technical Standards and
Safety Authority

Technical Standards and
Safety Ac

2000

Ontario

Technology Centres

Technology Centres Act

1982

Ontario

The Financial
Corporation

Electricity Act

1998

Ontario

The Law Society of
Upper Canada

The Law Society Act

Ontario

Toronto Area Transit
Operating Authority Act

Toronto Area Transit
Operating Authority Act

1974

2011

Ontario

Toronto Futures
Exchange

Toronto Futures
Exchange Act

1983

2009

Ontario

Toronto Stock Exchange

The Toronto Stock
Exchange Act

Ontario

Toronto Waterfront
Revitalization
Corporation

Toronto Waterfront
Revitalization
Corporation Act

2002

Ontario

Wine Authority

Vintners Quality
Alliance Act

1999

Ontario

Workplace Safety and
Insurance Appeals
Tribunal

Workplace Safety and
Insurance Act

1997

Ontario

Workplace Safety and
Insurance Board

Workplace Safety and
Insurance Act

(before 1946
blank)
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1952

1999

Appendix C: Government Healthcare Document Collection
Province

Document Name

Alberta	
  

1989.	
  Premier's	
  Commission	
  on	
  Future	
  of	
  Health	
  Care	
  for	
  Albertans.	
  The	
  
Rainbow	
  Report:	
  Our	
  Vision	
  of	
  Health,	
  Volume	
  1.	
  Government,	
  Edmonton:	
  
Queen's	
  Printer	
  for	
  Alberta.	
  

Alberta	
  

1989.	
  Premiers's	
  Commission	
  on	
  Future	
  Health	
  Care	
  for	
  Albertans.	
  The	
  
Rainbow	
  Report:	
  Our	
  Vision	
  of	
  Health,	
  Volume	
  2.	
  Government,	
  Edmonton:	
  
Queen's	
  Printer	
  for	
  Alberta.	
  

Alberta

2000.	
  Legislative	
  Assembly.	
  “Regional	
  Health	
  Authorities	
  Act,	
  Revised	
  
Statutes	
  of	
  Alberta	
  2000,	
  Chapter	
  R-‐10.”	
  Edmonton,	
  AB:	
  Queen's	
  
Publisher	
  for	
  Alberta.

Alberta	
  

2001.	
  Premier's	
  Advisory	
  Council	
  on	
  Health.	
  A	
  Framework	
  for	
  Reform:	
  
Report	
  of	
  the	
  Premier's	
  Advisory	
  Council	
  on	
  Health.	
  Government,	
  
Edmonton:	
  Queen's	
  Printer	
  for	
  Alberta.	
  

Alberta	
  

2004.	
  Alberta	
  Health	
  and	
  Wellness.	
  Tracking	
  Health	
  Refrom	
  in	
  Alberta:	
  
Alberta	
  Health	
  Reform	
  Implementation	
  Team	
  Final	
  Report	
  January	
  2004.	
  
Government,	
  Edmonton:	
  Queen's	
  Printer	
  for	
  Alberta.	
  

Alberta	
  

2005.	
  Alberta	
  Health	
  and	
  Wellness.	
  Guide	
  to	
  Health	
  Authority	
  
Accountability	
  Documents.	
  Government,	
  Edmonton:	
  Queen's	
  Printer	
  for	
  
Alberta.	
  

Alberta	
  

2006.	
  Alberta	
  Health	
  and	
  Wellness.	
  Health	
  Authority	
  Accountability	
  in	
  
Alberta’s	
  Health	
  System.	
  Government,	
  Edmonton:	
  Queen’s	
  Printer	
  for	
  
Alberta.	
  

Alberta	
  

2007.	
  Alberta	
  Health	
  and	
  Wellness.	
  Aligning	
  Health	
  Authority	
  
Accountability	
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Appendix D: Interview Questions
Health Care System Case Study: Interview Question Guide
The Interview process will combine standardized questions as well as unstructured
questions. This semi-structured approach is intended to allow for elaboration on
responses to standardized questions and to allow for interviewees to express opinions that
may not have been captured by the standardized questions. Standardized questions are
number, while possible probes are listed in the bullet points below each question. Not all
standard questions may be applicable to each interviewee or may be superseded by
answers to previous questions.
Interview Topic Areas:
•

What it means to be accountable and the role of the non-governmental organization,
government, and society in ensuring accountability

•

The nature of the accountability relationship between the non-governmental
organization and government

•

The nature of the accountability relationship between the non-governmental
organization and society.

Interview Script
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. The focus of the research project is on how
organizations that have been given the authority to make policy decisions, but sit outside
the structure of traditional government are held accountable. The questions that I will be
asking you today deal with your perception of the accountability of <organization name>.
Before we get started, do you have any questions for me?
Are you okay with me recording our conversation?
In cases where either the role of the organization or individual is not know one or both of
the following questions may be asked prior to proceeding with the standardized questions
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6. In what capacity are or were you would you describe the role of your organization
within the health care system?
7. How would you describe the part you play or played in helping your organization
fulfill its role?
Section 1: Accountability (as defined by the interviewee)
1.1

The focus of this research is to gain an understanding of how organizations like

the <organization name> are held accountable. As accountability can mean different
things to different people I would like to start with how you would define or describe
accountability.
•
1.2

What do you think it means for <organization name> to be accountable?
Based on your definition of accountability, to whom do you feel <organization

name> is most accountable to?
•

How do you feel <organization name> is held accountable by <insert
response>?

•

1.3

Are there specific accountability requirements that must be met?
•

What are they?

•

How effective do you feel them to be?

Whose interests do you feel the decisions of <organization name> most represent?
•

How do you feel <organization name> is held accountable by <insert
response>?

•

Are there specific accountability requirements that must be met?
•

What are they?

•

How effective do you feel them to be?
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If the provincial government is not mentioned then ask question 1.4.
1.4

How would you describe the accountability relationship between <organization

name> and government?
If the general public not mentioned then ask question 1.5.
1.5

How would you describe the accountability relationship between <organization

name> and members of the public?
Section 2: Accountability (as defined by Mark Bovens)
One way to look at accountability is to break it down into three components:
1) The obligation the organization to explain and justify action
2) The ability of those outside the organization to question and pass judgment
3) The ability for those outside the organization to impose sanctions
For each of the three aspects of accountability I am interested in your perception of the
relationship between the < organization name > and both government and society.
To start lets focus on the accountability relationship with government.
2.1

To what extent do you feel that the <organization name> has an obligation to

explain and justify its actions to government?
•

How successful do you believe the <organization name> has been at explaining
and justifying its actions?

•

What more if anything could or should be done to make <organization name>
explain and justify its actions?
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2.2

To what extent do you feel the provincial government is able to question and pass

judgment on the decisions and actions of <organization name>?
•

How successful do you believe the provincial government has been at asking
questions and passing judgment in relation to the actions of <organization
name>?

•

What more if anything could or should be done to allow for the province to
question the <organization name> and pass judgment.

2.3

To what extend do you believe the provincial government is able to sanction

<organization name> for actions that it does not approve of?
•

When, or if, required, how successful has the provincial government been at
sanctioning <organization name>?

•

What more if anything could or should be done to allow the provincial
government to sanction <organization name> more effectively?

Now lets focus on the accountability relationship with society.
2.4

To what extent do you feel that the <organization name> has an obligation to

explain and justify its actions to society?
•

How successful do you believe the <organization name> has been at explaining
and justifying its actions?

•

What more if anything could or should be done to make <organization name>
explain and justify its actions?
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2.5

To what extent do you feel society is able to question and pass judgment on the

decisions and actions of <organization name>?
•

How successful do you believe society has been at asking questions and passing
judgment in relation to the actions of <organization name>?

•

What more if anything could or should be done to allow for society to question
the <organization name> and pass judgment.

2.6

To what extend do you believe society is able to sanction <organization name>

for actions that it does not approve of?
•

When, or if, required, how successful has society been at sanctioning
<organization name>?

•

What more if anything could or should be done to allow society to sanction
<organization name> more effectively?

Section 3: Alberta Only
Alberta moved multiple regional authorities to one single organization. I am interested in
what, if any, impact this change has had in your view on the accountability relationships
for both government and society.
3.1

From your perspective, what impact has the shift from regional authorities to a

single provincial health board had on the ability to hold decision-makers accountable?
Wrap up
Is there anything else you would like to add in regard to <organization name> how it is
accountable for its decisions?
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Appendix E: Introductory E-mail Script
Dear ____________________,
I am a Doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at The University of
Western Ontario working under the supervision of Dr. Cameron Anderson.
The purpose of this e-mail is to invite you to participate in a research study that looks to
better understand how organizations external to the traditional structure of government
that have been delegated the authority to make public policy decisions are held
accountable.
Case studies across four provinces have been selected for study including insert their
specific organization name here. You are being contacted because of your role as insert
their role here. For each case I would like to interview people from the organization
being studied, the public service, elected officials and interest groups. All interviews are
confidential and no information that discloses the identity of the interviewee will be
released or published without their specific consent.
Participation would entail an interview of no longer than one hour in length that would
cover the following topic areas:
1. The function or purpose of the organization and the role government and society play
in the organization fulfilling that purpose
2. What it means to be accountable and the role of the organization, government, and
society in ensuring accountability
3. The nature of the accountability relationship between the organization and
government
4. The nature of the accountability relationship between the organization and society
Thank you for considering this request. I look forward to hearing from you.
Robert
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Appendix F: Interview Consent Form
1

Research Consent Form
Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making
in Multi-level Governance

Title of Research:

Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making in Multi-level
Governance

Investigator:

Robert W. Waterman

Supervisor:

Dr Cameron D. Anderson

Introduction:
I am a Doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at The University of Western
Ontario working under the supervision of Dr. Cameron Anderson.
You are being invited to participate in a research study that looks at the accountability of nongovernmental organizations that have been authorized or created by government to make public
policy decisions. The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information you require to
make an informed decision on participating in this research.
Purpose of Research and Interviews:
The purpose of the research project is to better understand how organizations external to the
traditional structure of government that have been delegated the authority to make public policy
decisions are held accountable. In addressing this question the project includes four case
studies selected across four provinces. Each case study includes interviews used to obtain the
insights of individuals within the non-governmental organization, government, and society.
Interview Procedure and Questions:
Interviews will last a maximum of 1 hour. Interviews will be completed over the phone, with the
interviewer calling you at the number specified by you, or over the internet through Skype or an
alternative software package. With your permission an audio recording of the interview will be
made. Declining to have an audio recording of your interview created does not disqualify you
from participation in the study.
The interview process is divided into 5 topic areas: 1) How you associated with the organization;
2) The function or purpose of the organization and the role government and society play in the
organization fulfilling that purpose; 3) What it means to be accountable and the role of the
organization, government, and society in ensuring accountability; 4) The nature of the
accountability relationship between the organization and government; and 5) The nature of the
accountability relationship between the organization and society.

Participants Initials:
The University of Western Ontario
Faculty of Social Science • Department of Political Science
Room 4154, Social Science Centre • London, Ontario • CANADA – N6A 5C2
Telephone: 519-661-3266 • Fax: 519-661-3904 • www.uwo.ca
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2

Research Consent Form
Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making
in Multi-level Governance
After the interview has been completed you will be given the opportunity to review the material
collected. At your request a copy of the material transcribed from your interview and review of
available audio recordings will be provided. You will have the opportunity to provide corrections
or clarifications to the information, as well as the opportunity to withdraw from the study at this
time.
Participants interviewed as society representatives must have no previous employment with
either the non-governmental organization or government.
Possible Risks and Benefits:
The risks of the proposed research are minimal. You may feel some psychological or emotional
discomfort answering questions about the organization’s level of accountability if you have
concerns over how the organization or those working for or with the organization will be
perceived.
The direct benefit to you, as a participant, is the opportunity to put forward your view of the
accountability of non-governmental decision-makers. Broader benefits to society include
developing an understanding of the use of non-governmental actors in public decision-making
and how such actors are held accountable.
Withdrawing From the Study or Omitting Certain Questions:
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any
question or withdraw from the study at any time. You have the right to be given important
information about the study and what will be asked of you. You should only agree to take part if
you feel confident that enough information has been given. Participation is voluntary; you do not
have to take part in the study if you do not want to.
Confidentiality and Storage of Personal Records
You do not waive any legal rights by signing the consent form. Your confidentiality will be
respected. No information that discloses your identity will be released or published without your
specific consent to the disclosure. It is importing to note, however, that due to the small sample
size and the inclusion of organization names, speculation on the identity of participants may
occur and it may be possible for individual participants to be identified. If you are not comfortable
with this possibility then you should not participate.
Your research records will be encrypted and stored digitally. Copies of the encrypted audio
recording and associated transcripts will be stored on the investigator’s personal computer,
backup device, and CD. Audio recordings will be destroyed 5 years after the completion of the
research. Transcripts of your interview will be kept indefinitely.
Participants Initials:
The University of Western Ontario
Faculty of Social Science • Department of Political Science
Room 4154, Social Science Centre • London, Ontario • CANADA – N6A 5C2
Telephone: 519-661-3266 • Fax: 519-661-3904 • www.uwo.ca
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4

Research Consent Form
Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making
in Multi-level Governance

Title of Research:

Accountability and Non-governmental Decision Making in Multi-level
Governance

I consent to having an audio recording of my interview created:

Accept

Decline

I have read the Letter of Information (or Information/Consent document), have had the nature of
the study explained to me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my
satisfaction.

Name of Participant (Printed)

Contact Phone Number or Skype Address of
Participant

Signature of Participant

Date

Signature of Investigator Reviewing

Date

Research Consent Form

Participants Initials:
The University of Western Ontario
Faculty of Social Science • Department of Political Science
Room 4154, Social Science Centre • London, Ontario • CANADA – N6A 5C2
Telephone: 519-661-3266 • Fax: 519-661-3904 • www.uwo.ca
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Appendix G: Performance Measures Reporting Example (From AHS Annual
Report 2013-1014)
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